DRAPER v. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MAINE DEPT et al

Filing 15

ORDER Affirming in part and Rejecting in part Report and Recommendations re 8 Report and Recommendations for 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by MARY MAYHEW, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MAINE DEPT. By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (jlg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
SUE ANN DRAPER
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MAINE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.

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2:13-cv-00028-JAW

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART THE
RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Sue Ann Draper is a woman with a hearing disability who communicates in
American Sign Language and requires an interpreter to effectively communicate.
Ms. Draper claims that the state of Maine Department of Health and Human
Services (MDHHS) discriminated against her because of her disability when she
visited MDHHS offices to obtain state services, in violation of state and federal
statutory law. The Defendants move to dismiss all counts, arguing that Ms. Draper
failed to state a claim and as to one count that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes
the State. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court grant the Motion to
Dismiss as to all counts against Commissioner Mary Mayhew and as to Counts II
and III against the remaining Defendants but otherwise deny the motion. The
Court accepts in part and rejects in part the recommended decision of the

Magistrate Judge, denying in part and sustaining in part the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
The Complaint alleges that Sue Ann Draper is a deaf individual who requires

an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter for effective communication. Compl.
¶ 7 (ECF No. 2-1). This disability is a “physical disability” within the meaning of
the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551 et seq. (2013), and a
“physical impairment” that substantially limits a major life activity within the
meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132 et seq.
(2012), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794
(2012).2 Compl. ¶ 8. The Defendants are MDHHS and Mary Mayhew in her official
capacity as Commissioner of MDHHS. Id. ¶ 3.
Ms. Draper meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services from or the participation in programs provided by MDHHS, and has
received services from MDHHS for “several years.” Id. ¶¶ 9-10. To receive services,
Ms. Draper must meet with MDHHS representatives on a regular basis. Id. ¶ 11.
On March 10, 2010, Ms. Draper had an appointment to meet with an employee of
MDHHS, for which she had requested the presence of an ASL interpreter and had
verified with MDHHS that an interpreter would be present.

Id. ¶¶ 12-14.

For the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss, this Court assumes all the well-pleaded
factual allegations in the complaint to be true. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555
(2007).
2
“Section 504” refers to the relevant portion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)). The pleadings refer variously to “The Rehabilitation
Act” and “Section 504.”
1

2

However, before the meeting MDHHS cancelled the interpreter, and so none was
available to assist Ms. Draper. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. A similar scenario occurred on April
21, 2010; Ms. Draper made an appointment, requested an ASL interpreter, and
arrived to find that MDHHS had cancelled the interpreter. Id. ¶¶ 21-24. On April
15, 2010, Ms. Draper made an unscheduled visit to her local MDHHS office to
request emergency assistance to remain in her home, but no ASL interpreter was
available.

Id. ¶¶ 17-18.

Finally, on May 5, 2010 Ms. Draper had made an

appointment with MDHHS and requested an ASL interpreter, but the interpreter
failed to appear—although this was apparently not caused by a cancellation by
MDHHS. Id. ¶¶ 25-27.
MDHHS has a policy of providing a telephone interpreter to help serve people
with limited English proficiency. Id. ¶ 20. A similar service, called Video Remote
Interpreting (VRI), is available to provide remote ASL interpretation, but MDHHS
has made a policy choice not to provide VRI. Id. ¶ 19. At each visit and also
immediately before filing this lawsuit, Ms. Draper requested that MDHHS provide
VRI for her, but consistent with its policy, MDHHS refused.

Id. ¶ 28-30.

Ms.

