MORGAN v. COLVIN

Filing 99

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION re 63 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by CAROLYN W COLVIN Objections to R&R due by 12/22/2016 By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN H. RICH III. (jwr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
KATHERINE MORGAN,
Plaintiff
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, in her
Official Capacity as Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:15-cv-00107-GZS

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, acting commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”), moves for summary judgment as to all three claims against her by plaintiff SSA
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Katherine Morgan, for retaliation (Count I), sex discrimination
(Count II), and age discrimination (Count III). See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Motion”) (ECF No. 63) at 3; First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (“Amended
Complaint”) (ECF No. 38) ¶¶ 25-53. Morgan concedes that SSA is entitled to summary judgment
as to both discrimination claims (Counts II and III). See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opposition”) (ECF No. 89) at 3. However, she opposes
summary judgment with respect to her claim for retaliation (Count I). See id. For the reasons that
follow, I conclude that Morgan fails to raise a triable issue on that claim. Hence, I recommend
that the court grant the Motion.
I. Applicable Legal Standards
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
1

56(a); Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490, 495 (1st Cir. 2014). “A dispute is genuine if ‘the evidence
about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving
party.” Johnson v. University of P.R., 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Thompson v. CocaCola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008)). “A fact is material if it has the potential of
determining the outcome of the litigation.” Id. (quoting Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20,
25 (1st Cir. 2008)).
The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In
determining whether this burden is met, the court must view the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor.
Johnson, 714 F.3d at 52. Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine
issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must “produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary
form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Brooks v. AIG SunAmerica Life Assur. Co.,
480 F.3d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006)
(emphasis omitted)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “As to any essential factual element of its claim on
which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with
sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving
party.” In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
B. Local Rule 56
The evidence that the court may consider in deciding whether genuine issues of material
fact exist for purposes of summary judgment is circumscribed by the local rules of this district.
See Loc. R. 56. The moving party must first file a statement of material facts that it claims are not
in dispute. See Loc. R. 56(b). Each fact must be set forth in a numbered paragraph and supported

2

by a specific record citation. See id. The nonmoving party must then submit a responsive
“separate, short, and concise” statement of material facts in which it must “admit, deny or qualify
the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material
facts[.]” Loc. R. 56(c). The nonmovant likewise must support each denial or qualification with
an appropriate record citation. See id. The nonmoving party may also submit its own additional
statement of material facts that it contends are not in dispute, each supported by a specific record
citation. See id. The movant then must respond to the nonmoving party’s statement of additional
facts, if any, by way of a reply statement of material facts in which it must “admit, deny or qualify
such additional facts by reference to the numbered paragraphs” of the nonmovant’s statement. See
Loc. R. 56(d). Again, each denial or qualification must be supported by an appropriate record
citation. See id.
Local Rule 56 directs that “[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of
material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted
unless properly controverted.” Loc. R. 56(f). In addition, “[t]he court may disregard any statement
of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary
judgment” and has “no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not
specifically referenced in the parties’ separate statement of fact.” Id.; see also, e.g., Borges ex rel.
S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party fails
to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact
as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the
motion[.]”).

3

II. Factual Background
The parties’ statements of material facts, credited to the extent that they are either admitted
or supported by record citations in accordance with Local Rule 56, with disputes resolved in favor
of Morgan as the nonmovant, reveal the following.1
A. Context
Morgan has been an ALJ in the Portland Hearing Office of the Office of Disability
Adjudication and Review (“ODAR”) since 1994. Joint Factual Stipulations (“Stipulations”) (ECF
No. 57) ¶ 1.2 ODAR is the component within the SSA that is responsible for holding hearings,
issuing decisions, and reviewing appeals as part of the SSA’s process for determining whether or
not a person may receive benefits. Id. ALJs like Morgan conduct de novo hearings and make
decisions on appeal of determinations involving retirement, survivors, and disability benefits. Id.
1. Portland Hearing Office and Boston Regional Office Staff
During the time period relevant to this case, approximately July 2013 through August 2014,
Morgan was one of six ALJs in the Portland Hearing Office. Id. ¶ 2. In July 2013, she was 69
years old. Id. At all relevant times, Morgan’s direct supervisor was Judge Guy Fletcher, the
Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law Judge (“HOCALJ”) in Portland, and her second-line
supervisor was Judge Carol Sax, the Regional Chief Administrative Law Judge (“RCALJ”) for
New England (“Region 1”), headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts (the “Boston Regional
Office”). Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Sax reported to the Chief Judge for all of ODAR, Debra Bice. Id. ¶ 4. At
all relevant times, Fletcher was in his early 60s, and Sax was in her mid-60s. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.

1

Statements that are qualified are assumed to be admitted subject to that qualification, unless a qualification indicates
otherwise. To the extent that I have incorporated one side’s qualification into the statement of the other, I have
determined that the qualification is supported by the record citation(s) given. I have omitted qualifications that are
unsupported by the citation(s) given or are redundant. To the extent that I have taken into consideration a denial of a
statement, I have determined that the denial is supported by the citation(s) given.
2
SSA clarifies that it disputes many of the facts set forth in the Stipulations but admits them for purposes of summary
judgment only, pursuant to Local Rule 56(g). See Stipulations at 1 n.1.

4

As the RCALJ for Region 1, Sax was responsible for supervising eight hearing offices,
located in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. Id. ¶ 5. The
Portland Hearing Office was the only hearing office in Maine. Id. During the time that Sax served
as RCALJ, Edward (“Ted”) Malvey, the Regional Attorney in Region 1, served as her principal
adviser on legal matters, including labor and employment matters. Id. ¶ 6. As Regional Attorney,
Malvey, who worked in the Boston Regional Office, also assisted and advised the management
teams in each of the eight hearing offices in Region 1. Id.
Every hearing office within ODAR has a Hearing Office Director (“HOD”). Id. ¶ 8. The
HOD is responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations of the office. Id. At all relevant
times, Stephanie Korupp, who is not an attorney, was the HOD in the Portland Hearing Office. Id.
During the relevant time period, the other ALJs in the Portland Hearing Office were John
Melanson, John Edwards, Vickie Evans, Edward Gaulin, and Joseph Shortill. Id. ¶ 9. Melanson
and Edwards were in their early 50s, Evans was in her early 40s, Gaulin was in his early 80s, and
Shortill was in his early 70s. Id. In addition to the ALJs, ODAR employs a variety of support
staff in the Portland Hearing Office, namely, Case Technicians, Attorney Advisers, Paralegal
Analysts, a Contact Representative (who also serves as a receptionist), an Administrative Assistant
(who is also responsible for entering employees’ time into SSA’s web-based payroll system), a
Case Intake Technician, and a Hearing Office Systems Administrator. Id. ¶ 10.
During the relevant time period, Mary Franklin was the Administrative Assistant (and
timekeeper). Id. ¶ 11. Magda Ortiz and Ellen Munsey were the two Group Supervisors,
responsible for directly supervising all non-ALJ staff in the office. Id. ¶ 13. Ortiz and Munsey
reported directly to Korupp. Id. Fletcher, as the HOCALJ, Korupp, as the HOD, and Ortiz and

5

Munsey, as Group Supervisors, comprised the management team at the Portland Hearing Office
at all times pertinent to this case. Id. ¶ 14.
2. Time and Attendance Policies
During all relevant times, all full-time ODAR employees, including ALJs, were required
to work eight and a half hours a day or use approved leave for hours when they were not working.
Id. ¶ 33. All ODAR employees, including ALJs, were required to sign in at the beginning of their
workday and sign out at the end. Id. The ALJs in the Portland Hearing Office were supposed to
sign in and out every day on a paper sign-in sheet that Fletcher kept in his office for that purpose.
Id. On the sign-in sheet, each ALJ was required to record the time that he or she arrived in the
office and the time when he or she left the office at the end of the day. Id. Approved leaves of
absence (typically either sick leave or annual leave) could be taken in 15-minute increments. Id.
Franklin, the timekeeper in the Portland Hearing Office, used the paper sign-in sheets to enter time
and leave for every ALJ into SSA’s web-based timekeeping system, “WebTA.” Id. ¶ 44 n.2.
During the relevant time period, ODAR permitted ALJs to work at a designated location
outside of the office on certain days of the week, up to eight days a month, so long as the days and
locations were approved in advance. Id. ¶ 34. ODAR’s telework policy was known as the
“Flexiplace” policy. Id. Most ALJs typically worked from home on their approved Flexiplace
days. Id. Morgan typically worked from home pursuant to the Flexiplace policy on Mondays and
Fridays. Id.
When ALJs worked outside of the office on their Flexiplace days, they were required to
account for the matters on which they were working as well as hours worked. Id. ¶ 35. Each ALJ
(including Morgan) was required to submit a separate Flexiplace sign-in sheet for each day he or
she worked out of the office. Id. The Flexiplace sign-in sheet was identical to the sign-in sheet

6

used by ALJs in the office. Id. It contained lines where an ALJ was supposed to indicate his or
her start and end time for each workday as well as any periods of leave taken during the workday.
Id.
During the workday, each ODAR employee was given two 15-minute break periods and
one 30-minute period for lunch. Id. ¶ 36. At the Portland Hearing Office, it was acceptable for
employees, including ALJs, to aggregate those break periods and take an hour break for lunch. Id.
At all relevant times, ALJs were permitted to earn “credit” hours when they worked more
than eight hours in any given day. Id. ¶ 37. Credit hours could be used in lieu of sick or annual
leave by an ALJ. Id.
ODAR employees who wish to take time off from work to observe religious holidays are
permitted to earn so-called Religious Compensatory Time (“RCT”), which permits them to
“repay” time used for religious holidays on specific terms and conditions, when approved in
advance by the HOCALJ. Id. ¶ 38. By earning and applying RCT, the employee is able to avoid
using annual leave or taking leave without pay on religious holidays. Id. The terms and conditions
governing the use of RCT are set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between ALJs and
SSA (the IFPTE contract). Id.
3. Huntington, West Virginia, Scandal and Repercussions
In May 2011, the Wall Street Journal published a scathing article about the high approval
rate of ALJ David Daugherty in Huntington, West Virginia. Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s SMF”) (ECF No.
64) ¶ 38; Plaintiff’s Opposing Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to District of Maine Local
Rule 56(c) (“Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF”) (ECF No. 83) ¶ 38. In the article, the reporter noted that
Daugherty was not the only SSA ALJ who awarded benefits to the vast majority of claimants who

7

appeared before him. Id. The article included a scattershot graph depicting the number of other
“outlier” ALJs who awarded benefits more frequently than the average ALJ nationwide. Id.
The Wall Street Journal article triggered a congressional investigation into high allowance
rates of ALJs nationwide. Id. ¶ 39. In October 2013, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Government Affairs published a report titled, “How Some Legal, Medical, and Judicial
Professionals Abused Social Security Disability Programs for the Country’s Most Vulnerable: A
Case Study of the Conn Law Firm.” Id. In that report, the Senate Committee also faulted SSA for
overlooking Daugherty’s noncompliance with SSA’s policies and rules regarding time and
attendance. Id. It noted that his “time and attendance problems grew to such a level” that another
ALJ in the hearing office “filed allegations of misconduct against Judge Daugherty with the
agency’s Office of Inspector General.” Id.
Beginning in early 2011 and continuing through 2014, ODAR Deputy Commissioner
Glenn Sklar frequently communicated the importance of compliance with the agency’s time and
attendance and leave policies on regularly scheduled nationwide calls with the management teams
in every hearing office, including the Portland Hearing Office. Id. ¶ 40.
In December 2013, ODAR also embarked on a new campaign called “See Something, Say
Something” to encourage employees in the field to report any type of potential misconduct. Id.
¶ 41. ODAR created a dedicated mailbox through which employees could report suspicious
activities. Id. In an effort to ensure that every ODAR employee was aware of the “See Something,
Say Something” campaign, ODAR executives placed a large, clickable icon in the center of the
Intranet home page of every employee. Id. ¶ 42. As a result, executives at ODAR received
hundreds of complaints in the “See Something, Say Something” mailbox. Id. Those complaints
were then triaged by a specially-dedicated staff in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner. Id.

