IN RE MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Unsealed) ON MOTIONS TO DISSOLVE MATERIAL WITNESS WARRANTS, MOTION FOR CONFLICT COUNSEL, MOTION TO QUASH, AND MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY mooting 1 Motion to Return Property. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN H. RICH III. (mjlt)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
In re: Material Witness Lukas Zak
FILED UNDER SEAL
In re: Material Witness Jaroslav Hornof
FILED UNDER SEAL
In re: Material Witness Damir Kordic
FILED UNDER SEAL
In re: Material Witness Peter Demcak
FILED UNDER SEAL
In re: Motion for Conflict Counsel
FILED UNDER SEAL
In re: Motion for Return of Property
FILED UNDER SEAL
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS TO DISSOLVE MATERIAL WITNESS
WARRANTS, MOTION FOR CONFLICT COUNSEL, MOTION TO QUASH, AND
MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY
Four material witnesses, Slovak citizens Lukas Zak and Peter Demcak, Czech citizen
Jaroslav Hornof, and Croatian citizen Damir Kordic, petitioned for release from material witness
arrest warrants issued by this court. 1 Each filed a motion or motions seeking to dissolve his arrest
warrant, modify the conditions of his release, or be deposed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 15. 2 The material witnesses also collectively filed a motion for the return of property
The material witness warrants were issued on the following dates: Zak, July 17, 2017; Hornof, August 9, 2017;
Kordic and Demcak, August 21, 2017.
These motions, filed by docket, are as follows: Zak: Motion To Discharge Warrants, Modify Conditions of Release,
or Take Depositions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15, and for Expedited Briefing and Hearing (“Zak
Warrant Motion”) (ECF No. 15), as supplemented by Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion To Discharge
Warrants (ECF No. 19), Second Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion To Discharge Warrants (ECF No.
20), and Supplemental Memorandum Summarizing First Circuit Precedent That Grand Jury Matters Are Not Criminal
Proceedings (ECF No. 32), In re Material Witness Lukas Zak (“Zak”); Hornof: Emergency Motion of Jaroslav Hornof
for Discharge from Constructive Detention, To Take Deposition Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15,
and for Expedited Briefing and Hearing (ECF No. 4) and Motion of Jaroslav Hornof To Dissolve Arrest Warrant or
for Immediate Deposition and Release Without Restriction (ECF No. 6) (together, “Hornof Warrant Motions”), In re
Material Witness Jaroslav Hornof (“Hornof”); Kordic: Emergency Motion of Damir Kordic To Reconsider Order for
Arrest Warrant and To Revoke Warrant for His Arrest (ECF No. 5) and Emergency Motion To Dissolve Warrants,
Release Witnesses or for Depositions (ECF No. 10) (together, “Kordic Warrant Motions”), In re Material Witness
Damir Kordic (“Kordic”); and Demcak: Emergency Motion of Peter Demcak To Reconsider Order for Arrest Warrant
and To Revoke Warrant for His Arrest (ECF No. 5) and Emergency Motion To Dissolve Warrants, Release Witnesses
that they alleged had been confiscated by the United States Coast Guard, namely, their passports
and visas. See Motion To Return Property Pursuant to F.R. Crim. P. 41(g) (“Motion To Return
Property”) (ECF No. 1), In re Motion for Return of Property.
In connection with those matters, the government filed a motion for the appointment of
conflict counsel, see United States’ Motion for Conflict Counsel (“Conflict Motion”) (ECF No.
1), In re Motion for Conflict Counsel, and a motion to quash subpoenas served by material witness
Zak on four United States Department of Homeland Security officials, see Government’s Motion
To Quash Subpoenas Served on Four Department of Homeland Security Officials (“Motion To
Quash”) (ECF No. 28), In re Material Witness Lukas Zak.
