BEANEY v. UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SYSTEM et al
Filing
18
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THEPLEADINGS granting 7 Motion to Dismiss By JUDGE JON D. LEVY. (akr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JEFFREY BEANEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE
SYSTEM, et al.,
Defendants.
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ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
Plaintiff Jeffrey Beaney filed suit in the Maine Superior Court against the
Defendants—the University of Maine System, James Page (the University System’s
Chancellor), and David Flanagan (formerly the President of the University of
Southern Maine). ECF No. 1-9. Beaney was previously employed as a hockey coach
and lecturer at the University of Southern Maine, and his Complaint arises out of
events leading to the termination of his employment in January 2015. Beaney asserts
claims for deprivation of due process under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2016), defamation,
intentional
misrepresentation,
negligent
misrepresentation,
and
intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 5-9. The Defendants removed the suit to federal
court, ECF No. 1, and now move for judgment on the pleadings on the § 1983 and
defamation claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c),1 ECF No. 7.
Although Defendants’ motion is styled as a motion to dismiss, they filed an answer to the Complaint
in state court, before removing the case. ECF No. 1-10. Their motion is therefore properly treated as
one for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50,
54 (1st Cir. 2006).
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts as set forth in the Complaint,2 which are largely denied by the
Defendants, are as follows.
Beaney was employed by the University for
approximately thirty years, from 1985 until January 2, 2015. From 2004 until his
employment ended in 2015, Beaney worked as a full-time hockey coach and lecturer.
In November 2014, the University received an anonymous letter containing
accusations of inappropriate behavior by the hockey team’s coaching staff, in violation
of the school’s sexual harassment policies. University officials allegedly told Beaney
that an independent investigation had revealed or was about to reveal that he was
personally responsible for the conduct alleged in the letter. Beaney denies engaging
in or allowing any inappropriate behavior.
Agents of the University allegedly threatened to terminate Beaney’s
employment for cause on the basis of the allegations if he did not retire. Beaney was
told that his termination for cause would result in the loss of his health, retirement,
and other benefits, including a tuition waiver for his son. On December 29, 2014,
President Flanagan allegedly declared that Beaney’s employment would be
terminated immediately unless he retired instead.
Beaney further alleges that
University agents falsely represented the nature of the benefits he would receive if
he agreed to retire. Beaney agreed to retire, effective January 2, 2015. After he
retired, he did not receive the benefits he was promised, and his son’s tuition waiver
Beaney filed an Amended Complaint in state court before the case was removed to federal court.
See ECF No. 1-9. For simplicity’s sake, the Amended Complaint is referred to in this decision as “the
Complaint.”
2
2
was revoked. An independent investigation later determined that there was no basis
for any of the accusations purportedly contained in the anonymous letter.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
Motions under Rule 12(c) are treated nearly the same as motions to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), with the “modest difference” that Rule 12(c) motions implicate
the pleadings as a whole. See Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54-55 (1st
Cir. 2006). Thus, I must view the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
and draw all inferences in his favor. Id. at 54. I am not tasked with resolving factual
disputes at this stage; I may enter judgment on the pleadings “only if the uncontested
and properly considered facts conclusively establish the movant’s entitlement to a
favorable judgment.” Id.
In order to survive a Rule 12(c) motion, as with a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Bovin Belskis v. DT Developers Inc., 2016 WL
5395833, at *10 (D. Me. Sept. 27, 2016); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
B.
Section 1983 Claim
Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment on Count One of the
Complaint, which alleges deprivation of due process in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
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ECF No. 7 at 5-12. The Defendants assert five3 separate arguments in support of this
contention: (1) the University has sovereign immunity from § 1983 liability; (2)
Beaney’s suit is precluded by his failure to avail himself of internal grievance
procedures; (3) Beaney has not sufficiently alleged personal liability on the part of
Defendants Flanagan and Page; (4) Beaney had no constitutionally-protected
property interest in his continued employment; and (5) Flanagan and Page are
entitled to qualified immunity.
1. The University’s Sovereign Immunity
Defendants assert that the University of Maine System is immune from suit
under § 1983 because it is an arm of the state. ECF No. 7 at 5-6. Beaney argues that
the University waived its immunity by removing the case to federal court, and asserts
that there is not enough information in the record to determine whether the
University qualifies as an arm of the state for purposes of § 1983. ECF No. 11 at 4.
Removing a suit from state to federal court does not result in a waiver of
sovereign immunity if the same immunity is available to the removing party in state
court. See Bergemann v. RI Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 665 F.3d 336, 342 (1st Cir. 2011).