8

In addition to the “See Something, Say Something” campaign, SSA’s Office of the
Inspector General (“OIG”) had an online form on its website through which anyone, including
members of the public, could report allegations of “fraud, waste and abuse concerning SSA
programs and operations.” Id. ¶ 43. Anyone using the online form had the option of remaining
“confidential,” “anonymous,” or both. Id.
4. Morgan’s History of Time and Attendance Issues
Beginning as early as 2011, Morgan occasionally failed to submit Flexiplace time sheets
in a timely fashion. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 1; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 1. 3 She also frequently
failed to submit leave slips in a timely fashion to Fletcher and Franklin and frequently entered
incorrect arrival times on the sign-in sheet used by the ALJs, indicating that she had arrived at the
office earlier than she had in fact arrived. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 1; Declaration of Guy Fletcher
(“Fletcher Decl.”) (ECF No. 66) ¶ 16; Declaration of Mary M. Franklin (“Franklin Decl.”) (ECF
No. 67) ¶¶ 14, 18; Declaration of Stephanie Korupp (“Korupp Decl.”) (ECF No. 69) ¶ 12.
When that occurred, Fletcher would email Morgan to request that she provide the missing
documentation and/or correct the sign-in sheets. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 2; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF
¶ 2. For example, on January 31, 2011, Fletcher emailed Morgan requesting that she provide 24
missing Flexiplace time sheets dating as far back as November 2010. Id. ¶ 3. With respect to one
date in that period, December 23, 2010, Fletcher wrote, “December 23 is a mystery. I don’t have

Morgan’s request to strike paragraph 1 on the basis that it contains multiple facts not followed by an appropriate
record citation pursuant to Local Rule 56(b), see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 1, is DENIED. The paragraph, which
contains one four-line sentence followed by citations to specific paragraphs of three declarations, see Defendant’s
SMF ¶ 1, passes muster pursuant to the rule, see, e.g., Donahue v. Clair Car Connection, Inc., 736 F.Supp.2d 294,
298 n.2 (D. Me. 2010) (“Local Rule 56 does not mandate that each paragraph contain only one sentence[,]” and a
paragraph that does not exceed 12 lines is not “so lengthy as to merit [its] disregard.”) (citations omitted). However,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Morgan as nonmovant, I substitute her admission that she
“occasionally” failed to turn in time sheets in a timely fashion for SSA’s statement that she “frequently” did so.
Morgan also denies that she frequently failed to turn in leave slips in a timely fashion, admitting that she occasionally
failed to do so, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 1; however, that assertion is not supported by the citation given, which
pertains only to time sheets.
3

9

a sheet of any cases you took home that day, but I also don’t have a leave slip. Please provide me
with a leave slip or [F]lexiplace time sheet as appropriate.” Id.
In the same email, Fletcher noted that Morgan had incorrectly signed in on January 27,
2011, and asked that she amend the sign-in sheet. Id. ¶ 4. Fletcher wrote:
You show yourself as signing in at 9:15, but I know that people were still asking
about you and whether you were coming in until after 9:30, and my understanding
from a couple of people is that you came in at about 9:45. That is consistent with
the hearing record, which shows your hearing starting at 10:00. Please amend your
sign in time, and provide a leave slip for the time between 9:30 and your arrival
....
Id.
Two months later, on March 30, 2011, Fletcher again wrote to Morgan requesting several
months of missing Flexiplace time sheets and asking that she submit a leave slip to account for a
“long lunch” taken on February 24, 2011. Id. ¶ 5. On June 3, 2011, he again wrote to Morgan
about missing leave slips, in an effort to “get our timesheets in order.” Id. ¶ 6. With respect to
March 29, 2011, he noted:
When we discussed this day before, you indicated that you had it down in your
book as a day on which you did hearings. I was able to track down your itinerary
for that day, but when I go into each of the cases, the schedule screen shows that
you requested on March 28 that the day be cancelled. Was this possibly one of the
days where you were dealing with your finger? In any event, you never signed in
on March 29. As such, I think I need a leave slip or possibly a [F]lexiplace time
sheet, though I can’t find anything suggesting that you took work home for that
day. . . .
Id.
Morgan’s failure to provide time sheets and leave slips on a timely basis, and to account
accurately for her time in general, was a chronic source of stress for Fletcher, Korupp, and
Franklin. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 7; Fletcher Decl. ¶ 22; Franklin Decl. ¶¶ 14, 23; Korupp Decl. ¶ 13.4

4

Morgan denies this, asserting that between 2010 and 2013 she was not a chronic source of stress for Fletcher but an
ally, whom he trusted and with whom he had a good working relationship, and she was probably his most productive
judge. Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 7. However, these assertions neither contradict SSA’s statement that Morgan’s
time and attendance difficulties caused Fletcher chronic stress nor address the impact on Korupp or Franklin.

10

No other ALJ in the Portland Hearing Office was as delinquent as Morgan when it came to
providing timely and accurate information about his or her time, attendance, and leave.
Defendant’s SMF ¶ 8; Fletcher Decl. ¶ 22; Franklin Decl. ¶ 14.5
Fletcher also had to press Morgan to comply with ODAR’s policies regarding RCT.
Defendant’s SMF ¶ 9; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 9. For example, on November 13, 2011, he
wrote to her:
As I think you know, whenever a person takes religious comp, he/she is also
supposed to submit a plan or schedule as to how the time will be repaid. . . . [T]his
is an area in which Falls Church is taking increasing interest. As of early last week,
payroll records showed that you ‘owe’ the agency 6.15 hours of religious comp.
Could you please respond to this email with information as to how the time will be
repaid. . . .
Id.6
On September 26, 2012, Fletcher emailed Morgan again about a number of time and
attendance matters. Id. ¶ 12. He asked Morgan to provide him with several months’ worth of
missing timesheets, a missing repayment plan for RCT, a missing signature on a sign-in sheet, and
a missing leave slip. Id.7 He wrote: “Any time you work 6 hours or more, it will be assumed that
Morgan’s request to strike paragraph 8 on the basis that it constitutes opinion, not fact, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF
¶ 8, is DENIED. As SSA rejoins, see Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests To Strike (“Defendant’s Strike
Responses”), commencing on page 1 of Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests To Strike and to Plaintiff’s
Additional Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Defendant’s Responses/Reply SMF”) (ECF No. 94), ¶ 8, the
statement is one of fact in the sense that it is “susceptible to objective verification[,]” Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247
F.3d 303, 316 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, lay opinions are admissible
to the extent rationally based on the witness’s perception. See Defendant’s Strike Responses ¶ 8; Fed. R. Evid. 701.
That is the case here: during the relevant period, both Fletcher and Franklin had responsibility for ALJs’ submission
of timely and accurate time sheets and leave slips. See Fletcher Decl. ¶¶ 3, 16-22; Franklin Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, 12. In the
alternative, Morgan denies paragraph 8, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 8; however, her assertions that Fletcher
testified that he had a good working relationship with her, that she was his ally, and that she was probably the highest
producing judge in the Portland office, see id., do not controvert it.
6
I omit Defendant’s SMF ¶¶ 10-11, which Morgan denies, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶¶ 10-11, viewing the record
in the light most favorable to Morgan as nonmovant.
7
I GRANT Morgan’s request to strike Defendant’s SMF ¶ 13 on the basis that Franklin’s statement concerning
Fletcher’s reminders to Morgan is hearsay, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 13. SSA argues that the statement is not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein, which it characterizes as SSA’s policy regarding combining lunch
and leave, but rather to establish that Fletcher had to remind Morgan numerous times about the policy. See
Defendant’s Strike Responses ¶ 13. However, in context, the statement is offered for the truth of the latter assertion,
5

11

you have taken a ½ hour lunch. So, on 9/20, when you signed out after 6 ½ hours, you will be
charged with two hours of leave rather than 1 ½ hours. We have discussed this on many
occasions.” Id. ¶ 14. Despite these frequent reminders, Morgan continued to have problems
complying with basic time and attendance requirements, even though she had been an ALJ for
many years and had herself been a HOCALJ at one time. Id. ¶ 15.8
On October 2, 2012, Korupp called Carolyn Tedino at the Boston Regional Office to
express her misgivings about the discrepancies between Morgan’s timesheet and what she had
personally observed that day. Id. ¶ 17. She knew that Franklin was going to be out of the office
that week and that she would have to certify Morgan’s time for that pay period. Id. During the
phone call, Tedino warned Korupp that the HOD is always the “last to know and the first held
accountable.” Id. ¶ 18. Korupp interpreted that comment to mean that her career could be
adversely affected if Morgan’s unchecked abuse of the agency’s time and attendance rules
continued. Id.
Korupp also spoke with Fletcher about the matter and told him that she did not feel
comfortable certifying Morgan’s time. Id. ¶ 19. Korupp suggested that they post Morgan’s
unaccounted-for time as Absent Without Leave (“AWOL”). Id. Fletcher was not comfortable
posting Morgan’s time as AWOL and instead directed Korupp to post the time normally (i.e., as
regular “duty” time), create a memory jogger, and then let him resolve the discrepancy when he
returned to the office. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 20; Korupp Decl. ¶ 10; Korupp Dep. Exh. 1 (ECF No.

rendering it hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) (Hearsay is a statement that “(1) the declarant does not make while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement.”).
8
I omit Defendant’s SMF ¶ 16, material portions of which Morgan denies, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 16, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Morgan as nonmovant.

12

53), Exh. E1 to Stipulated Record (“Stip. Rec.”) (ECF No. 49), at Page ID # 1700.9 This same
scenario happened repeatedly with Morgan while Korupp was the HOD. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 21;
Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 21.10
The postponement of hearings on short notice had an adverse impact on both staff and
claimants, contributed to the backlog of cases, and was something that ODAR tracked closely. Id.
¶ 23. In December 2011, which was part of fiscal year 2012, Fletcher attempted to address the
issue with Morgan, writing:
Not too surprisingly, your leave request for the week of December 19 has set off a
bit of a firestorm in [the] Regional Office. They are, to put it mildly, very upset at
the idea that three days’ worth of hearings is likely to be lost in this month’s
dispositions, as well as the fact that there are now a bunch of claimants who thought
they would have their hearing before Christmas who will now have to wait for
several additional months. Based on that, I have been directed to obtain from you
a doctor’s note for the appointment you have that week. This is consistent with the
contract. In addition, if you need to reschedule cases in the future, you need to go
through me or through Stephanie. I will be sending an email to all of the judges to
this effect. Last minutes [sic] changes like this wreak havoc on our efforts to meet
goals and to keep the [Regional Office] up to date on how we’re doing. . . .
Id. ¶ 24.
On July 31, 2013, Morgan canceled all hearings she had scheduled for the following day,
August 1, 2013, and submitted a leave slip for annual leave on that day. Stipulations ¶ 45. On
August 6, 2013, Fletcher wrote to her asking why she had cancelled those hearings with only one
day’s notice and taken annual leave. Id. ¶ 46. In his email, Fletcher noted that “canceling and
postponing at the last minute puts a lot of strain on the staff, and represents a lot of wasted effort
in having scheduled the hearings in the first place.” Id.

Morgan denies this statement, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 20; however, her assertion that Fletcher never
instructed Korupp to keep an unofficial personnel file on Morgan does not controvert it.
10
I omit Defendant’s SMF ¶ 22, which Morgan denies, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 22, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Morgan as nonmovant.
9

13

Morgan responded to Fletcher’s email on August 7, 2013. Id. ¶ 47. She stated that she had
a “non medical unexpected matter” that she had to attend to on August 1, 2013. Id. She noted that
she was “not the only judge in the office” who “has ever cancelled a hearing for non medical
reasons,” stating:
I do believe there is at least one (male) judge in this office who cancels or postpones
hearings more than a bit for non medical reasons. That judge has a much lower
production rate than I do. I’m wondering if production and efficiency count for
anything in this office?
Id. Fletcher responded on August 9, 2013, apologizing for his belated response and writing:
I understand your concern, but do question why you assume that you are the only
person I’ve spoken to about cancelling or postponing hearings. I do my best to
have such matters are [sic] addressed on a strictly one-to-one basis. In any event,
yes production and efficiency do count for a lot, and I greatly appreciate your
ongoing contributions to the success of this office. In this regard, I am joined by
entire [sic] management team. However, I am also charged with trying to ensure
that we operate in a way that promotes the efficiency of everyone.
Id. ¶ 48. Morgan always informed the management team when it was necessary to cancel hearings.
Plaintiff’s Additional Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Plaintiff’s Additional SMF”),
commencing on page 26 of Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF, ¶ 25; Declaration of Katherine Morgan
(“Morgan Decl.”) (ECF No. 86) ¶ 8.11
On or about August 26, 2013, Franklin told Korupp that she felt “uncomfortable” posting
Morgan’s time for that pay period because she did not believe that it was accurate. Stipulations
¶ 49. Korupp told Franklin to bring her concerns regarding Morgan’s timesheets to Fletcher’s
attention. Id. Franklin subsequently communicated her concerns to Fletcher. Id. ¶ 50. She made
contemporaneous handwritten notes regarding her observations and entered them in the “Pay
Period Remarks” section of Morgan’s WebTA timesheet for that pay period. Id.

