MARCH v. MILLS et al

Filing 71

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION re: 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction By JUDGE NANCY TORRESEN. (mjlt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ANDREW MARCH,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
JANET T. MILLS, Attorney General
)
for the State of Maine, CITY OF
)
PORTLAND, WILLIAM PREIS, Police )
Lieutenant of the City of Portland,
)
JASON NADEAU, Police Officer of the )
City of Portland, DONALD KRIER,
)
Police Major of the City of Portland,
)
GRAHAM HULTS, Police Officer of
)
the City of Portland,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Docket No. 2:15-cv-515-NT

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Before the Court is the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) (ECF No. 4). For the reasons stated below,
the motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case presents the difficult question of whether a state law providing
protection to women seeking access to constitutionally-protected health care violates
the First Amendment rights of an individual who wishes to voice his opposition to
abortion on a public sidewalk. I conclude that it does.
The plaintiff in this case is Andrew March. He is a Christian pastor and cofounder of a church in Lewiston, Maine called Cell 53. Dec. 28, 2015 March Decl. ¶ 4

(“First March Decl.”) (ECF No. 5-1). Part of the mission of Cell 53 “is to plead for
the lives of the unborn at the doorsteps of abortion facilities.” First March Decl. ¶ 5.
March believes that “abortion is the killing of unborn citizens” and that it “harms
women.” First March Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. He voices his opposition to abortion outside the
Planned Parenthood Portland Health Center on Congress Street in downtown
Portland (the “Health Center”). First March Decl. ¶¶ 8-15. The Defendants in this
case are the Maine Attorney General, the City of Portland (the “City”), and Portland
law enforcement officers who interacted with March outside of the Health Center in
November and December of 2015.
This is not the first lawsuit sparked by activity outside the Health Center. In
2014, abortion opponents challenged a City ordinance that created a buffer zone
around the Health Center. See Fitzgerald v. City of Portland, 2:14-cv-53-NT, 2014 WL
5473026 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2014). The City repealed the ordinance after the United
States Supreme Court struck down a similar Massachusetts regulation in McCullen
v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). Following the repeal of the buffer zone, the City
looked to alternative ways to address protests outside of the Health Center. Sept. 2,
2014 Memo. re: Reproductive Health Facility Protests—Buffer Zone Alternatives
(“Sept. 2, 2014 Memo”) (ECF No. 43-2). Counsel for the City advised against passing
any new regulations, and instead recommended—consistent with McCullen—that
law enforcement focus on enforcing existing laws. Sept. 2, 2014 Memo. 6 (“[T]he city
should not pursue passage of any new regulations at this time. This is particularly
true given the potential of another lengthy legal battle, and considering our current

2

legal expenses and pending budget challenges.”); cf. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2538
(pointing out that the state had less-intrusive, targeted laws it could enforce to
address problems around clinics that would burden less speech than a generallyapplicable buffer zone). One of the existing laws counsel for the City identified to
address issues around the Health Center was the Maine Civil Rights Act,
5 M.R.S.A. § 4684-B.
The Maine Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”) was enacted in 1989. In broad strokes,
it creates a cause of action against any person who, “whether or not acting under color
of law, intentionally interferes or attempts to intentionally interfere . . . with the
exercise or enjoyment by any other person” of rights secured by the United States or
Maine Constitutions or federal or state laws. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4681, 4682. The MCRA
authorizes suit by the Attorney General or any aggrieved person. Id.
In 1995, the Office of the Attorney General submitted a bill to amend the
MCRA by adding a section that prohibited certain conduct in and around reproductive
health facilities. L.D. 1216 (117th Legis. 1995) (ECF No. 36-1). Through the
legislative process, the scope of protection was expanded to cover conduct outside all
buildings, rather than just reproductive health facilities. One observer noted that this
change made the bill “generic or neutral . . . [t]he new bill protects all buildings and
business establishments . . . including crisis pregnancy centers, pro-life groups’
headquarters and offices, etc.” L.D. 1216 at 29 (117th Legis. 1995). A summary of the
proposed bill included a section on why it had been offered:
The history of civil rights enforcement in this country over the past
several years has demonstrated that the most extreme violence tends to
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occur in situations where less serious civil rights violations are
permitted to escalate. When the rhetoric of intolerance and the
disregard for civil rights do, in fact, escalate, then some people at the
fringes of society will take that atmosphere as a license to commit
unspeakable violence. The amended version of L.D. 1216 represents a
commitment on the part of both sides of the abortion debate to reduce
tensions in order to lessen the chances of tragic violence.
L.D. 1216 at 14 (117th Legis. 1995). As enacted, the amendment made it a violation
of the MCRA to interfere or attempt to interfere with a person’s civil rights by: (1)
physically obstructing the entrance or exit of a building; (2) making repeated
telephone calls to disrupt activities in a building; (3) setting off any device that
releases “noxious and offensive odors” within a building; or (4) making noise that can
be heard within a building, after having been ordered by law enforcement to stop,
with the intent to jeopardize or interfere with the delivery of health services inside.
5 M.R.S.A. § 4684-B(2).
In the instant suit, March challenges the constitutionality of the noise portion
of the amendment, which reads:
2. Violation. It is a violation of this section for any person, whether or
not acting under color of state law, to intentionally interfere or attempt
to intentionally interfere with the exercise or enjoyment by any other
person of rights secured by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State
by any of the following conduct:
D. After having been ordered by a law enforcement officer to cease such
noise, intentionally making noise that can be heard within a building
and with the further intent either:
(1) To jeopardize the health of persons receiving health services within
the building; or
(2) To interfere with the safe and effective delivery of those services
within the building.

