HASSAPELIS v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER
Filing
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ORDER AFFIRMING THE RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE re: 19 Report and Recommended Decision re 13 Social Security Statement of Errors/Fact Sheet, dismissing 22 Motion to Strike 21 Response to Objection to Report and Recommended Decision By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (CCS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
MICHAEL H.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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2:17-cv-0447-JAW
ORDER AFFIRMING THE
RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The United States Magistrate Judge filed with the Court on August 31, 2018
his Recommended Decision.
Report and Recommended Decision (ECF No. 19)
(Recommended Decision). The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
filed objections to the Recommended Decision on September 14, 2018. Def.’s Obj. to
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommended Decision (ECF No. 20) (Def.’s Obj.).
Michael H. filed his response to the Commissioner’s objections on September 28,
2018. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Obj. to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommended
Decision (ECF No. 21) (Pl.’s Resp.). 1
The Court reviewed and considered the
Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision, together with the entire record. The
Court has made a de novo determination of all matters adjudicated by the Magistrate
The Commissioner filed a motion to strike Mr. H.’s response to her objection to the
recommended decision, Mot. to Strike Resp. to Obj. to Report and Recommended Decision (ECF No.
22), and his response to her motion to strike. Resp. to Mot. to Strike Resp. to Obj. to Report and
Recommended Decision (ECF No. 23). As the Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s recommended
decision, the Court dismisses the motion to strike as moot.
1
Judge's
Recommended
Decision.
Although
the
Court
concurs
with
the
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, the Court’s analysis of the record differs
somewhat from that of the Recommended Decision.
The Court offers the following additional discussion.
I.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A.
The Commissioner’s Objection
The Commissioner objects to the Recommended Decision on three grounds.
First, she argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in elevating Dr. Leslie Susan
Dixon’s “one-page ‘employability form’ to the status of a treating source medical
opinion” because “[p]laintiff failed to provide any evidence establishing that the
doctor who prepared the form was a treating source.” Def.’s Obj. at 1. Second, the
Commissioner argues that the Recommended Decision “relies on Mills [v. Apfel, 244
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001)] to impose an articulation requirement on the Appeals Council
that neither Mills nor the Social Security Act or regulations require.” Id. at 1 (citing
Recommended Decision at 9-10). Finally, the Commissioner maintains that remand
is not required on the basis that the Appeals Council did not consider the
employability form because it is merely cumulative evidence. Id. at 1-2.
B.
Michael H.’s Response
Mr. H. responded to the Commissioner’s objections and raised additional
reasons why the Appeals Council erred in its decision. Pl.’s Resp. at 1-2. First, Mr.
H. notes that “this is a case where the Appeals Council, rather than acting in its usual
capacity as a reviewing entity, chose to act as the fact finder and issue a de novo
2
decision.” Id. at 3 (italics in original). He argues that this is relevant to several of
the Commissioner’s objections, including to the Appeals Council’s handling of the
Dixon report. Id. According to Mr. H., because the Appeals Council acted as a
factfinder, it “specifically solicited new evidence prior to issuing its decision.” Id. He
also argues that “although the decision was issued by the Appeals Council, it is still
subject to exactly the same scrutiny that would apply to any decision by an ALJ.” Id.
In response to the Commissioner’s argument that the Magistrate Judge
improperly construed Mills, Mr. H. avers that “[t]he Defendant simply refuses to
acknowledge that in this case the Council was not acting in its appellate capacity.”
Id. at 6. He further argues that the Recommended Decision “is not applying Mills to
impose a greater requirement on the Council in the appellate role as discussed in
Mills . . . . Contrary to the Defendant’s argument, the Recommended Decision
properly reviews the decision under the same standards as any other final decision of
the Commissioner . . ..” Id.
