ADKINS v. ATRIA SENIOR LIVING

Filing 16

ORDER on Oral Argument. By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (MFS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
KIMBERLY ADKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ATRIA SENIOR LIVING, INC.,
Defendant.

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2:14-cv-00186-JAW

ORDER ON ORAL ARGUMENT
On April 30, 2014, Kimberly Adkins filed a complaint in this Court, containing
two counts: (1) sex-based discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act
(MHRA), and (2) retaliation under the Maine Human Rights Act. Pl.’s Compl. for
Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation (ECF No. 1). On June 23, 2014, Ms.
Adkins filed an amended complaint, containing five counts, including the two original
counts and adding (3) discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), (4) retaliation under Title VII, and (5) per se slander. Pl.’s Am. Compl. for
Discrimination and Retaliation (ECF No. 4). On July 11, 2014, Ms. Adkins filed a
second amended complaint.

Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. for Discrimination and

Retaliation (ECF No. 7) (Am. Compl.). On September 30, 2014, Atria Senior Living,
Inc. (Atria) filed a motion to dismiss. Mot. of Def. Atria Senior Living, Inc. to Dismiss
Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. (ECF No. 13) (Def.’s Mot.). Ms. Adkins responded on October
21, 2014. Pl.’s Mem. of Law In Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) (Pl.’s

Opp’n). Atria replied on November 4, 2014. Def.’s Atria Senior Living Inc.’s Reply to
Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15) (Def.’s Reply).
Having reviewed the memoranda, the Court has determined that oral
argument is necessary. In anticipation of oral argument, the Court has determined
that there are certain legal issues not fully addressed in the current memoranda and
the Court orders the parties to file memoranda on the following issues, all of which
involve the timeliness of her MHRA claims:
I.

THE TIMELINESS OF MS. ADKINS’ MHRA CLAIMS
The applicable provisions of the MHRA require that an action must be

commenced not more than either 2 years after the act of unlawful discrimination
complained of or 90 days after the Maine Human Rights Commission (MHRC)
dismissed Ms. Adkins’s claim. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4613(2)(C), 4622(1)(A).
As the Court understands the parties’ positions, there is no dispute that Ms.
Adkins missed both deadlines. She filed her first complaint in this Court on April 30,
2014 and she was terminated from employment on March 12, 2012. She therefore
missed the two-year deadline. The MHRC issued its statement of finding on January
28, 2014 and April 30, 2014 is 92 days after January 28, 2014. She therefore missed
the 90-day deadline by two days. The parties dispute whether Ms. Adkins’s MHRA
claims should be dismissed as untimely because she filed her initial complaint 92
days after the MHRC issued its letter; Ms. Adkins has requested equitable tolling
relief.

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With this background, the Court observes that although Ms. Adkins claims it
would be inequitable to require her to have filed her MHRA complaint while her claim
was pending before the EEOC, the Court agrees with the Defendant that Ms. Adkins
has cited nothing to support her equity claim. In the circumstances of this case,
where the time limit was narrowly missed and there was a pending EEOC claim, the
Court is concerned that it would be inequitable to decide that there is no equitable
relief without giving the parties, particularly the Plaintiff, a further opportunity to
address the question of tolling.
To this end, the Court would benefit from a more detailed explanation from the
parties, particularly the Plaintiff, as to the following:
1.

Ms. Adkins failed to file an initial complaint within the 90-day deadline.

She has not explained why she did not file an initial complaint under the MHRA and
then file an amended complaint once the EEOC issued its letter. Do counsel have
any authority on this issue?
2.

Under Maine law, is equitable tolling available to Ms. Adkins on her

MHRA claims? The Law Court has distinguished equitable tolling from another
doctrine, equitable estoppel, stating that:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is distinct from the doctrine of
equitable tolling. In cases of equitable estoppel, the statute of
limitations has expired and the defendant asserts the running of the
statute of limitations as a defense. The defendant, however, is estopped
from benefitting from the statute of limitations as a defense because the
defendant has acted in such a way as to cause the claimant to forego
filing a timely cause of action. In contrast, in cases involving the
doctrine of equitable tolling, the defendant does not have the statute of
limitations as a valid defense because it has not yet run. Rather, the

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statute of limitations is tolled when strict application of the statute of
limitations would be inequitable.
Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 995 n.2 (Me. 1995) (internal citations
omitted). Here, the statute of limitations expired before Ms. Adkins filed her
complaint. Does that make equitable tolling unavailable to her? Additionally,
has Ms. Adkins made any allegations that would entitle her to relief under the
equitable estoppel doctrine?
3.

On what specific legal grounds should the Court grant or deny Ms.

Adkins’s request for equitable tolling relief?
a.

To the extent that Maine employment law generally tracks Title

VII law, may the Court apply federal law and equitably toll the MHRA
filing deadline? The Law Court has not said that the MHRA is subject
to equitable tolling, but Maine law generally tracks federal law. Under
federal law, the EEOC filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling. See
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982); 29 C.F.R. §
1614.604(c).

Title VII and the MHRA differ slightly in this area,

however. Title VII has only one deadline, which is the deadline to file a
charge of discrimination either 180 or 300 days after the cause of action
accrues.

In contrast, the MHRA filing deadline is the later of two

deadlines: one deadline for filing a complaint with the MHRC after the
cause of action accrues, and a second deadline for filing suit after the
MHRC rules on an employee’s charge. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4613(2)(C),
4622(1)(A). How does this difference weigh into the analysis of tolling
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the second MHRA deadline using federal equitable tolling principles?
Could the Court toll the first filing deadline instead?
b.

Do any other grounds for equitable tolling exist in this case?

The Court orders seriatim briefing on the above issues. The Court will set oral
argument at a time mutually convenient to the Court and the parties. Once the date
for oral argument is set, the Plaintiff is to file additional briefing no later than two
weeks before oral argument and the Defendant is to respond no later than one week
before oral argument.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 28th day of April, 2015

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