4

5 M.R.S.A. § 4684-B(2)(D) (the “Noise Provision”).1
March filed suit in December of 2015, along with a motion for a preliminary
injunction. Compl. (ECF No. 1); Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 4). He later filed
an amended complaint. First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 30). The parties declined to
exchange discovery or present evidence through a hearing in connection with the
preliminary injunction motion, and instead simply chose to present their positions
through oral argument. Report of Hr’g & Order Re: Scheduling (ECF No. 46). The
parties also submitted supplemental briefing to address additional questions raised
at oral argument. Thus, the evidence at my disposal is limited to the declarations,
videos, and additional documents the parties attached as exhibits to their
preliminary injunction briefing.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Health Center is located on the second floor of a building on Congress
Street, a loud and busy thoroughfare. First March Decl. ¶¶ 10, 22; Feb. 22, 2016
March Decl. ¶ 6 (“Second March Decl.”) (ECF No. 43-5). The Health Center
relocated to Congress Street in September of 2011. Feb. 8, 2016 Healey Aff. ¶ 4
(“Healey Aff.”) (ECF No. 38). After this relocation, protesters opposed to abortion
began to congregate on the sidewalk in front of the entrance to the Health Center.
Healey Aff. ¶ 5. Approximately a dozen protesters would gather along the sidewalk

“Building” is defined as “any structure having a roof or a partial roof supported by columns or
walls that is used or intended to be used for shelter or enclosure of persons or objects regardless of the
materials of which it is constructed.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 4684-B(1)(A). “Health service” is defined as “any
medical, surgical, laboratory, testing or counseling service relating to the human body.” Id. at § 4684B(1)(B).
1

5

carrying signs, handing out literature, and attempting to engage in conversation with
individuals entering the building. Healey Aff. ¶ 7. In response to these protests, the
Health Center implemented a “greeter program” whereby volunteers would stand
outside of the facility to escort patients past the protesters into the Health Center.
Healey Aff. ¶ 6. The Health Center also hired City police officers to stand outside to
ensure that patients could safely enter and exit the facility. Healey Aff. ¶ 6.
Although protesters had gathered on the sidewalk outside of the Health Center
for years, they generally could not be heard within the facility. Healey Aff. ¶ 26. But
after the City repealed the buffer zone ordinance around the Health Center, the
protesters became much louder. Healey Aff. ¶¶ 8-9. One protester, Brian Ingalls,
began yelling disruptively outside of the Health Center, occasionally yelling directly
at patients inside the facility. Healey Aff. ¶ 10. At times, his yelling could be heard
inside the Health Center’s waiting room, counseling rooms, and an exam room.
Healey Aff. ¶ 11. In the counseling rooms, employees obtain patients’ medical
histories, take vital signs, discuss treatment options, potential risks, complications,
and side-effects. Healey Aff. ¶ 12. Employees also explain what a patient should
expect post-procedure and what at-home care the patient may require, while also
answering questions and ensuring that the patient has provided informed consent to
the treatment. Healey Aff. ¶ 12. Medical examinations and procedures are performed
in the Health Center’s exam rooms. Healey Aff. ¶ 13.

6

Loud and sustained yelling that is audible within the Health Center interferes
with the Health Center’s staff’s ability to provide care to their patients. Healey Aff.
¶ 15. This noise is problematic because:


To effectively deliver health services, staff need a calm and quiet environment
for their interactions with patients. Healey Aff. ¶ 14. Effective communication
between Health Center staff and patients is essential because of the
importance of obtaining accurate information regarding patients’ “medical
histor[ies], allergies, and other issues that may impact . . . medical care.” Feb.
8, 2016 Dowling Aff. ¶ 8 (“Dowling Aff.”) (ECF No. 35).



It is essential that patients fully understand and retain the information
provided to them by the Health Center regarding their medical procedure.
Health Center staff need to explain to patients “the various symptoms they
may experience after they leave [the] facility, including which symptoms are
to be expected and which symptoms are abnormal.” Dowling Aff. ¶ 10. If a
patient does not understand or retain this information, the medical
repercussions can be significant. Dowling Aff. ¶ 10.



It becomes very difficult to communicate with patients when protesters are
loud enough that they can be heard inside the building. The loud noise
distracts patients and renders them unable to concentrate on their discussions
with staff. This in turn causes staff to spend more time repeating instructions
to patients, which causes additional delays for the entire facility. Dowling
Aff. ¶¶ 11-12



“When abortion procedures are delayed, the medical risks associated with such
procedures increase.” Dowling Aff. ¶ 13; see also Healey Aff. ¶ 20. At least one
patient requested that her appointment be postponed to a later date “because
of the disruptive effect of noise.” Dowling Aff. ¶ 13.



“[D]elays have an escalating effect throughout the facility” because they impact
all patients waiting for care. Dowling Aff. ¶ 15. “The longer patients wait, the
longer they are subjected to the loud shouting of protesters, with a
corresponding increase in their agitation and emotional distress.” Dowling Aff.
¶ 15.



Loud noise from outside the building has a physiological effect on patients,
causing “additional stress and elevated blood pressure, pulse, and respiratory
rates.” Healey Aff. ¶ 16. Such physical effects interfere with medical care
because patients require “additional evaluation and treatment.” This also can
lead to treatment being delayed. Healey Aff. ¶ 16.

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

The Health Center provides “many patients with anti-anxiety medications
prior to abortion procedures.” Healey Aff. ¶ 18. When patients are subjected to
noise from protesters on the sidewalk, staff often have to “give patients
multiple doses of medication until the[ir] anxiety is under control.” Healey Aff.
¶ 18. Providing these additional doses can result in further delay of care.
Healey Aff. ¶ 18.



Transitory noise produced by parades, sirens, and car horns have the potential
to disrupt medical care. However, those noises are normally brief in duration
and any disruption dissipates quickly. “[U]nabated constant noise” that is
specifically directed at patients “is uniquely disruptive” to the Health Center’s
ability to provide medical care. Healey Aff. ¶¶ 29-30.
Furthermore, such noise often causes patients to complain to staff and ask to

move to other areas of the Health Center where the noise is less audible. Healey Aff.
¶ 22. The Health Center has tried to mitigate the impact of noise on their patients by
relocating exam rooms and moving patients into recovery areas where the noise is
less audible. This can be problematic, however, because patients are then separated
from people who are there to support them, as recovery areas are restricted to
patients and staff. Healey Aff. ¶ 28.
The Health Center contacts the police when at least two staff members
determine that the noise level outside has reached a point where it is having an
impact on patients and interfering with the staff’s ability to provide medical care.
Healey Aff. ¶ 23. Typically, the responding police officer will enter the Health Center
to verify the noise level before taking any action.2 Healey Aff. ¶ 24. The Health Center
called the police on multiple occasions after Ingalls repeatedly yelled and screamed
directly at patients inside the Health Center. Healey Aff. ¶ 10.

