SPARKS v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER

Filing 16

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION re 11 Social Security Statement of Errors/Fact Sheet. Objections to R&R due by 9/7/2018. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (MFS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JEFFREY S.,
Plaintiff
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
COMMISSIONER,
Defendant

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2:17-cv-00468-NT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION
On Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits under Title II and
supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
Defendant, the Social Security Administration Commissioner, found that Plaintiff has
severe impairments, but retains the functional capacity to perform substantial gainful
activity. Defendant, therefore, denied Plaintiff’s request for disability benefits. Plaintiff
filed this action to obtain judicial review of Defendant’s final administrative decision
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Following a review of the record, and after consideration of the parties’ arguments,
I recommend the Court affirm the administrative decision.
The Administrative Findings
The Commissioner’s final decision is the August 31, 2016 decision of the
Administrative Law Judge. (ALJ Decision, ECF No. 9-2.)1 The ALJ’s decision tracks the

Because the Appeals Council found no reason to review that decision, the Acting Commissioner’s final
decision is the ALJ’s decision. (Notice of Appeals Council Action, R. 1, ECF No. 9-2.)
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familiar five-step sequential evaluation process for analyzing social security disability
claims, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe, but non-listing-level impairments
consisting of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, polysubstance abuse,
spine disorder and arthritis. (Id. ¶¶ 3 – 4.) The ALJ, however, found Plaintiff has the
residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform medium exertion work, but cannot perform
production rate or pace work, and must work in a “low-stress environment,” with only
occasional decision-making, changes in work setting, and interaction with the public and
with co-workers. (Id. ¶ 5.) Based on the stated RFC, Plaintiff’s vocational background,
and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retains the capacity
to perform past relevant work as a groundskeeper, and that Plaintiff could transition to
other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including the
representative jobs of cleaner, kitchen helper, office cleaner, and auto detailer. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Id. ¶ 7.)
Standard of Review
A court must affirm the administrative decision provided the decision is based on
the correct legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence, even if the record
contains evidence capable of supporting an alternative outcome. Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y
of HHS, 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec’y of HHS,
819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a finding. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of HHS, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981). “The ALJ’s findings
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of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, but they are not conclusive
when derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to
experts.” Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
Discussion
The record supports, and Plaintiff does not challenge, the ALJ’s findings regarding
Plaintiff’s mental health impairments, which included depression, post-traumatic stress
disorder and anxiety. (R. 17 – 18.) Plaintiff argues that the final administrative decision
should be vacated because the ALJ’s determination that he can work in a job having a “low
stress environment” is vague, unreviewable, and contrary to Social Security Ruling 85-15,
and relevant legal authority in this District. MacFarlane v. Astrue, No. 2:07-cv-132-DBH,
2008 WL 660225, at *3, and Lancellotta v. Sec’y of HHS, 806 F.2d 284, 285 (1st Cir.
1986). (Statement of Errors at 4 – 5.)
Following a consultatitve examination in May, 2014, Donna Gates, Ph.D., opined
that Plaintiff would be able to manage “a mild level of work-related stress and function
independently on simple tasks.” (Ex. 5F, R. 388, ECF No. 9-7.) The assessment is
consistent with the evaluation of a treatment provider, Jonathan Purinton, LCPC, who
determined that Plaintiff requires a “low stress” job. (Ex. 4F, R. 382.)
Consultative experts who reviewed Plaintiff’s claim on behalf of Disability
Determination Services also concluded that Plaintiff has a severe impairment, but believed
Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity for full-time work with certain limitations.
They also noted Dr. Gates’s statement that Plaintiff could manage a mild level of workrelated stress. (Lewis Lester, Ph.D., Ex. 1A, R. 114 – 15; Mary Burkhart, Ph.D., Ex. 5A,
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R. 144 – 45, ECF No. 9-3.)
At the hearing on Plaintiff’s claim, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to consider
a hypothetical individual with a residual functional capacity that included the ability to
perform work that “may have some busy periods but not the assembly line scenario,” with
“only occasional interaction with the public and co-workers.” (Hr’g Tr. at 66, R. 99, ECF
No. 9-2.) The ALJ further described the hypothetical individual as one who “essentially
…. should work in a low stress environment” that included “only occasional decision
making, occasional changes in work setting.” (Id.) The vocational expert identified several
jobs the individual could perform. The vocational expert testified the individual would be
able to perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a groundskeeper, and other substantial
gainful activity such as maintenance worker, kitchen helper, office cleaner, and auto
detailer. (R. 99 – 101.)
Plaintiff contends remand is required because the ALJ’s reference to a restriction to
work in a “low-stress environment” is impermissibly vague. Plaintiff’s argument is
unpersuasive.
First, the ALJ’s hypothetical posed to the vocational expert was not limited to a
reference to a “low stress” restriction. The ALJ defined the low stress restriction to include
jobs that involved some busy time, but not constantly busy as in assembly line work,
occasional interaction with the public and co-workers, only occasional decision making,
and occasional changes in the work setting. The ALJ’s question included sufficient detail
to elicit a meaningful response from the expert. Consistent with the question to and
response of the vocational expert, the ALJ’s RFC finding includes the specific limitations
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that would constitute the low-stress environment (i.e, only occasional decision making,
only occasional changes in work setting, only occasional interaction with the public and
co-workers, limitation on production rate or pace). (ALJ Decision ¶ 5, R. 15 – 16.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, therefore, the ALJ’s RFC finding is not vague and
unreviewable.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s reference to the stress of a work environment is in accord
with Defendant’s regulations and rulings, which recognize that stress is an important
consideration for many individuals with mental impairments. Ruling 85-15 provides:
The reaction to the demands of work (stress) is highly individualized, and
mental illness is characterized by adverse responses to seemingly trivial
circumstances. The mentally impaired may cease to function effectively
when facing such demands as getting to work regularly, having their
performance supervised, and remaining in the workplace for a full day. A
person may become panicked and develop palpitations, shortness of breath,
or feel faint while riding in an elevator; another may experience terror and
begin to hallucinate when approached by a stranger asking a question. Thus,
the mentally impaired may have difficulty meeting the requirements of even
so-called “low-stress” jobs.
Titles II & XVI: Capability to Do Other Work-The Medical-Vocational Rules As A
Framework for Evaluating Solely Nonexertional Impairments, SSR 85-15 (S.S.A. 1985).
The record in this case reflects that the medical experts were cognizant of Plaintiff’s
stress limitations, and considered Plaintiff’s stress tolerance in assessing his work capacity.
Significantly, while the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s stress tolerance in the RFC
assessment, the ALJ did not simply define Plaintiff’s limitation to a low stress work
environment. Instead, as explained above, the ALJ defined the restrictions necessary to
reduce Plaintiff’s stress, which restrictions include no production rate or pace work, only
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occasional decision making, only occasional changes in the work place, and only
occasional interaction with the public and co-workers. In other words, the ALJ’s RFC
finding is tailored to Plaintiff’s individual needs and is not simply a general, vague
determination that Plaintiff is limited to a low-stress work environment. In short, the ALJ’s
finding is not impermissibly vague, and the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled
during the claimed period is supported by substantial evidence on the record.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, I recommend the Court affirm the administrative
decision.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, and request for oral
argument before the district judge, if any is sought, within fourteen (14) days
of being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum and any
request for oral argument before the district judge shall be filed within
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to
de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 24th day of August, 2018.

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