An evidentiary hearing was held before me on August 24, 2017, at which all four material
witnesses were present, had the assistance of an interpreter, and were represented by counsel, and
counsel for both sides argued orally. 3 I questioned all four material witnesses on the conflict of
counsel issue and admitted several exhibits without objection. During the hearing, I orally granted
the Conflict Motion to the extent that I questioned each of the material witnesses under oath, and
otherwise denied it, determining that no actual or apparent conflict existed, granted the Warrant
Motions to the extent that I ordered the government to depose the four material witnesses within
30 days, following which they were to be released from the material witness warrant conditions
and allowed to depart the United States, and deemed the Motion To Return Property moot. 4
or for Depositions (ECF No. 10) (together, “Demcak Warrant Motions”), In re Material Witness Peter Demcak
(“Demcak”). I shall refer to all seven motions, collectively, as the “Warrant Motions.”
Five other crew members were also detained. No material witness orders were ever sought as to four of those crew
members. On July 17, 2017, I issued a material witness order as to the fifth crew member, Oleksandr Zakharchenko,
but he was released prior to the August 24, 2017, hearing.
Depositions of the four material witnesses were taken on September 11 and 12, 2017. They departed the United
States on September 14, 2017, following an emergency hearing during which I granted the parties’ cross-motions for
the material witnesses’ release to the extent that I permitted that release, but otherwise denied the government’s crossmotions to the extent that it sought release on certain conditions, and denied the material witnesses’ cross-motions,
without prejudice, to the extent that they sought to vacate trial subpoenas served on them. See ECF Nos. 46-50, Zak;
ECF Nos. 17-21, Hornof; ECF Nos. 15-19, Kordic; ECF Nos. 15-19, Demcak.
I write to set forth my grounds for my August 24, 2017, rulings and to clarify that those
rulings mooted the Warrant Motions, to the extent that they sought additional or alternative relief,
as well as the government’s motion to quash in the Zak case.
Together, the material witnesses served as crew members aboard the Motor Vessel (“M/V”)
Marguerita, whose owner, known as “Reederei,” and operator, known as “MST,” have been
indicted on criminal charges related to, inter alia, the alleged discharge of oil waste in violation of
various federal laws. See Indictment (ECF No. 1), United States v. MST Mineralien Schiffarht
Spedition und Transport GMBH, et al., No. 2:17-cr-00117-NT (D. Me.).
The vessel was inspected by United States Coast Guard officials from July 7-9, 2017, in
the port of Portland, Maine. The material witnesses and other crew members were detained
onboard for approximately a week, following which MST and Reederei entered into a security
agreement with the government pursuant to which the material witnesses were housed at a motel
in the Portland, Maine, area and provided their salaries and a per diem allowance to cover meals
and expenses. The United States Coast Guard seized their passports.
In substance, the material witnesses asserted in the Warrant Motions that they had testified
before the grand jury to everything that they knew about any topic of possible interest and that, to
the extent that the government desired their testimony at trial, a deposition pursuant to Rule 15
would suffice. Accordingly, they argued, they should be released and allowed to return to their
In its Conflict Motion, the government requested that the court inquire of the four material
witnesses as to whether a conflict of interest existed because they were represented by a single
attorney, or, in the alternative, that the court appoint conflict counsel to engage in the same inquiry.
See Conflict Motion at 1. The government also asserted that the material witnesses’ attorney might
have a conflict of interest as between the material witnesses and the corporate defendants. See id.
A. Government’s Motion for Conflict Counsel
Conflict of interest inquiries in this district are governed by the Maine Rules of Professional
Conduct. See Concordia Partners, LLC v. Ward, No. 2:12-cv-138-GZS, 2012 WL 3229300, at *1
(D. Me. Aug 6, 2012); Loc. R. 83.3(d). Maine’s Law Court “has held that disqualification of an
attorney is appropriate only where the moving party produces evidence supporting two findings:
(1) ‘continued representation of the nonmoving party by that party’s chosen attorney results in an
affirmative violation of a particular ethical rule’ and (2) continued representation by the attorney
would result in ‘actual prejudice’ to the party seeking that attorney’s disqualification.” Concordia,
2012 WL 3229300, at *1 (quoting Morin v. Me. Educ. Ass’n, 993 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Me. 2010)).