SSA denies this, see Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Additional Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
(“Defendant’s Reply SMF”), commencing on page 28 of Defendant’s Responses/Reply SMF, ¶ 24; however, I view
the evidence in the light most favorable to Morgan as nonmovant.
11

14

On August 26, 2013, Fletcher emailed a memo to Morgan regarding a number of “time and
attendance issues.” Id. ¶ 51. He informed her that an entry of 30 minutes of “AWOL” was made
on August 20 and 22, 2013, because the leave slips she had submitted for those two days did not
account for 30 minutes on each of those days. Id. He invited her to amend her leave slips for those
two days to ensure that her paycheck would not be “one hour short.” Id. He also asked her to
submit a leave slip for a quarter-hour on August 14, 2013, because he had “received information”
that she had arrived 15 minutes later than the time reflected on her sign-in sheet. Id. Finally, he
questioned her entitlement to so-called “credit hours” on August 15, 2013, because he had been
informed that she had taken a two-hour lunch that day. Id. The information in his memo was
based on information that Franklin had provided to him. Id.
Morgan responded in an August 29, 2013, email to Fletcher, indicating that she would
amend her leave slips for August 20 and 22 to account for the two 30-minute blocks of time but
refused to sign leave slips for August 14 and 15. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. She denied that she had arrived
late on August 14 or taken a two-hour lunch on August 15. Id. ¶ 53. In that email, she also asserted
that Fletcher was creating a “hostile work environment” for her by questioning her compliance
with time and attendance policies. Id. She stated that she believed that she was being “singled out
for disparate treatment based on [her] age and gender” and asserted that Melanson and Edwards
frequently took long lunches and/or breaks during the day. Id. Finally, she reiterated her belief
that Fletcher had treated her “in a disparate manner” when he questioned her cancellation of
hearings on August 1. Id. She wrote that Melanson “cancels cases frequently” on short notice.
Id. She concluded: “I only hope this can be resolved amicably and that you and your anonymous
informants will cease and desist from singling me out for monitoring and disparate treatment.” Id.

15

Fletcher believed that Morgan’s perception that Melanson cancelled as many hearings as she did
was misplaced. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 27; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 27.
On August 20 and 22, 2013, Franklin noted that Morgan worked part of each day and took
leave for several hours each afternoon, leaving 30 minutes each day unaccounted for. Defendant’s
SMF ¶ 34; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 34. Franklin made contemporaneous handwritten notes
regarding her observations of Morgan’s behavior on August 14, 15, 20, and 22, 2013, and also
entered her observations in the “Pay Period Remarks” section of Morgan’s WebTA time sheet for
that pay period. Id.
Morgan’s disregard for the agency’s time and attendance rules was a topic of frequent
discussion within the Portland Hearing Office long before December 2013. Id. ¶ 36. Morgan
never intentionally entered an incorrect arrival time on a sign-in sheet. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF
¶ 28; Morgan Decl. ¶ 6.12
B. Alleged Instances of Retaliation on Account of Protected Activity
1. Sax’s December 11, 2013, Disclosure of Existence of OIG Investigation
On July 29, 2013, Edwards filed an anonymous complaint about his colleague Morgan with
the SSA’s OIG using a link provided on the OIG’s website for reporting fraud, waste, and abuse.
Stipulations ¶ 40. Edwards, who did not identify himself, asked the OIG to investigate Morgan
for “blatant abuses of time [and] attendance” rules and other violations of SSA policies, including

SSA denies this, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 28; however, I view the evidence in the light most favorable to
Morgan as nonmovant. I GRANT SSA’s request to strike Morgan’s statements regarding certain SSA workplace
policies, see Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶¶ 29-31, on the basis that Donna Brown, whose declaration Morgan cites,
does not make clear how she has personal knowledge of the asserted facts, see Declaration of Donna Brown (“Brown
Decl.”) (ECF No. 84); Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶¶ 29-31; Navedo v. Nalco Chem., Inc., 848 F. Supp.2d 171, 179
(D.P.R. 2012) (striking statements of declarant when his basis for personal knowledge of the asserted facts was neither
set forth in, nor inferable from, his declaration). Morgan rejoins that Brown states that her declaration supplements
her deposition testimony and a prior affidavit, see Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendant’s Requests To Strike (“Plaintiff’s
Strike Responses”) (ECF No. 98) ¶¶ 29-30; however, Brown does not incorporate by reference specific passages of
her prior affidavit or deposition testimony, see Brown Decl. ¶ 1.
12

16

the agency’s Flexiplace policies. Id. Edwards also questioned Morgan’s high allowance rate of
claims for disability benefits, noting that she had “the highest approval rate in the office[,]” which
was “close to if not exceeding the Administration’s outlier status.” Id.
The OIG assigned the anonymous complaint Allegation Number Q13040689 and referred
it to ODAR’s Division of Quality Service (“DQS”). Id. ¶ 41. DQS is the unit within ODAR’s
Office of Executive Operations and Human Resources (“OEOHR”) responsible for addressing
labor and employment issues that arise anywhere in the 10 regions within ODAR. Id. On August
20, 2013, DQS referred the allegation to Malvey with instructions to investigate the complaint and
report back to DQS. Id.
On August 21, 2013, Malvey contacted members of the management team at the Portland
Hearing Office to inform them about the OIG complaint and request their assistance in gathering
information on Morgan’s compliance (or noncompliance) with SSA’s time and attendance rules
and other policies. Id. ¶ 42. Malvey instructed Boston Regional Office employee Maureen
Schofield to conduct the investigation. Id. ¶ 43. Schofield is a Special Projects Officer with the
Boston Regional Office.

Defendant’s SMF ¶ 56; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 56.

Since

approximately July 2013, she has been “out-stationed” at the Portland Hearing Office, that is,
physically located in Portland. Id. Between July 2013 and August or September 2015, her office
was located directly beside that of Morgan. Id.
During the two-year period when Schofield’s office was next to Morgan’s, Schofield
typically arrived in the office between 6:30 and 7:30 in the morning and was generally there before
Morgan. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 60; Declaration of Maureen Schofield (“Schofield Decl.”) (ECF No.

17

73) ¶ 9.13 Based on her own first-hand observations, Schofield believed that there were many
occasions when Morgan arrived later than the times she indicated on the judges’ sign-in sheet and
took long lunch breaks, often in excess of two hours, in violation of the agency’s rules and policies.
Defendant’s SMF ¶ 61; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 61. Schofield also noticed that Morgan’s
behavior seemed to worsen whenever Fletcher was out of the office. Id.14 Morgan’s apparent
unwillingness (or inability) to comply with the agency’s time and attendance rules has been a topic
of discussion since Schofield arrived at the Portland Hearing Office in July 2013. Id. ¶ 62.
Schofield doubts whether Morgan herself realized how frequently she bends the rules when it
comes to properly accounting for her time and attendance. Id.
When Malvey contacted the management team in the Portland Hearing Office, he asked
that they provide Schofield with copies of certain documents for the previous four months,
including Morgan’s sign-in sheets (for office and Flexiplace days), leave requests, leave
denials/approvals, and WebTA records. Stipulations ¶ 44.
On September 11, 2013, Schofield provided a report of her findings to Malvey. Id. ¶ 54.
Schofield noticed “some discrepancies, but nothing egregious.” Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 58;
Exh. A (ECF No. 85-1) to Declaration of Benjamin N. Donahue (“Donahue Decl.”) (ECF No.
85).15 She noted that Morgan often did not properly complete Flexiplace logs, did not timely
submit time sheets for processing by Franklin, attempted to take her lunch break within the last

I omit SSA’s further assertion that Schofield “had the ability to see when Morgan arrived each day[,]” Defendant’s
SMF ¶ 60, which Morgan denies, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 60, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to Morgan as nonmovant.
14
Morgan qualifies this paragraph, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 61, admitting that Schofield’s beliefs are what
they are but denying that her attendance record worsened when Fletcher was out of the office, see Morgan Decl. ¶ 20.
15
SSA’s request to strike this paragraph on the basis that it constitutes inadmissible hearsay, see Defendant’s Reply
SMF ¶ 58, is DENIED. As Morgan argues, see Plaintiff’s Strike Response ¶ 58, the statement fits an exception to the
hearsay rule for statements offered against a party that were “made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within
the scope of that relationship and while it existed[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). In the alternative, SSA denies the
statement, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 58; however, I view the evidence in the light most favorable to Morgan as
nonmovant.
13

18

two hours of the day in violation of agency policy, failed to account for the last half hour of her
workday because she improperly combined leave with lunch, and made frequent changes to her
start and end times on sign-in sheets. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 58; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 58. She
also reported that, on two occasions, she personally observed Morgan arrive at the office 15
minutes later than the arrival time Morgan entered on the judges’ sign-in sheet. Id. ¶ 59.
Malvey made a few minor editing changes and forwarded the report to DQS. Stipulations
¶ 55. On December 5, 2013, Randall Arrand, an employee in ODAR’s OEOHR who received the
report from DQS, submitted it electronically to the OIG. Id. On the form that accompanied the
electronic submission, he checked a box indicating: “Allegation substantiated – corrective action
taken – no fraud involved.” Id.
On December 11, 2013, approximately a week after ODAR had submitted the DQS report
electronically to the OIG, Sax traveled to the Portland Hearing Office to meet with Morgan. Id.
¶ 56. Before that meeting, both Fletcher and Sax asked Malvey whether they had an obligation to
disclose the existence of the OIG allegation to Morgan under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement between the ALJ corps and the agency. Id. ¶ 57. Malvey consulted with employees at
SSA’s Office of Labor Management and Employee Relations and thereafter advised both Fletcher
and Sax that they should not discuss the OIG allegation, or the possibility of an OIG investigation,
with Morgan. Id. Fletcher and Sax were under instructions from the Chief Judge’s Office not to
inform Morgan that she was the subject of an OIG investigation. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 38;
Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 38. Malvey also advised Fletcher that, pursuant to the ALJ contract,
Morgan “will be notified when the OIG investigation is complete.” Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶
41; Sax Dep. at Page ID # 1193.16

I substitute Fletcher for Sax, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike the reference to Malvey having so informed Sax
as unsupported by the citation given. See Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 41.
16

19

Sax and Fletcher met with Morgan on the morning of December 11, 2013, and discussed
time and attendance issues with her. Stipulations ¶ 58. Sax also talked about Senator Coburn and
the West Virginia situation and advised that the OIG was investigating ALJs with high production
and high payment rates. Id. During the meeting, Morgan asked Sax point blank whether she
(Morgan) was the subject of an OIG investigation. Id. Sax responded in the negative. Id.
At the end of the meeting, Morgan asked for an opportunity to speak privately to Sax. Id.
¶ 59. In that meeting, she informed Sax that she believed she had been subjected to harassment
by her colleagues and that Fletcher had condoned the inappropriate behavior of Edwards and
Melanson. Id. She told Sax that she believed Melanson, Edwards, and Fletcher were hostile to
older women and that they had treated her in a hostile and disrespectful manner in judges’
meetings. Id. Sax responded, “Yes, I really should have done something to stop them,” referring
to times that Edwards and Melanson had treated her (Sax) in a hostile, disrespectful manner. Id.17
After lunch, and in violation of her specific instructions from the Chief Judge’s Office and
Malvey, Sax returned to Morgan’s office and told her about the OIG allegation. Id. ¶ 60; Plaintiff’s
Additional SMF ¶ 39; Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 39.18 After Sax informed Morgan that she was
the subject of an OIG investigation, the conversation was over. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 40;
Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 40. Morgan was very distraught that Sax told her that she was the
subject of an OIG investigation. Stipulations ¶ 60. During the early morning hours of December
12, 2013, Morgan sent an email to Fletcher expressing how upset she was about the anonymous

17

Sax denies that she made this statement or ever felt mistreated by Melanson and Edwards. Stipulations ¶ 59 n.5.
However, for purposes of summary judgment, SSA accepts it as true. Id.
18
I omit Morgan’s further assertion that this disclosure was in violation of SSA protocol, see Plaintiff’s Additional
SMF ¶ 39, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike it on the basis that it is unsupported by the citations given, see
Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 39.

