INMAN v. RIEBE et al

Filing 56

ORDER denying 54 Motion for Recusal. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (CWP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

FRANK INMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
WENDY RIEBE, et al.,
Defendants

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2:15-cv-0080-JAW

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECUSAL
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s request that I recuse from further involvement
in this matter. (ECF No. 54.) In support of his request, Plaintiff writes that a conflict exists because
I “was involved in a criminal case of [Plaintiff’s] out of Kennebec County in March 2012.” (Pl.
Motion at 1.) Plaintiff evidently maintains that recusal is required because in my prior position as
a Maine State Superior Court Justice, I presided over one of Plaintiff’s state court criminal
matters.1
The fact that a judge has previously ruled adversely on matters involving a party is not a
basis for recusal. U.S. v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1035 (1st Cir. 1988) (“the mere fact of an adverse
ruling … does not – standing alone – create an inference of lack of [im]partiality”) (citing United

1

While Plaintiff references a Kennebec County matter, the record reflects that although some of the proceedings might
have occurred in Kennebec County, the relevant state court matter was on the Somerset County docket. In Inman v.
Landry, 2:15-cv-00243-GZS, an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Plaintiff contends that his conviction
for receiving stolen property in New Hampshire and his conviction for theft (Class C) in Maine involved the same
property and, therefore, he was subjected to double jeopardy. A review of the record in the Somerset County matter
that is the subject of Plaintiff’s double jeopardy claim reveals that Justice M. Murphy presided over Plaintiff’s plea to
the theft charge (Class C) in Maine, and imposed the sentence on the charge. Justice Murphy also presided over
Plaintiff’s pleas to and imposed the sentences on a burglary charge and another theft charge (Class E), which pleas
Plaintiff entered at the same time he pled to the theft charge (Class C). As part of the sentence on the burglary charge,
the court sentenced Plaintiff to a period of probation. In May 2012, after Plaintiff admitted a violation of his probation
on the burglary charge, I sentenced Plaintiff to thirty days in jail as a partial revocation of his probation. (2:15-cv00243-GZS, ECF No. 8-1 at 9.)

States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 890 (1st Cir. 1983.)) Indeed, parties often appear before the same
judge on a variety of matters. In fact, habeas actions commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
are typically considered by the judge who entered judgment against and sentenced a petitioner.
See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings (upon filing of a section 2255 motion,
“[t]he clerk must promptly forward the motion to the judge who conducted the trial and imposed
sentence, or, if the judge who imposed sentence was not the trial judge, to the judge who conducted
the proceedings being challenged.”) To the extent, therefore, that Plaintiff contends that my
involvement as a judge in a criminal matter to which he was a party in state court requires recusal,
Plaintiff’s argument fails. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (“It has long been
regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in
successive trials involving the same defendant.”).
Plaintiff’s motion for recusal is denied.
CERTIFICATE
Any objections to this Order shall be filed in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 9th day of December, 2015.