TELLERMAN v. MAINE VETERANS HOME INC et al

Filing 6

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER denying 3 Motion for TRO By JUDGE GEORGE Z. SINGAL. (lrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
RONNIE HALFACRE TELLERMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAINE VETERANS’ HOMES, INC., et
al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3).
Having reviewed the Motion as well as Plaintiff’s Complaint and all of the attached filings, the
Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Request for a Temporary Restraining Order.
To obtain injunctive relief, Plaintiff, as the moving party, bears the burden of persuasion
to show: “(1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm if the
injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to the nonmovant
if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if no injunction issues; and (4) the
effect (if any) of the court’s ruling on the public interest.” Iantosca v. Step Plan Servs., Inc., 604
F.3d 24, 29 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In considering a request for injunctive relief,
the Court must “bear constantly in mind that an ‘[i]njunction is an equitable remedy which
should not be lightly indulged in, but used sparingly and only in a clear and plain case.’” Saco
Def. Sys. Div., Maremont Corp. v. Weinberger, 606 F. Supp. 446, 450 (D. Me. 1985) (quoting
Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1230 (6th Cir.
1975)).
The Court readily concludes that Plaintiff’s filings do not support the injunctive relief she
seeks from this Court. First, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the only federal statute contained on the face of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, does not provide a basis for this federal court to have jurisdiction over the
apparent dispute between these parties. Although Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint also can be
generously read to suggest that the state court foreclosure proceedings somehow violated her

federal constitutional rights, the Complaint does not name any state actor as a defendant. In
short, it appears that the only possible basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case
would be the diversity of the parties. However, the Complaint alleges that both Plaintiff and
Defendants are citizens of Maine. As a result, the required complete diversity is lacking. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Therefore, the Court can see no basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims Plaintiff states against the two named Defendants.

Additionally, to the extent that

Plaintiff appears to be asking this Court to take actions that would interfere with ongoing
foreclosure and eviction proceedings in Maine state court, a federal court will likely be unable to
provide Plaintiff the relief she seeks due to various abstention doctrines. See, e.g., Colonial Life
& Acc. Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (“As a matter of comity, federal
courts are required to abstain from enjoining ongoing state court proceedings absent
extraordinary circumstances.”) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1971)); Jiminez v.
Rodriguez-Pagan, 597 F.3d 18, 27-32 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining and applying Colorado River
abstention). Ultimately, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of her claims. See Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.
2007) (noting that likelihood of success is the “most important part of the preliminary injunction
assessment”).
Therefore, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(ECF No. 3).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ George Z. Singal
United States District Judge
Dated this 10th day of April, 2014.