The parties dispute whether the noise level was verified by police on the instances where the
Health Center lodged complaints against March. See pg. 10 n.4 infra.
2

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In October of 2015, the Attorney General’s Office brought an action against
Ingalls under the MCRA. Feb. 8, 2016 Robbin Aff. ¶ 4 (“Robbin Aff.”) (ECF No. 37).
Since the MCRA was enacted in 1995, the Attorney General’s Office has filed 12 other
actions relating to incidents around clinics that provide abortion and family planning
services. Robbin Aff. ¶ 5. Ten actions have been filed to protect abortion protesters’
First Amendment rights and two actions have been brought against abortion
protesters. Robbin Aff. ¶ 5. The Ingalls case is the first instance in which the Attorney
General’s Office has brought a case under the Noise Provision of the MCRA. See
Robbin Aff. ¶ 6.
After the State sued Ingalls under the MCRA, March began preaching on the
public sidewalk in front of the Health Center. First March Decl. ¶ 11. He preaches
from the sidewalk so he can effectively reach his intended audience of women and
employees before they enter the Health Center. First March Decl. ¶¶ 20-21. The
parties’ affidavits conflict on whether March ever shouted, but he was loud enough to
be heard within the Health Center on three occasions.3 He does not engage in group
chanting or use an amplification device while preaching outside of the Health Center.
First March Decl. ¶¶ 12-15.

Healey avers that on November 6, December 4, and December 11, 2015, March could be heard
within the building and was disrupting patient care. Feb. 8, 2016 Healey Aff. ¶ 25 (“Healey Aff.”)
(ECF No. 38). March does not dispute that he could be heard within the building, but he does argue
that he was “peacefully” preaching on those dates. Dec. 28, 2015 March Decl. ¶¶ 27, 50, 61 (“First
March Decl.”) (ECF No. 5-1). Sneddon claims that March peacefully preaches at a normal volume
and was not excessively loud on November 6, 2015. Dec. 28, 2015 Sneddon Decl. ¶¶ 6, 12 (“First
Sneddon Decl.”) (ECF No. 5-2). Leen asserts that March never shouts or yells, that he was “peacefully
preaching” on November 6 and December 4, and that he was “preaching” on December 11, 2015. Dec.
29, 2015 Leen Decl. ¶¶ 6, 19, 29, 36 (“Leen Decl.”) (ECF No. 5-3).
3

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On November 6, 2015, March was approached by Defendant Nadeau and
another police officer while he was preaching on the sidewalk outside of the Health
Center. First March Decl. ¶¶ 27-28. Officer Nadeau informed March that he had
received a complaint from a Health Center employee who said that March could be
heard within the building. First March Decl. ¶ 29. The parties dispute whether the
police officers verified whether March could be heard inside the building.4 When
March asked Officer Nadeau for an objective volume at which he could speak, Officer
Nadeau informed him that there was no objective volume and that the law was based
on whether Health Center employees could hear him inside. First March Decl. ¶ 32.
After March again asked Officer Nadeau for an objective standard, he requested that
March keep his voice down so they cannot hear him inside. Pl.’s Ex. B (ECF No. 9).
An officer approached March later that day and handed him a copy of the
MCRA. First March Decl. ¶¶ 41-42. The officer informed March that he was officially
being warned under the MCRA. First March Decl. ¶ 45. After March was officially
warned, he spoke at a quieter volume, but this made it more difficult for him to convey
his pro-life message over the noise on Congress Street. First March Decl. ¶ 47. March
feared he would be completely banned from speaking on the sidewalk. First March
Decl. ¶ 48.

Healey asserts that typically the police verify the noise level before taking any action, and that
the police likely verified March’s volume on all three occasions that they spoke to March. Healey Aff.
¶¶ 24, 25. March and Leen assert “upon information and belief” that the police officers who approached
him on November 6, 2015 did not confirm that his voice could be heard inside the building. First March
Decl. ¶ 30; Leen Decl. ¶ 21.
4

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On December 4, 2015, March was again preaching on the sidewalk in front of
the Health Center when Defendant Lieutenant Preis told him to lower his voice. First
March Decl. ¶¶ 50-51. Earlier in the day, a climate change march, which included
hundreds of people shouting and chanting in unison, had passed in front of the Health
Center on Congress Street. First March Decl. ¶ 25. March asked Lieutenant Preis
why the much louder climate change protest was permissible but his preaching was
not. First March Decl. ¶ 52. Lieutenant Preis explained to March that the MCRA
applies if Health Center staff can articulate that noise, and specifically the type of
speech and what is said, is interfering with a medical procedure. Pl.’s Ex. F (ECF No.
9). Lieutenant Preis acknowledged that the standard was “very grey” and that other
noises may be louder than March. First March Decl. ¶ 55; Pl.’s Ex. F. March asked
Lieutenant Preis if the content of his speech was the problem, and Preis said that it
was a combination of things. Pl.’s Ex. F. March responded that, what Lieutenant
Preis had just said to him was that it was not necessarily his volume that was the
problem, but the content of what he was saying. Pl.’s Ex. F. Lieutenant Preis again
explained that the MCRA applies if the noise that someone makes, which could be
content, interferes with the ability of somebody to deliver medical services. Pl.’s Ex.
F. March’s interaction with Preis made him fear that he would be sued for preaching
on the sidewalk. First March Decl. ¶ 60.
On December 11, 2015, March was again preaching outside of the Health
Center. Second March Decl. ¶ 1. A Health Center employee came down to the
sidewalk and told Defendant Officer Hults that March could be heard upstairs.

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Second March Decl. ¶ 2. After going upstairs to confirm the employee’s allegation,
Officer Hults gave March the “thumps up sign,” which March interpreted to mean he
could continue to speak at the same volume. Second March Decl. ¶ 4. Approximately
20 minutes later, a Health Center employee came back downstairs and spoke with
Officer Hults. Second March Decl. ¶ 6. After speaking with the employee, Officer
Hults told March to quiet down.5 First March Decl. ¶¶ 61-62. He also told March he
could be charged with disorderly conduct. First March Decl. ¶ 66.
On other occasions, individuals outside of the Health Center have been louder
than March and other pro-life advocates. For instance, an unidentified man often
loudly plays guitar and sings down the road in front of the Health Center. Dec. 29,
2015 Leen Decl. ¶¶ 15-16 (“Leen Decl.”) (ECF No. 5-3). In October of 2015, a woman
yelled at Ingalls outside of the Health Center for approximately five minutes. Feb.
20, 2016 Hebert Decl. ¶¶ 12-13 (“Hebert Decl.”) (ECF No. 43-3). The woman was not
cited under the MCRA. Hebert Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. On or about December 18, 2015,
another woman loudly yelled and cursed at March on the sidewalk outside of the
Health Center. Leen Decl. ¶¶ 17-18. March asked a nearby police officer if the
woman’s behavior violated the MCRA, and the officer said that the woman had a right
to free speech. Leen Decl. ¶ 17. And pro-choice advocates frequently yell and scream
at pro-life advocates outside of the Health Center for up to ten minutes at a time.
Hebert Decl. ¶¶ 20-23.