Draper alleges that MDHHS’s failure to provide either an interpreter or VRI caused
her pecuniary losses, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Id. ¶ 31.
This lawsuit followed. Ms. Draper complains that the Defendants violated
section 4592 of the MHRA (Count I), § 12132 of the ADA (Count II), and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (Count III). The Defendants moved to dismiss all three counts
for failure to state a claim under any of the statutes, and in the alternate to dismiss

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Count II as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 4).
In support of their Eleventh Amendment argument, the Defendants requested the
Court take judicial notice of a new Language Access Policy posted on its public
website, intended to ensure that “the Department . . . carries out its services in a
non-discriminatory manner.” Id. at 11 & n.4. The United States Magistrate Judge
filed a Recommended Decision with the Court on April 26, 2013, recommending
dismissal of all counts except Count I as to MDHHS. Recommended Decision on
Mot. to Dismiss at 10 (ECF No. 8) (Rec. Dec.).
Ms. Draper urges that the counts against the Commissioner should not be
dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment because the Commissioner falls into the
Ex parte Young exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Furthermore, she
maintains that sovereign immunity is also not available to MDHHS because
Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity as to Title II of the ADA.
Finally, as to Count III alone, Ms. Draper asserts that the state has waived
sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act.
Defendants, for their part, press their Eleventh Amendment defense as to Count II.
They also argue for dismissal of Count III on the merits, arguing that Ms. Draper
failed to allege that she was denied access to any services or programs when
MDHHS failed to have an interpreter on hand or to provide VRI.

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II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

A district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made” when a party objects to the recommendation of a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) (2012).
B.

Count I

The Magistrate Judge correctly noted that Ms. Draper presented no objection
to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count I as to Commissioner Mayhew. Rec.
Dec. at 4.

Ms. Draper likewise made no objection to this conclusion in the

Recommended Decision. Pl.’s Objection at 1-10.

In the absence of objection and

having reviewed the merits of the motion, the Court will dismiss Count I as to the
Commissioner.

In the opposite vein, the Defendants have not objected to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Count I survives dismissal as to MDHHS
to the extent Ms. Draper is seeking relief other than compensatory damages.

The

Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.
C.

Count II

Count II alleges a violation of § 12132 of the ADA. Specifically, Ms. Draper
argues that the Defendants violated § 12132 by failing to provide her with
interpreters or VRI.

Consequently, she argues, MDHHS excluded her from

participation in the benefit of the services it provides, and also subjected her to
discrimination because of her disability.

The Defendants assert both that Ms.

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Draper failed to state a claim under the ADA and also that, even if the claim has
merit, the Eleventh Amendment bars it. The Court disagrees with the Magistrate
Judge’s analysis and recommendation that Count II be dismissed.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to deprive the
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over suits by any citizen against any
state. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). This immunity
extends to agencies under state control. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). It also applies to state officials sued in their
official capacity, except when the suit seeks to enjoin continuing violations of the
federal Constitution. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). “In determining
whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit,
a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002).
1.

Commissioner Mayhew

The Defendants assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to Count II.
Def’s Mot. to Dismiss at 9. Technically the Eleventh Amendment defense goes to
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. However, consistent with “the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance,” before reaching the Eleventh Amendment defense, the
Court must first analyze the merits of the underlying claim; if it fails, the Court
need not and should not consider the Eleventh Amendment. Buchanan v. Maine,

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469 F.3d 158, 172-73 (1st Cir. 2006) (Buchanan II). As the First Circuit wrote in
Buchanan II, “[u]nder [United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006)], the court
must determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, which aspects of the
State’s alleged conduct violated [the ADA]. If the State’s conduct does not violate
[the ADA], the court does not proceed to the next step in the analysis. The claim
ends.” Id. at 172-73.
On the merits of Count II, Ms. Draper has alleged facts sufficient to state a
“failure to accommodate” claim under ADA § 12132. In this respect, the Magistrate
Judge properly analyzed the merits of Count II with respect to MDHHS. Rec. Dec.
at 7-8. To state disability discrimination claims under the ADA, a plaintiff must
establish
(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was
either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some
public entity's services, programs, or activities or was otherwise
discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits,
or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability.
Parker v. Universidad de P.R., 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). Even assuming, as
MDHHS claims, that failing to provide a disabled person with the accommodation of
her choice is not by itself unlawful discrimination, MDHHS’s failure to provide VRI
when Ms. Draper requested it is not the only leg of her ADA claim. She also alleges
that MDHHS discriminates against people with hearing impairment (including
herself) through its policy choice to provide on-demand translation to people who
communicate in spoken language while denying it to people who must communicate
in visual language. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 30. In other words, paragraphs 20 and 30 allege
that MDHHS has chosen not to provide translation services based on the specific
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disability of individuals with hearing impairments. See id. ¶¶ 20, 30. In statutory
terms, Ms. Draper alleges that this policy decision “otherwise discriminates”
against hearing impaired individuals based on their disability. Ms. Draper’s other
factual allegations are the source of her standing to bring this claim—injury in fact,
causation,

and

redressability—but

Ms.