Rules 1.7 of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict-of-interest. A concurrent conflict-ofinterest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client would be directly adverse to another client, even
if representation would not occur in the same matter or in substantially related
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients would be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict-of-interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer would be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; and
(2) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Me. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7.
In its motion, and at oral argument, the government advanced four arguments in support of
its position that the witnesses’ shared counsel, Edward MacColl, Esq., had several possible
conflicts of interests arising from his participation in this case.
First, it argued that, because Attorney MacColl identified himself as representing several
corporate entities related to this case at the inception of the M/V Marguerita investigation, a
conflict might exist between his representation of those entities and, later, the material witnesses.
See Conflict Motion at 3-4. The government noted that on or about July 8, 2017, shortly after
Coast Guard officials first boarded the ship, Attorney MacColl told investigators that he
represented the ship’s owner, operator, and underwriter. See id. at 2. The next day, he arrived at
the ship accompanied by George Chalos, Esq., an attorney who represents the now-indicted
corporate defendants, and offered the crew members representation while also informing them that
he worked for “the company.” Id. At the hearing, the government entered into evidence a copy
of the ship’s log book in which Attorney MacColl identified himself as an attorney for the
At the hearing, Attorney MacColl confirmed that he responded to the ship at the request of
the corporate entities involved and that, at the outset of the investigation, the lawyers present did
not immediately determine who would represent the corporate interests and who would represent
the crew members. He also confirmed that he had previously represented members of the
organization that provided the M/V Marguerita’s financial underwriting. He stated, however, that
once it became clear that the material witnesses would be in need of counsel, he and Attorney
Chalos decided that Attorney MacColl would represent the witnesses, and the witnesses alone. He
confirmed that from that point forward, he has not represented the corporate entities involved in
Based on Attorney MacColl’s representations, I found that no apparent or actual conflict
existed with respect to any representation of the corporate defendants and the material witnesses.
In addition, I note here that throughout the course of this case, each of the four witnesses who has
appeared before me has been zealously represented by Attorney MacColl, without any apparent
conflict. What he may have said aboard the ship is different, and removed, from his filing of
documents and other efforts on behalf of the material witnesses both in and out of court. The
government made no proffer, other than the ambiguous statements allegedly made by Attorney
MacColl aboard the ship, that he represented the interests of anyone but the material witnesses.
Indeed, by obtaining use immunity, he ensured that none of the material witnesses would face
criminal liability, and he ultimately secured relief in the form of the taking of the material
witnesses’ depositions, paving the way for their return to their homelands.
Moreover, in addition to the four material witnesses, Attorney MacColl represented five
other crew members, not named here, who were subject to the same agreement between the
government and MST/Reederei and likewise functionally detained in the same Portland-area hotel.
Each of those individuals, as well, received a grant of use immunity from the government in
exchange for his grand jury testimony, was released from the agreement, and was allowed to return
to his home country.
If there was any conflict between the witnesses collectively and the M/V Marguerita’s
owner and/or operator, it was not apparent from the record or proceedings before me.
The government next argued that conflicting interests might exist among the witnesses
themselves because of the potential for future criminal liability arising out of the alleged
misconduct that formed the basis of the investigation and indictments in the case against the
I confirmed at hearing that each witness had been granted use immunity from prosecution
in exchange for his grand jury testimony. In its motion, and at hearing, the government failed to
advance any reason to assume that any of the material witnesses was a potential future target of
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, any concern that the material witnesses might have had
conflicting interests among themselves was effectively mooted. To the extent that a possibility of
future criminal liability existed, I found that it was too remote to serve as a ground for further
inquiry into this sub-issue.