March also attests that Officer Hults did not reconfirm that he could be heard within the
Health Center on December 11, 2015. Second March Decl. ¶ 7.
5

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Since March filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on December 30, 2015,
he has continued to preach on the sidewalk outside of the Health Center. On January
8, 2016, March stood on a milk crate outside of the Health Center and spoke to
passers-by and a group of protesters. Robbin Aff. ¶ 7; see Ex. A to Robbin Aff. (ECF
No. 37-1). March could be heard by those in his vicinity even though he did not yell
or raise his voice. Robbin Aff. ¶ 7. Likewise, on January 28, 2016, March again stood
on a milk crate on the sidewalk outside of the Health Center for an hour to an hour
and a half and spoke about his opposition to abortion. Healey Aff. ¶ 27. Although
March could be heard by others on the sidewalk, the Health Center did not complain
to the police because he could not be heard inside the building. Healey Aff. ¶ 27.
DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff challenges the Noise Provision as a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, both facially and as-applied. Because I find that the
Plaintiff is likely to succeed on his claim that the Noise Provision is facially
unconstitutional, I do not go on to consider the as-applied challenge.
I.

Legal Standard for Injunctive Relief and Burdens of Proof
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate: “(1) a likelihood

of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm absent interim relief, (3)
a balance of equities in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) service of the public interest.”
Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci. Advancements, Inc., 794 F.3d 168, 171 (1st
Cir. 2015). The First Circuit has described likelihood of success on the merits as “the
main bearing wall” of the preliminary injunction standard. Ross-Simons of Warwick,
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Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996); accord Corp. Techs., Inc. v.
Harnett, 731 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2013).
As the party seeking a preliminary injunction the Plaintiff bears the overall
burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). In the First Amendment context, the moving party
must make an initial showing that the challenged law infringes on First Amendment
rights. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 n.5 (1984). If
a plaintiff makes this initial showing, then the burden shifts to the government to
justify its regulation on speech. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666; see also Thalheimer v.
City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Courts asked to issue
preliminary injunctions based on First Amendment grounds face an inherent tension:
the moving party bears the burden of showing likely success on the merits—a high
burden if the injunction changes the status quo before trial—and yet within that
merits determination the government bears the burden of justifying its speechrestrictive law.”).
II.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A.

Legal Background
1.

Facial Challenge

Generally, a plaintiff mounting a facial attack must meet the demanding
burden of “establish[ing] ‘that no set of circumstances exists under which [the law]
would be valid.’ ”United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). In the First Amendment context,
however, this requirement is refined: a plaintiff can attack a law on its face by arguing
14

that it “do[es] not have ‘a plainly legitimate sweep.’ ”6 Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town
of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). In addressing the facial challenge, I
focus “not on the historical facts of how the statute has been applied,” but on the text
of the law itself. McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2004).
2.

Framework for Analysis Under the First Amendment

The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech[.]” U.S. Const. amend. I. “Freedom of speech ‘is the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.’ ” McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 42
(1st Cir. 2001) [hereinafter McGuire I] (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)). Freedom of speech, however, is not an absolute right. At
times, it must be weighed against other rights and legitimate interests that the state
seeks to protect, and “[t]his balance may be weighted differently . . . depending upon
the nature of the restriction that the government seeks to foster.” Id.
The well-recognized framework for addressing the constitutionality of the
Noise Provision turns on three considerations: (1) whether the First Amendment
protects the speech at issue; (2) the nature of the forum; and (3) the appropriate level
of scrutiny. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797

A party may also mount a second type of facial challenge to a statute under the overbreadth
doctrine. Under this standard, “[a] facial challenge may . . . succeed where even though ‘one or more
valid application exists, the law's reach nevertheless is so elongated that it threatens to inhibit
constitutionally protected speech.’ ” Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 70 n.7
(1st Cir. 2014) (quoting McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2001)). Here, the Plaintiff does not
raise an overbreadth challenge.
6

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(1985). It is undisputed that the Plaintiff’s speech is protected under the First
Amendment7 and that the Noise Provision restricts speech in a public forum.
Traditional public fora—such as sidewalks, streets, and parks—“occupy a ‘special
position in terms of First Amendment protection’ because of their historic role as sites
for discussion and debate.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529 (quoting United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)). Given this importance, the government’s ability to
regulate speech in these fora is highly constrained. Id. at 2529.
Turning to the third factor, the proper level of scrutiny depends on whether
the law is content-based or content-neutral. The government may not “inhibit,
suppress, or impose differential content-based burdens on speech.” McGuire I, 260
F.3d at 42. Such restrictions are generally impermissible because they “pose a high
risk that the sovereign is, in reality, seeking to stifle unwelcome ideas rather than to
achieve legitimate regulatory objectives.” Id. Given this high risk, content-based
restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505
U.S. 377, 386 (1992). Under this exacting standard, the law “must be the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at
2530. “If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the
legislature must use that alternative.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529
U.S.

803,

813

(2000).

Although

content-based

restrictions

are

presumed

Only a few categories of speech are not protected by the First Amendment. These categories
include obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct. See United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
7

16

unconstitutional, R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382, such restrictions can survive in rare cases.
See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015).
“[W]hen a statute does not regulate speech per se, but, rather, restricts the
time, place, and manner in which expression may occur,” judicial review is more
lenient. McGuire I, 260 F.3d at 43. These “laws are less threatening to freedom of
speech because they tend to burden speech only incidentally, that is, for reasons
unrelated to the speech's content or the speaker's viewpoint.” Id. Accordingly, while
content-based restrictions are presumed unconstitutional, content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions “enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.” Naser
Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, 513 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2008). Such restrictions are
subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC., 512 U.S. 622,
642 (1994). Under this standard, the government must demonstrate that the
restriction “is ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that
[it] leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’ ”
Cutting v. City of Portland, 802 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
As evidenced by the number of sharply divided Supreme Court cases on the
topic, determining whether an ordinance is content-neutral or content-based is
tricky,8 and abortion protest cases are uniquely challenging. Two recent Supreme
Court cases—McCullen and Reed—shed light on this difficult inquiry.