Mr. H. disagrees that the Appeals Council was not required to consider the
Dixon medical opinion because it was cumulative, contending that the limitations in
Dr. Dixon’s evaluation “are quite different from the limitations adopted by the ALJ
in the RFC and, in turn, specifically adopted in the Council’s superseding decision.”
Id. at 7 (citing Recommended Decision at 6-7).
Finally, Mr. H. raises additional issues he argues require reversal and remand
of the Appeals Council’s decision. Id. at 9. He contends that the evidence does not
reflect the conclusion that Mr. H. did not have a severe impairment, and that the
3
Commissioner “failed to give good reasons for rejecting Ms. Beneck’s opinions.” Id.
at 9-10.
II.
THE RECORD
A.
The Appeals Council Request
On March 23, 2016, the Administrative Law Judge rendered an unfavorable
decision against Mr. H.’s application for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits. Administrative Record, Attach. 2, Administrative Process Docs. at 30-42
(ECF No. 9). On May 13, 2016, Mr. H. appealed the unfavorable decision to the
Appeals Council. Id. at 25. On May 26, 2016, the Appeals Council wrote Attorney
Francis Jackson, Mr. H.’s lawyer, and notified him:
You may send more evidence or a statement about the facts and the law
in this case.
Any more evidence must be new and material to the issues considered
in the hearing decision dated March 28, 2016.
Id. at 22.
On May 25, 2017, the Appeals Council sent Mr. H. a Notice of Appeals
Council Action, informing him that it “plan[ned] to make a decision again finding you
are not disabled.” Id. at 12. The May 25, 2017 letter contained the following notice:
You may send us a statement about the facts and the law in your case
or additional evidence within 30 days of the date of this letter. We will
consider additional evidence if it meets the rules we applied above.
Id. In the May 25, 2017 letter, the Appeals Council also wrote:
Under our rules, we will review your case for any of the following reasons:
We receive additional evidence that you show is new, material, and
relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision. You
must also show there is a reasonable probability that the additional
4
evidence would change the outcome of the decision. You must show good
cause for why you missed informing us about or submitting it earlier.
On June 23, 2017, Attorney Jackson sent the Appeals Council the June 1, 2017 Dr.
Dixon evaluation. Administrative Record, Attach. 6, Disability Related Development,
Letter from Att’y Jackson to Hon. Jeffrey Kirkwood and Hon. Adelaide Edelson at 9093.
B.
The Appeals Council Decision
After receiving Attorney Jackson’s June 23, 2017 letter, the Appeals Council
issued its September 19, 2017 decision, concluding that Mr. H. “is not entitled to or
eligible for a period of disability or disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i)
and 223, respectively, or Supplemental Security Income payments under sections
1602 and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.” Administrative Record Attach. 2,
Docs. Related to Administrative Process at 2-9. Regarding Dr. Dixon’s evaluation, the
Appeals Council wrote:
The claimant submitted an opinion from Dr. Dixon dated June 2, 2016
(4pgs). . . The Administrative Law Judge decided your case through
March 28, 2016. This additional evidence does not relate to the period
at issue. Therefore, it does not affect the decision about whether you
were disabled beginning on or before March 28, 2016.
Id. at 5-6.
C.
Dr. Leslie Susan Dixon’s June 1, 2016 Evaluation
The Administrative Record contains an “Employability Form” Dr. Dixon
completed on June 1, 2016 for the state of Maine Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), Family Interdependence Office. Administrative Process Docs. at
21. Maine DHHS asked Dr. Dixon to complete three categories in the form: (1)
5
physical abilities and limitations, (2) mental abilities and limitations, and (3) other.
Id. Dr. Dixon completed the physical abilities and limitations section with express
reference to a prior evaluation of September 2015 by Dr. Phelps. Id. (“per R. Phelps
prior evaluation 9/2015”). The record contains a Complete General Medical Physical
Examination Report by Robert N. Phelps, Jr., M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, dated
September 14, 2015. Administrative Record, Attach. 8, Med. Records at 728-35. Dr.
