HOOKER v. KNIGHTLY et al

Filing 64

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION re 43 Amended Complaint filed by SAMUEL HOOKER, 49 Amended Complaint filed by SAMUEL HOOKER Objections to R&R due by 6/19/2019 By MAGISTRATE JUDGE ANDREA K. JOHNSTONE. (sfw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

Samuel Hooker
v.

Civil No. 17-cv-345-JNL

United States 1

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Samuel Hooker has filed a First Amended Complaint
(Doc. No. 43) (“FAC”) and Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 49)
(“SAC”).

The court construes each filing as a proposed addendum

to Hooker’s initial complaint (Doc. No. 1).

The FAC and SAC are

before this court for preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a).

Background 2
Hooker is a paraplegic prisoner confined to a wheelchair.
In this case, Hooker has asserted that on four occasions in

1The

United States is the only defendant presently in this
action. In his proposed Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 43) and
proposed Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 49), plaintiff seeks
to add United States Marshals Service employees Dean Knightly,
Jesse Belanger, Spencer Christie, Clairmont Forde, and two
unnamed individuals, as defendants to this action.

2The

court conducts its preliminary review of the FAC and
SAC using the standard set forth in its April 23, 2018 Report
and Recommendation (Doc. No. 29, at 4-5), which the district
judge approved in its July 17, 2018 Order (Doc. No. 41).

August and September 2012, U.S. Marshals Service (“USMS”)
employees Dean Knightly, Jesse Belanger, Spencer Christie,
Clairmont Forde, and two unnamed individuals, transported him to
court from the Cumberland County Jail in a non-handicapped van.
Hooker had requested to be transported in a wheelchair
accessible vehicle, but his request was denied because the
defendants did not have access to such a van.

Because the van

was not wheelchair accessible, those individuals transported
Hooker by placing him on the floor in the back of the van, next
to his wheelchair, without securing him in the van with a
seatbelt or other safety restraints, despite Hooker’s request to
be so secured.

As a result of this mode of transport, and the

alleged traffic violations and reckless driving of the
transporting officers, Hooker asserts, he was injured during
those van rides.
In his initial Complaint (Doc. No. 1), Hooker asserted
claims under the FTCA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).

The Bivens and Rehabilitation Act claims have been

dismissed, and the defendants to those claims have been dropped
from this action.

See July 17, 2018 Order (Doc. No. 41)

(approving Apr. 23, 2018 R&R (Doc. No. 29)).

The FTCA claims

were served on the United States, see Apr. 23, 2018 Order (Doc.
No. 30), and remain pending at this time.
2

Hooker now seeks to

add claims that the defendants’ actions violated his rights
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and
constituted crimes and state traffic law violations.

Discussion
I.

ADA Claims
Hooker attempts to assert ADA claims against Knightly,

Belanger, Christie, Forde, and two unnamed employees of the USMS
in both their individual and official capacities.

Title II of

the ADA provides a right of action where “‘a “‘public entity’
[has discriminated] against a ‘qualified individual with a
disability’ on account of that individual’s disability.”

Pa.

Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12132); see also Parker v. Universidad de P.R., 225
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000).
“There is no individual liability under Title II of the
ADA.”

Gross v. Landry, No. 1:17-cv-00297-JAW, 2017 WL 5509995,

at *5 (D. Me. Nov. 17, 2017).

To the extent Hooker seeks to

assert ADA claims against the named defendants in their
individual capacities, the district judge should dismiss the
claims.
To the extent Hooker seeks to assert ADA claims against the
named defendants in their official capacities, such claims are
not viable.

Neither the United States nor its agencies,
3

including the USMS, fall within the statute’s definition of
“public entity.”

See 42 U.S.C. § 12131; Manuel v. City of

Bangor, No. 09-CV-339-B-W, 2009 WL 3672917, *4 (D. Me. Oct. 30,
2009), R&R approved, 691 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D. Me. 2010).
Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss each of Hooker’s
proposed ADA claims.

II.

Criminal Conduct
Hooker asserts that defendants are liable to him in this

action because their conduct in placing him in the back of the
van without a seatbelt was criminal, as it violated Maine
traffic laws which require the use of seatbelts.

“Private

citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”

In re Compact Disc

Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 131,
145 (D. Me. 2006) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 619 (1973) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).

Because Hooker cannot state a private cause of action

based on the named defendants’ alleged violation of state
criminal laws and traffic laws, the district judge should
dismiss those claims.

Conclusion
As fully explained herein, the district judge should
4

dismiss Hooker’s proposed complaint addenda (Doc. Nos. 43, 49),
as they fail to state any claim upon which relief might be
granted.

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must

be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
extended upon motion.

See

The fourteen-day period may be

Failure to file specific written

objections to the Report and Recommendation within the specified
time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order.
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge

June 4, 2019
cc:

Samuel Hooker, pro se
James D. Concannon, Esq.
Wilbur A. Glahn III, Esq.

5

See