In addition, when I questioned the material witnesses during the August 24, 2017, hearing,
each reconfirmed, as he had during his initial appearance following the issuance of the material
witness warrants, that he desired Attorney MacColl’s continued representation. I informed each
that he had a right to his own attorney, without cost, and that, by virtue of Attorney MacColl’s
collective representation, no individual witness could engage in a confidential conversation with
him, whereas if each witness retained his own counsel, his conversations with that counsel would
remain confidential. After I confirmed that each witness understood his right to separate counsel,
each stated that he wished to retain the services of Attorney MacColl. To the extent that the
government was concerned that a conflict existed by virtue of Attorney MacColl’s representation
of multiple witnesses, each witness’s waiver in open court resolved that issue.
The government also argued that a potential conflict existed because it was unclear if one
of the corporate entities involved in this case was paying Attorney MacColl’s fees associated with
his representation of the material witnesses. I presumed that Attorney MacColl was aware of the
ethical canons in force in every case, including Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(f), and,
indeed, his written response to the government’s motion cited that rule. See Objection to Motion
for Conflict Counsel (ECF No. 3), In re Motion for Conflict Counsel, at 1. Rule 1.8(f) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other
than the client unless:
(1) the client gives informed consent;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) the confidences and secrets of a client are protected as required by Rule 1.6.
Me. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(f).
These requisites were met here. Most importantly, Attorney MacColl’s work in this case
demonstrated his pursuit of his clients’ interests, including their immediate release from the
material witness warrants, whatever the source of his fees.
Finally, the government raised a concern that Attorney MacColl might have potentially
divided loyalty because, at some point, under the applicable statutes governing the conduct in
which the owner and operator of the M/V Marguerita are alleged to have engaged, the material
witnesses might be entitled to a monetary award tied to any fines or fees assessed against the
corporate defendants. See Conflict Motion at 5-6. As of August 24, 2017, the corporate defendants
had not yet been arraigned, let alone found guilty and assessed a fine. To my knowledge, the
witnesses have not filed any action seeking a share of the proceeds from compensation paid by the
corporate defendants. Because this argument was too speculative to present any actual or potential
conflict issue, I did not consider it further.
B. The Material Witnesses’ Petitions for Depositions
As noted above, each witness moved for various forms of relief from his status as a material
witness, including a court order that the government take his deposition in accordance with Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 to facilitate his release. 5
The statute governing material witnesses is 18 U.S.C. § 3144. It provides:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is
material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer
may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with the
provisions of section 3142 of this title [governing detention and release of criminal
defendants]. No material witness may be detained because of inability to comply
with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be
secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure
of justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of
time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
18 U.S.C. § 3144.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 provides, in relevant part:
A witness who is detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3144 may request to be deposed by
filing a written motion and giving notice to the parties. The court may then order
that the deposition be taken and may discharge the witness after the witness has
signed under oath the deposition transcript.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(2). The witnesses invoked the first sentence of Rule 15(a)(2).
When a material witness moves for a deposition pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), he must be
released if his testimony can be adequately secured by deposition, and further detention is not
necessary to prevent a failure of justice. See, e.g., Torres-Ruiz v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of
Calif., 120 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1997). Material witnesses need not demonstrate “exceptional
circumstances to effectuate their own depositions.” United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1404
For ease of reference, I shall refer solely to the Zak Warrant Motion and the response thereto filed by the government.
The points made by both sides in the Zak case are substantially similar to those advanced in the Hornof, Kordic, and
n.4 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also, e.g., United States v.
Li, No. 08-CR-212, 2008 WL 4104062, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 4, 2008) (humanitarian costs of
prolonging detention of alien material witnesses itself is an exceptional circumstance).
The government argued that the material witnesses were not “detained” for purposes of the
statute and the rule because they were not incarcerated. See Government’s Response in Opposition
to Defendant’s [sic] Motion To Discharge Warrants (“Warrant Response”) (ECF No. 26), Zak, at
 n.10. That contention, carried to its logical extreme, would permit the government to prevent
foreign nationals from leaving this country indefinitely, particularly as the government also
contended at hearing that, as a matter of law, the warrants could not be discharged until at least the
end of trial, should the grand jury investigation in connection with which the material witnesses’
liberty was constrained result in the issuance of an indictment.