Dixon’s completion of the physical abilities and limitations portion of the form is
consistent with Dr. Phelps’ conclusions.
Dr. Dixon’s completion of the second part of the form, the mental abilities and
limitations, indicates that Mr. H. was “extremely limited” in (1) “Remember work
location and work procedures,” (2) “Carry out instructions,” (3) “Maintain attention
and concentration,” (4) Perform activities within a schedule,” and (5) “Sustain an
ordinary routine.” Administrative Process Docs. at 21. Dr. Dixon concluded that Mr.
H. was “markedly limited” in his ability to “interact with [the] general public.” Id.
The third part of the form, “other,” contained additional information. First,
she said that Mr. H. was not expected to have surgery. Id. She said she had last
examined Mr. H. on May 10, 2016 and that his limitations began in 1993 and “then
May 2012.” Id. She stated that Mr. H. will need “medical management every monthbimonthly.” Id. When asked her diagnoses, she wrote: “ADHD combined type –
severe (despite meds), Mood Disorder, Panic Disorder without agoraphobia, Chronic
neck, back, shoulder pain hypertension (Degenerative Disc Disease Osteoarthritis).”
Dr. Dixon opined that Mr. [H.] is “unable to work.” She described his “Functional
6
Limitations” as “Chronic pain with physical impairment, anxiety, mood liability with
an asterisk.” Directly below are three asterisks for “*inattention *poor organization
*memory limitations.” Id.
D.
The Recommended Decision
The Magistrate Judge concluded that because Dr. Dixon referred to Dr. Phelps’
2015 evaluation and because she reported that Mr. H.’s limitations began in 1993 and
then in May 2012, her opinion, contrary to the Appeals Council’s decision, did in fact
relate to the period at issue. Recommended Decision at 9-10 (“The mere fact that a
medical opinion is based in part on an examination that occurred after the date of the
ALJ’s decision does not foreclose the examining medical expert from offering an
opinion on the duration of a medical condition”).
The Magistrate Judge also
concluded that the Appeals Council’s refusal to consider Dr. Dixon’s opinion was not
harmless error. Id. at 13-14.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Appeals
Evaluation
Council’s
Failure
to Consider
Dr.
Dixon’s
In her objection to the Recommended Decision, the Commissioner argues that
any error in failing to consider the employability form was “harmless, and cannot
serve as the basis for remand . . . because the employability form is cumulative of
evidence from acceptable medical source Dr. Robert Phelps,” and because Mr. H.
failed to provide “any evidence that Dr. Dixon performed any type of objective
physical examination of him.” Def.’s Obj. at 7-8.
7
Although the Commissioner’s response assumes that the Appeals Council
erred, albeit in her view harmless error, to provide context, the Court turns to the
error itself. In its decision, the Appeals Council refused to consider Dr. Dixon’s
opinion because the “additional evidence does not relate to the period at issue.
Therefore, it does not affect the decision about whether you were disabled beginning
on or before March 28, 2016.” Administrative Process Docs. at 5-6. This conclusion
is contradicted on its face by the Dixon evaluation. In her June 1, 2016 evaluation,
Dr. Dixon clearly says that the limitations began in 1993 and then in May 2012.
The
Commissioner’s
argument
selectively
characterizes
Dr.
Dixon’s
evaluation. Dr. Dixon’s form confirms that she completed the “Physical Abilities and
Limitations” portion of the employability form based on Dr. Phelps’ 2015 evaluation.
As to this portion of the Dixon form, Dr. Dixon’s opinions were cumulative. But Dr.
Dixon’s opinions in the “Mental Abilities and Limitations” section of the form do not
rely on Dr. Phelps’ evaluation, and Dr. Dixon completed this portion of the form after
she examined Mr. H. on May 10, 2016. Administrative Process Docs. at 21 (“Date of
last exam? 5/10/16”).