See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular
regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”); see also City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (applying content-neutral standard to a law that applied
8

17

a.

McCullen

The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a Massachusetts law
which established buffer zones around abortion facilities in McCullen. The law
provided:
No person shall knowingly enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk
adjacent to a reproductive health care facility within a radius of 35 feet
of any portion of an entrance, exit or driveway of a reproductive health
care facility or within the area within a rectangle created by extending
the outside boundaries of any entrance, exit or driveway of a
reproductive health care facility in straight lines to the point where such
lines intersect the sideline of the street in front of such entrance, exit or
driveway.
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, § 120E½(b) (West 2012), invalidated by McCullen, 134 S.
Ct. at 2541, repealed by 2014 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 197 (S.B.2283) (West). The law
defined a “reproductive health care facility” as “a place, other than within or upon the
grounds of a hospital, where abortions are offered or performed.” Id. § 120E½(a). And
the law exempted:
(1) persons entering or leaving such facility; (2) employees or agents of
such facility acting within the scope of their employment; (3) law
enforcement, ambulance, firefighting, construction, utilities, public
works and other municipal agents acting within the scope of their
employment; and (4) persons using the public sidewalk or street rightof-way adjacent to such facility solely for the purpose of reaching a
destination other than such facility.
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2526 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court first found that the law was facially content-neutral because it did
“not draw content-based distinctions on its face[,]” nor “require[] ‘enforcement

only to theaters showing films with sexually explicit content because law was aimed at the secondary
effects of adult theatres on the surrounding community).

18

authorities’ to ‘examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine
whether’ a violation has occurred.” Id. at 2531 (quoting FCC v. League of Women
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)). A violation of the law did not depend on what
was said, but rather where it was said. See id. (“[P]etitioners can violate the Act
merely by standing in a buffer zone, without displaying a sign or uttering a word.”).
The fact that the law only established buffer zones outside of clinics that
performed abortions did not render the law content-based. Although this limitation
had “the ‘inevitable effect’ of restricting abortion-related speech more than speech on
other subjects[,]” the Court explained that “a facially neutral law does not become
content based simply because it may disproportionately affect speech on certain
topics.” Id. Rather, “ ‘[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others.’ ” Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). Because the State’s
asserted justifications for the law—public safety, promoting access to healthcare, and
the unobstructed use of sidewalks and roadways—were content-neutral, the Court
applied (and ultimately struck down) the law under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at
2532-34.
The Court likewise rejected the argument that the law’s exemptions rendered
it viewpoint based. While acknowledging that exemptions can be problematic at
times, the Court found that the record did not show that the exemptions for clinic
employees and their agents were an attempt by the State to favor one side of the
abortion debate over the other. Id. at 2533. To the extent that the record reflected

19

instances where escorts acted outside of the scope of their employment by
“thwart[ing] petitioners’ attempts to speak and hand literature to” women inside the
buffer zones, the Court noted that those allegations might amount to a claim for
selective enforcement. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2533.
b.

Reed

The Supreme Court’s most recent case examining the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral laws is Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218
(2015). Reed involved a municipal sign code that regulated where and how various
signs could be placed within the Town. For example, “Ideological Sign[s]” were
permitted to be 20 square feet in area and allowed “in all zoning districts without
time limits,” but “Political Sign[s]” were only allowed to be “up to 16 square feet on
residential property and up to 32 square feet on nonresidential property, undeveloped
municipal property, and rights-of-way.” Id. at 2224 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event” were
limited to six square feet and were only permitted on “private property or on a public
right-of-way,” and only four signs could be “placed on a single property at any time.”
Id. at 2225.
After a small local church was twice cited for violating the sign code for placing
too many temporary signs in a public right-of-way, it brought suit to challenge the
law on First Amendment grounds. See id. The Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the
District Court, held that the sign code “was content-neutral because the Town ‘did
not adopt its regulation of speech [based on] disagree[ment] with the message
conveyed,’ and its justifications for regulating temporary directional signs were
20

‘unrelated to the content of the sign.’ ” Id. at 2227 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
707 F.3d 1057, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2013)).
The Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas
explained:
Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed. This commonsense meaning of the phrase “content based”
requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech “on its face”
draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some facial
distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech
by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining
regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn
based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to
strict scrutiny.
Id. at 2227 (internal citations omitted). Applying this standard, the Court held that
the Town’s sign code was “content based on its face” because whether it applied
“depend[ed] entirely on the communicative content of the sign” in question. Id. Simply
put, “the Church's signs inviting people to attend its worship services [were] treated
differently from signs conveying other types of ideas.” Id. Accordingly, the
constitutionality of the code needed to be assessed under strict scrutiny.
The Court found that the Ninth Circuit overlooked “the crucial first step in the
content-neutrality analysis” by failing to consider whether the law was content-based
on its face. Id. at 2228. If a law is content-neutral on its face, a court may go on to
examine the government’s justification for the law to determine whether an improper
legislative intent exists. But “a law that is content based on its face is subject to strict
scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification,
or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” Id. (quoting
21

Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)). Thus, “an innocuous
justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content
neutral.” Id. Given that the sign code was content-based on its face, the Town’s
justifications for enacting it were irrelevant. Id. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court
struck down the sign code. Id. at 2232.
B.

Application of Law
1.

