COOK v. MAINEHEALTH et al

Filing 29

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT granting 27 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim By JUDGE JON D. LEVY. (akr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JASON COOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAINEHEALTH, et al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Jason Cook alleges that his former employers, Defendants
MaineHealth and NorDx (“Defendants”), violated his rights under the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C.A. § 4301
et seq. (2018); the Federal Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et
seq. (2018); the Maine Family Medical Leave Requirements Law (“MFMLR”), 26
M.R.S.A. § 843 et seq. (2018); the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 4571 et seq. (2018); and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (2018).
In January 2018, the Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9),
moving to dismiss Count IV of Cook’s original Complaint, which alleged a violation of
the MHRA, as barred by the statute of limitations and for failing to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. In an order issued June 13, 2018 (ECF No. 23), I granted
the motion, concluding that Cook’s MHRA claim based on his employment with
NorDx was time-barred, and that his MHRA claim based on his employment with

Maine Medical Partners (“MMP”) failed to state a claim. I also granted Cook leave
to amend his complaint. Cook filed a First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26) on June
24, 2018. The Defendants have filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 27), moving to dismiss all claims in connection with Cook’s
employment with MMP.
For the reasons explained below, I grant the Defendants’ Partial Motion to
Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, dismissing all counts to the extent they arise
from Cook’s employment with MMP. This results in the complete dismissal of Count
IV.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant NorDx and MMP are subsidiaries of Defendant MaineHealth. Cook
worked in a laboratory for NorDx from May 2014 to July 2015, when his employment
was terminated for violating NorDx’s employee leave policy. Cook suffers from a
disability he sustained while on active duty with the United States Army, which, he
asserts, caused him to be absent from work beyond what was allowed by NorDx’s
employee leave policy. Cook alleges that NorDx disciplined him and then terminated
his employment for violating the leave policy. He contends that in so doing, NorDx
violated the MHRA by failing to accommodate his disability, failing to engage in an
interactive process, and requiring that he undergo a medical examination, and also
retaliated against him in response to his request for an accommodation.
In March 2015, Cook applied for a job with MMP. Sometime between July and
October 2015, MMP offered Cook a job. During the hiring process, Cook informed
MMP that he was a disabled veteran. Before Cook started his new job with MMP,
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MaineHealth Employee Health Service conducted a pre-placement evaluation of
Cook, which documented his mood disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic
low back pain, chronic foot pain, sleep disorder, and the medications Cook was
prescribed. These medical conditions delayed Cook’s medical clearance for at least a
week.
On October 30, 2015, before he had started the job at MMP, Cook e-mailed his
soon-to-be supervisor that he would like to discuss his “history and personal
information.” ECF No. 26 at ¶ 102. The supervisor responded that she “should not
know” any medical or personal history that was not pertinent to his job. Id. at ¶ 103.
Several days later on November 2, 2015, Cook began working and was provided a
sitting/standing work station to assist him.
Shortly after Cook started work, Cook alleges that MMP personnel began to
criticize him and take adverse action against him for performance-related issues. On
January 22, 2016, a MMP human resource partner wrote to Cook’s supervisor: “Per
our conversation today, this will verify that Jason Cook has never made you aware
that he has a medical condition, or that a medical condition is allegedly impacting his
work, or asked for an accommodation for health/medical reasons. Separation of
employment will be for performance reasons. Please respond that this is a correct
statement.” Id. at ¶ 111. Cook’s supervisor replied that the statement was correct,
and MMP terminated Cook’s employment. Cook contends, in his First Amended
Complaint, that in so doing, MMP treated him differently because he a disabled
veteran in violation of USERRA, and violated the MHRA by failing to accommodate
his disability and failing to engage in an interactive process.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint need
not set forth “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007), but “must nonetheless ‘contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436,
442 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Applying this standard requires two steps: first, “‘isolate and ignore statements in
the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash causeof-action elements[,]’” and second, “take the facts of the complaint as true, ‘drawing
all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a
claim for relief.’” Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 717
(1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50,
55 (1st Cir. 2012)).

“In evaluating plausibility, particularly in the employment

discrimination context, courts should be mindful of the facts the plaintiff is likely to
know, versus the facts that are likely out of the plaintiff’s reach at the pleading stage.”
Brady v. Bath Iron Works Corp., No. 2:16-cv-4-NT, 2016 WL 3029948, at *2 (D. Me.
May 25, 2016) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Defendants argue that Count IV and all other claims arising from Cook’s
employment with MMP outlined in the First Amended Complaint fail to adequately
state a claim arising from Cook’s employment with MMP. Cook concedes that Counts
II, III, and V do not apply to Cook’s employment with MMP. Accordingly, I do not
analyze those counts further, and they are dismissed to the extent they concern
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Cook’s employment with MMP. I therefore address whether Cook has adequately
stated claims arising from his employment with MMP for (A) disability
discrimination under the MHRA (Count IV), and (B) discrimination on the basis of
military service in violation of USERRA (Count I).
A.