In this portion of the form, Dr. Dixon opines that Mr. H.’s ability to remember
work location and work procedures, to carry out instructions, to maintain attention
and concentration, to perform activities within a schedule, and sustain an ordinary
income are “extremely limited.” Id. She further assesses Mr. H.’s ability to “interact
with the general public” as “markedly limited.”
Id.
She notes in the “Other
Information” section of the form that Mr. H. has diagnoses of “ADHD combined type-
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severe (despite meds), mood disorder, panic disorder without agoraphobia, chronic
neck, back and shoulder pain, hypertension, degenerative disc disease, and
osteoarthritis.” Id. Furthermore, Dr. Dixon’s assessment, as the Magistrate Judge
noted, was that Mr. H.’s “chronic pain, including pain from degenerative disc disease
and osteoarthritis, significantly restricts Plaintiff’s ability to stand, walk and sit for
appreciable durations.” Recommended Decision at 12. Dr. Dixon concludes that Mr.
H. is “unable to work.” Id. Because Dr. Dixon’s evaluation of Mr. H.’s mental health
is not cumulative of other evidence and because the evidence in this record confirms
that Dr. Dixon evaluated his mental abilities and limitations, the Court concludes
that the Commissioner’s argument that Dr. Dixon’s evaluation was merely
cumulative is unsupported by the record.
The Social Security Administration’s own regulation states that “[r]egardless
of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive.”
404.1527(c).
20 C.F.R. §
Yet, the Appeals Council refused to consider Dr. Dixon’s evaluation,
which was medical evidence, in violation of its own regulation. Moreover, because
the Appeals Council solicited the report from Mr. H., promised to review it if it
complied with the Appeals Council’s rules, and then ignored it, citing an erroneous
basis for doing so, the Court views the Appeals Council’s refusal to consider the Dixon
report as egregious.
The remaining question is whether, in light of the Appeals Council’s failure to
consider Dr. Dixon’s evaluation, its determination is supported by substantial
evidence. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Manso-Pizarro v. Sec'y of Health & Human
9
Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (“The standard of review of the Commissioner’s
decision is whether the determination made is supported by substantial evidence”).
Stated differently, “the determination must be supported by such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion drawn.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981). Robert W. v. Berryhill, No. 2:17-CV00359-DBH, 2018 WL 3219444, at *1 (D. Me. July 2, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-cv-359-DBH, 2018 WL 3448208 (D. Me. July 17,
2018).
Here, the Magistrate Judge determined that, in light of the Appeals Council’s
failure to consider Dr. Dixon’s report, its decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence.
The Recommended Decision reasons that “[g]iven that Dr. Dixon has
assessed disabling limitations based, in part, on chronic back pain and ADHD
impairments that the ALJ found non-severe, the record does not suggest that remand
would be an ‘empty exercise.’” Recommended Decision at 13. The Court’s analysis of
Dr. Dixon’s evaluation does not change this result. Although the Court finds that Dr.
Dixon’s evaluation was cumulative of evidence examined by the ALJ with regard to
chronic back pain, Dr. Dixon’s assessment of Mr. H.’s ADHD impairment runs
contrary to the ALJ’s determination that his ADHD is not a severe condition, as she
concludes that Mr. H.’s mental limitations render him unable to work.
Administrative Process Docs. at 21.
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The Court views Mr. H.’s case as similar to Hamm v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-cv00627-DBH, 2017 WL 4918514, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179925 (D. Me. Oct. 31, 2017),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:16-CV-627-DBH, 2017 WL 6029588, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199453 (D. Me. Dec. 5, 2017). In Hamm, the ALJ’s and the Appeals
Council’s failure to consider a medical evaluation—a Veterans Administration
disability decision and underlying records—was deemed “egregious error” requiring
remand.
Id. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199453, at *6.
Although there are some
differences between Hamm and this case, the basic principle is the same: neither the
ALJ nor the Appeals Council are “at liberty to ignore medical evidence.” Nguyen v.
Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
On this basis, the Court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
vacating the administrative decision and remanding the matter for further
proceedings.
B.
Dr. Dixon as a Treating or Examining Source
In his Recommended Decision, the Magistrate Judge stated:
Even if Dr. Dixon first met with Plaintiff after the ALJ issued her
decision . . . [she] had access to Plaintiff’s longitudinal records, some of
which she referenced, and the benefit of an examination of Plaintiff. Dr.
Dixon’s opinion, therefore, constitutes the opinion of an established
treatment provider regarding the relevant time period . . . The Appeals
Council, therefore, should have discussed the opinion and, in the event
it found the opinion unpersuasive, provided “good reasons” for rejecting
it.
Recommended Decision at 13 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2);
McAllister v. Colvin, 205 F. Supp. 3d 314, 333 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)). Under the
“treating source rule,” the opinion of a treating physician may be rejected only for
11
good reasons. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), Smythe v. Astrue, No. 2:10-CV-251-GZS,
2011 WL 2580650, at *4 (D. Me. June 28, 2011), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 2:10-CV-251-GZS, 2011 WL 2942733 (D. Me. July 21, 2011).
The Commissioner and Mr. H. strongly disagree about whether the Magistrate
Judge erred in determining that Dr. Dixon was a “treating source” under the
regulations and caselaw. The Court considers this a close question.
Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a “treating source” as “your own acceptable
medical source who provides you, or has provided you, with medical treatment or
evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with you.”
The provision further states:
Generally, we will consider that you have an ongoing treatment relationship
with an acceptable medical source when the medical evidence establishes that
you see, or have seen, the source with a frequency consistent with accepted
medical practice for the type of treatment and or/evaluation required for your
medical condition(s).
§ 404.1527(a)(2).
Courts have typically interpreted this provision to require multiple visits with
a medical provider for the provider to be deemed a “treating source.” See Carson v.
Barnhart, 242 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37 (D. Me. 2002) (holding that a physician who saw a
plaintiff once to evaluate him for an insurer is not a treating physician); Jessica B.
v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-CV-00294-NT, 2018 WL 2552162, at *4 (D. Me. June 3, 2018),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-294-NT, 2018 WL 4289314 (D. Me.
Sept. 7, 2018) (concluding that a medical provider who on the same day, “met with
the plaintiff for the first time, examined her, and completed a form titled “Medical
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Source Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related Activities (Mental)” was not a
treating source); Smythe, 2011 WL 2580650, at *4 (“A onetime examining consultant
is not a ‘treating source’”); see also Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 (10th Cir.
2012) (a physician who had been “in a professional relationship with [the Plaintiff]
for merely two months” is not a treating source, but is “effectively reduce[d] . . . to the
status of an examining-source”).
Consistent with this approach, courts have largely rejected the contention that
a patient’s visits with multiple doctors in the same practice creates an “ongoing
treatment relationship.”
There is authority in this District for the view that a
treatment relationship does not exist simply because the physician “had access to the
plaintiff’s records of treatment by other professionals” at the same practice; the
concern is that under this approach, an “applicant could simply choose a more
favorable treating source, see him or her once and provide him or her with all . . .
previous treatment records, and the commissioner would have to treat the new
treating source as if the treatment relationship had gone on for many years.” Brown
v. Astrue, 2010 WL 5261004, at *3 n.4; see also Jessica B., 2018 WL 2552162, at *4.
With this said, the situation presented in this case strikes the Court as
potentially different from Brown and Jessica B. Mr. H. had been a patient at Maine
Behavioral Healthcare from February 13, 2015 through at least January 4, 2016,
when the records stop.
As with many modern medical practices, a physician’s
assistant, Stacey Beneck, provided mental health treatment for Mr. H. about every
twelve weeks during this entire time under the supervision of Thor Agustsson, D.O.,
13
who countersigned all the patient visit notes. Administrative Record, Attach. 7, Med.