If, however, a party is not immune from suit in state court, then removing the case to
federal court may constitute a waiver of immunity. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002). In Lapides, the Court held that the
University of Georgia had waived its immunity by removing a case to federal court,
where the state had explicitly waived immunity in state court. Id. at 616-17, 624.
Defendants also argued in their motion that Defendants Flanagan and Page could not be sued in
their official capacities. ECF No. 7 at 9-10. Plaintiff confirmed at oral argument, however, that he is
not suing either Flanagan or Page in his official capacity.
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4
The Court reasoned that “seriously unfair results” would result from a rule that
permitted a state to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, but then claim that
the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the suit due to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See id. at 619.
The First Circuit discussed Lapides at length in its decision in Bergemann, 665
F.3d at 340-41. In that decision, the First Circuit held that Rhode Island had not
waived its immunity by removing the case to federal court because the state would
also have been immune in the state court where the suit was originally filed. Id. at
342. Noting that the waiver by conduct doctrine is animated by a “desire to avoid
unfairness,” the court reasoned that there was “nothing unfair” about allowing Rhode
Island to assert its immunity after removal because that immunity was equally
robust in both state and federal court. Id. at 341-42. By contrast, allowing a party
to assert immunity in federal court after removing a case from a state court where it
did not have immunity would create the sort of unfair result discussed in both
Lapides and Bergemann. Accordingly, the question of whether the University can
assert sovereign immunity in this case, after having removed it to federal court, turns
on whether the University would have been immune from suit in the Maine state
court where the case was originally filed.4
The Maine Law Court has developed a two-part test for determining whether
a state agency is entitled to immunity under § 1983. See Campaign for Sensible
Defendants rely on Lockridge v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 2009 WL 1106529, at *21 (D. Me. Apr. 23, 2009)
adopted at 2009 WL 1585771 (D. Me. Jun. 4, 2009) to argue that the University is immune in federal
court. ECF No. 7 at 5. However, Lockridge does not answer the question presented in this case, as it
is silent as to both the University’s immunity in state court and the effect of removal to federal court.
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Transp. v. Me. Tpk. Auth., 658 A.2d 213, 216-17 (Me. 1995). Courts must determine:
“(1) [I]s the agency an alter ego of the state or is it relatively autonomous, and (2)
would funds to pay a judgment against the agency come from the state treasury.” Id.
(footnote omitted). The pleadings in this case do not provide enough information to
determine whether the University qualifies for immunity under this test.
The
pleadings alone offer no information regarding the governance of the University that
might shed light on whether it is an autonomous organization, or the sources of
funding that would be used to pay a judgment against it. Thus, it is premature to
determine whether the University would have been entitled to immunity in state
court, and, consequently, whether it waived immunity by removing the case to federal
court. Accordingly, at this early juncture, the University has not shown that it is
entitled to a judgment in its favor based on sovereign immunity.
2. Internal Grievance Procedure
Defendants argue that Beaney is precluded from bringing a due process claim
because he failed to take advantage of the internal grievance procedures that are
available to University employees. ECF No. 7 at 8-9. They argue that Beaney cannot
intentionally forego the process that was available to him, and then claim that he was
deprived of due process. Id. at 9.
“In order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must
have taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those
processes are unavailable or patently inadequate.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107,
116 (3d Cir. 2000). The Defendants point to the University’s Handbook for Nonrepresented Faculty and Salaried Staff (“the Handbook”) to demonstrate that there
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were internal grievance processes that Beaney declined to pursue following the
termination of his employment. ECF No. 7 at 8. Beaney argues that the Handbook
is not properly before the Court at this stage in the proceedings, but even if it were,
it does not necessarily apply to him. ECF No. 11 at 5-6.
In deciding a motion under Rule 12(c), a court can consider a document outside
of the pleadings if the allegations in the complaint are expressly linked to and
admittedly dependent upon the document. Beddall v. State St. Bank and Trust Co.,
137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998) (referring to Rule 12(b)(6)). Mere relevance to the
factual allegations in the complaint is not enough. Pimpiano v. Cent. Me. Power Co.,
221 F. Supp. 2d 6, 10 (D. Me. 2002) (“However ‘germane’ the documents may be, that
is not the test applied by this court.”).
Defendants rely on Goodman v. President and Trustees of Bowdoin Coll., 135
F. Supp. 2d 40 (D. Me. 2001), in claiming that the Handbook should be considered.
ECF No. 7 at 3, n.4. In Goodman, the court considered a similar student handbook
in ruling on a motion to dismiss a claim for breach of contract brought by a student
against a college. Id. at 46-47. The court determined that the handbook in that case
was central to the student’s allegation that a contractual relationship existed
between the student and the college. Id. at 47. The student agreed that it was central
to his contract claim, and he did not oppose the consideration of the handbook, which
had been submitted by the college. Id. at 46. The handbook was explicitly referenced
in the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 45.
