BEAN v. WAL-MART STORES INC

Filing 12

GRANTING WITHOUT OBJECTION Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11), GRANTING IN PART Defendants Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) as to Plaintiffs claims under the MHRA (Counts I and IV of the Amended Complaint), DENYING IN PART Defendants Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs claims under Title VII (Counts II and III of the Amended Complaint). REMINDER: After entry of this Order, if Amending a COMPLAINT, counsel are REQUIRED to separately file the AMENDED COMPLAINT Document. By JUDGE GEORGE Z. SINGAL. (akr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
CHRISTINE BEAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Defendant.

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) Docket no. 2:16-cv-631-GZS
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ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) and Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11). As briefly explained herein, the Court
GRANTS WITHOUT OBJECTION Plaintiff’s Motion, GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s Motion
as to Plaintiff’s Maine Human Rights Act claims, and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion as
to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that courts “should freely give

leave” to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). As a result, courts
generally grant leave to amend in the absence of reasons not to grant leave “such as undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of
the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Klunder v. Brown Univ., 778 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir.
2015) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

Regarding the issue of whether a complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint contain “a short and plain statement of
the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief; and a demand for the relief sought[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3).
A viable complaint need not proffer “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” but in order to survive
a motion to dismiss it must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may present a
statute of limitations defense when the passage of time prevents a plaintiff from stating “a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” However, the facts supporting the defense must be apparent
on the face of the pleadings. Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Dávila, 579 F.3d 109, 113-14 (1st Cir.
2009).

Generally, the Court “may consider only facts and documents that are part of or

incorporated into the complaint” when resolving any motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Int’l Union v. Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37,
39 (1st Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). With this standard in mind, the Court lays out the
well-pled factual allegations as they relate to the motions under consideration.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 5, 2013, Defendant Wal-Mart terminated the employment of Plaintiff

Christine Bean. (Compl. (ECF. No. 1-2) ¶ 14.) Plaintiff submitted a charge of disability
discrimination against Defendant with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which was
processed on May 23, 2014. (Id. ¶ 7 n.1.) In a letter to Plaintiff dated July 1, 2016, the Commission

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stated its conclusion that there were no reasonable grounds to believe unlawful discrimination had
occurred. (Id. ¶ 8; Ex. B to Def.’s Mot. (ECF No. 7-2), Page ID # 50.)1
On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Maine Superior Court alleging
“discrimination based upon sex and retaliation, in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act, 5
M.R.S.A. § 4551 et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (‘Title VII’), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq.” (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff also alleged, inter alia, that she is “a person within a
protected class (female) within the meaning of Title VII and the Maine Human Rights Act.” (Id.
¶ 15.)

Plaintiff re-alleged and incorporated these allegations in her two charges of sex

discrimination (Count I) and retaliation (Count II). (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.) The Prayer for Relief explicitly
requests relief pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, but also requests “such additional relief
as [the court] deems appropriate.” (Id., Page ID # 12.)2
On December 27, 2016, Defendant moved to dismiss the suit. Specifically, Defendant
moved to dismiss the Complaint “in its entirety on the basis that Plaintiff’s claims [pursuant to the
Maine Human Rights Act] are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” (Def.’s Mot. (ECF
No. 7) at 1.) However, in its Reply, Defendant clarified that it is also asking this Court to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, arguing, in fact, that Plaintiff had not properly pled any Title
VII claims at all. (See Def.’s Reply (ECF No. 9) at 3.) On January 27, 2017, while Defendant’s
Motion was under advisement with this Court, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended
complaint. The proposed Amended Complaint, unlike the initial Complaint, states separate claims

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For purposes of deciding this Motion, the Court has considered the Maine Human Rights Commission letter (the
“Statement of Finding”), the Commission meeting agenda and minutes, and the EEOC’s Dismissal and Notice of
Rights, all submitted with the parties’ filings, because these documents are “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the
complaint” and their authenticity is not challenged. Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315,
321 (1st Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
Although the charge of discrimination Plaintiff filed with the Commission is referenced as “Exhibit A” in the
Complaint (Compl. (ECF. No. 1-2) ¶ 7), it does not appear that the charge was included as part of the state court record
that was transferred to this Court.
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for relief pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act and Title VII and pleads fact demonstrating
administrative exhaustion for purposes of the Title VII claims. (See Amended Compl. (ECF No.
11-1) ¶¶ 7-9, 20-22, 23-25.)

III.

DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
The Court sees no reason to deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend given that leave to amend

should be “freely given” in the absence of countervailing considerations such as undue delay, bad
faith by the moving party, or undue prejudice to the non-moving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2); Klunder, 778 F.3d at 34. Notably, Defendant did not file a response to Plaintiff’s motion
and thus the request to amend is unopposed. The Court is mindful that the possibility of undue
prejudice to Defendant is a concern. See Klunder, 778 F.3d at 34 (“In reviewing a district court's
decision on whether or not to grant an amendment, we routinely focus our analysis on the prejudice
to the non-moving party.”) However, in this case, the Court can discern no undue prejudice
because (1) the case was removed from state court a little over a month ago and is at an early stage
in the litigation, and (2) Defendant was on notice of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.3 For these reasons,
the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and considers Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in light of
the Amended Complaint.

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A fair reading of the Complaint as initially filed indicates that Plaintiff attempted to plead claims for sex
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII in a manner that provided Defendant with notice of these claims. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 15, 16, 19, and Page ID # 12.) In addition, although Plaintiff failed to plead administrative exhaustion
in her initial Complaint, it is evident to the Court that Defendant was put on notice that Plaintiff has indeed
administratively exhausted her claim when the EEOC copied the Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Defendant. (See
Ex. B to Pl.’s Response (ECF No. 8-2).)

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B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
1. Maine Human Rights Act Claims
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff missed the statutory filing period
for claims under the Maine Human Rights Act. (Def.’s Mot. (ECF No. 7) at 3.) In general,
“[g]ranting a motion to dismiss based on a limitations defense is entirely appropriate when the
pleader’s allegations leave no doubt that an asserted claim is time-barred.” LaChapelle v. Berkshire
Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 509 (1st Cir. 1998).
Under the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), a plaintiff must file suit “not more than
either 2 years after the act of unlawful discrimination complained of or 90 days after any of the
occurrences listed under section 4622, subsection 1, paragraphs A to D, whichever is later.” 5
M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(C). Plaintiff does not dispute that the Complaint was filed more than two
years after the last act of discrimination, her termination on December 5, 2013, or that it was filed
more than 90 days after her claim was dismissed by the Commission, which was the applicable
triggering event. (See Pl.’s Response (ECF No. 8) at 2.) Assuming, without deciding, that the
90-day filing period began to run when the Commission sent its letter of dismissal to Plaintiff on
July 1, 2016, rather than on any earlier date, Plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed a day late.4
Plaintiff contends that the late filing was the result of a “glitch” in counsel’s normally
reliable calendaring system and constitutes “excusable neglect.” (Id. at 2.) However, the concept
of “equitable tolling,” rather than “excusable neglect,” applies when a party seeks to avoid the
consequences of missing a statutory filing period. See, e.g., Rice v. New England Coll., 676 F.2d
9, 11 (1st Cir. 1982) (“In the absence of a recognized equitable consideration, the court cannot

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Plaintiff does not contend that the statutory period began to run when she received the letter of dismissal. See Adkins
v. Atria Senior Living, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 399, 408 (D. Me. 2015) (“The Court concludes that the critical date under
the MHRA is not the date of receipt; it is the date of the dismissal.”)

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extend the limitations period by even one day.”) It is well established that a party seeking the
benefit of equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing that “some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way,” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005), and “[t]he fundamental
principle is that equitable tolling is appropriate only when the circumstances that cause a [party]
to miss a filing deadline are out of his hands,” Jobe v. INS, 238 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2001)
(quotation marks omitted). Simply put, “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, such as a
simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline, does not warrant equitable
tolling.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-52 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[E]quitable tolling is a rare
remedy to be applied in unusual circumstances, not a cure-all for an entirely common state of
affairs.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Pena, No. 05-10332-GAO, 2015 WL
3741911, at *2 (D. Mass. June 15, 2015) (compiling First Circuit cases holding that garden-variety
attorney error does not support equitable tolling). Plaintiff has not demonstrated any extraordinary
circumstance beyond garden-variety error by counsel that would warrant allowing late filing of
her claims under the MHRA. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to the MHRA
claims and DISMISSES those claims. See Adkins v. Atria Senior Living, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d
399, 410 (D. Me. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s MHRA lawsuit filed two days late and noting that
state statutes of limitation “should be construed strictly in favor of the bar [they were] intended to
create” (quotation marks omitted)).
2. Title VII Claims
As explained above, Defendant has also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. (See
Def.’s Reply (ECF No. 9) at 3.) Because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint clearly states claims for

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relief pursuant to Title VII (see Amended Compl. ¶¶ 7-9, 20-22, 23-25), and it is not apparent that
these claims are time-barred, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to the Title VII claims.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT OBJECTION Plaintiff’s

Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s Motion and
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims under the MHRA (Counts I and IV of the Amended Complaint),
but DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII (Counts II and
III of the Amended Complaint).5
SO ORDERED.
/s/ George Z. Singal
United States District Judge
Dated this 9th day of February, 2017.

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The Court notes that the Amended Complaint correctly names the Defendant as “Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.”

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