20

complaint to OIG about her. Id. ¶ 61. She asserted that she had been the victim of age and gender
discrimination, writing:
I am still in a state of shock and greatly disturbed. I have been unable to function
or sleep since the disturbing news. As you well know, this is a continuation of the
hostile work environment you have subjected me to for the last year or more. You
have allowed Judge Melanson to insult me and interfere with my judicial
independence. . . . You have allowed Judge Melanson to continue staring at me
and making faces whenever our paths cross. You have condoned Judge Melanson’s
false accusation regarding falsifying a sign out sheet (by three minutes) on at least
one occasion. At judges’ meetings, you have condoned Judge Melanson and Judge
Edwards speaking to me with disdain, aggression, and hostility. . . . I have told you
that I am being singled out for abuse by Judges Melanson and Edwards because of
my age and gender.
Id.
Fletcher forwarded Morgan’s email to Sax and let Morgan know he had done so. Id. ¶ 62.
On January 10, 2014, Morgan sent a three-page, single-spaced email to Sax directly, again
asserting that she believed she had been subjected to a hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 63.19
Prior to Sax’s and Fletcher’s meeting with Morgan on December 11, 2013, OIG had
decided to take no action, deciding that there were no substantiated allegations that required any
discipline. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶¶ 36-37; Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶¶ 36-37.20 The OIG
had in fact summarily “closed” the anonymous allegation about Morgan on September 28, 2013,
without taking any action. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 121; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 121. The fact
that the OIG had “closed” the allegation in September 2013 was not discovered by ODAR until
February 2015, when Joy Bryan, a Branch Chief at DQS, inquired about the status of the matter

I omit Morgan’s assertion that allegations that trigger an OIG investigation, even if found unsubstantiated, can
destroy an ALJ’s reputation and negatively impact his or her career, see Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 45, GRANTING
SSA’s request to strike it on the basis that it is unsupported by the citation given, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 45.
20
SSA qualifies this statement, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 37, asserting that the allegations were “substantiated”
but that the Boston Regional Office decided that they did not “require[] any discipline” and elected instead to “counsel
Judge Morgan on time and attendance rules and Flexiplace rules[,]” Deposition of Social Security Administration by
Edward Malvey, Esq. (“Malvey Dep.”) (ECF No. 49-21), Exh. H to Stip. Rec., at Page ID # 1121; Schofield Decl.
¶ 6.
19

21

and discovered that the OIG had done nothing. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 122; Sax Dep. Exh. 17 (ECF
No. 49-24), Exh. I-1 to Stip. Rec., at Page ID ## 1256-58; Malvey Dep. at Page ID ## 1115, 1120.21
Sax discovered that OIG had closed out the allegation in February 2015. Defendant’s SMF
¶ 123; Declaration of Carol Sax (ECF No. 81) ¶ 14.22 At that point, she was exhausted and
distracted by the press of unrelated stressors at work and at home and on the verge of announcing
her decision to step down as RCALJ. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 123; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 123.
Sax did not tell Morgan that the OIG had closed the allegation in September 2013 without taking
any action on the anonymous complaint.

Id. ¶ 124.

With the benefit of hindsight, Sax

acknowledges that she should have said something to Morgan when she received the update. Id.
¶ 125.
Morgan alleges that SSA’s failure to inform her that the OIG investigation was completed
in October 2013 was a “retaliatory act.” Id. ¶ 120.

Morgan denies this, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 122; however, the citations on which she relies do not
demonstrate that anyone at ODAR knew before February 2015 that OIG had closed its investigation. See Malvey
Dep. at Page ID # 1121; Videoconference Deposition of Tammy Farmer (ECF No. 49-29), Exh. L to Stip. Rec., at
Page ID # 1452; Farmer Dep. Exh. 13 (ECF No. 49-30), Exh. L-1 to Stip. Rec., at Page ID # 1489. Morgan relies
heavily on an October 16, 2014, email from Valencia Melbane of ODAR to Bryan of DQS stating, “Below is the
information found on the subject allegation. It appears that Randall released a copy of the response via the AMFED
response system.” Farmer Dep. Exh. 13 at Page ID # 1489. However, as Morgan elsewhere admits, the “response”
released by “Randall” is ODAR’s December 5, 2013, response to the OIG, not OIG’s report back to ODAR. See
Stipulations ¶ 55; Plaintiff’s Strike Responses ¶ 35. For the same reason, I omit Morgan’s statement that Bryan
received notice on October 16, 2014, that the OIG investigation had been closed on September 28, 2013, see Plaintiff’s
Additional SMF ¶ 35, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike the statement on the basis that it is unsupported by the
citation given, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 35.
22
Morgan denies that Sax discovered this in February 2015, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 123, but the citation on
which she relies does not support her denial. While the cited portion of the Malvey deposition indicates that, by
December 12, 2013, the OIG had decided to take no action and the Boston Regional Office had decided that there
were no substantiated allegations requiring discipline, it does not speak to whether Sax knew then that the OIG had
decided to take no action. See Malvey Dep. at Page ID #1121.
21

22

2. Selective and Hypervigilant Enforcement of Policies
a. Sick Leave
Fletcher became aware of Morgan’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint
in late June 2014. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 18; Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 18. In June 2014,
Korupp arranged for a private trainer from EAP Consultants, LLC, to come to the Portland Hearing
Office on July 16, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. and provide training to all of the employees on “Improving
Workplace Communications.” Stipulations ¶ 119. Morgan’s EEO complaint was part of the basis
for having the July 16, 2014, training. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 9; Defendant’s Reply SMF
¶ 9.23
On June 13, 2014, and again on July 14, 2014, Korupp sent office-wide reminders to all
employees about the training, which was mandatory. Id. Korupp arranged for this training in large
part to address what she perceived as the strained relationship between some of the ALJs, including
Morgan. Id.
At 12:27 p.m. on July 15, 2014, the day before the scheduled training, Morgan emailed
Fletcher to let him know that she would be requesting sick leave on multiple dates in July and
August. Id. ¶ 120. July 16 was not one of the dates listed in the email. Id. At 2:46 p.m. on July
15, 2014, Fletcher sent an email to all ALJs reminding them of the “Improving Workplace
Communications” training the following day. Id. ¶ 121. He wrote, “All judges are expected at the
afternoon training.” Id. The following day, at 11:53 a.m., Morgan wrote Fletcher indicating that
she would not be attending the mandatory training that afternoon because she had scheduled

23

SSA qualifies this statement, asserting that Fletcher testified that the purpose of the training was to address the
“rather frozen communications between Judge Morgan and the other judges and even some of the staff” and “get
together and talk about ways that we could all treat each other better and have a friendlier office” in the aftermath of
Morgan’s complaints about a hostile work environment. Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 9; Deposition of Guy E. Fletcher
(“Fletcher Dep.”) (ECF No. 49-18), Exh. G to Stip. Rec., at Page ID # 955.

23

unanticipated “medical tests” at 1:30 p.m. Id. ¶ 122. Fletcher responded by email at 1:03 p.m.,
stating:
Katherine,
I do not understand why I am being made aware of this conflict only two hours
prior to the training. It has been the subject of a number of emails from Stephanie,
the most recent of which was late Monday afternoon. The date was specifically
chosen due to the lack of apparent conflicts on the calendar.
The training is mandatory. As such, you should make every effort to be there. If
not, please provide me with an explanation as to why the tests could not have been
rescheduled.
Id. ¶ 123. Morgan responded by email at 1:16 p.m.:
I just got the appointment this morning after describing my symptoms to my
doctor’s office and having them reviewed by my doctor. It is very important that I
be tested now. My medical condition specifics are confidential but I can tell you
that the test cannot wait.
Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 7; Fletcher Dep. Exh. 13 (ECF No. 49-19), Exh. G1 to Stip. Rec., at
Page ID # 996.24
Shortill missed the same July 16, 2014, training session to attend a medical appointment.
Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 8; Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 8. Both Morgan and Shortill provided
doctors’ notes to explain their absence from that session. Id. ¶ 10.25 Fletcher took no disciplinary
action against Shortill. Id. ¶ 11.26 With respect to Morgan, Fletcher contacted Malvey of the

I have quoted from the underlying exhibit, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike Morgan’s characterization that she
informed Fletcher that she was going to miss the training session because she had to attend an emergency medical
appointment. See Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 7. That characterization ignores the stipulated fact that Morgan initially
informed Fletcher that she had scheduled unanticipated medical tests. See Stipulations ¶ 122. Only when Fletcher
questioned that did Morgan state that the test “cannot wait.” Fletcher Dep. Exh. 13 at Page ID # 996.
25
SSA qualifies this statement, asserting that Shortill informed Fletcher about his medical appointment well in advance
of the training, while Morgan provided only two hours’ notice. Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 10; Fletcher Dep. at Page
ID # 955; Fletcher Dep. Exh. 13 at Page ID # 995.
26
I omit Morgan’s assertion that Fletcher began taking actions to formally discipline Morgan, see Plaintiff’s
Additional SMF ¶ 12, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike on the basis that it is unsupported by the citation given,
see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 12.
24

24

Boston Regional Office, inquiring if he could appropriately ask for documentation of her medical
appointment and expressing irritation at the last-minute cancellation on top of Morgan’s
cancellation of other hearings a month earlier and recent leave requests. Plaintiff’s Additional
SMF ¶ 13; Fletcher Dep. Exh. 13 at Page ID # 997.27 Malvey informed Fletcher that he had spoken
“with DQS and we are in agreement that a Weingarten may be needed.” Plaintiff’s Additional
SMF ¶ 14; Fletcher Dep. Exh. 13 at Page ID # 1002.28 Fletcher ultimately approved Morgan’s
sick leave request for her medical appointment on July 16, 2014. Stipulations ¶ 124.
Morgan, like many judges, struggled to comply with each and every SSA time and
attendance policy. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 16; Morgan Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.29
b. Lunch Breaks
On July 23, 2014, Fletcher wrote Evans to let her know that he would be out of the office
for the next week and a half and to ask if she would be willing to serve as acting HOCALJ in his
absence. Stipulations ¶ 125. She agreed to do so. Id.

I have summarized the relevant portion of the underlying exhibit, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike Morgan’s
characterization that Fletcher “reported” her to the Boston Regional Office. See Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 13.
28
I have quoted the relevant portion of the underlying exhibit, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike Morgan’s
characterization that DQS “recommended proceeding with a formal Weingarten investigation.” See Defendant’s
Reply SMF ¶ 14. “A ‘Weingarten meeting’ refers to the Supreme Court’s decision in N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251 (1975), a case in which the Court held that union employees were entitled to the right to insist on the
presence of a union representative at an investigatory interview with employer personnel which [they] reasonably
believe[] will result in disciplinary action.” Lerner v. Shinseki, No. 3:12-CV-00565, 2013 WL 5592906, at *2 n.2
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
29
I DENY SSA’s request to strike this paragraph on the basis that the phrase “like many judges” is unsupported by
competent, admissible evidence. See Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 16. As Morgan rejoins, see Plaintiff’s Strike
Responses ¶ 16, lay opinions are admissible to the extent rationally based on the witness’s perception, see Fed. R.
Evid. 701. Morgan explains that this opinion was based on her “own observations from years of working at the
Portland ODAR[.]” Morgan Decl. ¶ 7. In the alternative, SSA denies that “many judges” struggled to comply with
SSA time and attendance policies, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 16; however, I view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Morgan as nonmovant. I omit Morgan’s further assertions that (i) her time and attendance compliance is
similar to that of other judges in the Portland ODAR office, see Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 15, (ii) she works
extremely hard and is frequently the only ALJ in the Portland ODAR office to meet SSA’s annual case disposition
goals, see id. ¶ 17, and employment actions involving an ALJ, including counseling and other discipline, are
documented in the ALJ’s 7(b) file, see id. ¶ 19, GRANTING SSA’s requests to strike those paragraphs on the basis
that they are unsupported by the citations given, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶¶ 15, 17, 19.
27

25

Evans had joined the Portland Hearing Office as an ALJ in 2010 and occasionally served
as acting HOCALJ in Fletcher’s absence. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 63; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 63.
After she joined the Portland Hearing Office, it became apparent to her that Morgan frequently
disregarded ODAR’s policies regarding time and attendance. Id. ¶ 64. She observed that Morgan
came and went as she pleased and was frequently absent for long periods during the day. Id. Evans
was told that Morgan had previously sued SSA for discrimination and won a large settlement and,
as a result, was essentially “untouchable.” Id. ¶ 65. Morgan’s disregard for the office’s time and
attendance policies was a frequent topic of discussion within the office. Id. ¶ 66.
On several occasions when Evans was the acting HOCALJ, Franklin reported her concerns
about Morgan’s time and attendance to her and indicated that she did not feel comfortable
certifying Morgan’s time sheets because she did not believe they were accurate. Id. ¶ 68. Evans
was also skeptical that Morgan truly worked a full eight-hour day when she was working from
home on Flexiplace. Id. ¶ 69.
In early June 2014, ODAR established a virtual private network (“VPN”) to allow
employees working from home to connect to the ODAR network, just as if they were working at
their desktop computers in the office. Id. ¶ 70. The Microsoft Office Outlook suite used by SSA
enables users to see the “status” of other users working online. Id. ¶ 71. Users can see, for
example, whether someone is “available” or “busy” or “away” from his or her computer and for
how long someone has been “offline” from the network. Id. After ODAR installed VPN capability
on all of the ALJs’ laptops, ALJs teleworking from home connected to the network to access their
case files. Id. ¶ 72.
On Friday, June 6, 2014, and again on Monday, June 9, 2014, Evans was aware that Morgan
was supposed to be teleworking from home. Id. ¶ 73. Evans periodically checked on Morgan’s