Here, in contrast, Beaney opposes the Court’s consideration of the Handbook,
arguing that the only indication the Handbook may be relevant to his claims “is
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Defendants’ own say-so.” ECF No. 11 at 5; see also Knowlton v. Shaw, 708 F. Supp.
2d 69, 75 (D. Me. 2010) (noting that if parties dispute document’s relevance, then the
issue is better reserved for summary judgment stage). Furthermore, the Handbook
is not referenced in Beaney’s Complaint. See Goodman, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (“In
order for a document to be incorporated into the pleadings, the Court must find that
the document is ‘referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and . . . central to [a] claim.’”)
(quoting Beddall, 137 F.3d at 17).
The Handbook is also not central to Beaney’s claims. See Beddall, 137 F.3d at
17. Unlike the plaintiff in Goodman, who asserted that the defendants had breached
a contract defined by the student handbook, see 135 F. Supp. 2d at 45, Beaney asserts
a deprivation of due process claim under § 1983 that is not explicitly dependent on
the terms of the Handbook. In fact, based on the pleadings, it is not possible to
determine whether the Handbook controlled any of the terms of Beaney’s
employment.
Because the Handbook is neither referenced in Beaney’s Complaint nor central
to his claims, it is not properly before the Court at this stage in the proceedings. The
pleadings alone do not establish what internal procedures may have been available
to Beaney, or indicate whether those procedures were effectively “unavailable or
patently inadequate.” See Suzuki, 227 F.3d at 116. Accordingly, Defendants are not
entitled to judgment based on Beaney’s alleged failure to exhaust the University’s
internal grievance procedures.
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3. Personal Liability of Flanagan and Page
The Defendants argue that the Complaint does not sufficiently allege a basis
for personal liability on the part of Flanagan and Page. ECF No. 7 at 10-11. They
assert that Beaney has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Flanagan or Page
had any personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Id. Beaney counters that he has adequately alleged a basis for supervisory liability
on the part of Flanagan and Page, asserting that supervisors may be held liable for
the actions of their subordinates even if they do not personally interact with a
plaintiff. ECF No. 11 at 8.
“Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992) (quoting City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). Similarly, a person cannot be liable
under § 1983 solely by virtue of their position of authority. Guadalupe-Báez v.
Pesquera, 819 F.3d 509, 515 (1st Cir. 2016).
Supervisory liability may attach,
however, where a plaintiff shows that one of the supervisor’s subordinates abridged
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and that the supervisor’s action or inaction was
affirmatively linked to that behavior so that it can be characterized as
encouragement, condonation, acquiescence, or deliberate indifference. Id. at 514-515.
While a supervisor need not directly engage in unconstitutional behavior, the
supervisor’s liability must be premised on his or her own acts or omissions. Id. at
515.
In order to survive a motion under Rule 12(c), a complaint must allege
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. See In re Ariad Pharm., Inc. Sec.
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Litig., 842 F.3d 744, 756 (1st Cir. 2016). Here, the Complaint states that “Defendants’
agents” told Plaintiff that they had reason to believe that he was responsible for the
conduct alleged in the anonymous letter, and that they coerced him into resigning in
order to avoid termination for cause and the attendant loss of benefits. ECF No. 1-9
at 3-4. It further states that “[o]n or about December 29, 2014, Defendant Flanagan
declared that Plaintiff’s employment would be terminated immediately unless he
elected to ‘retire’ instead.” Id. at 4, ¶ 6 [sic]. Accepting these allegations as true and
drawing all inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, as I must at this stage, I find that
Beaney has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly infer supervisory liability on the part
of Flanagan. His personal involvement in the termination process, as evidenced by
his statement, may establish his “encouragement, condonation, or acquiescence” in
the asserted constitutional violation carried out by his subordinates. See GuadalupeBáez, 819 F.3d at 515; see also Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 907 (1st Cir.
1988) (finding inference of supervisory liability reasonable where supervisors were
aware of, but did nothing to correct, unconstitutional behavior by subordinates).
The Complaint does not, however, allege any facts suggesting that Page played
a role in the alleged deprivation of Beaney’s constitutional rights. The only mention
of Page in the Complaint is the statement that he is the Chancellor of the University.