Whether the Noise Provision is Content-Based or ContentNeutral on its Face

As Reed makes clear, I must first determine whether the Noise Provision draws
content-based distinctions on its face before considering the State’s justification for
its enactment. In arguing that the law is facially content-based, the Plaintiff focuses
primarily on the portion of the Noise Provision that restricts making noise with the
intent “[t]o interfere with the safe and effective delivery of [health services].” 5
M.R.S.A. § 4684-B(2)(D)(2). According to the Plaintiff, this language demonstrates
that the Noise Provision is content-based because it disfavors “oppositional” speech.
Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 3 (“Pl.’s Reply”) (ECF No. 43).
As noted above, the Reed Court observed that: “Some facial distinctions based
on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and
others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose.” 135 S.
Ct. at 2227. The Noise Provision applies only to individuals who intentionally make
noise that can be heard within a building with the “intent . . . [t]o jeopardize the
health of persons receiving health services . . . or . . . interfere with the safe and
effective delivery of those services.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 4684-B(2)(D)(1)-(2). The application
22

of the Noise Provision turns both on the mode or method of expression (i.e., the
volume) and on the purpose of the noise (i.e., to disrupt). In other words, the Noise
Provision regulates noise, in part, by its function or purpose. Outside a health care
facility that performs abortions, a pro-life protester’s activity would be treated
differently under the Noise Provision than a pro-choice protester’s activity.
Conversely, outside a crisis pregnancy counseling center, a pro-choice protester’s
noise would be treated differently than a pro-life protester’s noise. The difference in
treatment is based on the message expressed.9
In McCullen, the Court stated that a statute “would be content based if it
required ‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘examine the content of the message that is
conveyed to determine whether’ a violation has occurred.”134 S. Ct. at 2531 (quoting
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 383). Here, where there is protest
involving speech, authorities would need to examine the content of that speech to
determine whether the speaker is in violation of the Noise Provision. As the State
concedes, “[t]he fact that a person shouting loudly outside a reproductive health clinic
is expressing views against abortion is evidence that the person is attempting to

9

The State contends that the Noise Provision is content-neutral because it is not limited to
individuals expressing pro-life messages. See State Def.’s Opp’n 14 (“Def.’s Opp’n”) (ECF No. 34). But
contrary to the State’s argument, the fact that the Noise Provision would apply equally to pro-choice
protestors outside of a pro-life crisis pregnancy counseling center only demonstrates that it is not
viewpoint-based, not that it is content-neutral. Viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are “an
egregious form of content discrimination” because they “target[] not subject matter, but particular
views taken by speakers on a subject.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995). The fact that the Noise Provision would apply equally to speakers on both sides of the
debate does not render it content-neutral. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015)
(“[A] speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not
discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.”). Although the Plaintiff asserted in
briefing that the Noise Provision was viewpoint-based, at oral argument Plaintiff’s counsel indicated
that she was withdrawing that argument.

23

interfere with the delivery of medical services inside the facility.” State Def.’s Opp’n
15 (“Def.’s Opp’n”) (ECF No. 34). On the other hand, a person who screams back at
pro-life protestors would not be in violation of the Noise Provision since she would
lack the requisite intent to interfere with delivery of medical services.10
The State cites Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), another abortion buffer
zone case, for the proposition that a law can be content neutral even if it allows
authorities to look “at the content of an oral or written statement in order to
determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct.” Def.’s Opp. 15 n.9
(citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 721). In Hill, pro-life “sidewalk counselors” challenged a law
that banned any approach within eight feet of a person “for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or
counseling.” 530 U.S. at 707 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The law applied
“to all . . . demonstrators whether or not the demonstration concern[ed] abortion.” Id.
at 725. Although Justice Stevens recognized that “[t]heoretically . . . cases may arise
in which it is necessary to review the content of the statements made by a person
approaching . . . an unwilling listener to determine whether the approach is covered
by the statute[,]” he reasoned that this “kind of cursory examination” would not be

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in State v. Janisczak, 579 A.2d 736 (Me. 1990)
lends support to my conclusion that the Noise Provision is content-based. There, the court analyzed
the validity of Maine’s obstructing government administration statute in light of a First Amendment
challenge. At the time, the statute provided that a person “is guilty of obstructing government
administration if he . . . engages in any criminal act with the intent to interfere with a public servant
performing or purporting to perform an official function.” 17–A M.R.S.A. § 751 (1983), amended by
P.L. 1997, ch. 351, § 2 and P.L. 2003, ch. 657, § 5. The court reasoned that, because the law “applies
only where the violator's intention is to obstruct government officials in the course of their duty, an
application of this statute to verbal protests cannot be deemed content-neutral.” Janisczak, 579 A.2d
at 739 n.6. As a result, the court held that “the time, place, and manner test for the constitutionality
of content-neutral restrictions on speech” was inapplicable. Id.
10

24

problematic. Id. at 721-22. But Justice Stevens also wrote: “it is unlikely that there
would often be any need to know exactly what words were spoken in order to
determine whether ‘sidewalk counselors’ are engaging in ‘oral protest, education, or
counseling’ rather than pure social or random conversation.” Id. at 721. In context, it
is clear that Justice Stevens’s “cursory examination” was to determine the broad
category of speech at issue: whether this was a social interaction or an oral protest.
The type of examination that the Noise Provision invites is more extensive: whether
the speaker outside a health facility that performs abortions was expressing a prochoice message or an anti-abortion message. Thus, even under Hill, the Noise
Provision is content-based because “its application turns on the substance of a
communication,” not merely “the mode or method of expression.” Bruni v. City of
Pittsburgh, 91 F. Supp. 3d 658, 668 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
Citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), the State contends that it is
permissible to “[c]onsider[] a speaker’s words in determining the speaker’s intent”
without implicating the First Amendment. Def.’s Opp’n 15 n.9. In Mitchell, the
Supreme Court dealt with a Wisconsin statute that enhanced criminal sentences for
defendants who intentionally selected their victims based on “race, religion” or other
protected categories. 508 U.S. at 480. The defendant argued—and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court agreed—that the statute violated the First Amendment because it
punished “offenders’ bigoted beliefs.” Id. at 485. The Supreme Court held that the law
survived the defendant’s First Amendment challenge, reasoning that the law was not
directed at protected expression itself, but rather overt criminal conduct that was

25

unprotected by the First Amendment. Id. at 487. The State has not advanced an
argument that the speech targeted by the Noise Provision is unprotected under the
First Amendment. Thus, the State’s reliance on Mitchell is not persuasive.
The State contends that the Noise Provision is content-neutral because it
“applies equally to all noise” and that it is “indifferent as to the nature or content of
the noise.” Def.’s Opp’n 13. The State cites Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir.
1989), where the Fifth Circuit held that an ordinance that banned the use of
loudspeakers within a certain proximity to medical facilities was content-neutral
because it “merely prohibit[ed] amplified speech within 150 feet of certain facilities
without regard for what [was] being said.” Id. at 1090. Yet, unlike the ordinance at
issue in Medlin and contrary to the State’s characterization, the Noise Provision does
not ban all noise; it bans only noise made with the “intent . . . [t]o jeopardize the
health of persons receiving health services . . . or . . . interfere with the safe and
effective delivery of those services.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 4684-B(2)(D)(1)-(2). Thus, the Noise
Provision targets a subset of loud noise—noise made with the intent to jeopardize or
interfere—and treats it less favorably.
The State also argues that the Noise Provision can be violated by conduct that
has no communicative content. As an example, the State posits that a person playing
a drum loudly “outside a medical facility with the intent to interfere with the
provision of medical services would be in violation of the statute even though the
noise being made expresses no message at all.” Def.’s Opp’n 14-15. It is certainly true
that there are ways to violate the statute that do not involve pure speech. But it is

