MASON v. INTERCOAST CAREER INSTITUTE
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, granting as to Counts I and III of the Complaint and denying as to the remaining Counts; denying 6 Motion for More Definite Statement. By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (MFS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
COURTNEY MASON,
Plaintiff,
v.
INTERCOAST CAREER
INSTITUTE,
Defendant.
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2:14-cv-00377-JAW
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
After dismissing those counts that the Plaintiff concedes must be dismissed,
the Court denies the rest of the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for more
definite statement because the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to allow the
Defendant to craft an answer and to withstand summary dismissal. Also, the lack of
specificity in the complaint would be better remedied by discovery, and the potentially
dispositive legal issues presented in the surviving counts would be better addressed
in a motion for summary judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Procedural History
On September 23, 2014, Courtney Mason filed a complaint in this Court,
containing five counts: (1) retaliation under the Maine Whistleblower’s Protection
Act, (2) breach of contract, (3) retaliation under the False Claims Act, (4) First
Amendment retaliation, and (5) Due Process retaliation. Pl.’s Compl. for Breach of
Contract, Retaliation and Violation of Due Process (ECF No. 1) (Compl.).
On
November 14, 2014, Intercoast Career Institute (Intercoast) filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint and/or a motion for more definite statement. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
Compl. and/or Mot. for a [More] Definite Statement (ECF No. 6) (Def.’s Mots.). Ms.
Mason responded on December 12, 2014. Pl.’s Mem. of Law In Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss (ECF No. 11) (Pl.’s Opp’n). Intercoast replied on December 29, 2014. Def.’s
Reply Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss Compl. and/or Mot. for a [More]
Definite Statement (ECF No. 12) (Def.’s Reply).
B.
Dismissed Counts I and III
In her response to Intercoast’s motions, Ms. Mason only opposed the dismissal
of Count II – breach of contract, Count IV – First Amendment retaliation, and Count
V – Due Process retaliation. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. Ms. Mason did not object to the
dismissal of Count I – the Maine Whistleblower Protection Act claim, and Count III
– the retaliation under the False Claims Act claim. Id. at 1-10. In its reply, Intercoast
urged the Court to dismiss Counts I and III. Def.’s Reply at 1. As Ms. Mason did not
object to the dismissal of Counts I and III, the Court dismisses each count.
II.
THE ALLEGATIONS
COMPLAINT
A.
AND
THEORIES
OF
ACTION
IN
THE
The Factual Allegations
Ms. Mason, a resident of Rochester, New Hampshire, was a student at
Intercoast’s for profit nursing school in Kittery, Maine beginning in October 2012.
Compl. ¶¶ 1-6.
Intercoast failed to provide her with the education, training or
facilities that it had advertised and that are required by the Board of Nursing. Id. ¶
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7. Ms. Mason complained about the conditions at Intercoast to the President and
Director of Nursing, but her complaints went unanswered. Id. ¶ 8. Due to a lack of
response from Intercoast, on November 23, 2013, Ms. Mason wrote a letter to the
Maine Board of Nursing and on November 26, 2013, Andrea Gauntlet, Director of
Nursing at Intercoast, called Ms. Mason into her office to discuss her letter to the
Board of Nursing. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. On November 27, 2013, Intercoast expelled Ms.
Mason.
Id. ¶ 11.
Ms. Mason believes she was expelled in retaliation for her
complaints to Intercoast and to the Board of Nursing. Id. ¶ 12. Ms. Mason claims
that Intercoast receives federal funds and that it uses those funds to train students
according to federal and state regulations. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
B.
The Counts
1.
Count Two: Breach of Contract
In Count Two, Ms. Mason alleges that she entered into a contract “whereby
the Plaintiff paid tuition to Defendant in exchange for a professional work-like
atmosphere with mature competent professionals to teach Plaintiff the skills she
needed to become a nurse.” Id. ¶ 21. She claims that Intercoast “breached the subject
agreement by exposing Plaintiff to the environment described [in the Complaint] and
then expelling her from the school.” Id. ¶ 22.
2.
Count Four: First Amendment Retaliation
In Count Four, Ms. Mason says that to sustain a First Amendment retaliation
claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) her speech was constitutionally protected, (2)
she suffered adverse conduct that would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness
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from engaging in such speech, and (3) there was a causal relationship between the
adverse conduct and the protected speech. Id. ¶ 31. She alleges that her speech does
not fall under any exception to the First Amendment’s protection of speech, that
Intercoast retaliated against her when it expelled her from the school for making a
complaint to the Board of Nursing, and that expulsion would deter an ordinary person
from engaging in such speech. Id. ¶¶ 32-34.