See ECF No. 1-9 at 2, ¶ 3. As mentioned above, supervisory liability must be premised
on a defendant’s own acts or omissions, and not simply upon that person’s position of
authority. See Guadalupe-Báez, 819 F.3d at 515. The Complaint does not specifically
allege that Page was involved in, or indeed even aware of, the incidents leading to
Beaney’s allegedly coerced retirement. Nor is there a basis on which to infer a causal
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connection between Page’s acts or omissions and the constitutional violation alleged.
See Ramírez-Lluveras v. Rivera-Merced, 759 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have
stressed the importance of showing a strong causal connection between the
supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.”). The Complaint therefore fails
to allege sufficient facts to support a plausible inference of supervisory liability on
the part of Page. See Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding no
supervisory liability on part of police sergeants for constitutional violation occurring
within their district where defendants’ conduct played no role in alleged
constitutional violation).
Accordingly, Page is entitled to judgment with respect to the § 1983 claim
asserted against him.
4. Beaney’s Property Interest in Employment
Defendants also assert that Beaney cannot sustain a claim under § 1983
because he has not pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that he had a property
interest in his continued employment. ECF No. 7 at 7-8. Defendants claim that
Beaney was an at-will employee and the University was free to terminate him
without providing any process. Id. Defendants point to the Handbook as evidence
that Beaney was an at-will employee.
Id.
Beaney argues that the terms and
circumstances of his employment gave rise to an implied contract, and therefore he
had a constitutionally-protected interest in his continued employment. ECF No. 11
at 6-7.
At-will employees do not have a protected interest in continued employment
that would give rise to an entitlement to due process protections. Ayala-Rodríguez v.
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Rullan, 511 F.3d 232, 238 (1st Cir. 2007). Accordingly, if Beaney was an at-will
employee, he does not have a viable claim under § 1983. As discussed above, however,
the Handbook is not properly before the Court at this stage of the proceedings, so it
cannot be used to establish that Beaney was an at-will employee. The viability of his
claim therefore turns on whether Beaney has sufficiently pleaded the existence of a
protected interest in his continued employment.
An employer’s words and conduct, as well as rules and understandings
promulgated or fostered by an employer, may give rise to a protected property interest
in a public employee’s continued employment, even absent an express contract. Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972). Beaney contends that he has sufficiently
pleaded a property interest in his continued employment. ECF No. 11 at 6. The
Complaint alleges that Beaney was employed by the University from 1985 until 2015,
and that “[t]he terms and circumstances of Plaintiff’s employment were such that he
had a protected property interest and/or a liberty interest in his continued
employment at all relevant times.” ECF No. 1-9 at 2, ¶¶ 6, 9.
In order to survive a motion under Rule 12(c), as with a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), “a complaint must include ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ariad, 842 F.3d at 756 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Allegations that simply parrot the relevant legal standard
are to be disregarded as conclusory legal allegations, rather than allegations of fact.
Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
In Ariad, the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging violations
of the Securities Act. 842 F.3d at 757. The Securities Act allows plaintiffs to recover
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for false or misleading statements made in connection with a stock offering, provided
the plaintiffs can show that their securities are traceable to the public offering that
was the subject of the false or misleading statement. Id. at 755. The complaint in
Ariad generally alleged that the securities purchased by the plaintiffs were traceable
to the specific stock offering at issue. Id. The court held that this general allegation
was not sufficient to meet the pleading standard set out in Twombly and Iqbal. Id.
at 756. Noting that “traceability is an element of a [Securities Act] claim,” the court
held that “a general allegation that a plaintiff’s shares are traceable to the offering
in question is nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation’ of that element.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Because the complaint did not set forth sufficient facts
to plausibly suggest that the plaintiffs’ shares were issued in the specific offering, its
dismissal was upheld. Id.
Beaney’s assertion that the terms and conditions of his employment were such
that they gave rise to a protected interest is similar to the formulaic recitation
considered in Ariad. The existence of a protected interest in his employment is an
element of Beaney’s claim of a deprivation of his due process rights, much like the
traceability of the stock shares in Ariad was an element of the Securities Act claim.
A general allegation that this protected interest existed asserts a legal conclusion,
rather than a fact, and therefore is not entitled to the presumption of truth. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 681. In order to state a claim, the Complaint must allege facts, not merely
legal conclusions, that plausibly suggest that Plaintiff had a protected interest in his
continued employment. See id. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (quotations omitted); see
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also Ariad, 842 F.3d at 756.
Beyond the length of his employment with the
University, Beaney’s Complaint does not contain any specific factual allegations
regarding the “terms and conditions” of his employment that suggest that they gave
rise to a protected interest. See ECF No. 1-9.