Draper

states

a

facial

claim

of

discrimination in Count II of the Complaint and her allegations withstand
dismissal.
Having concluded that Count II survives dismissal on its merits, the Court
turns to the Eleventh Amendment defense. Buchanan II, 569 F.3d at 172-73. Ms.
Draper asserts that her case falls into the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh
Amendment; the Court agrees.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Count II should be dismissed as to
Commissioner Mayhew because the Complaint fails to allege any ongoing violation
of the federal Constitution that would implicate Ex parte Young. Rec. Dec. at 5-6.
However, the Complaint alleges that MDHHS has a policy to provide telephonic
interpretation to people who require spoken-language interpretation but refuses to
provide an analogous service to people requiring ASL interpretation. Compl. ¶¶ 20,
30. This alleged difference in treatment of a class of people based on disability
could violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
therefore states a claim under ADA § 12132. See Buchanan v. Maine, 377 F. Supp.
2d 276, 283 (D. Me. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 469 F.3d 158 (1st Cir. 2006)
(Buchanan I) (stating that, although Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate

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state sovereign immunity, disability discrimination nonetheless could be considered
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause subject to rational basis review).
Ms. Draper has also requested prospective relief that addresses the substance
of the alleged constitutional violation. Rec. Dec. at 6. She requests an injunction
that requires the Defendants “to adopt and implement policies and procedures to
ensure that Defendants carr[y] our [their] services in a nondiscriminatory manner.”
Compl. at 7. The Court takes judicial notice of the new MDHHS Language Access
Policy (Policy). See Chmielinski v. Mass. Office of the Comm’r of Prob., 513 F.3d
309, 312 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008) (“In reviewing a rule 12(b)(6) motion, [a court] may
consider ‘documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties . . .
documents central to plaintiffs’ claim; [and] documents sufficiently referred to in the
complaint’”) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)); Beddall v.
State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998).3
The Policy presents two stumbling blocks against dismissal. The first is that
the Policy does not render Ms. Draper’s claim for relief any less prospective. The
gist of the Defendants’ argument seems to be that the Policy makes Ms. Draper’s
request “moot,” a reference by analogy to the law of standing. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
at 11. However, “a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not
deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). Here, the fact that

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Ms. Draper has not objected to the Court’s consideration of the terms of the MDHHS Policy.

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MDHHS issued a new policy does not guarantee for the purpose of determining
jurisdiction that it will not revert to its old practice.4
At the same time, the Court is chary about concluding that having attained
dismissal of this lawsuit by adopting a new policy, MDHHS officials would cynically
reinstate the old policy once the lawsuit was dismissed. As the First Circuit has
explained, “[t]he [voluntary cessation] exception, to be invoked, also requires some
reasonable expectation of recurrences of the challenged conduct.” ACLU of Mass. v.
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2013). In ACLU, the
First Circuit gave “some weight” to the fact that “the defendants are high-ranking
federal officials, including a cabinet member, who have, as a matter of policy,
abandoned the prior practice and adopted a concededly constitutional requirement.”
Id. at 56. Guided by ACLU, this Court will not conclude that the state of Maine
officials at MDHHS, including a state cabinet officer, will abandon the new Policy in
favor of the old one once the lawsuit is over. The Defendants cleared one stumbling
block.
Another remains. In her objection, Ms. Draper questions the sufficiency of
the new Policy. Pl.’s Objection to Rec. Dec. at 4 (ECF No. 13). She emphasizes that
the Policy “has no information about the use of Video Remote Interpreting, although
it does contain information about telephone-based interpreting for individuals with
limited English interpreting.”