26

also true that a person playing a drum is expressing a message. Clark, 468 U.S. at
294 (“[A] message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative
and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be
communicative.”). This message is what triggers the Noise Provision, whether it is
delivered verbally or by expressive conduct.
Finally, in arguing that the Noise Provision is content-neutral, the State relies
heavily on the MCRA’s benign legislative history, contending that the fact that prolife groups supported the enactment of the 1995 MCRA amendment undercuts any
argument that it is content-based. Def.’s Opp’n 12. However, like the Ninth Circuit
in Reed, the State skips the crucial first step of the analysis—the determination of
whether the law is content-neutral on its face. Reed makes clear that “an innocuous
justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content
neutral.” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. The legislature’s justification for enacting the
MCRA is irrelevant because the Noise Provision is content-based on its face.
Accordingly, under Reed, there is no need to address the legislature’s motives in
enacting the law. The Noise Provision must survive strict scrutiny in order to be
upheld as constitutional.
2.

Whether the Noise Provision Survives Strict Scrutiny

Given that the Noise Provision is content-based, it is presumed to be
unconstitutional. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. “While courts theoretically will uphold such
a regulation if it is absolutely necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is
narrowly tailored to the achievement of that end, such regulations rarely survive
strict scrutiny.” McGuire I, 260 F.3d at 43 (citations omitted). Under strict scrutiny’s
27

demanding standard, the law “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state interest.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2530. “If a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.” Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. And “[t]he existence of
adequate content-neutral alternatives . . . undercut[s] significantly any defense of
such a statute.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). It is the government’s burden to show that the law is constitutional. Playboy
Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 816.
This case implicates a number of important interests. It is well-established
that the State has a legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of its
citizens, which is a “traditional exercise of the [State’s] police powers.” Hill, 530 U.S.
at 715 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As is stated in the summary
of L.D. 1216, there is a history in this country of violence, sometimes extreme, that
arises from the tensions inherent in the abortion debate. L.D. 1216 at 14 (117th Legis.
1995). The State has a legitimate interest in deescalating these situations so that
they do not lead to violence. Moreover, the State has “a substantial interest in
protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.” City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984). And the Supreme Court has also
recognized an individual’s “right to avoid unwelcome speech” when such speech “is so
intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-17; see
also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (“The First Amendment permits the
government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the ‘captive’ audience

28

cannot avoid the objectionable speech.”). These interests become particularly
significant around hospitals and medical facilities “ ‘where human ailments are
treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and
worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day's
activity, and where the patient and his family . . . need a restful, uncluttered,
relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.’ ” Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 772 (1994) (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 783 n.12
(1979)). Thus, even “[t]he First Amendment does not demand that patients at a
medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political
protests.” Id. at 772-73. Accordingly, protecting the captive audience inside hospitals
and medical facilities from unwelcome noise that threatens their health and wellbeing is paramount. The State has established that it likely has compelling interests
at stake.
However, “even the most legitimate goal may not be advanced in a
constitutionally impermissible manner.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1980).
Here, the Noise Provision will not likely survive strict scrutiny because adequate
content-neutral alternatives could achieve the State’s asserted interest.11 See R.A.V.,

The State has proffered two limiting interpretations of the Noise Provision. The first is that “a
person would not be acting with the requisite intent” to interfere with health services “if there were
no possibility that he would interfere with the safe and effective delivery” of those health services.
State’s Suppl. Br. 2 (ECF No. 67). The import of this interpretation is that “a person would not be in
violation of [the Noise Provision] if . . . he protested outside of a closed health facility or outside of a
building where health services are not provided.” State’s Suppl. Br. 2. The second interpretation
concerns the longevity of an official warning under the Noise Provision. According to the State, it
interprets the warning provision as requiring that “the noise that forms the basis for an MCRA action
must be the same or substantially the same noise that was the subject of the warning.” State Suppl.
Br. 3. Although I have read the Noise Provision “in light of the limits set forth in” the State’s
11

29

505 U.S. at 396 (content-based ordinance not necessary because “[a]n ordinance not
limited to the favored topics . . . would have precisely the same beneficial effect”).
Current authority suggests that the State could enact a law prohibiting all “loud,
raucous, or unreasonably disturbing noise” outside of facilities providing medical
care. See Pine v. City of W. Palm Beach, 762 F.3d 1262, 1273 (11th Cir. 2014). Or, the
State might prohibit all noise made within a certain proximity to such facilities that
has the effect of disrupting the safe and effective delivery of health care. See, e.g.,
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (upholding anti-noise ordinance
that “punishes only conduct which disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school
activities”). In addition, the State (or the City) could limit all noise outside of
buildings offering health services if the noise exceeds a certain decibel level. See, e.g.,
City of Portland Ordinance § 4-57 (prohibiting noise over a certain decibel level for
facilities licensed by the state to sell liquor). Given the available content-neutral
alternatives, I conclude that it is likely that the Noise Provision is not necessary to
serve the State’s asserted interest.
The State argues that the intent element of the Noise Provision narrows the
reach of the law and targets only the noise that is the problem.12 It cites Burson v.

construction of the law, Cutting v. City of Portland, 802 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2015), this does not change
my conclusion that the Noise Provision is unlikely to survive strict scrutiny.
It is not clear to me that the Plaintiff’s loud protesting is the only noise that it problematic.
The Healey Affidavit suggests that other noise at least has the potential to be disruptive. Healey Aff.
¶¶ 29-30. The video marked as Plaintiff’s Exhibit B illustrates this point. See Ex. B to Pl.’s Reply (ECF
No. 43-6). In it, a woman loudly and profanely assails the pro-life protestors. The pro-choice woman
shouts, “What are you doing with your child.” She is addressing the comment to the pro-life protestor
who has his child with him, and she objects to him exposing the child to the signs with pictures of
aborted fetuses. A patient in the examination room would be unlikely to realize that the loud prochoice protestor is addressing the pro-life protester and not the patient. The pro-choice protestor, who
12