Because Beaney failed to sufficiently allege a constitutionally-protected
interest in his continued employment, all of the Defendants are entitled to judgment
on Count I of the Complaint.
5. Flanagan and Page’s Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that Flanagan and Page are entitled to qualified
immunity because Beaney has not sufficiently alleged the violation of a clearly
established constitutional right. ECF No. 7 at 11-12. Beaney responds that existing
caselaw makes it clear that he could not be deprived of his employment without due
process. ECF No. 11 at 10-13.
Qualified immunity shields an official from money damages “unless a plaintiff
pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Alberti v. Carlo-Izquierdo, 548 F. App’x 625, 637 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). Whether or not the Defendants can be said to
have violated a clearly established right of Beaney’s depends on how the right at issue
is characterized. Employees do not have a clearly established right to due process
before the termination of at-will employment, see Alberti, 548 F. App’x at 638, but do
have a clearly established right to due process before the termination of an express
or implied public employment contract, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
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U.S. 532, 538 (1985). The question of whether Flanagan and Page are entitled to
qualified immunity therefore turns on whether Beaney is able to demonstrate that
he had a protected interest in his continued employment.
As discussed above, Beaney has not sufficiently alleged that he had a protected
interest in his continued employment. Defendants Flanagan and Page are therefore
entitled to qualified immunity from Beaney’s § 1983 claim, and are entitled to
judgment on that basis.
6. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the University, Page, and Flanagan are entitled to
judgment on the pleadings as to Beaney’s § 1983 claim because: (1) Beaney has not
alleged sufficient facts to infer supervisory liability on the part of Defendant Page; (2)
Beaney has failed to sufficiently allege a constitutionally-protected interest in his
continued employment; and (3) Defendants Flanagan and Page are entitled to
qualified immunity because Beaney has failed to sufficiently allege a protected
interest in his continued employment.
C.
Defamation Claim
Count Two of the Complaint alleges that the Defendants defamed Beaney by
publishing false statements about his occupational and professional fitness. ECF No.
1-9 at 6. Defendants argue that this count must be dismissed because it is conclusory
and not supported by sufficient facts. ECF No. 7 at 13-14. Specifically, Defendants
claim that the Complaint does not identify who made the statements, what the
content of the statements was, when they were made, or to whom they were
communicated. Id. at 14. Beaney contends that the allegations in the Complaint are
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sufficient to meet the pleading standard of Rule 8, that he has sufficiently alleged
each element of a defamation claim, and that it is not necessary to include details
regarding publication of the alleged defamatory statements. ECF No. 11 at 13-14.
Defamation claims are not subject to the heightened pleading standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), but “the pleadings in a defamation case need to
be sufficiently detailed to the extent necessary to enable the defendant to respond.”
Bishop v. Costa, 495 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (D. Me. 2007). In order to enable a
defendant to respond effectively to the complaint, courts “require plaintiffs to assert
the substance of the allegedly defamatory statements and the context of the
publication.” McDonald v. Verso Paper LLC, 2015 WL 5993875, at *2 (D. Me. Oct.
14, 2015).
In McDonald, this Court held that a defamation claim was pleaded with
sufficient detail to survive a motion to dismiss. See id. at *3. The complaint in that
case alleged that the defendant published false statements in connection with the
termination of the plaintiff’s employment, including that “his employment was
terminated for making threatening statements, failure to meet performance
standards and/or for other purported reasons relating to his alleged lack of fitness for
his position.” Id. The Court found that this was enough to put the defendant on
notice of the claim against him. Id.
The allegations in this case are similar to those considered in McDonald.
Beaney alleges that “beginning in or about December 2014, Defendants published
and forced Plaintiff to publish false statements defaming his occupational and
professional fitness, including statements indicating that he was guilty of engaging
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in, facilitating and/or condoning sexual harassment and/or similar misconduct while
acting as a university hockey coach.” ECF No. 1-9 at 6. The gist of the content of the
alleged defamatory statements is apparent from the Complaint. See McDonald, 2015
WL 5993875, at *2.
Absent from Beaney’s Complaint, however, is any information about the
context of the publication of the statements. The Complaint does not identify which
of the Defendants or their agents made the alleged statements, to whom the
statements were allegedly made, the method of publication, or any information that
provides insight as to when the statements were allegedly made, other than that the
statements began in or about December 2014. See ECF No. 1-9 at 6; cf. Hawkins v.
Kiely, 250 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Me. 2008). Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to
judgment on the pleadings as to Beaney’s defamation claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings as to Beaney’s § 1983 and defamation claims (ECF No. 7)
is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 28th day of February 2017
/s/ JON D. LEVY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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