Id.

She also contends that the MDHHS should

demonstrate “trainings and written material regarding the use of Video Remote
MDHHS has not, for example, rendered this issue “moot” by entering into a consent decree
binding it to the terms of the Policy.
4

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Interpreting.” Id. Even though the Defendants respond that Ms. Draper is not
entitled to receive “the accommodation she most prefers,” Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s
Objection to Rec. Dec. at 4 (ECF No. 14), there remains a factual dispute as to
whether the Policy—which does not appear to require VRI—provides sufficient
accommodation to equalize the treatment of deaf persons.
Because Ms. Draper’s Complaint has made out the elements required to bring
the Commissioner within the Ex parte Young exception and there remain factual
issues concerning the application of the voluntary cessation exception to the
mootness doctrine, Count II may not be dismissed as to the Commissioner on
sovereign immunity grounds.
2.

MDHHS

First, the Count II claim against MDHHS survives dismissal on the merits
for the same reasons set forth above with respect to the Commissioner. Thus, the
Court must once again consider the Eleventh Amendment defense. Buchanan II,
469 F.3d at 172-73.
MDHHS is an agency of the state of Maine, and for Eleventh Amendment
purposes a suit against the agency is a suit against the state. P.R. Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 144.

The Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh

Amendment for suits against state officers in their official capacities does not
extend to suits against state agencies. Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 11
n.1 (1st Cir. 2011). However, under a narrow range of circumstances, Congress may
strip a state of sovereign immunity with respect to a statute enacted under § 5 of

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the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55-56. Title II of the ADA
purports to perform just such an abrogation with respect to violations of Title II. 42
U.S.C. § 12202 (2012).
The Supreme Court has defined a three step analysis to determine when the
Title II abrogation of sovereign immunity is effective:
[The court should determine,] on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which
aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what
extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of
sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.
Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159.
Here the conduct alleged to violate Title II is the facial discrimination by
MDHHS between people who require spoken-language translation and people who
require sign-language translation.

Such conduct might violate the Fourteenth

Amendment under rational basis review. See Buchanan I, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 283;
section II.C.1, supra.

However, this Court previously concluded that only

fundamental rights trigger sovereign immunity abrogation under Title II, and
disability is not such a right. Buchanan I, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
The First Circuit decision in Toledo v. Sanchez adds some weight to this
conclusion.

454 F.3d 24, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2006).

In Toledo, the First Circuit

determined that discrimination based on disability remains subject only to rational
basis review, and that it does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment for the
purpose of applying the second stage of the Georgia analysis.

Id. at 33 (“The

disabled are not a suspect class for equal protection purposes”); see also Pope v.

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Bernard, No. 10-1443, 2011 WL 478055, at *3 (1st Cir. Feb. 10, 2011) (reiterating
that disability discrimination remains subject only to rational basis review).
Likewise, the Supreme Court recently held that the provision of the Family Medical
Leave Act purporting to abrogate state sovereign immunity was not valid as applied
to the Act’s requirement that an employer grant employees a “self-care” leave of
absence. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332, 1335 (2012).
The Court reasoned that discrimination “on the basis of illness” was not sufficient to
support an abrogation of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1335. Although the Court
suggested that sex discrimination might be sufficient to support abrogation, it held
that the Act was “not congruent or proportional” to sex discrimination. Id. at 1335.
In sum, the Court cannot conclude that the alleged disability discrimination
here violates the Fourteenth Amendment for the purposes of abrogating sovereign
immunity.
Because application of the first two steps in Georgia leaves Ms. Draper
alleging conduct that only violates Title II, not the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court moves to the third step to determine if “Congress’s purported abrogation of
sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.” Georgia, 546
U.S. at 159.

However, this Court has already performed this same analysis in

Buchanan I and concluded that the Title II abrogation of sovereign immunity is not
valid for access to state mental health services.5 377 F. Supp. 2d at 279-83. Ms.

