CHARRON v. COUNTY OF YORK et al

Filing 21

ORDER ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT reserving ruling 19 Motion for Default Judgment By JUDGE JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. (CCS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JOHN A. CHARRON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER MOSS, et al.

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No. 2:18-cv-00105-JAW

ORDER ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s suggestion that his claims for compensatory and
punitive damages are for a sum certain under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 and
orders the Plaintiff to give notice of the damages hearing to the defaulted Defendants.
The Court orders that an evidentiary damages hearing be held.
I.

BACKGROUND
On March 8, 2018, John A. Charron filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against Christopher Moss, Eric J. Pilvelait as well as a number of Defendants
associated with York County Maine, alleging that the Defendants violated his civil
rights. 1 Compl. (ECF No. 1). Mr. Charron effected service of the Complaint and
Summons on Mr. Moss on May 29, 2018, Summons in a Civil Action (ECF No. 7), and
on Mr. Pilvelait on June 6, 2018. Summons in a Civil Action (ECF No. 13). Neither
Mr. Moss nor Mr. Pilvelait has answered or otherwise defended the Complaint.

The York County Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint and are not the objects of Mr.
Charron’s motion for default judgment. Ans., Affirmative Defenses and Jury Trial Demand (Defs. Cnty.
of York, William L. King, Jr., Rachel A. Horning, Darren Cyr, Heath Mains, Steven Thistlewood and
Bill Vachon) (ECF No. 14).
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On July 27, 2018, Mr. Charron moved for default against Defendants Moss and
Pilvelait. Pl.’s Appl. to Clerk for Default against Non-County Defs. Christopher Moss
and Eric J. Pilvelait (ECF No. 18). On July 30, 2018, the Clerk entered default
against each Defendant. Order Granting Mot. for Entry of Default (ECF No. 20). On
July 27, 2018, Mr. Charron moved for entry of default judgment. Pl.’s Verified Mot.
for Default J. against Non-County Defs. Christopher Moss and Eric J. Pilvelait (ECF
No. 19). In his motion, Mr. Charron says that he is seeking $100,000 in compensatory
damages and $150,000 in punitive damages against Mr. Moss and Mr. Pilvelait. Id.
at 2. He writes that “[i]f this qualifies as a ‘sum certain,’ then the Clerk should enter
a judgement against them accordingly.

Otherwise, the Court should conduct a

hearing on damages.” Id.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Sum Certain

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) governs the reduction of a procedural
default to a default judgment by the Court. Before issuing such a judgment, the Court
“may conduct” an evidentiary hearing “when . . . it needs to . . . determine the amount
of damages.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). In general, the Court may not grant a default
judgment unless the damages are fixed and certain. KPS & Assocs., Inc. v. Designs
By FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2003). Where the amount of damages is not
fixed by operation of law, susceptible to mathematical calculation, or agreed to by the
parties, the Court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of

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damages before granting a default judgment. 2

Id. at 20-21; see also CSXT

Intermodal, Inc. v. Mercury Cartage, LLC, 271 F.R.D. 400, 401 (D. Me. Nov. 9, 2010)
(“Unless a claim is for a ‘sum certain,’ a court must consider proof of damages before
entering final judgment.”).
Mr. Charron’s claimed damages are not for a “sum certain” as the term appears
in Rule 55. KPS & Assocs., 318 F.3d at 19 (“[A] claim is not a sum certain unless
there is no doubt as to the amount to which a plaintiff is entitled as a result of the
defendant’s default.”). Mr. Charron claims damages for injury to “his personal and
professional reputation,” for “humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, severe emotional
distress,” for “financial loss to his self-employment business as a tree removal expert,”
and for punitive damages. Compl. ¶¶ 44-45, 47. These are not damage categories
susceptible to mathematical calculation, liquidated damages, damages fixed by law,
or damages agreed to by both parties.

KPS & Assocs., 318 F.3d at 18-21.

Consequently, the Court must receive testimony and make a factual determination
as to the proper amount of damages in these categories. Id.
B.

Notice to Defaulted Parties

Even though the defaulted parties do not have the right to contest liability at
this point, they retain the right to contest the scope and amount of damages.
Accordingly, in order to make certain that the defaulted Defendants are aware of

In KPS & Assocs., the First Circuit said that “in limited circumstances” it has “permitted
district courts to dispense with a Rule 55(b)(2) hearing, even in the face of apparently unliquidated
claims.” 318 F.3d at 21. For example, where the district court was “intimately familiar with the case
from years of travail,” the First Circuit allowed an exception to the hearing requirement. Id. (quoting
HMG Prop. Inv’rs, Inc. v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d 908, 919 (1st Cir. 1988)). In this
case, none of the exceptions to the hearing requirement applies.
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their rights, the Court ORDERS counsel for the Plaintiff to give the Defendants notice
of the date, time and location of the damages hearing so that the Court satisfies itself
of the concerns raised by the First Circuit in Key Bank of Maine v. Tablecloth Textile
Co., 74 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 1996). Counsel for the Plaintiff should be prepared to
present evidence of compliance with this order at the damages hearing.
III.

CONCLUSION
The Court ORDERS that an evidentiary hearing on damages be held at the

mutual convenience of the Plaintiff and the Court and that, once the date, time and
place of the damages hearing are set, Plaintiff’s counsel give notice of the hearing to
the defaulted Defendants and alert them of their right to attend, if they wish to do
so, to contest the damages Plaintiff is seeking.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 25th day of September, 2018

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