Disability Discrimination Under the MHRA
The Defendants contend that the only direct allegations in the First Amended

Complaint relating to disability discrimination by MMP, in violation of the MHRA,
are conclusory statements that need not be considered in assessing a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 717; see also ECF
No. 26 at ¶¶ 15, 141. The Defendants further argue that the new allegations added
to the First Amended Complaint serve only to establish that MMP was aware that
Cook had a disability, but do not establish any connection between that disability and
his termination. Cook argues, however, that the new allegations show that Cook
attempted to discuss his need for accommodations with MMP, ECF No. 26 at ¶¶ 10102, which constituted an attempt to engage in an interactive process, and that the
January 22 e-mail from the MMP human resource partner to Cook’s supervisor
mentioning Cook’s disability, id. at ¶ 111, provides a plausible basis from which to
infer that Cook’s disability was a causal factor in his termination.
“To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination pursuant to the
MHRA, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the following: first, she suffers
from a disability; second, she is otherwise qualified, with or without reasonable
accommodations, and is able to perform the essential functions of the job; and third,
she was adversely treated by the employer based in whole or in part on her disability.”
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Taghavidinani v. Riverview Psychiatric Ctr., No. 1:16-cv-00208-JDL, 2018 WL
1156287, at *8 (D. Me. Mar. 5, 2018) (quoting Doyle v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 824
A.2d 48, 54 (Me. 2003)). “It is not necessary to plead facts sufficient to establish a
prima facie case at the pleading stage.” Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711
F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). “But this does not mean ‘that the elements of the prima
facie case are irrelevant to a plausibility determination in a discrimination suit. . . .
Those elements are part of the background against which a plausibility
determination should be made.’” Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir.
2017) (quoting Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 54).
Here, Cook has not plausibly alleged that his disability was the basis, in whole
or in part, for his termination. Disregarding conclusory statements, see, e.g., ECF
No. 26 at ¶ 15 (“MMP fired Plaintiff in early 2016 for reasons that reveal disability
discrimination in violation of the MHRA.”), Cook alleges only that MMP was aware
of his disability and that he was terminated for performance-related issues. Cook
does not allege (1) what his performance-related issues were or how they were
affected by his disability, (2) that he communicated to anyone at MMP that his
disability was connected to his performance issues, or (3) that he requested leave or
accommodation. Although Cook characterizes his October 30 e-mail to his supervisor
seeking to discuss his “history and personal information” as a request for
accommodation and an initiation of an interactive process, this request was made
before Cook had begun his employment and, therefore, before any performance issues
occurred. Cook therefore fails to allege any connection between his disability and his
termination. The one alleged communication between the human resource partner
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and Cook’s supervisor seeking confirmation that Cook had not made her aware that
his work was being affected by his disability is an insufficient foundation to state a
claim for disability discrimination under the MHRA.1
To the extent Count IV of the First Amended Complaint alleges discrimination
arising from Cook’s employment with MMP, it is dismissed. Because I already
dismissed Count IV of the original complaint based on Cook’s employment with
NorDx as time-barred, ECF No. 23 at 4, Count IV is dismissed in its entirety.
B.

Discrimination on the Basis of Military Service in Violation of
USERRA
The Defendants argue that there is no allegation in the First Amended

Complaint that MMP’s termination of Cook’s employment was connected to his
military service or veteran status.

Cook’s allegation in the First Amended

Complaint—that if he “had a disability that was not connected to military service,
[MMP] would not have taken the same adverse actions against him, but instead
would have engaged in a genuine interactive process with him and accommodated
him, instead of proceeding with corrective actions and termination”—states a legal
conclusion. ECF No. 26 at ¶ 119. The remaining relevant allegations in the First
Amended Complaint, taken as true with all inferences drawn in Cook’s favor,
establish only that MMP was aware that Cook is a disabled veteran. There are no
allegations that Cook’s status as a disabled veteran was a cause of his termination.
Thus, the First Amended Complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual matter that

The Defendants argue that should Count IV’s disability discrimination claim survive on the basis of Cook’s
employment with MMP, Cook’s claims for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees must be
stricken because he never filed an administrative charge of discrimination against MMP or in any way relating
to his employment at MMP. Because I conclude that the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for
disability discrimination, I do not analyze this argument.
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narrates a plausible claim for violation of USERRA and Count I is dismissed to the
extent it arises from Cook’s employment with MMP.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED. Counts I-V are dismissed to the
extent they arise from Cook’s employment with Maine Medical Partners. Because
Count IV of the original complaint was dismissed as time-barred to the extent it was
based on Cook’s employment with NorDx by the Order dated June 13, 2018 (ECF No.
23), Count IV is therefore dismissed in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of August, 2018.
/s/ JON D. LEVY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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