COOK v. MAINEHEALTH et al

Filing 23

ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; adopting in part Report and Recommendations re 17 Report and Recommendations. By JUDGE JON D. LEVY. (akr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JASON COOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAINEHEALTH, et al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER

Plaintiff Jason Cook alleges that his former employers, Defendants
MaineHealth and NorDx (“Defendants”), violated his rights under the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C.A. § 4301
et seq. (2018); the Federal Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et
seq. (2018); the Maine Family Medical Leave Requirements Law (“MFMLR”), 26
M.R.S.A. § 843 et seq. (2018); the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 4571 et seq. (2018); and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (2018). The Defendants filed a Partial Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 9), moving to dismiss Count IV of Cook’s Complaint which
alleges a violation of the MHRA as barred by the statute of limitations and for failing
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The United States Magistrate Judge, John C. Nivison, filed his Recommended
Decision (ECF No. 17) with the Court on April 17, 2018, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The Magistrate Judge recommended

dismissing Cook’s MHRA claim related to Cook’s employment with NorDx as time-

barred. See ECF No. 17 at 12. The Magistrate Judge otherwise recommended
denying the Motion, concluding that Cook had adequately stated a claim under the
MHRA. See id. at 5-7. A hearing on the Recommended Decision was held on June
12, 2018.
After reviewing and considering the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended
Decision, together with the entire record and the attorneys’ arguments at the hearing,
I have made a de novo determination of all matters adjudicated by the Magistrate
Judge’s Recommended Decision. I concur with and adopt the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that Cook’s MHRA claim based on his employment with NorDx is timebarred and should be dismissed. For the reasons explained below, I disagree with the
Recommended Decision’s conclusion that Cook adequately stated a MHRA claim
arising out of Cook’s employment with Maine Medical Partners (“MMP”).
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant NorDx and MMP are subsidiaries of Defendant MaineHealth. Cook
worked in a laboratory for NorDx from May 2014 to July 2015 when his employment
was terminated. After his termination from NorDx, Cook worked for MMP until his
termination in November 2015. Cook suffers from a disability he acquired while on
active duty with the United States Army, which he asserts caused him to be absent
from work beyond what was allowed by the employee leave policy while employed by
NorDx. Cook alleges that in disciplining him for violating the leave policy, the
Defendants violated the MHRA by failing to accommodate his disability, failing to
engage in an interactive process, and requiring that he undergo a medical
examination, and also retaliated against him in response to his request for an
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accommodation. Cook’s allegations against NorDx comprise over fifty paragraphs in
the Complaint. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 36-90. Cook’s substantive allegations against
MMP comprise a single paragraph: “MaineHealth rehired Mr. Cook to work at MMP,
but fired him in November of 2015 for reasons that demonstrate disability
discrimination similar to the allegations set forth above.” Id. at ¶ 92.
II. ANALYSIS
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint “must
contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). In analyzing
whether Cook adequately pled a MHRA claim concerning his employment with MMP,
the Recommended Decision applied the notice pleading standard that preceded the
Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.

In light of those

decisions, while a complaint need not set forth “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “it must nonetheless ‘contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678).

Applying this standard requires two steps:

first, “‘isolate and ignore

statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely
rehash cause-of-action elements[,]’” and second, “take the facts of the complaint as
true, ‘drawing all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor, and see if they
plausibly narrate a claim for relief.’”

Carrero–Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía

Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 717 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Schatz v. Republican State
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Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)). “In evaluating plausibility,
particularly in the employment discrimination context, courts should be mindful of
the facts the plaintiff is likely to know, versus the facts that are likely out of the
plaintiff’s reach at the pleading stage.” Brady v. Bath Iron Works Corp., No. 2:16-cv4-NT, 2016 WL 3029948, at *2 (D. Me. May 25, 2016) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002)).
Cook’s allegation in the Complaint against MMP—namely, that it “fired him
in November of 2015 for reasons that demonstrate disability discrimination similar
to the allegations set forth above”—states a legal conclusion. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 92.
Apart from this conclusory statement, there are no factual allegations that
demonstrate a basis for relief against MMP. Thus, the Complaint fails to set forth
sufficient factual matter that narrates a plausible claim for disability discrimination
related to his employment by MMP. See Tambone, 597 F.3d at 442.
III. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that the Recommended Decision (ECF No. 17) of
the Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED IN PART, with regard to its
recommendation that Cook’s MHRA claim based on his employment with NorDx be
dismissed as time-barred. It is further ORDERED that Cook’s MHRA claim based
on his employment with MMP is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Count IV of
the Complaint is therefore ORDERED dismissed in its entirety. However, Cook is
GRANTED LEAVE to amend his complaint within ten (10) days of this Order to
adequately plead a MHRA claim based on his employment with MMP.

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SO ORDERED.
Dated this 13th day of June, 2018.
/s/ JON D. LEVY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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