3.
Count Five: Due Process Retaliation
In Count Five, Ms. Mason alleges that the “Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the states from depriving a person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.” Id. ¶ 36. She says that she had a property interest in her continued enrollment
in Intercoast’s Nursing Program and she could not be deprived of that interest
without due process. Id. ¶ 37. She claims Intercoast expelled her from the Nursing
Program without due process, which should have at least required notice and some
form of a hearing. Id. ¶ 38.
III.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A.
Intercoast’s Motions to Dismiss and/or for More Definite
Statement
1.
Count Two: Breach of Contract
In its motion, Intercoast cites Associated Builders, Inc. v. Coggins, 1999 ME
12, 722 A.3d 1278, for the proposition that in order to state a breach of contract claim,
“a Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts of the terms of the contract, the breach, and
Plaintiff’s performance or excuse from performance.” Def.’s Mot. at 3. Characterizing
Ms. Mason’s allegations as “vague and ambiguous”, Intercoast claims that Ms. Mason
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has failed to “allege any material facts to satisfy each of these requirements.” Id.
Intercoast demands that Ms. Mason’s Complaint either be dismissed or that she be
required to make a more definite statement of the factual basis for each element. Id.
at 3-4.
2.
Count Four and Count Five: Constitutional Counts
Intercoast makes the same argument for both Counts Four and Five, namely
that to bring a constitutional claim, a plaintiff must allege state action and there is
no such allegation in the Complaint for either count. Id. at 5.
B.
Courtney Mason’s Response
1.
Count Two: Breach of Contract
In her response, Ms. Mason observes that the law has determined that the
relationship between a university and a student “has [a] strong, albeit flexible,
contractual flavor”, and she argues that the terms of a student handbook may be the
source of reciprocal rights and obligations. Id. at 3 (quoting Dinu v. President and
Fellows of Harvard Coll., 56 F. Supp. 2d 129, 130 (D. Mass. 1999)). She also notes
that the district court in Maine observed that a student handbook may constitute the
terms of a contract between a student and a college and, even in absence of express
promises in a student handbook, that a court should evaluate the college’s
disciplinary decisions under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 3-4 (citing
Goodman v. Pres. and Trustees of Bowdoin Coll., 135 F. Supp. 2d 40, 58 (D. Me.
2001)).
Based on these standards, Ms. Mason maintains that she has alleged
sufficient facts to plead the existence of a valid contract between Intercoast and
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herself. Id. at 4. Additionally, she contends that she has alleged facts sufficient to
establish performance, specifically that she paid tuition to Intercoast in exchange for
an education. Id. at 5. Finally, she argues that she has sufficiently alleged that
Intercoast breached the contract by alleging that Intercoast failed to provide her with
the education, training or facilities that it advertised and were required by the Board
of Nursing, and that Intercoast expelled her for complaining about its education
conditions. Id. at 4.
2.
Counts Four and Five: Constitutional Counts
In further response, Ms. Mason says that courts have held that private
universities engage in activities tantamount to governmental functions when they
accept government funds to provide a higher education. Id. at 5-6 (citing Buckton v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass 1973)). Ms. Mason
suggests that if her allegations are insufficient, she would move to amend the
Complaint to allege additional facts about Intercoast’s intertwining with state
government. Id. at 7.
C.
Intercoast’s Reply
Encouraged by Ms. Mason’s concessions on Counts One and Three, Intercoast
demands that the Court dismiss the remaining counts. Def.’s Reply at 1-4. Describing
the breach of contract allegations in Count Two as “wholly insufficient”, Intercoast
argues that such vague allegations would allow any student to sue a vocational school
any time the “environment” was unacceptable. Id. at 1.
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Addressing Ms. Mason’s opposition to the dismissal of her constitutional
counts, Intercoast points out that in relying on Buckton, “the Plaintiff relies upon a
District Court Decision, not an appellate decision.”
Id. at 2.
They say that
subsequent First Circuit law has eclipsed Buckton. Id. at 2-5 (citing Logiodice v. Trs.
of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 26-28 (1st Cir. 2002)).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standards
1.
Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must
determine “whether, construing the well-pleaded facts of the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, the complaint states a claim for which relief can be
granted.” Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011). A court
need not assume the truth of conclusory allegations, and the complaint must state at
least a “plausible claim for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
However, “[n]on-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must . . . be treated
as true, even if seemingly incredible.” Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12. A court
may not “attempt to forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits”. Id. at
13.
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2.
Motion for More Definite Statement Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(e)
Under Rule 12(e), a defendant may move for a more definite statement if the
complaint is “so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a
response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). Rule 12(e) motions, however, are “not favored ‘in
light of the availability of pretrial discovery procedures.’” Haghkerdar v. Husson
Coll., 226 F.R.D. 12 (D. Me. 2005) (quoting Cox v. Me. Mar. Acad., 122 F.R.D. 115,
116 (D. Me. 1988)). “Such motions are designed to strike at unintelligibility, rather
than at lack of detail in the complaint and accordingly, properly are granted only
when a party is unable to determine the issues he must meet.” Hawkins v. Kiely, 250
F.R.D. 73, 74 (D. Me. 2008) (internal punctuation omitted).
B.
The Motion to Dismiss
Even though Ms. Mason could have been more forthcoming, in the Court’s
view, none of her claims is subject to summary dismissal by a motion to dismiss. The
Court views the breach of contract count as alleging: (1) the formation of a contract
between Ms. Mason and Intercoast, namely that in exchange for her payment of
tuition, it would teach her how to be a nurse, (2) her performance of her end of the
contract by paying tuition to Intercoast, and (3) Intercoast’s breach of its obligation
to teach her by failing to provide her with the proper education, training or facilities,
and by expelling her before the end of the term.
It may well be that Intercoast is able to demonstrate that there is insufficient
state action to allow Ms. Mason to proceed on her constitutional claims against it.
The First Circuit decision in Logiodice declined to find state action in a case where
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the school and the state seemed much more intertwined than appears at first blush
here. Logiodice, 296 F.3d at 24 (describing Maine Central Institute (MCI) as serving
as the local high school by contract with the local school administrative district). But
significantly, the district court did not rule in favor of MCI in Logiodice on a motion
to dismiss. Id. at 26. In fact, the district judge denied the motion to dismiss and
granted the motion for summary judgment, leading to the appeal. Id.
Taking its cue from the First Circuit and district court in Logiodice, this Court
declines to issue a dispositive ruling in favor of Intercoast at this early stage. Instead,
it is preferable to allow the parties to engage in discovery and frame the legal issues
in a motion for summary judgment.
C.
The Motion for More Definite Statement
In their treatise, Professors Wright and Miller describe two situations where a
motion for a more definite statement may properly be granted. 5C CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND
PROCEDURE § 1376 (3d ed.
2004) (WRIGHT & MILLER). One is where the higher pleading requirements under
Rule 9(b), applicable to a complaint alleging fraud or mistake, apply. Id. (FED. R. CIV.
P. 9(b) (“the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be pleaded with
particularity”)). The other is where there are possible “threshold defenses to the
claim for relief.” Id. The most obvious is to ferret out the date of an alleged event in
order to determine whether there is a proper statute of limitations defense. See
Oresman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 321 F. Supp. 449, 458 (D.R.I. 1971) (“The date of the
alleged stroke should be alleged in order that defendant may plead the statute of
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limitations if it be applicable”). Even so, Professors Wright and Miller warn that
“there should be a bias against the use of the Rule 12(e) motion as a precursor to a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion or as a method for seeking out a threshold defense.” WRIGHT &
MILLER § 1376.
Here, in the Court’s view, there is nothing to be gained by forcing the Plaintiff
to make a more definite statement of her claim in her Complaint. Whether Ms. Mason
and Intercoast entered into a contract, whether the contract was written or oral,
whether there was a student handbook, whether the student handbook contained
language that affected her expulsion, are just some of the factual questions that will
be in play in this case on the breach of contract count. Similarly, what type of
institution of higher education Intercoast is, whether it receives federal or state
funding, whether it meets the Logiodice tests are just some of the factual questions
that will be in play in this case on the constitutional claims. To order the Plaintiff to
describe the underlying facts in this circumstance would serve no useful purpose.
V.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Intercoast Career Institute’s
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Motion for a [More] Definite
Statement (ECF No. 6). The Court GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as
to Counts I and III of the Complaint and the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss the remaining Counts. The Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion for
More Definite Statement.
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SO ORDERED.
/s/John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 4th day of March, 2015
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