Records at 628-52, Attach. 8, Med. Records at 767-84. ALJ Cutter gave “little weight”
to PA Beneck’s opinions in part because she is “not an acceptable medical source” and
because in ALJ Cutter’s view, PA Beneck’s “findings are not consistent with medical
evidence of record as a whole.” Administrative Record Attach. 2 at 35.
Assuming that Dr. Agustsson’s opinions as Ms. Beneck’s supervising physician
would have been acceptable, the exact status of Dr. Dixon, who was part of the Maine
Behavioral Healthcare practice and also examined Mr. H., is unclear. Except for the
May 20, 2016 Dr. Dixon examination, there is no evidence whether Mr. H. continued
to treat at Maine Behavioral Healthcare after January 4, 2016, whether Dr.
Agustsson continued to supervise P.A. Beneck’s mental health treatment of Mr. H.,
and whether Dr. Dixon assumed the role of supervisory physician over P.A. Beneck,
replacing Dr. Agustsson.
Even if the Commissioner’s regulations prohibited
physician assistants like P.A. Beneck from expressing medical opinions, see Drew v.
Social Security Admin. Comm’r, No. 1:11-cv-00240-GZS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67679, at *8-10 (D. Me. Apr. 27, 2012), Dr. Dixon’s opinions as a medical doctor would
not have been so cabined. Moreover, Dr. Dixon’s opinions might have fit within the
definition of treating source if she had assumed responsibility for Mr. H.’s mental
health care.
In addition, although the form suggests that Dr. Dixon had access to at least
one of Mr. H.’s longitudinal records, namely the Dr. Phelps evaluation, it is unclear
from the record whether Dr. Dixon and Dr. Phelps maintain a practice affiliation or
14
whether Dr. Dixon had access to additional records.
Id.
This differs from the
circumstances of Blevins v. Berryhill, No. 5:16-CV-310-WTH/CAS, 2017 WL 6330823,
at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 7, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:16-cv00310-WTHCAS, 2017 WL 6329956 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2017), on which Mr. H. relies
for the proposition that a treating relationship can be derived from seeing multiple
providers within a practice. In Blevins, the medical provider referenced “a wealth of
information from several providers including records of an ongoing relationship
between March 2013 and June 2016 and between Plaintiff and the treating
physicians at BSC where Dr. Elzawahry practices.” 2017 WL 6330823, at *10.
With these principles in mind, neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council
reached the question of what role Dr. Dixon was assuming when she performed the
May 20, 2016 examination and completed the June 1, 2016 evaluation form because
the Dr. Dixon examination and assessment took place after the ALJ issued her
decision and because the Appeals Council refused to consider her opinions in reaching
its ruling. As the case requires remand regardless of the resolution of this issue, the
Court views this issue, as framed, as an advisory opinion, one that may not be reached
depending upon the Appeals Council’s determination.
If the Appeals Council
concludes that Dr. Dixon’s opinion, regardless of how it is characterized, causes a
different result, it may not reach whether Dr. Dixon was a treating or evaluating
source. Yet, the Appeals Council may determine that it is necessary to clarify Dr.
Dixon’s role before assessing the weight to be given her opinion. It is preferable, in
this Court’s view, to give the Appeals Council an opportunity to state how it
15
characterizes Dr. Dixon’s evaluation and, if the parties remain dissatisfied, for this
Court to rule based on a considered opinion from the Appeals Council.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the Appeals Council’s decision is unsupported by
substantial evidence, and affirms the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation vacating
the administrative decision and remanding the matter for further proceedings.
1. It is therefore ORDERED that the Recommended Decision of the
Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 19) is hereby AFFIRMED.
2. It is further ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision be and hereby is
VACATED.
3. It is further ORDERED that the Commissioner’s Motion to Strike Response
to Objection to Report and Recommended Decision is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 15th day of February, 2019
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