PROULX v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION re 9 Social Security Statement of Errors/Fact Sheet. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN H. RICH III. (jlg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JESSICA LYNN PROULX,
Plaintiff
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant
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No. 2:14-cv-355-JHR
MEMORANDUM DECISION1
In this Social Security Disability (“SSD”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
appeal, the plaintiff contends that the administrative law judge improperly interpreted raw medical
evidence and wrongly analyzed the opinion of a treating source. I affirm the commissioner’s
decision.
In accordance with the commissioner’s sequential evaluation process, 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920; Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.
1982), the administrative law judge found, in relevant part, that the plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act for purposes of SSD only through June 30, 2010, Finding
1, Record at 19; that she suffered from bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, history of
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This action is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The defendant has admitted that the
plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies. The case is presented as a request for judicial review by this court
pursuant to Local Rule 16.3(a)(2), which requires the plaintiff to file an itemized statement of the specific errors upon
which she seeks reversal of the commissioner’s decision and to complete and file a fact sheet available at the Clerk’s
Office, and the commissioner to file a written opposition to the itemized statement. Oral argument was held before
me on June 12, 2015, pursuant to Local Rule 16.3(a)(2)(D), requiring the parties to set forth at oral argument their
respective positions with citations to relevant statutes, regulations, case authority, and page references to the
administrative record. The parties have consented to have me conduct all proceedings in this mater, including the
entry of judgment. ECF No. 12.
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lumbar disc surgery, history of right arm fracture, and right ankle fracture, impairments that were
severe, but which, considered separately or in combination, did not meet or medically equal the
criteria of any impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P (the “Listings”),
Findings 3-4, id. at 20; that she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work,
except that she could occasionally climb stairs, must avoid ladders and working at heights, must
avoid operating dangerous machinery, and could perform simple, routine jobs that did not involve
public contact or more than occasional contact with coworkers, Finding 5, id. at 22; that she was
unable to perform her past relevant work, Finding 6, id. at 26; that, given her age (32 on the
amended alleged date of onset of disability, December 31, 2006), at least high school education,
work experience, and RFC, and using the Medical-Vocational Rules in Appendix 2 to 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P (the “Grid”) as a framework for decision-making, there were jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform, Findings 7-10, id.; and that,
therefore, she had not been under a disability, as that term is defined in the Social Security Act, at
any time from the alleged date of onset through the date of the decision, June 11, 2013, Finding
11, id. at 28. The Appeals Council declined to review the decision, id. at 1-3, making it the final
determination of the commissioner, 20 C.F.R. §§404.981, 416.1481; Dupuis v. Secretary of Health
& Human Servs., 869 F.2d 622, 623 (1st Cir. 1989).
The standard of review of the commissioner’s decision is whether the determination made
is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Manso-Pizarro v. Secretary
of Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). In other words, the determination must
be supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
the conclusion drawn. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Rodriguez v. Secretary
of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981).
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The administrative law judge reached Step 5 of the sequential evaluation process, at which
stage the burden of proof shifts to the commissioner to show that a claimant can perform work
other than her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Goodermote, 690 F.2d at 7. The record must contain substantial
evidence in support of the commissioner’s findings regarding the plaintiff’s RFC to perform such
other work. Rosado v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 807 F.2d 292, 294 (1st Cir. 1986).
I.
Discussion
A. Medical Evidence
The plaintiff contends that an incorrect statement and an incoherent statement in the
administrative law judge’s opinion each entitle her to remand, because they demonstrate that the
administrative law judge “impermissibly interpreted raw medical evidence” and lacked evidentiary
support for the RFC that he assigned to the plaintiff. Itemized Statement of Errors Pursuant to
Local Rule 16.3 Submitted by Plaintiff (“Itemized Statement”) (ECF No. 9) at 2-3.
I agree with the plaintiff, id. at 2, that the administrative law judge mischaracterized the
report of Benjamin Weinberg, M.D., a physician consultant, when he wrote the following:
Dr. Weinberg’s opinion that she can sustain light work, with postural
limitations, is supported by her work after her back and right arm
surgeries. Dr. Weinberg’s opinion is given extra weight pursuant to
Ruling 96-6p.
Record at 25. It is not correct to say, as the defendant does here, that “[t]he ALJ was correct in
stating that Dr. Weinberg’s opinion indicated ‘that she can sustain light work, with postural
limitations[,]” citing the Record at 25, 100, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Statement of
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Errors (“Opposition”) (ECF No. 10) at 5, when, in fact, Dr. Weinberg only said that there were no
physical limitations.2
The defendant’s subsequent argument is more worthy of attention; she contends that the
physical RFC fashioned by the administrative law judge was more favorable to the plaintiff than
the medical evidence would support, and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot establish that the alleged
error was other than harmless. Id. at 5-6. That would ordinarily be the case, see, e.g., Henderson
v. Colvin, No. 2:13-cv-426-JHR, 2015 WL 46075 at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 2, 2015); Soto v. Colvin, No.
