OCONNOR et al v. OAKHURST DAIRY et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON SCHEDULING re: denying 24 Motion for Order; granting in part and denying in part 25 Motion for Order; granting 28 Motion to Extend Time By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN H. RICH III. (mjlt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
CHRISTOPHER O’CONNOR, et al.,

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Plaintiffs
v.
OAKHURST DAIRY and DAIRY
FARMERS OF AMERICA, INC.,
Defendants

No. 2:14-cv-192-NT

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON SCHEDULING

In accordance with the terms of my Report of Hearing and Order re: Scheduling (ECF No.
22), the parties have submitted memoranda, docketed as cross-motions, addressing the issues upon
which the defendants seek limited, phased discovery in order to bring an early motion for summary
judgment and the plaintiffs’ request for specific and immediate class-related discovery that they
contend is necessary for them to address those issues. ECF Nos. 24 & 25.1 Treating the matter as
a motion by the defendants for limited, phased discovery, I deny the motion. Also at issue is the
defendants’ motion to extend the time to respond to the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional class
certification (ECF No. 26). ECF No. 28. That motion is granted.
I.

Background

The complaint sets out a putative class and collective action by former and current delivery
drivers seeking to recover allegedly unpaid minimum wage and overtime compensation. First

In their Joint Objection to Scheduling Order (ECF No. 18), the parties “jointly request[ed] that the discovery in this
matter be phased and the deadline to complete Phase I Discovery be set at January 19, 201[5],” id., but their
subsequently-submitted memoranda evince a marked disagreement between them as to what “Phase I Discovery”
should be.
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Amended Class and Collective Action Complaint (ECF No. 17) at 1. The defendants propose
moving for early summary judgment based on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims are
preempted by the federal Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”) and the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”) and that the plaintiffs are exempt from the overtime
requirements of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Defendants’ Memorandum
Regarding the Legal Bases for Their Anticipated Dispositive Motion(s) and Related Discovery
Issues (“Defendants’ Memorandum”) (ECF No. 24) at 2-3.
The plaintiffs contend that the court should not entertain an early dispositive motion on
these defenses because they will require “significant discovery, during which time the statute of
limitations is not tolled2 as to the overtime claims of the putative class members.” Plaintiffs’
Response to Defendants’ Memorandum Regarding the Legal Bases for Their Anticipated
Dispositive Motion(s) and Related Discovery Issues (“Plaintiffs’ Memorandum”) (ECF No. 25) at
1. They also assert that the defendants’ arguments on the issues that they have identified are not
likely to succeed. Id. at 5-9.
II.

Discussion

The usual sequence of events in a class-action or collective-action case in this court
involves, after the court issues a scheduling order, a motion to certify the proposed class
conditionally, ongoing filing of consents to join the collective action, discovery on all issues, and
occasionally a motion to decertify the class; all interspersed with motions to dismiss and discovery
disputes, before the filing of dispositive motions. A motion for conditional certification of the
proposed collective action has already been filed by the plaintiffs in this case. ECF No. 26.

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The plaintiffs have not specified the length of the applicable limitations period and when it began to run.

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The defendants’ submissions do not establish beyond question that their anticipated motion
for summary judgment will necessarily succeed. If it does not, there will have been a significant
delay in the progress of the action. On the other hand, if, as the defendants assert, the dispositive
issues that they intend to raise “are legal in nature” and “require little, or no, fact discovery[,]”
Defendants’ Memorandum at 2, then they may file notice of their intent to file such a dispositive
motion, pursuant to Local Rule 56(h), without waiting for the close of the discovery period, and
the case will proceed as would any other case in which an early motion for summary judgment is
filed. The dispositive motion deadline, after all, does not prohibit any party from filing such a
motion at any time before that date, even if waiting until the close of discovery is generally the
better practice. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
The defendants concede that “they will be asking for a good faith extension of the law”
with respect to their argument that Maine’s minimum wage and overtime laws are preempted by
the federal Motor Carrier Act. Id. at 3. As the plaintiffs point out, Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 56, existing precedent largely rejects the defendants’ position. See, e.g., Keeley v. Loomis Fargo &
Co., 11 F.Supp.2d 517, 520-21 (D.N.J. 1998) (“[E]very Circuit that has considered the issue has
held that states may require employers to pay overtime wages to employees who are subject to the
Motor Carrier Act and thus exempt under § 13(b)(1) of the FLSA.”). And, with respect to the
FAAAA, the First Circuit has observed fairly recently in a case in which the employer argued that
state law was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, that “the Supreme Court would be
unlikely . . . to free airlines [the employer in that case] . . . from prevailing wage laws . . . applicable
to other businesses.” DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 87 (1st Cir. 2011). See also
Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2014) (FAAAA does not preempt

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state meal and rest break laws applicable to delivery truck drivers); Martins v. 3PD, Inc., Civil
Action No. 11-11313-DPW, 2013 WL 1320454, at *12-*13 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2013) (same).
In addition, with respect to the defendants’ other specified basis for a dispositive motion,
that “some of the Plaintiffs are, or were, exempt under the FLSA’s Outside Sales exemption,”
Defendants’ Memorandum at 5 (emphasis added), by the very terms used by the defendants, if
successful, such an argument would not be dispositive of the claims of all of the plaintiffs, and
thus not dispositive of the action, negating any advantage to be gained from preventing discovery
until the court rules on the motion.
As to the plaintiffs’ request for immediate, class-related discovery opposed by the
defendants, I decline the plaintiffs’ request that the defendants “should be ordered to provide
Plaintiffs forthwith with information identifying all putative class members, including their names,
last known addresses, and last known telephone numbers.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 1-2.
Counsel for both sides should attempt to resolve this request by engaging in a good faith effort to
do so. See Local Rule 26(b). If they cannot do so, after a good faith effort, they may return to the
court with a request for specific relief in this regard. Id.
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for limited discovery and an early
dispositive motion deadline is DENIED. The defendants’ motion for an extension of time to
respond to the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification is GRANTED; the defendants shall
file their response to that motion within 21 days hereof.
The clerk is directed to schedule a telephonic scheduling conference of counsel as soon as
possible to discuss resetting pretrial deadlines in light of this Memorandum Decision.

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NOTICE
In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a party may serve and file an
objection to this order within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to review by the
district court and to any further appeal of this order.

Dated this 17th day of December, 2014.
/s/ John H. Rich III
John H. Rich III
United States Magistrate Judge

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