RUFFIN v. HINKLEY et al

Filing 10

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION re 1 Complaint filed by DANIEL ONEIL RUFFIN. Objections to R&R due by 6/13/2017. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (CWP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
DANIEL ONEIL RUFFIN,
Plaintiff
v.
JOHN HINKLEY, et al.,
Defendants

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2:17-cv-00151-NT

RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER SCREENING COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A
In this action, Plaintiff Daniel Ruffin, an inmate incarcerated at the Knox County
Jail, alleges Defendants discriminated against him based on his religion, race, and
grievance activity.
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3), which
application the Court granted. (ECF No. 5.)

In accordance with the in forma pauperis

statute, a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate.

28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2). Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to screening “before docketing,
if feasible or … as soon as practicable after docketing,” because he is “a prisoner seek[ing]
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Following a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, I recommend the Court dismiss all but
two of Plaintiff’s claims.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is designed to ensure
meaningful access to the federal courts for those persons unable to pay the costs of bringing
an action. When a party is proceeding in forma pauperis, however, “the court shall dismiss
the case at any time if the court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or
malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under § 1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance
of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of
answering such complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
In addition to the review contemplated by § 1915, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to
screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act because Plaintiff currently is incarcerated
and seeks redress from governmental entities and officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
The § 1915A screening requires courts to “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim …; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be
granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the
benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
2

Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is subject to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), this is
“not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a
claim”, Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980). To allege a civil action in
federal court, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege that a defendant acted
unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that identify the manner by which the
defendant subjected the plaintiff to a harm for which the law affords a remedy. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff alleges he is an African American and a Muslim. Plaintiff’s narrative
complaint contains four claims:2
1.

Violation of his right to receive meals that do not contain pork because
it is proscribed by his religious belief;

2.

Violation of his right to religious items, which violation includes
discriminatory treatment based on his race and religion;

3.

Discrimination based on race, religion, and grievance activity in
connection with the refusal to transfer Plaintiff to a minimum custody
pod, despite his minimum custody security clearance; and

4.

Violation of due process in the course of grievance review activity.

1

The facts set forth herein are derived from Plaintiff’s complaint.

2

Plaintiff does not set forth his claims in separate counts or paragraphs.
3

A.

Relevant Legal Standards
1.

RLUIPA3

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA or
Act), provides in relevant part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person residing in or confined to an institution, … even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person – (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are unable
freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s
permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 721 (2005).
“[A] RLUIPA plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that he or she wishes to
engage in (1) a religious exercise (2) motivated by a sincerely held belief, which exercise
(3) is subject to a substantial burden imposed by the government.” LeBaron v. Spencer,
527 F. App'x 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). In this context, a substantial
burden “is one that puts ‘substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs.’” Id. at 29 (quoting Spratt v. Rhode Island Dep’t of Corr., 482 F.3d 33,
38 (1st Cir. 2007)).

3

Although Plaintiff makes no mention of RLUIPA in his pleadings, the Court may consider sua sponte
whether his factual allegations raise such a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b).
4

RLUIPA provides Plaintiff with a claim “against a government,” but does not
authorize an “individual capacity” claim against the individual defendants. 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc–1(a). Although the statutory definition of “government” includes “any ... person
acting under color of State law,” the Act does not authorize individual capacity liability as
under section 1983. Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1334 – 35 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing
additional circuit court authority and explaining that RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to
Spending Clause authority, and therefore does not run against individual government
employees except in their official capacities). Furthermore, even against an institutional
defendant, RLUIPA does not authorize a claim for money damages. Sossamon v. Texas,
563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011); Reese v. Bouffard, No. 1:14-CV-00244-GZS, 2015 WL
1947192, at *7, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10093, at *16 (D. Me. Jan. 28, 2015)
(recommended decision), aff’d (Apr. 29, 2015).
2.

The First Amendment

A claim for deprivation of first amendment rights is actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, “against those who, acting under color of state law, violated federal law.” Kuperman
v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2011). A claim based on a prison regulation that
restricts the free exercise of religion requires a showing that the regulation is not reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest. Id. “The factors relevant in deciding the
regulation’s constitutionality are: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between
the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether
alternative means to exercise the right exist; (3) the impact that accommodating the right

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will have on prison resources; and (4) the absence of alternatives to the prison regulation.”
Id.
In addition to the Free Exercise Clause, the First Amendment provides a right to
Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 47–48 (1st

access the courts in redress of grievances.

Cir.2011). Prison officials can violate the First Amendment if they retaliate against an
inmate based on the inmate’s participation in protected activity. Id. A retaliation claim
requires (1) that the inmate engaged in conduct that is protected by the First Amendment;
(2) that a defendant took adverse action against the inmate because of the prisoner’s
protected conduct; and (3) that the adverse action would deter an inmate of ordinary
firmness from exercising his or her First Amendment rights. Ayotte v. Barnhart, 973 F.
Supp. 2d 70, 94 (D. Me. 2013). “Because prisoner retaliation claims are ‘easily fabricated
[ ] and ... pose a substantial risk of unwarranted judicial intrusion into matters of general
prison administration,’ courts must insist that such claims are bound up in facts, not in the
gossamer strands of speculation and surmise.” Hannon, 645 F.3d at 48 (quoting Bennett
v. Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)).
3.