30

Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992) (plurality opinion), for the proposition that there
is “no evidence” that any other noise is a problem and that “[t]he First Amendment
does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist.”13 State Supp. Br.
10 (ECF No. 67). It does seem “counterintuitive to argue that a law violates the First
Amendment by abridging too little speech.” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. But
“underinclusiveness can raise ‘doubts about whether the government is in fact
pursuing the interest it invokes.’ ” Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n., 564
U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).
Finally, the Plaintiff claims that other laws found in the Maine criminal
statutes could adequately serve the State’s interests of keeping order on the
sidewalk.14

Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 14. Although it is the State’s burden to

demonstrate that the Noise Provision can survive strict scrutiny, the State has not
offered any explanation as to why these alternative laws are inadequate.15

lacks the intent to disrupt medical services inside the building, would not be in violation of the Noise
Provision. But the pro-life protestor’s loud preaching would likely be a violation.
Further, beyond the fact that the State’s evidence seems to suggest that other noise at least
has the potential to be disruptive, see Healey Aff. ¶¶ 29-30, this portion of the plurality opinion in
Burson is not consistent with the strict scrutiny inquiry. As Justice Stevens points out in dissent, this
“no evidence” justification “contradicts a core premise of strict scrutiny—namely, that the heavy
burden of justification is on the State.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 226 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (plurality opinion). Requiring the challenger to present evidence of a problem takes the
burden away from the State to justify its restriction on speech.
13

A person violates Maine’s disorderly conduct statute if, “[i]n a public place, the person
intentionally or recklessly causes annoyance to others by intentionally [m]aking loud and
unreasonable noises.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501-A(1)(A)(1). Moreover, a person violates Maine’s harassment
statute if, without reasonable cause, they “engage[] in any course of conduct with the intent to harass,
torment, or threaten another person” after having been warned “not to engage in such conduct.” Id. §
506-A(1)(A).
14

I offer no opinion as to whether these laws “would pass constitutional muster.” McCullen, 134
S. Ct. at 2538 n.8.
15

31

Accordingly, I conclude that the State has not shown at this stage of the
proceeding that the Noise Provision is necessary to serve its interest in protecting its
citizens’ ability to receive safe and effective health care. Because it is likely that the
Noise Provision is content-based and will not survive strict scrutiny, I find that the
Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim.
III.

Remaining Injunctive Relief Factors
“In the First Amendment context, the likelihood of success on the merits is the

linchpin of the preliminary injunction analysis.” Sindicato Puertorriqueño de
Trabajadores v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) And “[t]he loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion). Thus,
“irreparable injury is presumed upon a determination that the movants are likely to
prevail on their First Amendment claim.” Fortuño, 699 F.3d at 11; see also Asociación
de Educación Privada de P.R., Inc. v. García-Padilla, 490 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2007).
Given my conclusion that the Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his
First Amendment claim, there is a presumption of irreparable harm. In arguing that
the Plaintiff is not likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, the State
points out that the Plaintiff continues to express his views in opposition to abortion
outside of the Health Center. Def.’s Opp’n 23. But the fact that the Plaintiff has
continued to preach outside the Health Center can cut the other way as well, as it
makes the threat to the Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights more imminent by making
it more likely that he will be cited for violating a content-based restriction on speech.

32

Moreover, the Plaintiff has attested that his encounters with the police have
caused him to speak more quietly, and that this makes it more difficult for him to
convey his message over the noise from Congress Street. The Plaintiff fears that the
State will bring a civil action against him because of the content of his constitutionally
protected speech, while other speakers on the public sidewalk are free to voice
opposing views at a louder volume. The harm is not so much that his message will be
“driven out” as it is that it may be “drowned out” of the marketplace of ideas. The
Plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that he will suffer irreparable harm
absent injunctive relief.
Turning to “the balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to the
nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if no injunction
issues,” Esso Standard Oil Co. (P.R.) v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted), I conclude that this factor supports the granting of a preliminary
injunction. The hardship to the Defendants if enjoined from enforcing a law that is
likely unconstitutional will be minimal. On the other side of the scale, continued
enforcement of a content-based restriction on speech would result in irreparable harm
to the Plaintiff.
Finally, whether an injunction serves the public interest is a close question.
Protecting constitutional rights and the free flow of ideas in traditional public fora
plainly serves the public interest. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529 (citation and
quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he guiding First Amendment principle that the
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its

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subject matter, or its content applies with full force in a traditional public forum.”).
But it is also unquestionably in the public interest to allow women to receive medical
treatment in a safe and peaceful environment. If I were balancing a woman’s right to
receive safe and effective medical treatment against the Plaintiff’s right to speak at
his chosen volume outside the windows of the Health Center, I would conclude that
the former is considerably more important than the latter. However, I must also
consider the realities of the situation. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d
8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004). The Defendants can further their interests of maintaining order
and protecting individual patients through the criminal code, most obviously the
disorderly conduct and harassment statutes. And the Defendants are free to pass
content-neutral legislation that can achieve the goal of a peaceful environment for
people receiving health care. While I understand the Defendants’ frustration with the
shifting sands of First Amendment jurisprudence, avenues are still open to protect
the interests on both sides of this debate. Given that there are alternatives available
to the State and the City, I conclude that the Plaintiff has met his burden of showing
that granting an injunction to prevent continued enforcement of a content-based law
would serve the public interest.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED. The Defendants are hereby PRELIMINARY

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ENJOINED from enforcing the Noise Provision, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4684-B(2)(D). The
remaining portions of the MCRA may be enforced.16
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nancy Torresen
United States Chief District Judge
Dated this 23rd day of May, 2016.

I find that 5 M.R.S.A. § 4684-B(2)(D) is severable from the remainder of the MCRA. See Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (“Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not
have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.”); Gilbert v. State, 505 A.2d 1326,
1329 (Me. 1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (“[W]here an unconstitutional and invalid
portion of a statute is separable from and independent of a part which is valid the former may be
rejected and the latter may stand.”). The remainder of the MCRA can still be given effect without the
Noise Provision.
16

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