26

status throughout the day on each of her telework days and discovered that she was essentially
“away” or “offline” the entirety of both days. Id. Evans’ observations heightened her suspicions
regarding Morgan’s abuse of ODAR’s Flexiplace policy. Id. ¶ 74. She shared her observations
with Korupp, as well. Id.
While Evans was acting HOCALJ in July 2014, Korupp told her that Morgan had taken an
extended lunch on July 28, 2014, and then claimed an hour of “credit” time when she signed out
at her regular time at the end of the day. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 75; Declaration of Vickie G. Evans
(ECF No. 75) ¶ 19. Korupp did not believe that Morgan was entitled to an hour of credit time, and
brought the matter to Evans’ attention as acting HOCALJ. Id.30 On July 29, 2014, Evans and
Korupp emailed Fletcher expressing their concerns about Morgan’s time and attendance the prior
day. Stipulations ¶ 126. They described Korupp’s observations:
[Morgan] signed in at 6:30 a.m. I witnessed her departure for lunch at 1:25 p.m.
and was concerned because her tour was to end at 3:00 pm (lunch within 2 hours
of the [end] of the day). At 2:30 pm her door was shut and the instant messenger
reflected that she had been offline for over an hour.
As I was speaking to Maureen [Schofield] in her office, I witnessed the Judge
returning from lunch at about 3:05 pm. Judge Evans noticed that at 3:23 pm the
messaging system reflected that she had been offline for two hours. She was not
available online until 3:35 pm and by 3:50 pm, although she was online, she had
been inactive for [the] previous 5 minutes. Judge Evans noted that [at] 4:01 pm,
she was offline for 5 minutes. She signed out at 4:00 pm which coincides with
logging off the system at 3:56 pm.
She indicated on the sign in/out sheet that she worked 1 hour of credit; there is no
explanation for the extended lunch.
We feel the situation warrants attention sooner than your return to the office allows.
Judge Sax will be in our office tomorrow (Wednesday), do you agree she should
address the situation then or do you wish to handle it when you return?
Morgan’s request to strike paragraph 75 on the ground that it constitutes inadmissible hearsay, see Plaintiff’s
Opposing SMF ¶ 75, is DENIED. The statement is offered not for the truth of Korupp’s report to Evans, but for the
fact of the report. See Defendant’s Strike Responses ¶ 75; Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); United States v. Bailey, 270 F.3d 83,
87 (1st Cir. 2001) (a statement “offered to show the effect of the words spoken on the listener (e.g., to supply a motive
for the listener’s action)” is not hearsay) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
30

27

Id. ¶ 127.
Sax and Malvey subsequently instructed Fletcher to address the matters directly with
Morgan when he returned to the office. Id. ¶ 128.
On August 6, 2014, Fletcher emailed Morgan and told her that he wanted to meet with her
the following week “in regard to time and attendance issues relating to Monday and Tuesday of
last week.” Id. ¶ 134. In his email, he initially identified the wrong dates in question (as August
4 and 5 rather than July 28 and 29). Id. He noted in his email that Morgan had the right to have a
union representative present. Id.
Morgan responded later that day, indicating that she would not be available on the date he
had proposed for the meeting and questioning the dates he had identified in his email. Id. ¶ 135.
Morgan also wrote: “If you have something to charge me with I would like it in writing. I consider
this a continuation of the hostile environment, continuing harassment and retaliation against me.”
Id. In an email to Morgan’s union representative, Judge Peter Martinelli, the following day,
August 7, 2014, Fletcher clarified the dates in question and spelled out his concerns. Id. ¶ 136.
He noted: “My initial e-mail to Judge Morgan cited the wrong dates. My concern involves July
28 and 29, lunch breaks well in excess of one hour, and a claim for credit hours without accounting
for the extra time taken at lunch.” Id.
On August 11, 2014, Fletcher announced that he would be stepping down as HOCALJ in
the Portland Hearing Office and relocating to Arizona to serve as a line ALJ in the Phoenix Hearing
Office. Id. ¶ 137. Before meeting with Morgan on August 14, 2014, Fletcher prepared a one-page
memo detailing the bases for his concerns and provided it to her. Id. ¶ 138. He wrote:
Monday, July 28
You signed in at 6:30 (so the workday would end at 3:00)
28

Stephanie [Korupp] witnessed your departure for lunch at 1:25. She saw you return
at 3:05. This [is] consistent with the observations of Judge Evans, who was serving
as acting HOCALJ.
You signed out at 4:00 and claimed an hour of credit.
Tuesday, July 29
You signed in at 7:00, so the basic workday would end at 3:30
Mary [Franklin] saw you leaving the office at 1:20 PM
You were seen by Judge Evans re-entering the office at 3:03.
You signed out at 4:30 and claimed an hour of credit.
In both cases, you were gone in excess of one hour, and made no effort to account
for your time.
Id. ¶ 139. On August 14, 2014, Fletcher met with Morgan to discuss the time and attendance
concerns that had been raised by Korupp and Evans. Id. ¶ 140. This was a “Weingarten” meeting.
Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 57; Fletcher Dep. Exh. 4 (ECF No. 49-19), Exh. G-1 to Stip. Rec., at
Page ID ## 979-81.31 Martinelli participated by phone. Stipulations ¶ 140. During that meeting,
Morgan denied that she had taken a long lunch on the days in question. Id. She refused to amend
her sign-in sheets or take leave for the periods in question. Id. Morgan and Martinelli threatened
to file a grievance with the union if management took any disciplinary action against Morgan. Id.
On Friday, September 12, 2014, Fletcher spoke with Malvey about how to address
Morgan’s time and attendance issues on July 28 and 29, 2014. Id. ¶ 147. Fletcher emailed Malvey
the following Sunday, September 14, with two possible responses to Morgan. Id. On Friday,

31

I omit Morgan’s characterization of Fletcher as having “subjected” her to a Weingarten investigation, see Plaintiff’s
Additional SMF ¶ 57, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike that characterization on the bases that it is unsupported by
the citation given and constitutes argument of counsel, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 57.

29

September 19, Malvey responded and forwarded a draft response to Morgan that he had prepared.
Id.
At 3:16 p.m. on October 10, 2014, Fletcher’s last day as HOCALJ in the Portland Hearing
Office, he emailed Morgan regarding the unresolved time and attendance issues from July. Id.
¶ 148. He attached a copy of a memo that Korupp had circulated on September 12, 2014,
reminding all employees of ODAR’s time and attendance policies. Id. He wrote:
Katherine,
I wanted to wrap up a lose [sic] end.
After careful consideration, I conclude that you took a long lunch break from
approximately 1:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. on July 28th and July 29th. Additionally, there
was a problem in that your lunch breaks extended to within two hours of the end of
your work day.
I am not pursuing any discipline in this matter, but would remind you that leave
violations can result in you being marked Absent Without Leave (AWOL) and/or
subject to disciplinary action. This office permits employees to take one hour for
lunch, but the lunch period may not be taken within the first two hours or the last
two hours of an employee’s 8 hour tour. Likewise, a lunch break cannot be
combined with a core time deviation absence within two (2) hours of the beginning
or end of a Judge’s workday. Core time deviations must be recorded in the
appropriate block on the Form SSA-30. A judge must also account for the total
number of hours he or she is scheduled to work each day.
Id. ¶ 149.
The layout of the Portland ODAR office made it possible to exit or enter without anyone
knowing. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 47; Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 47. During the time period
when Fletcher was the chief judge of the Portland ODAR Hearing Office, Melanson “was routinely
going to the Bay Club” during his lunch break. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 1; Fletcher Dep. at
Page ID ## 947-48.32 During the 2006-07 time frame, Melanson’s trips to the Bay Club exceeded

I DENY SSA’s request to strike this paragraph on the basis that it is unsupported by the citation given. See
Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 1. In the alternative, SSA denies that this occurred throughout the pendency of Fletcher’s
32

30

one hour. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 2; Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 2. In response, during that
time frame, Fletcher asked Melanson to “try to keep it close to an hour.” Id. ¶ 3.33 Fletcher did
not report Melanson to the Boston Regional Office. Id. ¶ 4.34 Fletcher called Malvey to discuss
Morgan’s routinely long lunches but did not call regarding Melanson. Id. ¶ 5.35 Fletcher drafted
a memorandum to Morgan regarding the length of her lunch breaks but did not draft a
memorandum to Melanson regarding the length of his. Id. ¶ 6.36
Malvey, testifying on behalf of SSA, stated that, while it was his understanding that there
were no exceptions to the policy prohibiting combining leave and lunch, if an ALJ was nearing
the end of a hearing day and wanted to continue on and take a later lunch in order not to
inconvenience witnesses, claimants, or expert witnesses, “that would be a very good business
reason for not enforcing the policy[,]” and if he were the supervisor in that situation, he would say,
“yes, go ahead and take the late lunch.” Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 32; Malvey Dep. at Page ID
# 1128.37

tenure as HOCALJ, pointing out that Fletcher testified that this occurred from 2006 to 2007. See id.; Fletcher Dep. at
Page ID ## 947-48.
33
My recitation of paragraphs 2 and 3 incorporates SSA’s qualification as to the relevant time frame. See Defendant’s
Reply SMF ¶¶ 2-3; Fletcher Dep. at Page ID ## 947-48.
34
I omit Morgan’s further assertion that Fletcher “reported” her to the Boston Regional Office, Plaintiff’s Additional
SMF ¶ 4, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike on the basis that it constitutes argument of counsel rather than a fact,
see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 4.
35
I omit Morgan’s further assertions that Fletcher called Malvey to discuss “disciplining Morgan” and did not call
regarding Melanson’s “similar conduct[,]” Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 5, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike on
the basis that those statements constitute arguments of counsel rather than facts, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 5.
36
I omit Morgan’s further assertion that Fletcher did not draft a “similar” memorandum to Melanson “regarding his
routinely long lunches[,]” Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 6, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike on the basis that this
assertion constitutes argument of counsel rather than a fact, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 6.
37
I GRANT SSA’s request to strike paragraph 32 as originally worded as unsupported by the citation given, see
Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 32; however, I have reworded the paragraph to conform more closely to the underlying
record citation and have incorporated SSA’s qualification. I omit Morgan’s statements that (i) SSA employees would
take lunch breaks within two hours of the end of the workday, (ii) during those lunch breaks, certain SSA employees
would watch television in the Portland ODAR office lobby, (iii) on at least one occasion, Melanson summarily
dismissed numerous cases so that he could leave early for the day, and (iv) SSA went to great lengths to enforce
policies against Morgan even if it meant disrupting hearings, see Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶¶ 42-43, 46, 59,
GRANTING SSA’s request to strike them on the bases that (i) Brown, whose declaration Morgan cites in support of
paragraphs 42, 43, and 46, does not make clear how she has personal knowledge of the asserted facts, see Defendant’s

31

2. Korupp’s Three Complaints about Morgan in 2014 to OIG, SSA
a. Anonymous July 30, 2014, Complaint to OIG
On or about July 30, 2014, Korupp submitted an anonymous complaint to the OIG using
the link on the OIG’s website regarding what she perceived to be Morgan’s continuing violations
of the agency’s time and attendance policies. Stipulations ¶ 129.38 In her complaint, she wrote:
All of ODAR was required to read the Senator Coburn report on Huntington _ WV
and has been repetitively instructed to _ say something when you see something _.
For approximately 10 years _ Agency executives have allowed Judge Katherine
Morgan of the Portland _ Maine office to routinely abuse staff and managers _
flagrantly violate policies and expectations _ and complete fraudulent time and
attendance records despite receiving reports of all of the these [sic] instances.
Copious documents _ in executive level possession _ demonstrate that she
consistently fails to complete 8 hours of work while asserting on time and
attendance records that she has. Upper management is and has been aware of her
abuse yet does not take action out of either fear of losing productivity in an apparent
effort to achieve agency goals _ or of her history of vindictive retaliation. In July
2013 _ allegation Q13040689 was anonymously filed requesting an investigation
of Judge Morgan_s misbehaviors and to date _ no action has been taken. . . .
Id. The July 30, 2014, anonymous complaint was assigned an “allegation” number by the OIG
and closed on the very same day as a “duplicate allegation.” Id. ¶ 130. No one from the OIG ever
followed up on the second complaint regarding Morgan’s alleged failure to follow the agency’s
time and attendance policies. Id.

Reply SMF ¶¶ 42-43, 46; Brown Decl.; Navedo, 848 F. Supp.2d at 179, and (ii) paragraph 59 constitutes argument of
counsel rather than a fact, see Defendant’s SMF ¶ 59. As to paragraphs 42, 43, and 46, Morgan rejoins that Brown
states that her declaration supplements her deposition testimony and a prior affidavit, see Plaintiff’s Strike Responses
¶¶ 42-43, 46; however, Brown does not incorporate by reference specific passages of her prior affidavit or deposition
testimony, see Brown Decl. ¶ 1.
38
Korupp does not recall submitting this specific complaint to the OIG. Stipulations ¶ 129 n.7. However, for purposes
of summary judgment, SSA accepts that she was the individual who did so. Id.

