PEREZ-WEBBER et al v. INTERCOAST CAREER INSTITUTE

Filing 10

ORDER denying 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and/or for a More Definite Statement. By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (MFS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
MARIA PEREZ-WEBBER and
JOSSIE REYNOSO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
INTERCOAST CAREER
INSTITUTE,
Defendant.

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2:16-cv-00196-JAW

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
Doing the same thing twice, one should expect the same result.1
I.

BACKGROUND
On April 6, 2016, the Plaintiffs, former students at the Nursing Program at

InterCoast Career Institute (InterCoast), filed this civil action claiming that
InterCoast failed to provide them the nursing education it had advertised was
available. Compl. (ECF No. 1). The Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, negligent
misrepresentation, and fraud. Id. On May 4, 2016, InterCoast moved to dismiss the
complaint and for a more definite statement. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. and/or

This sentence borrows from the quotation attributed to Albert Einstein that the definition of
insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. The Court does
not wish to disparage defense counsel and has cleansed the quotation.
At the same time, the Court observes that the current motions are virtually identical to the
Mason motions filed by InterCoast that the Court previously rejected, including the same
typographical error in the heading of each: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or
Motion for a Motion (sic) Definite Statement with Incorporated Memorandum of Law.
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Mot. for a Mo[re] Definite Statement (ECF No. 7) (Def.’s Mot.).

The Plaintiffs

responded on May 23, 2016. Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 9).
II.

Mason v. InterCoast Career Institute, No. 2:14-cv-00377-JAW
This is not the Court’s first ruling on a motion to dismiss and motion for more

definite statement filed by InterCoast against a former nursing student’s legal action
on the same set of facts. On September 23, 2014, Courtney Mason filed a civil action
against InterCoast alleging essentially the same underlying facts as form the basis
of Ms. Perez-Webber’s and Ms. Reynoso’s allegations against InterCoast. See Compl.,
Mason v. InterCoast Career Inst., No. 2:14-cv-00377-JAW (D. Me. Sept. 23, 2014)
(ECF No. 1) (Mason Compl.). Just as in this case, Ms. Mason has been represented
by Attorneys Guy Loranger and Danielle Campbell; InterCoast has been represented
by Attorney Frank K. N. Chowdry of Portland and Attorney Neil C. Evans of Sherman
Oaks, California.
On March 4, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part InterCoast’s
motions. Order on Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and Mot. for More Definite Statement,
Mason, No. 2:14-cv-00377-JAW (ECF No. 13) (Mason Order). In Mason, the Plaintiff,
a former nursing student like the Plaintiffs here, filed suit against InterCoast
claiming that she did not receive the nursing education that InterCoast promised in
its advertisements. Mason Compl. Courtney Mason, however, proceeded on the
following legal theories: (1) retaliation under the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection
Act, (2) breach of contract, (3) retaliation under the False Claims Act, (4) First
Amendment retaliation, and (5) due process retaliation. Id. at 1-4. In her response

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to InterCoast’s motions to dismiss and for more definite statement, Ms. Mason did
not oppose the dismissal of the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and False
Claims Act counts, but she objected to the dismissal of the remaining counts. Pl.’s
Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3-10, Mason, No. 2:14-cv-00377JAW (ECF No. 11). In its ruling, the Court granted the motion to dismiss as to the
unopposed counts, but rejected InterCoast’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract,
First Amendment retaliation, and due process retaliation counts. Mason Order at 2,
8-9. The Court also declined to grant InterCoast’s motion for more definite statement.
Id. at 9-10.
III.

DISCUSSION
In its Order on InterCoast’s motion to dismiss in the Mason case, the Court

explained that in its view, Ms. Mason had alleged sufficient facts to withstand the
motion, but more particularly, the Court observed:
This Court declines to issue a dispositive ruling in favor of Intercoast at
this early stage. Instead, it is preferable to allow the parties to engage
in discovery and frame the legal issues in a motion for summary
judgment.
Id. at 9. Similarly, in its Mason Order, the Court explained that “in the Court’s view,
there is nothing to be gained by forcing the Plaintiff to make a more definite
statement of her claim in her Complaint.” Id. at 10.
InterCoast proffered no reason the Court’s ruling in Mason should not apply
with equal force to essentially the same motions in this case. In fact, InterCoast did
not even mention the Court’s Mason Order in its motions in this case, much less make

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any effort to distinguish Mason. Def.’s Mot. at 1-4. For the same reasons the Court
denied InterCoast’s motions in Mason, the Court denies them here.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES InterCoast Career Institute’s Motion to Dismiss and/or

Motion for a [More] Definite Statement (ECF No. 7).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 31st day of October, 2016

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