Equal protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination
by state officers. To state a claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must assert (1) facts that
could support a plausible inference that he or she experienced differential treatment when
compared to another prisoner “similarly situated in all relevant respects,” Bruns v. Mayhew,
750 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), and (2) facts that suggest

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that the difference in treatment “was based on an impermissible consideration, such as
race,” Ayala–Sepulveda v. Mun. of San German, 671 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2012).
4.

Limitation on recovery

With respect to claims brought by prisoners against their custodians, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act contains the following limitation on recovery: “No Federal civil
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,
for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury or the commission of a sexual act ….” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e). Although
the First Circuit has not resolved the issue in this circuit, this Court, several circuit courts
of appeals, and at least one other district court in this circuit have held that the limitation
applies to claims for compensatory damages based on the violation of a constitutional right.
Robinson v. Landry, No. 2:15-CV-58-DBH, 2015 WL 4077297, at *2, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87025, at *6 – 7 (D. Me. July 6, 2015); Mattei v. Dunbar, 217 F. Supp. 3d 367,
___, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154891, at *26 (D. Mass. 2016) (collecting circuit court
opinions).

The limitation, however, does not prevent constitutional claims from

proceeding where the claimant has alleged an actionable claim for nominal damages,
punitive damages, and/or injunctive relief. Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 n.5 (1st
Cir. 2011).

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B.

Analysis
1.

Religious diet

According to Plaintiff, upon intake at the jail on November 17, 2016, he informed
Defendant Warren Heat, a sergeant at the jail, that he is a Muslim and a diabetic.4 Plaintiff
alleges he was served pork on three occasions, soon after he arrived at the jail and after he
requested that he not be served pork because he is a Muslim.
A prisoner has a right under both RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution to receive a diet that conforms to dietary restrictions imposed by a sincerely
held religious belief system, subject only to limited exceptions. LeBaron v. Spencer, 527
F. App’x 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam). At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has
alleged sufficient facts to support the necessary inference that his adherence to the Muslim
faith is sincere and that his beliefs require that he observe certain dietary restrictions;
specifically, that he not consume pork. See Barnett v. Comm’r, 187 F.3d 621 (1st Cir.
1999) (per curiam table opinion). Plaintiff, however, has not identified a policy that would
deny him a diet that meets his needs. The incidents of which Plaintiff complains occurred
shortly after he arrived at the jail, were limited in number, and have not re-occurred. In the
absence of any type of policy that would deny Plaintiff of a diet in accordance with his
religious beliefs and with no other basis for injunctive relief, Plaintiff has not asserted a
claim based on the diet at the jail.

4

Although Plaintiff describes himself as diabetic, his diabetes does not relate to any of the claims asserted
in the complaint. Plaintiff has, however, filed a separate action in which he asserted claims related to his
diabetes. Ruffin v. Cichon, No. 2:17-CV-00152-NT.
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2.

Religious items

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Timothy McFarland, Assistant of Programs at the
jail, Cynthia Gardner, Lieutenant of Programs at the jail, and John Hinkley, Jail
Administrator, denied his requests for certain religious items. In particular, Plaintiff asserts
that he has not been provided with a Quran, and that he must purchase one from the
commissary, whereas Christian inmates have ready access to bibles because bibles are
available throughout the jail for general use. (Complaint at 6; Complaint Ex. 8, PageID #
19.) In his related grievance paperwork, Plaintiff identified several items necessary for the
practice of his religion, including the Quran, prayer rugs, prayer beads, medallions, prayer
oils, and religious books. (Complaint Ex. 11, PageID # 24.) Plaintiff evidently has
obtained some items, including prayer oil, a kufi, and some religious books, but seeks a
religious medallion of acceptable size. (Complaint Ex. 15, PageID # 33.) Plaintiff also
asserts that Christian inmates receive services and certain “medallions.” (Complaint at 6.)
Plaintiff alleges denial of his right to free exercise, and discrimination based on race
and religion. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a finding that any of the
defendants deprived Plaintiff of his right to free exercise or a finding that any defendant is
liable under RLUIPA. Plaintiff’s right to free exercise restricts the government’s ability to
impose burdens on his religious practice, but does not require the government to provide
any specific religious items. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 n.8 (2005) (“[RLUIPA
is] [d]irected at obstructions institutional arrangements place on religious observances. ...
[It] does not require a State to pay for an inmate’s devotional accessories.”); Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that RLUIPA required prison
9