2:14-cv-28-JHR, 2015 WL 58401 at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 5, 2015), even though the defendant cites
only non-medical evidence, or the absence of evidence, to support the chosen RFC. Opposition at
4-5.
I am troubled by the administrative law judge’s following statement, correctly
characterized by the plaintiff, Itemized Statement at 3, as “puzzling” and “incoherent”:
Dr. Sonti’s report essentially gives reasonable credibility to the claimant’s
allegations that she is limited by pain in her back, ankle and right upper
extremity, and cannot sustain work. That self-description does not match
the chronology of her treatment and accidents—including her more recent
ankle fracture. That allegation also does not match the Central Maine
orthopedic reports summarized by Benjamin Weinberg, M.D., the Maine
State Agency medical consultant.
Record at 25. These sentences appear in a discussion of the plaintiff’s credibility. Id. at 25-26.
Perhaps the administrative law judge meant to say that Dr. Sonti’s report is based on the
plaintiff’s subjective reports, and must be discounted for that reason. Perhaps he meant to say that
the report of Dr. Sonti, the plaintiff’s treating physician, supports her credibility. The former is
At oral argument, the plaintiff’s attorney asserted that Dr. Weinberg’s opinion that the plaintiff had no physical
impairment could never constitute substantial evidence to support an RFC that did not include any physical limitations.
Social Security caselaw is uniformly to the contrary. See, e.g., Baker v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13-cv01929-SAB, 2014 WL 7179859, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2014); Gregory v. Astrue, No. 3:09CV0207, 2010 WL
2519714, at *9 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2010).
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more likely, given the second and third sentences quoted above, and the administrative law judge’s
discussion, earlier in his opinion, of his reasons for discounting Dr. Sonti’s conclusions. Record
at 20, 24. That earlier discussion also addresses the plaintiff’s complaint that the opinion “gives
no statement of the weight it gives Dr. Sonti’s opinion.” Itemized Statement at 3. In addition, no
specific, formulaic statement of the particular weight given to a particular medical source’s
opinions is required. See, e.g., Enman v. Colvin, Civil No. 2:13-cv-307-DBH, 2014 WL 5384577
at *4 n.5 (D. Me. Oct. 21, 2014).
It is not accurate to say, as the plaintiff does, that the circumstances prove that the
administrative law judge in this case “impermissibly interpreted raw medical evidence.” Id. at 2.
Rather, he rejected Dr. Sonti’s medical evidence for adequately-stated reasons, and gave the
plaintiff a physical RFC that was more favorable to her than the medical evidence upon which the
administrative law judge purported to rely.3 Again, established caselaw in this district provides
that, if these circumstances do indeed constitute lay interpretation of medical evidence, the
conclusion reached only favors the plaintiff and cannot serve as the basis for remand.
B. Treating Source Opinion
The plaintiff also complains of the administrative law judge’s treatment of Dr. Sonti’s
opinion, asserting that he “gives no ‘good reason’ for” rejecting it. Id. at 4. If the cursory
presentation of this issue by the plaintiff can be deemed not to have waived it, but see, e.g., Poulin
v. Colvin, Civil No. 2:14-CV-102-DBH, 2015 WL 1809194 at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 21, 2015), the
previously-mentioned discussion at pages 20 and 24 of the administrative law judge’s opinion in
fact does give sufficient reason for rejecting Dr. Sonti’s conclusion that the plaintiff could not
work at all. Record at 519.
At oral argument, the plaintiff’s attorney maintained that, in such circumstances, the more-favorable RFC “still has
to be supported by substantial evidence.” That is not a correct statement of the law in this district.
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The plaintiff challenges the administrative law judge’s suggestion, Record at 26, that
having had a number of part-time jobs contradicts her allegations of disabling pain. Itemized
Statement at 4.4 However, this court has previously held that “part-time work may be suggestive
of greater functional ability than a claimant has alleged.” Carver v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-390-JHR,
2014 WL 7384777 at *4 (D. Me. Dec. 28, 2014); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571, 416.971.
II.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
Dated this 14th day of July, 2015.
/s/ John H. Rich III
John H. Rich III
United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff’s attorney pressed this position at oral argument, asserting that an administrative law judge cannot rely
on work that does not constitute substantial gainful activity to demonstrate ability to work. It is correct to say that
such work, standing alone, cannot support an unlimited RFC, but this is not how it was used in this case.
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