That could mean, in practical terms, that such material witnesses could be kept away from
their homes, in a foreign country where they do not speak the language and have no social
connections and no way to engage in the line of work in which they are experienced, or indeed any
remunerative work, for periods of well over a year. The argument, carried to its logical extreme,
also means that a material witness who is jailed would be able to seek discharge through
deposition, while a material witness subject to a warrant, but able to stay in a motel and walk to a
grocery store or recreation, would not have that option. Yet, as a practical matter, that individual
also is detained. See, e.g., United States v. Dalnave Navigation, Criminal No. 09-130, 2009 WL
743100, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2009) (material witnesses lodged at hotel with no passports, little
or no transportation, little knowledge of English, limited knowledge of customs and mores of this
country, and desiring to return home to their families were functionally detained for purposes of
section 3144 and Rule 15). 6
The government provided no authority in support of its position, apart from “a strict reading
of the rule,” Warrant Response at  n.10, and I located none. In rejecting that argument, I also
necessarily rejected the government’s contention that the material witnesses “lack[ed] standing”
to seek to have their depositions taken under Rule 15, which was predicated on the argument that
they were not detained. Id.
With indictments secured as of August 24, 2017, and trial contemplated, the government
further argued that the material witnesses should be detained until they testified at trial. In its
briefs and at hearing, the government contended that the witnesses’ testimony was necessary for
trial and that they should be detained in the interim because the government had “no ability to
compel the appearance of the Petitioners should they leave the United States.” Id. at . This was
so, the government argued, because the relevant international accords governing the mutual
assistance of countries in the prosecution of criminal matters “do not contain mechanisms to
compel [the witnesses] to return to the District of Maine to testify as witnesses in further
proceedings.” Id. at -.
However, assuming that is so, the government failed to provide a compelling reason why
a Rule 15 deposition would not permit the admission of the testimony of the material witnesses at
trial, affording them the opportunity to return to their home countries rather than continuing to be
detained in hotel rooms in Greater Portland, possibly for months, pending trial.
In Allie, alien material witnesses were given the option, after being deposed, “of remaining in the United States with
a work permit pending trial” or returning to their homeland after giving assurances that they would return to testify at
trial. Allie, 978 F.2d at 1403. No such offer was made in this case to my knowledge. In much of the caselaw cited
by the government, the courts speak of the obligations of United States citizens to testify in criminal proceedings,
whether they wish to or not. The material witnesses in this case do not enjoy the advantages of Unites States
citizenship and the reciprocal obligation thus carries little benefit in their instance.