32

b. Anonymous August 11, 2014, “See Something, Say Something” Complaint to SSA
On or about August 8, 2014, DQS concluded that Morgan’s hostile work environment
claim was unsubstantiated. Id. ¶ 131.39 On Monday, August 11, 2014, Korupp submitted the
following to the “See Something, Say Something” mailbox, using the link provided on ODAR’s
intranet page:
Thank you for the recent addition to the “Huntington Model” presentation
referencing ALJ behavior. As executive-level managers within the component are
aware, Judge Katherine Morgan of my hearing office, has a long-standing pattern
of fraudulent, wasteful and abusive behavior. To my knowledge, at least 2 OIG
reports and one, recently found unsubstantiated, investigation of a hostile
workplace have included consistent reports of her misbehaviors. These reports
have provided detailed and valuable information and documentation. If you require
additional information or documentation, however, please feel free to contact me.
Id. ¶ 132. The ODAR staff monitoring the “See Something, Say Something” mailbox forwarded
Korupp’s complaint to the Boston Regional Office for follow-up. Id. ¶ 133. “See Something, Say
Something” complaints are directed to the Chief Judge’s office. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 54;
Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 54.40 The Boston Regional Office did not initiate a new investigation
into Morgan’s compliance with the agency’s time and attendance policies, and no one ever
followed up with Korupp in response to her submission. Stipulations ¶ 133.
c. Anonymous October 2014 Report to OIG of Healthcare Fraud
On the afternoon of October 1, 2014, Morgan was hit in the head by a door as she was
attempting to locate her entry badge in her purse. Id. ¶ 150. As she was bending down in front of
one of the office exits searching her bag, another ALJ happened to be leaving the office, and when

I omit Morgan’s statements that Korupp first became aware of Morgan’s protected activity in May 2014 when she
was interviewed in response to Morgan’s charges of discrimination, see Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 55, and that
Korupp learned on August 8, 2014, that Morgan’s allegations of a hostile work environment had been found to be
unsubstantiated, see id. ¶ 56, GRANTING SSA’s requests to strike them on the basis that they are unsupported by the
citations given, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶¶ 55-56.
40
I GRANT SSA’s request to strike Morgan’s further assertion that such complaints “can trigger serious
consequences[,]” Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 54, on the basis that it is unsupported by the citation given, see
Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 54.
39

33

he opened the exit door, it struck her on the head. Id. Morgan left the office immediately after the
injury and went to her internist’s office for a CT-scan of her head, which was negative. Id. ¶ 151.
Fletcher permitted her to use administrative leave for the rest of the day of her injury. Id. She did
not return to the office until the following Tuesday, October 7, 2014. Id.
On Monday, October 6, 2014, Fletcher sent an urgent email to Morgan, on which Franklin
and Korupp were copied, regarding her time for October 2 and 3. Id. ¶ 152. He wrote:
Katherine,
When closing out the payroll this afternoon, it was determined that we did not have
a leave slip from you for last Thursday or Friday (October 2 and 3). For that reason,
you had to be listed as AWOL for those two days, which will affect your next pay
check.
We can go back and amend the payroll so that you can redeem any lost pay on the
next pay check. However, you do need to provide me with a leave slip for those
two days indicating what kind of leave you are requesting.
While on this topic, I also need a leave slip for Wednesday afternoon. You can go
ahead and ask for administrative leave for that day. Because it was on the day of
the injury, and I was aware of the fact you were leaving, I did not need to put you
down as AWOL for that period, but I will need the leave slip.
Guy
Id. ¶ 153. When Morgan returned to the office on October 7, 2014, she submitted all of the
requested leave slips. Id. ¶ 154. In addition, that day she completed an “Occupational Injury and
Illness Report” and a U.S. Department of Labor “Notice of Traumatic Injury and Claim for
Continuation of Pay/Compensation” form wherein she requested workers’ compensation in the
form of leave for the two days that she had missed the previous week. Id. ¶ 155. Her request was
later granted, and she was given two days of leave based on the injury that she had sustained. Id.
She was paid for all of the time she took off as a result of the workplace injury she sustained on
October 1, 2014, and did not have to use her own sick leave for that time. Id. ¶ 156.

34

Shortly thereafter, Korupp submitted a complaint to the OIG using the link provided on its
homepage. Id. ¶ 157. She wrote:
On 10/7/14, Katherine Morgan, an employee of the Portland, ME ODAR office,
filed a CA-1 with regard to an incident that occurred on 10/1/14. She asserts that
she entered the office while another employee was departing, and the door bumped
her in the head. Although the other employee confirmed this event, employee
Morgan may have created the circumstance in an effort to receive continuation of
pay benefits. Within the previous 6 months she has rapidly increased her leave use
to the extent that she is now routinely requesting advance leave. In mid-September,
the management team noted behaviors that, at the time, appeared unexplainable,
i.e., she would place her garbage can immediately in front of her closed office door,
and she would hide behind her[] nearly closed office door. We noted safety
concerns related to the behaviors, and as examples, moved the garbage can out of
traffic flow and approached her[] nearly closed office door with an abundance of
caution. In retrospect, it appears the behaviors may have been an effort to injure
herself at the workplace, either by falling over the garbage can or by getting bumped
by a [sic] when someone opened it without knowing she was behind it.
Id.
The OIG referred Korupp’s submission to the Boston Regional Office for follow-up. Id.
¶ 158. No one at the Boston Regional Office took any action with respect to her complaint,
however. Id.41 Korupp’s statement that Morgan intended to injure herself at the workplace is
baseless. Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 60; Morgan Decl. ¶ 5.42
Morgan did not learn about Korupp’s complaints until November 2015, and did so only
through the course of discovery in her federal lawsuit. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 128; Plaintiff’s
Opposing SMF ¶ 128.

I GRANT SSA’s request to strike Morgan’s statement that Korupp has not filed any complaints or attempted to
initiate investigations against other SSA employees, see Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 44, on the basis that it is
unsupported by the citation given, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 44.
42
I DENY SSA’s request to strike this statement on the basis that it constitutes improper and self-serving opinion
testimony and is in the nature of an argument rather than a fact. See Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 60. That Morgan
denies Korupp’s statement is a fact. SSA alternatively denies the statement, see id.; however, I view the evidence in
the light most favorable to Morgan as nonmovant.
41

35

At no time was Morgan ever subjected to any discipline as a result of her behavior.
Defendant’s SMF ¶ 98; Fletcher Decl. ¶ 39.43 In fact, to the contrary, Morgan’s compensation
actually increased each year. Defendant’s SMF ¶ 99; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 99. Between
January 2010 and January 2015, her adjusted basic pay increased from $164,048 to $167,359. Id.
As of June 27, 2016, her adjusted basic pay was $170,400. Id.
III. Discussion
Morgan opposes SSA’s motion for summary judgment as to her retaliation claim because,
she argues, following her December 11, 2013, complaint to Sax and Fletcher that her supervisors
had discriminated against her, those supervisors sought to drive her from the workplace by falsely
and improperly informing her that she was the subject of a career-ending investigation, attempting
to have her investigated without cause, singling her out for disparate treatment of workplace
policies, and generally endeavoring to make her work life miserable. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opposition”) (ECF No. 89) at 3; Amended
Complaint ¶¶ 25-45.
Morgan invokes 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), see Amended Complaint at 4, a provision of Title
VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 Act (“Title VII”) that “prohibit[s] employers from “retaliating
against persons who complain about unlawfully discriminatory employment practices[,]” Xiaoyan
Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 821 F.3d 206, 218 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation and internal punctuation
omitted). To demonstrate retaliation, “a plaintiff must show that (i) she undertook protected

I GRANT in part Morgan’s request to strike this statement, omitting the phrase “adverse employment action” on
the basis that it constitutes a legal conclusion, see Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 98, and otherwise DENY it. Morgan
alternatively denies the statement, see id.; however, her denial is not supported by the citation given. I omit Morgan’s
statement that, prior to her protected activity, she was never counseled or formally disciplined regarding time and
attendance issues, see Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 24, GRANTING SSA’s request to strike on the basis that the
statement is unsupported by the citation given, see Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 24.
43

36

conduct, (ii) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (iii) the two were causally linked.”
Id. at 218-19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“An employee who carries her burden of coming forward with evidence establishing a
prima facie case of retaliation creates a presumption of discrimination, shifting the burden to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged actions.” Id. at
219 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). “Should the employer create a genuine issue of
fact, the presumption of discrimination drops from the case, and the plaintiff carries the burden of
showing that the employer’s reason for the adverse action was pretextual.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
SSA does not dispute that Morgan engaged in protected conduct sufficient to satisfy the
first element of her prima facie case; namely, that, (i) on December 11, 2013, she informed Sax
that Melanson and Edwards were hostile toward older women and had subjected her to harassment,
(ii) the following day, she emailed Fletcher, alleging that she had been “singled out for abuse” by
her male colleagues based on her age and gender, (iii) on January 10, 2014, she emailed Sax and
again asserted that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment, (iv) on March 26, 2014,
she requested pre-complaint counseling with an EEO counselor regarding her claim of workplace
discrimination, (v) on May 2, 2014, she filed a formal EEO complaint alleging discrimination
based on age, gender, and retaliation for protected activity, (vi) on August 6, 2014, she informed
Fletcher that she believed his questioning of her time and attendance constituted a continuation of
a hostile work environment, harassment, and retaliation, and (vii) on August 18, 2014, she emailed
Fletcher and accused him of creating a hostile environment and of harassment based on age,
gender, parental status, and retaliation. Motion at 23-24 & n.9.

37

However, SSA argues that Morgan’s case founders on her failure to show that any of the
actions at issue constituted adverse employment actions. See id. at 24-29; Defendant’s Reply Brief
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Reply”) (ECF No. 95) at 2-10. In the alternative,
it contends that Morgan fails to demonstrate the requisite causal link between her protected activity
and the actions of which she complains for purposes of either her prima facie case or subsequent
burden-shifting analysis. See Reply at 10-15. For the reasons that follow, I agree that Morgan
fails to meet her burden of demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action.
This is dispositive of her retaliation claim, warranting summary judgment in SSA’s favor.
As the First Circuit has noted, for purposes of a claim of retaliation:
Material adverse actions are actions that are harmful to the point that they could
well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination. However, petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place
at work and that all employees experience are not material adverse actions and
consequently, fall outside the scope of the anti-discrimination laws. Title VII does
not set forth a general civility code for the American workplace.
Planadeball v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 793 F.3d 169, 176 (1st Cir. 2015) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted). “This is an objective test and should be judged from the perspective
of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.” Lockridge v.
University of Me. Sys., 597 F.3d 464, 472 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006)).
The First Circuit has observed that “[a]fter Burlington Northern, employment actions are
less susceptible to categorical treatment when it comes to the question of whether they are or are
not materially adverse.”

Id.

For example, “under certain circumstances, the denial of an

employee’s request for office space could dissuade a reasonable person from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination[,]” although not in circumstances in which “[t]he attendant
inconveniences may not have been optimal, but neither did they affect [the plaintiff] more
38

adversely than they did some of her colleagues.” Id. at 472-73. Additional “[e]xamples of adverse
employment actions in the retaliation context include termination of employment, a demotion
evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a
particular situation.” Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2010) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “In the absence of a finding that the plaintiff has suffered
adverse action, a retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Morgan argues that SSA took actions that, individually or collectively, were materially
adverse when (i) Sax falsely and improperly informed her that she was the subject of an OIG
investigation, (ii) Korupp repeatedly reported her to the OIG, and (iii) SSA supervisors and
employees selectively enforced sick leave and lunch break policies against her and monitored her
activities in a “Kafkaesque” manner. See Opposition at 4-14.44
SSA rejoins that none of those actions resulted in the type of significant harm necessary to
establish a legally cognizable claim of retaliation under Title VII and that the court can consider
the cumulative effects of such actions only in the context of a hostile work environment claim,
which Morgan abandoned. See Reply at 2-3 & n.4. In the alternative, it argues that the listed
actions, collectively, fail to demonstrate the existence of a retaliatory hostile work environment.
See id. at 3 n.4. I agree that, even viewing the cognizable evidence in the light most favorable to
Morgan, her claim founders on this prong.

44

“Kafkaesque” is defined as “[o]f or typical of Franz Kafka or his writings” and “[m]arked by surreal distortion and
usu[ally] by a sense of impending danger[.]” Webster’s II New Riverside Univ. Dictionary 660 (1994).

