MARTIN v. BOULEVARD MOTEL CORP

Filing 61

ORDER denying 54 Motion in Limine to Exclude Circumstances Surrounding Terminations of Former Employees. By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (MFS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ABINAIR MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOULEVARD MOTEL CORP.,
Defendant.

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2:14-cv-00168-JAW

ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE
With trial looming in this Maine law anti-retaliation and whistleblower
protection claim, Boulevard Motel Corp. (Boulevard) filed a motion in limine to
exclude the testimony of two former employees, Brenda Pippin and Grace Parker.
Def.’s Mot. in Limine (ECF No. 54) (Def.’s Mot.). Ms. Martin objected. Pl.’s Opp’n to
Defs.’ Mot. in Limine to Exclude Circumstances Surrounding Terminations of Former
Employees (ECF No. 57) (Pl.’s Opp’n). Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker filed separate
lawsuits against Boulevard, alleging that it terminated them in violation of the state
anti-retaliation and whistleblower protection acts, both of which are now on appeal
to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Pippin v. Boulevard Motel Corp., No. 14-cv-167JAW; Parker v. Boulevard Motel Corp., No. 14-cv-169-JAW.
Boulevard worries that if Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker are allowed to testify
about their terminations, the Pippin and Parker cases will become a trial within a
trial and Boulevard would be forced to defend three lawsuits when only one is actually

being tried. Def.’s Mot. at 4-5. It is also concerned that such evidence would be
unfairly prejudicial, would confuse the issues, and would waste time. Id. at 1-6.
Ms. Martin is not worried. She contends that other acts evidence may be
admissible depending on “how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s case
and theory of the case.”

Pl.’s Opp’n at 5 (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v.

Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2004)).

Ms. Martin also cites Fairweather v.

Friendly’s Ice Cream, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-00111-JAW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645 (D.
Me. Jan. 23, 2015), in which this Court ruled in a disparate treatment case that
evidence of disparate treatment would be admissible. See Vélez v. Thermo King de
P.R., Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 451 (1st Cir. 2009) (“in order to be probative of discriminatory
animus, a claim of disparate treatment ‘must rest on proof that the proposed analogue
is similarly situated in material respects’”) (quoting Perkins v. Brigham & Women’s
Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 752 (1st Cir. 1996)).
Under Brady v. Cumberland County, 2015 ME 143, 126 A.3d 1145, a plaintiff
in a whistleblower retaliation claim must prove “three elements: (1) that the
employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the employer took adverse
employment action against the employee; and (3) that there was a causal connection
between the two.” Id. ¶ 32 (citing Walsh v. Town of Millinocket, 2011 ME 99, ¶ 24,
28 A.3d 610). Assuming the Maine Supreme Judicial Court would apply the same
analysis to a Maine Human Rights Act retaliation claim, the Plaintiff would bear
similar proof requirements. See Cote v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00347-JAW,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27736, at *46-48 (D. Me. Mar. 2, 2016). Under either theory,

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the Plaintiff must prove causation between her exercise of allegedly protected activity
and the adverse employment action. If the Plaintiff is able to establish that within
the same period of time that it terminated Ms. Martin, Boulevard took adverse
employment actions against similarly situated employees, this evidence would be
probative of Boulevard’s discriminatory intent. See Vélez, 585 F.3d at 451.
That said, the Court is sensitive to Boulevard’s concern that it be required to
defend only Ms. Martin’s case. As in Fairweather, the Court “will monitor this
evidence as it is being presented to balance its probative value against the danger of
‘unfair prejudice, confusing the issues . . . undue delay, [and] wasting time.’”
Fairweather, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645, at *5-6 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).
Boulevard’s worry is mitigated here because the parties waived the right to jury trial
and the case will be heard by the Court, thereby lessening the potential that the
factfinder will be improperly influenced by cumulative or unfairly prejudicial
evidence. It is also mitigated by the fact that Ms. Martin represented that she intends
to call both Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker as witnesses at trial to testify about their
personal knowledge of events surrounding Ms. Martin’s claim and, therefore, each
witness will presumably testify during the upcoming trial in any event. Pl.’s Opp’n
at 3. The Court concludes that it would be inappropriate at this pretrial stage to rule
the proposed analogue testimony of Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker wholly inadmissible.
The Court DENIES Defendant Boulevard Motel Inc.’s Motion in Limine (ECF
No. 54).

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SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 10th day of March, 2016

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