OUELLETTE v. GAUDETTE et al

Filing 35

DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS - denying 6 Motion to Dismiss. By JUDGE D. BROCK HORNBY. (mnw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
MATTHEW LAUZON,
PLAINTIFF
V.

STEPHEN DODD, in his individual
capacity; ROGER BEAUPRE, in his
official capacity as Chief of Police for the
Biddeford Police Department and in his
individual capacity; AND CITY OF
BIDDEFORD,
DEFENDANTS

LAWRENCE OUELLETTE,
PLAINTIFF
V.

NORMAN
GAUDETTE,
in
his
individual
capacity;
ROGER
BEAUPRE, in his official capacity as
Chief of Police for the Biddeford Police
Department and in his individual
capacity; AND CITY OF BIDDEFORD,
DEFENDANTS

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CIVIL NO. 2:16-CV-51-DBH

CIVIL NO. 2:16-CV-53-DBH

DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
These two cases involve allegations that Biddeford police officers violated
the plaintiffs’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2015), as well as related state
laws. I previously entered an order and concluded that, but for a First Circuit
decision that troubled me, Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2001), I
was not prepared to say that the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiffs’

federal claims without a more developed record. See Dec. & Order on Pls.’ Mots.
to Am. Compl. & Order for Further Briefing on Defs.’ Mots. To Dismiss at 8-13
(ECF No. 41) (“Order”).

Before denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss,

however, I directed the parties to brief the significance of Nieves—a case where
the First Circuit stated—without elaborating—that because the district court had
properly determined that the 1983 claims against the individual police officers
were time-barred, the supervisory and municipal liability claims against the chief
and town “also must fail.” Nieves, 241 F.3d at 50. I asked the parties to address
whether I must follow Nieves and therefore dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against
Chief Beaupre and the City of Biddeford because the plaintiffs have dismissed
their 1983 claims against the individual police officers, Dodd and Gaudette.
After full briefing, I am satisfied that Nieves is not controlling and therefore DENY
the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Specifically, I am persuaded that these two cases are not governed by
Nieves because the plaintiffs in Nieves did not rely on the federal discovery rule.
In Nieves, unlike here, the only date of accrual for the statute of limitations was
the date of arrest and police contact because the plaintiffs “had ample reason to
know of the injury then and there.” Id. at 52. In contrast, at this stage of the
litigation in these two cases, the record before me is still undeveloped (on motions
to dismiss, not on summary judgment as in Nieves), as to whether there was an
underlying constitutional violation (even if the individual police officers are
dismissed from the section 1983 claims), see Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (“There is [ ] nothing to prevent a plaintiff from foregoing
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the naming of an individual officer as a defendant and proceeding directly to trial
against the municipality.”). It is also undeveloped as to when the plaintiffs knew
or should have known, through the exercise of due diligence, that Chief Beaupre
and the City of Biddeford were the proximate cause of their injuries.

See

Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018, 1033 (D. Mass. 1996); Order at 12.
Thus, because Nieves does not control the issue, and for the reasons stated
in my previous order addressing the application of the federal discovery rule, see
Order at 8-14, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED. These cases shall
proceed in the normal course.
SO ORDERED.
DATED THIS 9TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2016
/S/ D. BROCK HORNBY______________
D. BROCK HORNBY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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