In Buchanan I, the Court noted that “the closest First Circuit case is Kiman v. New
Hampshire Dep’t of Corrections, [2001 WL 1636431 (D.N.H. Dec. 19, 2001)],” but Kiman was then on
appeal. Buchanan I, 377 F. Supp. 2d, at 282 n.8. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane, the
5

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Draper offers no compelling reason to abandon that reasoning, and the Court stands
by it.6
Although MDHHS’s alleged facial discrimination would violate ADA § 12132,
MDHHS may assert the Eleventh Amendment as a bar because the discrimination
does not violate a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
Congress has not validly abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity. To be clear,
this somewhat technical result does not mean that the law condones the
discrimination that Ms. Draper alleges; rather, it means that the proper remedy
against the State lies in the state statute, the MHRA, not the federal one, Title II of
the ADA.
3.

Conclusion as to Count II

Count II of the Complaint states a claim on which the law may grant relief.
Because Ex parte Young permits Ms. Draper to seek prospective relief against

First Circuit decided that the Kiman plaintiff’s claims might have merit under the first step of the
Georgia analysis and remanded the matter to the District Court for reconsideration both of the
merits and of the Eleventh Amendment bar. Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corrections, 451 F.3d 274, 28182 (1st Cir. 2006). On remand the District Court determined that the defendants had abandoned
their sovereign immunity defense and therefore did not reach the issue. Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of
Corrections, No. 01-cv-134-JD, 2007 WL 2247843, at *6 (D.N.H. Aug. 1, 2007). Consequently the
Kiman litigation did not produce any further guidance from the First Circuit on this issue.
6
Using this same logic, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “the area of professional licensing
does not implicate a traditional category of fundamental rights.” Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101,
1123 (10th Cir. 2012). By contrast, in Toledo, the First Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s
“decisions under the Equal Protection Clause suggest that states cannot categorically deny disabled
students access to public education,” that there was a record of “persistent unconstitutional state
action,” and Congress was “justified in enacting prophylactic § 5 legislation in response.” Toledo, 454
F.3d at 36-39. Thus, the disability claim in Toledo was tethered to another essential, though not
fundamental right—the right to a free public education. Id. at 33. Here, Ms. Draper claims that the
state of Maine denied her access to state services at MDHHS, services that are important but do not
rise to the level of the right to a free public education. See Guttman, 669 F.3d at 1124 n.4
(“Discrimination against students in public education is an exception that proves the rule”); see also
Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1335, 1337 (discounting the constitutional weight of discrimination “on the
basis of illness”).

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Commissioner Mayhew in her official capacity, Count II survives dismissal as
against the Commissioner.

However, Count II must be dismissed as against

MDHHS because the Department is immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment.
D.

Count III

Count III alleges a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

As the

Magistrate Judge observed, “with the exception of the Rehabilitation Act’s
requirement that the Defendant be a recipient of federal funds, see [Compl. ¶ 45],
cases interpreting the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are
interchangeable for analytical purposes.”

Rec. Dec. at 10 (citing Ward v. Mass.

Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 33 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000); DeCotiis v.
Whittemore, 842 F. Supp. 2d 354, 371 (D. Me. 2012)).
However, it follows that the Court cannot agree with the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to dismiss Count III “for the reasons stated [as to Count II].” Rec.
Dec. at 10. First, Count III survives as to Commissioner Mayhew for the same
reasons that Count II survives. Second, as to MDHHS, the Defendants did not
assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense against Count III. See Def.’s Mot to
Dismiss at 9-11 (asserting the Eleventh Amendment as a bar only to Count II). As
detailed above, the Count II claim would survive against MDHHS as well but for
sovereign immunity, and because the Defendants did not claim sovereign immunity
as a defense to Count III, Count III survives dismissal against both Defendants on
the merits.

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III.

CONCLUSION
The Court AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on Count I as

against all Defendants and on Count II as against MDHHS. The Court REJECTS
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on Count II as against Commissioner
Mayhew and on Count III as against all Defendants.
1. The Court DISMISSES Count I against Commissioner Mayhew;
2. The Court DISMISSES Count II against MDHHS; and
3. The Court DENIES the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 27th day of August, 2013

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