officials to allow prisoner to possess Islamic prayer oil, but prisoner had responsibility for
purchasing oil). In short, neither the constitution nor RLUIPA requires defendants to
supply the requested religious items at government expense.
Plaintiff’s discrimination claim appears to be based on his assertion that certain
defendants “furnish the white inmates with all the religious material, service, and religious
medallions.” (Complaint at 6.) Plaintiff has not alleged the source of the materials. That
is, Plaintiff has not alleged that defendants purchased the materials with government funds
or whether the materials were donated to the jail.5 In this way, Plaintiff’s complaint is
somewhat ambiguous. Given the deferential review at this stage of the proceedings,
because Plaintiff’s complaint could be construed to allege that Defendants purchased the
items with state funds to provide for the availability of Christian religious programming,
Plaintiff has asserted an actionable § 1983 claim based on either the First Amendment or
the Equal Protection Clause, or both.6
3.

Discrimination in prison housing

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants McFarland and Gardner discriminated against him
based on his race and religion, and retaliated against him based on grievance activity by
repeatedly denying his requests to be moved into minimum security housing despite
Plaintiff’s minimum security classification. “[C]ompliance with the Fourteenth

5

In a grievance form, Plaintiff wrote that white inmates are given their religious medallions when they are
dropped off at the jail. (Grievance Paperwork, Complaint Ex. 14, PageID # 32.) This language might
suggest that jail officials did not purchase the items.

Differential treatment would also violate RLUIPA. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (“Properly applying RLUIPA,
courts … must be satisfied that the Act’s prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among
different faiths.”).
10
6

Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination is not only consistent with proper prison
administration, but also bolsters the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.”
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 – 11 (2005).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants frequently move white inmates from Plaintiff’s
housing area into the “minimum pods” even though they do not have a preferential status.
(Complaint at 6 – 7; Complaint Ex. 10, PageID # 22.) Although Plaintiff does not describe
his housing assignment, one can reasonably infer from his complaint that he is not in a
minimum security pod. Plaintiff, therefore, has asserted sufficient facts to proceed on a
prison housing discrimination claim.
4.

Due process

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Heat wrote up Plaintiff for a rule infraction based
on his refusal to lock down after an order to do so by Defendant Heat or Defendant David
Palmer. (Complaint Ex. 12(A), PageID # 26.) Plaintiff demanded a grievance form, which
Defendant Heat provided. (Complaint Ex. 12(B), PageID # 27 – 29.) Plaintiff contends
that Defendants Heat and Hinkley violated his due process rights because Defendant Heat
investigated and answered Plaintiff’s grievance, and Defendant Hinkley never responded
to Plaintiff’s grievance appeal. (Complaint at 8; Complaint Ex. 13, PageID # 30 – 31.)
To state a due process claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that would support a
determination that the procedural violation about which he complains resulted in an
“atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Plaintiff simply does not
describe an atypical and significant hardship.
11

Furthermore, the Due Process Clause does not compel states to follow any particular
grievance procedure. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A]
state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no
constitutional right to participate in grievance proceedings.”); Charriez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 596 F. App’x 890, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Because the prison grievance procedure
does not create a protected liberty interest, Charriez does not have a federal constitutional
right within that administrative-grievance procedure.”); Von Hallcy v. Clements, 519 F.
App’x 521, 523 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Von Hallcy cannot state a due process claim based on
allegations of an ineffective grievance reporting system.”); Woods v. First Corr. Med. Inc.,
446 F. App'x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] prisoner has no free-standing constitutional
right to an effective grievance process ….”); Butler v. Brown, 58 F. App’x. 712 (9th Cir.
2003) (“[A] prisoner has no constitutional right to prison grievance procedures.”); Young
v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x. 568, 569 – 70 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is no inherent constitutional
right to an effective prison grievance procedure.”). Defendant Heat’s review of the
grievance even though he initiated the disciplinary proceeding, and Defendant Hinkley’s
lack of response to the appeal, therefore, are not actionable under the Due Process Clause.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a), I recommend the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s diet-related free exercise and
RLUIPA claims, and Plaintiff’s due process claim, but permit Plaintiff to proceed on his

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claims based on the denial of religious items and the denial of minimum security housing.7
If the Court adopts the recommendation, Plaintiff would have failed to assert sufficient
facts to support a claim against Defendants Warren Heat, Heidi Norweg, David Palmer,
and Bruce Sheaff would be dismissed.8 I, therefore, also recommend the Court dismiss
Defendants Heat, Norweg, Palmer and Sheaff.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge's report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court's order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 30th day of May, 2017.

7

The defendants on the actionable claims are Defendants McFarland, Gardner, and Hinkley (denial of
religious items claim) and Defendants McFarland and Gardner (denial of minimum security housing).
8

Defendants Heat and Palmer are referenced in the discussion. Defendant Norweg is described as the
Assistant Jail Manager, and Defendant Sheaff is described as the Food Service Manager.
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