39

A. Sax’s Report of Existence of OIG Investigation
Morgan contends that, given the potential consequences of an OIG investigation, the mere
act of informing an employee that she is the subject of such an investigation constitutes a materially
adverse action, regardless of whether the employee is formally disciplined as a result. See
Opposition at 7. She cites O’Neal v. State Univ. of N.Y., Civil Action No. CV-01-7802 (DGT),
2006 WL 3246935, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006), for the proposition that a letter notifying a
plaintiff-employee of an investigation that did not result in formal discipline satisfied the
“materially adverse” standard, and Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp.2d 33, 52 (D.D.C. 2009), for
the proposition that whether an investigation’s effects are felt in the present is irrelevant to whether
it would dissuade a reasonable worker from making charges of discrimination. See id.
Nonetheless, as SSA points out, see Reply at 4-5, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia rejected a claim that an OIG investigation constituted a materially adverse
employment action when no evidence buttressed the plaintiff-employee’s allegations that (i) her
reputation had suffered as a result, (ii) OIG investigations generally “cast a shadow” on her
agency’s employees, (iii) her co-workers knew of the investigation, or (iv) it had any effect on the
terms or conditions of her employment, see Brown v. Mills, 674 F. Supp.2d 182, 191-92 (D.D.C.
2009).
Morgan likewise identifies neither reputational harm nor any impact on the terms or
conditions of her employment as a result of the OIG investigation at issue.45 Indeed, she does not
claim that the investigation itself was a retaliatory act but, rather, Sax’s allegedly deliberately false

45

Morgan included, in her statement of additional facts, an assertion that allegations that trigger an OIG investigation,
even if found unsubstantiated, can destroy an ALJ’s reputation and negatively impact his or her career. See Plaintiff’s
Additional SMF ¶ 45. As discussed above, I omitted that statement, granting SSA’s request to strike it on the basis
that it was unsupported by the citation given. See Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 45.

40

report to her of its existence. See Opposition at 7-8. As SSA argues, see Reply at 4, it is difficult
to see how telling an employee about an OIG investigation could constitute a materially adverse
action when the underlying investigation itself does not.

That is particularly so in these

circumstances: Morgan herself had asked Sax point-blank whether she was the subject of an OIG
investigation. See Stipulations ¶ 58.
To the extent that Morgan relies in part on the alleged deliberate falsity of the disclosure,
see Opposition at 7, I have determined, as discussed above, that she failed to controvert SSA’s
statement that Sax did not know until February 2015 that the OIG investigation had concluded,
see Defendant’s SMF ¶ 123. Hence, the only evidence in the record is that Sax told Morgan what
she believed at the time to be true. In any event, deliberate falsity, standing alone, would not
establish that the disclosure was materially adverse: the proper analysis centers on the impact of
the action on a reasonable employee in the plaintiff-employee’s shoes. See, e.g., Planadeball, 793
F.3d at 176. The mere fact that the disclosure was improper – that is, made against the advice of
Malvey and the Chief Judge’s Office predicated on the ALJ contract, see Stipulations ¶ 60;
Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 39; Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 39; Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 41;
Sax Dep. at Page ID # 1193 – does not suffice to render it materially adverse for the same reason.
The disclosure, hence, is not actionable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Bhatti v. Trustees of
Boston Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 2011) (“We have found before that a reprimand may
constitute an adverse action, but the reprimands at issue here are tamer beasts . . . . Specifically,
none of the reprimands here can be said to be material because none carried with it any tangible
consequences. . . . Bhatti may well be right that these reprimands were undeserved – indeed, she
presents enough evidence that we may safely presume her to be blameless (or nearly so) in each

41

instance for summary judgment purposes – but a criticism that carries with it no consequences is
not materially adverse and therefore not actionable.”) (citation omitted).
As SSA argues, see Reply at 7 n.6, O’Neal and Rattigan are distinguishable. The letter at
issue in O’Neal informed the plaintiff-employee “that she had to submit to a disciplinary interview
and that she was the subject of a disciplinary investigation.” O’Neal, 2006 WL 3246935, at *13.
The court, accordingly, concluded that “the prospect of O’Neal being disciplined was then
imminent.” Id. In this case, by contrast, there is no evidence that Sax indicated that the prospect
of discipline was imminent or that any particular step was about to be taken.
The Rattigan court recognized that, “[o]f course, plaintiff’s purely subjective perception
that the Leighton EC [Electronic Communication] and resulting security investigation jeopardized
his ‘career goals’ does not make defendant’s actions materially adverse.” Rattigan, 604 F. Supp.2d
at 54 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). It noted, “Rather, plaintiff must produce evidence
that the security investigation posed an objective harm to his reputation or prospects.” Id. (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). Yet, whereas the employee in Rattigan produced such evidence
in the form of the testimony of at least three witnesses, including the individual who conducted
the security investigation, that such an investigation could derail an FBI agent’s career, see id. at
54-55, Morgan offers no such cognizable evidence.
Sax’s disclosure to Morgan of the existence of the OIG investigation, hence, did not
constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of her retaliation claim.
B. Korupp’s Complaints to OIG About Morgan
Morgan next points to Korupp’s reports to the OIG in July, August, and October 2014,
citing O’Neal, 2006 WL 3246935, at *9, and Doucet v. University of Cincinnati, No. 1:05CV148,
2006 WL 2044955, at *22 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2006), aff’d, No. 06-4118, 2007 WL 2445993 (6th
Cir. Aug. 28, 2007), for the proposition that the initiation of a formal or serious disciplinary review
42

constitutes a materially adverse employment action even if it does not result in discipline. See
Opposition at 8. She asserts that the fact that she learned of Korupp’s complaints only through
discovery in this case is immaterial, citing Burlington Northern for the proposition that the
determination of whether an action is materially adverse is made by examining whether it holds a
prospect of harm, not by whether the harm comes to pass or its effect are felt in the present. See
id. at 9.
By contrast, SSA contends that the fact that Morgan was unaware of those complaints until
she learned of them through discovery, at which time it was clear that OIG had taken no action in
response to them, is dispositive. See Motion at 27-28; Reply at 7-8; Defendant’s SMF ¶ 128;
Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 128; Stipulations ¶¶ 130, 158. SSA has the better argument.
As Burlington Northern makes clear, the circumstances in which a plaintiff-employee is
subjected to alleged retaliatory action are relevant to whether, as an objective matter, a reasonable
employee in her shoes would be deterred from protected activity: “Whether a particular [action] is
materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and should be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the
circumstances.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 71 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, those circumstances include the fact that, when Morgan
learned of Korupp’s complaints, it was reasonably apparent that the OIG had chosen to take no
action in response to them.
A reasonable employee in Morgan’s shoes would not have been dissuaded from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination by learning simultaneously that complaints had been made
to the OIG but that no action had been taken as a result. See, e.g, Benuzzi v. Board of Educ. of City
of Chicago, 647 F.3d 652, 665 (7th Cir. 2011) (school principal’s request to have plaintiff-

43

employee removed from school did not constitute a materially adverse action for purposes of
retaliation claim when plaintiff-employee “was never in fact removed or demoted, even
temporarily; an empty threat that quickly dissipates before the employee becomes aware of it does
not constitute a materially adverse action”); Valles-Hall v. Center for Nonprofit Advancement, 481
F. Supp.2d 118, 155 (D.D.C. 2007) (lockout of plaintiff-employee from defendant-employer’s
offices and denial of her remote access to its computer system and voicemail was not a materially
adverse action for purposes of her retaliation claim when she did not learn of those actions until
after she had resigned; “As Plaintiff appears to have been entirely unaware of the lockout, she
cannot claim that she suffered an injury or harm as a result, and therefore cannot demonstrate a
materially adverse action on the part of [her employer].”); see also, e.g., Burlington Northern, 548
U.S. at 67 (“The antiretaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from
retaliation that produces an injury or harm.”).
O’Neal and Doucet – the other two cases on which Morgan relies – do not suggest
otherwise. Those cases are materially distinguishable in that, at the time the plaintiff-employees
were notified of the initiation of formal disciplinary investigations against them, the prospect of
harm remained quite real. See O’Neal, 2006 WL 3246935, at *13; Doucet, 2006 WL 2044955, at
*12. Indeed, in O’Neal, the court underscored that the notification letter itself constituted a
materially adverse action, regardless of whether the investigation resulted in formal discipline,
when (i) “the serious and formal nature of the disciplinary interview” was apparent from the face
of the notification given that the defendant-employer invited the plaintiff-employee to bring a
union representative or attorney, and (ii) “the prospect of O’Neal being disciplined was then
imminent.” O’Neal, 2006 WL 3246935, at *13.

44

In the circumstances of this case, as a matter of law, the Korupp reports do not constitute
materially adverse actions for purposes of Morgan’s Title VII retaliation claim.
C. Selective Enforcement of Policies
Morgan concedes that merely enforcing rules does not amount to an adverse employment
action; however, she asserts that the incidents of which she complains qualify as such because she
was subject to excessive and disparate policy enforcement and monitoring. See Opposition at 1314.
As SSA points out, see Reply at 8, courts “are near unanimous in concluding that close
scrutiny, monitoring, or tracking of an employee’s whereabouts – without more – simply does not
rise to the level of a materially adverse retaliatory action[,]” Aldrich v. Burwell, __ F. Supp.3d _,
Civil Action No. 15-1662 (JEB), 2016 WL 3919823, at *6 (D.D.C. July 18, 2016). The reason, as
the Aldrich court explained, is that:
Simply stated, putting in a full day’s work is a standard condition of employment.
An employer’s monitoring of an employee’s time and attendance, therefore, is a
basic employment practice, and as such could only be an adverse employment
action if plaintiff previously had immunity from general employment policies. In
other words, closely monitoring an employee’s attendance does not produce an
injury or harm, as employers may reasonably require consistent, complete
attendance and take reasonable steps to ensure an employee is not falling short.
Id. (citations and internal punctuation omitted) (emphasis in original). The Aldrich court observed:
The few cases to have gone the other way share one of two common attributes. The
first is the conclusion that where monitoring is not uniformly applied across the
workforce, the disparateness of such monitoring may elevate otherwise innocuous
attendance tracking to a materially adverse action. . . .
The second common characteristic of cases in which close monitoring might be
materially adverse is where the monitoring is so extreme and intrusive as to
constitute harassment in its own right.

45

Id. at *7 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).46 Morgan fails to generate a triable issue that
either exception applies.
1. Disparate Enforcement
a. Sick Leave
Morgan first alleges that, when she and Shortill both missed a July 16, 2014, mandatory
training session for medical reasons, Fletcher took no action due to Shortill’s absence and yet
“mobilized the formal disciplinary process” as to her, reporting her to the Boston Regional Office,
which initially agreed that a Weingarten investigation should proceed but later advised against one
because Shortill’s parallel absence would create an “appearance” of unfair treatment. Opposition
at 10-11 (citing Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶¶ 12-14).
As discussed above, these characterizations are unsupported by the citations given, which
reflect that Fletcher consulted Malvey of the Boston Regional Office for advice on how to resolve
the issue, and Malvey responded that he and the DQS agreed that a Weingarten hearing “may be
needed.” Fletcher Dep. Exh. 13 at Page ID ## 997, 1002. There is no evidence that Morgan ever
was notified that a Weingarten hearing might be held, that any such hearing was in fact held, or
that Morgan was disciplined in any manner as a result of her last-minute absence from the training.
Ultimately, Fletcher approved her requested medical leave. See Stipulations ¶ 124.
In any event, Morgan fails to show that she and Shortill were similarly situated, either in
terms of historical time and attendance policy compliance or the incident at issue. See Deshpande

The Aldrich court declined to adopt the first exception, explaining: “The problem with this reasoning . . . – and why
this Court chooses not to follow it here – is that although selective enforcement of employment policies may be
evidence of pretext, such selective enforcement does not alone convert enforcement of a general policy of employment
into adverse employment action. In other words, even if the employer’s scrutiny of plaintiff’s attendance differed
from the scrutiny given to his colleagues, such scrutiny does not, without more, constitute an adverse employment
action, as it does not produce an injury or harm. A petty slight is still a petty slight, even if that slight is disparately
applied.” Aldrich, 2016 WL 3919823, at *7 (citations and internal punctuation omitted) (emphasis in original). As
SSA has not made this argument, see Reply at 8-9, I have not considered it.
46

46

v. Medisys Health Network, Inc., No. 07-CV-375 (NGG) (VVP), 2008 WL 2004160, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2008), aff’d, 423 Fed. Appx. 31 (2d Cir. 2011) (allegations in plaintiff
physician’s complaint sufficed to survive motion to dismiss when he alleged, in connection with
Title VII retaliation claim, that “the monitoring to which Defendants have subjected him and the
one-year rather than two-year renewal of his privileges were selectively applied only to him and
not to other similarly situated physicians”) (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that Morgan had time and attendance compliance issues dating to as
early as 2011. See, e.g., Defendant’s SMF ¶ 1; Plaintiff’s Opposing SMF ¶ 1. Yet, there is no
evidence that Shortill had any such history. There is no dispute that Morgan apprised Fletcher two
hours before the mandatory training that she could not attend because she had scheduled some
unanticipated medical tests. Stipulations ¶ 122. Shortill informed Fletcher of his conflicting
medical appointment well in advance of the training. Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶ 10; Fletcher Dep.
at Page ID # 955; Fletcher Dep. Exh. 13 at Page ID # 995.
No reasonable trier of fact could conclude that, in handling the Morgan and Shortill
requests for medical leave in the way that he did, Fletcher selectively enforced time and attendance
policies in a manner rising to the level of a materially adverse action against Morgan.
b. Lunch Breaks
Morgan next complains that lunch break policies were selectively enforced against her both
as to the one-hour limit on such breaks and as to the ban against taking such breaks within two
hours of the end of a workday. See Opposition at 11-13. On the first point, she asserts that,
although she, like other judges, would occasionally take lunch breaks that lasted longer than the
officially-permitted single hour, Fletcher addressed this practice only once prior to December
2013, telling her colleague Melanson, who reportedly took long lunches to work out at the Bay