The government contended that, because depositions taken pursuant to Rule 15 would not
be admissible at trial, absent a showing that the material witnesses were unavailable to testify,
there was a risk that the trial court might rule that the government had not taken sufficient steps to
secure the witnesses’ presence at trial, if they were released from the arrest warrants following
their depositions. See id. at -. I was unpersuaded that this risk outweighed the material
witnesses’ liberty interests, deeming it dubious, in view of the government’s objection to their
release following deposition and its representation that it would lack a formal mechanism to
compel their attendance were they released to their home countries, that this court would rule
against any request to admit the witnesses’ depositions at trial on the basis of their unavailability,
so long as the government made reasonable efforts to convince them to return to testify in person. 7
Indeed, Rule 15 exists to strike a balance between the differing needs and rights presented
here – the material witnesses’ right not to be detained for an undue period of time and the
government’s need to present its case with admissible evidence. The rule grants courts the
authority to strike this balance, and I did so here. The government’s further concern, expressed in
its response, that a Rule 15 deposition was not ripe because the rule contemplates a defendant’s
right to be present at the deposition, see Warrant Response at , was mooted as of the time of
hearing by the fact that MST and Reederei had been indicted on the above-described charges. At
If the government “adequately preserve[s] [a criminal defendant’s] constitutional rights when [a Rule 15 deposition
is] taken,” then “the prior testimony of the now-unavailable witnesses is admissible at trial pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 . . . (2004).” United States v. Caramadre,
882 F.Supp.2d 295, 299 (D.R.I. May 15, 2012) (footnote omitted). In view of the importance of a criminal defendant’s
constitutional right to confront witnesses against him, the Supreme Court has held that “a witness is not ‘unavailable’
for purposes of the [unavailable witness] exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
See also Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) (a witness is unavailable if, inter alia, the witness “is absent from the trial or hearing
and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure . . . the [witness’s]
hearing, I received assurances from Attorney MacColl that counsel for criminal defendants MST
and Reederei were expected to be available to attend the material witnesses’ depositions. 8
The question then became one of timing. In at least two other federal jurisdictions, time
limits for the detention of material witnesses have been established by standing orders: 45 days in
the Southern District of Texas, see Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1992), and
60 days in the Western District of Texas, see Allie, 978 F.2d at 1403. In this case, the material
witnesses had been in the United States since July 7, 2017, either onboard the ship or functionally
detained at a local hotel, and had been subject to the material witness warrants since July 17, 2017,
or later. As of the date of the hearing, it appeared that the material witnesses would have been
detained for as long as two months by the time depositions reasonably could be scheduled.
Accordingly, I ordered that the government take the deposition of each material witness
within 30 days of my order, following which the material witnesses’ passports were to be returned
to them and they were to be allowed to return to their home countries.
C. Other Motions for Relief
1. Government’s Motion To Quash in Zak
In anticipation of the August 24, 2017, hearing on his warrant motion, material witness Zak
served subpoenas on four officials of the United States Department of Homeland Security
commanding both their testimony at hearing and the production of documents. See Motion To
Quash at 1-2. The government moved to quash the subpoenas, see id. at 7-13, and, at hearing, I
deferred ruling on them at Attorney MacColl’s request. I now clarify that, because I granted relief
to all of the material witnesses by ordering the government to take their depositions pursuant
The government also asserted that the material witnesses were “not innocent, uninvolved ship passengers[.]”
Warrant Response at . However, no suggestion was made that any of the material witnesses was a target of the
investigation involving the M/V Marguerita. Indeed, as noted above, the government represented at hearing that each
had been granted use immunity from criminal prosecution in exchange for his grand jury testimony.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15, following which their passports were to be returned to
them and they were to be allowed to depart the United States, the Motion To Quash is moot.
2. Material Witnesses’ Alternative Requests for Relief re: Arrest Warrants
In their motions seeking to dissolve the arrest warrants issued against them, the material
witnesses advanced alternative grounds upon which the court could grant relief. See generally
Warrant Motions. I now clarify that I granted in part those motions, to the extent that I afforded
the relief discussed above, and otherwise mooted them in part.
3. Material Witnesses’ Motion for Return of Property
As noted above, the material witnesses also collectively moved for the return of passports
and visas confiscated by the United States Coast Guard. See Motion To Return Property. As I
noted at hearing, my grant of the relief discussed above mooted that motion.
For the foregoing reasons, at hearing on August 24, 2017, I GRANTED the Conflict
Motion IN PART, to the extent that I examined the material witnesses regarding the possible
existence of a conflict, and otherwise DENIED it, GRANTED the Warrant Motions IN PART,
to the extent that I DIRECTED that the depositions of the material witnesses be taken within 30
days, following which their passports were to be returned to them and they were to be permitted
to depart the United States, and DEEMED the Motion To Return Property MOOT. My partial
grant of the relief requested in the Warrant Motions also MOOTED those motions to the extent
that they sought additional or alternative relief and MOOTED the Motion To Quash.
Dated this 19th day of November, 2017.
/s/ John H. Rich III
John H. Rich III
United States Magistrate Judge
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