COUGHLIN v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS re 33 Motion to Dismiss, 32 Motion to Substitute Party. By JUDGE D. BROCK HORNBY. (jib)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
PAUL M. COUGHLIN, JR.,
PLAINTIFF
V.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,
DEFENDANT
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CIVIL NO. 2:17-CV-470-DBH
DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint in this case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Def.’s Mot. (ECF No. 33). The defendant treats the
unrepresented plaintiff’s complaint as asserting a claim for relief under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
Id. at 2.
If that were the only correct
characterization, the defendant would be correct, for there is no federal
jurisdiction over such a claim unless the plaintiff has first filed an administrative
claim, something the defendant says the plaintiff did not do.
28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(a).1
But I disagree with that narrow reading of the plaintiff’s complaint. He
says that his “civil rights are being violated,” Compl. 4 (ECF No. 1), disclaims any
1 The plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) does not assert that the plaintiff filed an administrative
claim under the FTCA, and his response to the government’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 36)
does not assert that he filed such a claim. In the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, whose
decisions govern this court, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving that he filed the claim in
order to support FTCA jurisdiction. Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2003).
request for damages, and seeks only injunctive relief against the FBI, claiming
that the FBI is constantly harassing him and stating: “All I want from this case
is for the harassment to stop,” Addendum to Compl. (ECF No. 9), and that “I
would settle for them to just leave me alone,” Compl. 5.2 While some of his claims
do sound like state law tort claims such as trespass and libel (throwing stones
at his house; accusing him of pedophilia, Coughlin Aff. 1 (ECF No. 24)) subject
to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the complaint can also be read as asserting
federal constitutional claims such as invasions of privacy, substantive due
process, and Fourth Amendment rights (he alleges, for example, that a
surveillance camera/microphone was placed in his house and a tracking device
in his car, Addendum to Compl.). See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998) (substantive due process claim based on executive
abuse of power requires conduct that shocks the conscience); Hancock v. Cty. of
Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir. 2018) (constitutional privacy claim based
on executive action requires conduct that shocks the conscience); Nat’l Org. For
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 961-64 (N.D.
Cal. 1985) (injunctive suit based on surveillance in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); see generally Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2010)
He has muddied the waters, however, in response to the government’s criticism of his failure
to file an administrative claim. Now on the deadline for the government’s reply, he has filed with
this court what purports to be an administrative claim dated June 19, 2018, with no indication
that it was sent to the United States or the Federal Bureau of Investigation for action. Pl.’s
Second Resp. (ECF No. 39-1). In responding to the form’s direction to state the nature and extent
of the injury, he states on the form: “Mainly I want the harassment to stop, but I will start at a
dollar amount of $100,000 and reserve the right to change it.” At this stage I express no view on
what effect this action and this new statement have on any claim under the FTCA. Certainly the
document does not alter his claim for relief in this court.
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(“Lewis clarified that the shocks-the-conscience test . . . governs all substantive
due process claims based on executive, as opposed to legislative, action.”).
I do not decide whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) for constitutional violations, because the defendant has argued only
the absence of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). It has been clear
since Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) that “it is established practice for
this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to
protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution.”
See also Simmat v. United
States Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1230-40 (10th Cir. 2005) (outlining
the basis for federal jurisdiction over suits seeking an injunction or mandamus
against federal officials and agencies and the waiver of sovereign immunity under
5 U.S.C. § 702 for suits seeking nonmonetary relief).
I therefore DENY the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Since the
motion to substitute a party is also based on the premise that the plaintiff has
presented only a Federal Tort Claims Act claim, that motion is DENIED for the
same reason. I express no view on whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) or whether the FBI has done that of which it is accused; my decision
is only that this Court has jurisdiction over the claim.
SO ORDERED.
DATED THIS 21ST DAY OF JUNE, 2018
/S/D. BROCK HORNBY
D. BROCK HORNBY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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