47

Club, to “try to keep it close to an hour.” Id. at 11-12 (quoting Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 3).
Yet, she contends that after she engaged in protected activity in December 2013, Fletcher began
to enforce the one-hour rule aggressively against her, repeatedly drafting official memoranda and
emails to her, reporting her to Malvey, and eventually conducting a Weingarten investigation for
the same conduct that had merited only an informal warning to Melanson. See id. at 12. She
argues that the disparate use of official discipline against her, versus the treatment of Melanson for
the same conduct, would dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination.
See id.
Nonetheless, Morgan fails to show that she was similarly situated to Melanson. As
discussed above, I granted SSA’s request to strike her statements that Fletcher (i) “reported” her
to the Boston Regional Office, see Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 4, (ii) called Malvey to discuss
“disciplining Morgan” but did not call regarding Melanson’s “similar conduct,” id. ¶ 5, and (iii) did
not draft a “similar” memorandum to Melanson “regarding his routinely long lunches[,]” id. ¶ 6,
on the basis that they constituted arguments of counsel rather than fact. Morgan adduces no
evidence that Melanson’s lunch breaks were of comparable length to hers or that Melanson
inaccurately reported them on his timesheets.

She omits the fact, set forth by SSA in a

qualification, that Melanson’s conduct occurred in 2006-07, well prior to the period at issue here.
See Defendant’s Reply SMF ¶¶ 1-3; Fletcher Dep. at Page ID ## 947-48. While Melanson was
not subjected to disciplinary action for transgressing the policy, ultimately neither was she. See
Stipulations ¶ 149.
As to SSA’s purported selective enforcement of the policy barring the taking of a lunch
break within two hours of the end of a workday, Morgan does not argue that any particular
individual was treated more favorably than her. See Opposition at 12. Rather, she contends

48

generally that, although the policy had not been enforced prior to her protected activity, Fletcher
and Korupp repeatedly singled her out for enforcement thereafter, refusing to grant her requests to
take a late lunch so that she could finish hearings while “permitting others to bend the rules.” Id.
This does not suffice to demonstrate that SSA treated others who were similarly situated more
favorably in enforcing this policy. See Deshpande, 2008 WL 2004160, at *5. In any event, as
discussed above, I have granted in whole or in part, on various grounds, SSA’s requests to strike
all of the statements of additional facts on which Morgan relies in making this argument. See
Opposition at 12 (citing Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶¶ 31-32, 42, 57, and 59).
2. “Kafkaesque” Monitoring
Morgan finally contends that, in addition to selectively enforcing policies against her, SSA
supervisors and employees took drastic steps to ensure that she was following them to the letter,
going so far as to monitor her online messenger system for activity, document her alleged
malfeasance to the minute and report it to the Boston Regional Office, plant an investigator in the
office adjoining hers, and keep unofficial personnel files on her. See Opposition at 13. She asserts
that no other ALJ was monitored at all, much less in the Kafkaesque manner in which she was.
See id.
The cognizable evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Morgan, falls short of
demonstrating that she was subjected to the type of “extreme supervision” that courts have
concluded might constitute a materially adverse employment action, such as the use of “hidden
surveillance cameras and tails[,]” the detailing of another employee to follow a plaintiff-employee
and confirm his whereabouts during the day, and the placement of a plaintiff-employee under
“constant surveillance.” Aldrich, 2016 WL 3919823, at *7.

49

Morgan relies on Stipulations ¶¶ 43 and 127, Defendant’s SMF ¶¶ 70 through 75, and
Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 58, see Opposition at 13, which reflect that:
1.

Malvey asked Schofield, whose office was next door to that of Morgan, to conduct

the investigation undertaken in response to Edwards’ complaint, including obtaining and
reviewing timesheets, following which Schofield stated that she noticed “some discrepancies [in
the timesheets], but nothing egregious[,]” Stipulations ¶ 43; Plaintiff’s Additional SMF ¶ 58; Exh.
A to Donahue Decl.;
2.

Using software installed by ODAR, Evans periodically monitored Morgan’s online

activity on June 6 and 9, 2014, when she was aware that Morgan was supposed to be teleworking
from home, and shared her concerns about her observations with Korupp, see Defendant’s SMF
¶¶ 70-74; and
3.

Korupp informed Evans, who was serving at the time as acting HOCALJ, that

Morgan had taken an extended lunch on July 28, 2014, and then claimed an hour of “credit” time
when she signed out at the end of the day, see id. ¶ 75, and Evans and Korupp emailed Fletcher
the following day to report concerns arising from their observations of Morgan’s comings and
goings and Evans’ monitoring of Morgan’s online activity on July 28, 2014, see Stipulations
¶¶ 126-27.
Morgan points to no evidence that SSA kept an unofficial personnel file on her. See
Opposition at 13.
The parties stipulate that the period from approximately July 2013 through August 2014 is
the relevant time period in this case. See Stipulations ¶ 2. Even assuming arguendo that
Schofield’s investigation, which predated Morgan’s protected activity and was not undertaken at
the behest of her supervisors but, rather, in response to an anonymous OIG complaint, constitutes

50

“supervision,” the level of monitoring to which Morgan points over that more than yearlong period
does not, as a matter of law, qualify as a materially adverse employment action. See, e.g., Aldrich,
2016 WL 3919823, at *7 (plaintiff-employee failed to plead facts showing that leave restriction
was a materially adverse employment action when all that was demanded of her was that she
announce any arrival and departure during the day; noting that actions deemed to be materially
adverse “cross[ed] the line from enforcement of standard employment policies (even if not
uniformly applied) to harassing, badgering, and even threatening conduct”).
D. Cumulative Effect of Cited Conduct
Morgan argues, in the alternative, that even if the acts of which she complains do not
amount to materially adverse employment actions individually, they do in the aggregate. See
Opposition at 5-6 (citing, inter alia, Rodríguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps of P.R.,
743 F.3d 278, 285 (1st Cir. 2014); Ferrante v. MAS Med. Staffing, No. 2:13-cv-00211-JAW, 2015
WL 1401023, at *26 (D. Me. Mar. 26, 2015)). SSA rejoins that the First Circuit made clear in
Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 54 n.13 (1st Cir. 2008), that claims predicated on the
“collective effect” of retaliatory actions are essentially retaliatory hostile work environment claims
– the very claims that Morgan has now abandoned. See Reply at 3 n.4. She states that, to the
extent that this court nonetheless entertains a hostile work environment theory, she relies on
relevant arguments contained in her motion. See id.
In Billings, the First Circuit observed that “retaliatory actions that are not materially
adverse when considered individually may collectively amount to a retaliatory hostile work
environment.” Billings, 515 F.3d at 54 n.13. However, it noted that, because the plaintiffemployee had not made an argument about the collective effect of the actions of which she
complained, it had considered them only individually. See id.

51

Billings indeed suggests that a Title VII claim of retaliation can be predicated on either
discrete acts or their collective effect in the form of a hostile work environment (or both).
Rodríguez-Vives cannot fairly be read to hold otherwise. While, in Rodríguez-Vives, the First
Circuit held that a plaintiff-employee’s allegations of a series of retaliatory actions “cumulatively
. . . plausibly paint[ed] a picture that would allow a factfinder to find the [defendant-employer’s]
conduct sufficient to deter a reasonable person from challenging the [defendant-employer’s]
discriminatory hiring practices had she known she would be subjected to these abuses if
successful[,]” Rodríguez-Vives, 743 F.3d at 285, it did so in the context of analyzing whether the
district court had properly granted the defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss her complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, see id. at 286.
In that context, “[t]here need not be a one-to-one relationship between any single allegation
and a necessary element of the cause of action.” Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d
49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013). Rather, “[w]hat counts is the cumulative effect of the [complaint’s] factual
allegations.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Rodríguez-Vives, 743
F.3d at 286 (“Given the cumulative weight of [the plaintiff-employee’s] allegations, . . . we need
not decide whether each of these individual allegations would, standing alone, be sufficient to state
a plausible claim of retaliation under Title VII.”).
Nor did this court in Ferrante analyze the cumulative effects of asserted retaliatory actions
separate from a hostile work environment rubric. To the contrary, the court noted that, “although
a typical adverse employment action involves a discrete change in the terms and conditions of
employment (say, a discharge, demotion, or reduction in pay), workplace harassment, if
sufficiently severe or pervasive, may in and of itself constitute an adverse employment action

52

sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie case for Title VII retaliation cases.”
Ferrante, 2015 WL 1401023, at *28 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).47
Therefore, SSA makes the more persuasive argument: that, in this circuit, the cumulative
effects of asserted retaliatory actions are to be analyzed as a retaliatory hostile work environment
claim.
Yet, SSA reads too much into Morgan’s opposing brief in arguing that she “has now
apparently abandoned her retaliatory hostile work environment claim, and is instead proceeding
on a ‘discrete acts’ theory of retaliation.” Reply at 2. While Morgan disputes that it is necessary
to analyze the cumulative effects of retaliatory acts through a hostile work environment
framework, she plainly argues that the actions of which she complains cumulatively amounted to
retaliation for protected activity. See Opposition at 5-6. Nonetheless, her evidence falls short of
generating a triable issue.
The actions of which Morgan complains were not, as a matter of law, “sufficiently severe
or pervasive” to constitute a retaliatory hostile work environment. Ferrante, 2015 WL 1401023,
at *28 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Ferrante, this court found a triable claim
of a retaliatory hostile work environment when a plaintiff-employee offered evidence of 21 alleged
retaliatory acts during an approximately five-month period, including repeated instances of the
reassignment of her job responsibilities to other employees, assignment of blame for the misfiling
of charts, denial of a leave request, failure to invite her to an office get-together, omission of her

Morgan cites two other cases, Putman v. Secretary, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 510 Fed. Appx. 827, 831 (11th Cir.
2013), and Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2011), for the proposition that it is appropriate to
consider whether the cumulative effect of individual retaliatory acts could dissuade a reasonable worker from pressing
a charge of discrimination. See Opposition at 5-6. These cases do stand for that proposition. See Putman, 510 Fed.
Appx. at 831; Quinn, 653 F.3d at 751. However, as discussed above, the First Circuit has signaled that one must
consider the cumulative effect of individual retaliatory acts through the lens of a hostile work environment analysis.
47

53

name on several occasions from staff rosters, and failure to include her in a supervisor’s meeting
that she believed she was supposed to attend. See id. at 29-30.
By contrast, in this case, Morgan was unaware of the existence of the Korupp complaints
until it was clear that no action would result from them, and she offers no cognizable evidence that
Sax’s disclosure of the existence of an OIG investigation or her supervisors’ step-up in scrutiny of
her time and attendance compliance caused harms beyond “the ordinary tribulations of the
workplace[.]” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Likewise, in Rodríguez-Vives, the First Circuit observed that “several of the specific acts
alleged by [the plaintiff-employee, a female firefighter,] by themselves go quite a ways toward
making out a claim[,]” citing, as examples, (i) “the alleged refusal of [her] superiors to allow her,
like others, to travel on fire vehicles to get lunch[,]” which “might be an adverse employment
action on its own[,]” and (ii) her “allegation that she was assigned to cook and clean rather than to
perform the same jobs as others in the station,” which might, depending on the surrounding facts,
“make plausible a finding that there was an adverse employment action.” Rodríguez-Vives, 743
F.3d at 285-86.
Morgan identifies no comparably harmful action or collection of actions.
IV. Conclusion
Morgan having conceded that SSA is entitled to summary judgment as to her sex
discrimination and age discrimination claims (Counts II and III) and having failed to make out a
triable issue of the existence of a materially adverse employment action with respect to her
retaliation claim (Count I), I recommend that the court grant SSA’s motion for summary judgment
as to all claims against it.

54

NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate judge’s report or
proposed findings or recommended decisions entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for
which de novo review by the district court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum,
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum
shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to de novo review
by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
Dated this 7th day of December, 2016.

/s/ John H. Rich III
John H. Rich III
United States Magistrate Judge

55