DASTINOT v. AUBURN POLICE DEPARTMENT et al
Filing
208
ORDER denying 194 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN C. NIVISON. (MFS)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ROMELLY DASTINOT,
Plaintiff
v.
SCOTT WATKINS, TYLER HAM,
& MARK LEMOS,
Defendants
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2:18-cv-00166-JCN
ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Plaintiff alleged that during an encounter with three police officers, in violation of
his constitutional rights, he was stopped, arrested, and subjected to excessive force.
(Complaint, ECF No. 1; Order on Objections to Recommended Decision on Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 24; Amended Complaint, ECF No. 27.) After a five-day trial, a jury
determined that: (1) Plaintiff proved Defendant Lemos unlawfully stopped Plaintiff and
that Plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages; (2) Plaintiff did not prove that Defendant
Watkins unlawfully arrested him; (3) Plaintiff did not prove that Defendants Watkins and
Lemos used excessive force against him; and (4) Plaintiff proved that Defendant Ham used
excessive force against Plaintiff when Defendant Ham directed a canine to bite-and-hold
Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was entitled to $150,000 in compensatory damages. (Jury
Verdict, ECF No. 182.)
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Defendant Ham has moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 50(b).1 Defendant Ham argues that no reasonable jury could have
determined that the bite-and-hold was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and, alternatively, that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim.
(Renewed Motion, ECF No. 194.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Response, ECF No. 199.)
After consideration of the evidence and the parties’ arguments, the Court denies
Defendant Ham’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.
The Initial Interaction
Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on February 15, 2014, Plaintiff and other individuals exited
a night club at the southwest corner of the intersection of Court Street and Main Street in
Auburn, Maine. Plaintiff testified that he saw a taxi outside the club, but when he
approached the vehicle, the driver informed Plaintiff that he already had a fare. The driver
told Plaintiff that he would return soon to transport Plaintiff home. Plaintiff described the
taxi as pulled over and not blocking a driving lane. One of Plaintiff’s friends testified that
they got into the vehicle, they then exited the vehicle because it was not their taxi, another
group of people got in the taxi, and the taxi drove away.
Defendant Lemos, who was in a police vehicle parked further down on Court Street,
testified that he saw a taxi stopped in a driving lane and that multiple individuals were
1
At the close of the evidence, Defendants moved pursuant to Rule 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law.
(Motion, ECF No. 176.) The Court deferred a final ruling on the motion as to Defendant Ham in part
because he raised the issue of qualified immunity, which issue the Court determined would be appropriate
to address in post-verdict proceedings. (Order, ECF No. 181.)
2
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standing around the vehicle, moving in front of and behind the vehicle. Defendant Lemos
moved his vehicle to a parking space closer to the intersection, got out of his vehicle, and
approached the individuals. Defendant Lemos testified that he only intended to issue a
warning for obstructing a public way and to direct the individuals to move along.
Defendant Lemos claimed Plaintiff and his friend were still in the roadway until he directed
them to the sidewalk to talk with them and document their identities.2 Plaintiff testified
that they were already on the sidewalk when Defendant Lemos approached. Defendant
Lemos directed Plaintiff and one of his friends to provide identification. Plaintiff’s friend
provided his photo identification without delay. Plaintiff initially declined to provide his
ID but did so eventually.
Defendant Watkins was nearby when Defendant Lemos approached Plaintiff and
his friend. As Defendant Lemos checked the individuals’ identifications through dispatch,
Defendant Watkins approached and began conversing with Plaintiff. The conversation
escalated to a dispute, with each party accusing the other of using offensive language. The
officers also testified that Plaintiff was very loud, which Plaintiff disputes. Defendant
Watkins testified that he gave Plaintiff a verbal warning for disorderly conduct. Plaintiff
denied that he received any such warning. According to Defendant Watkins, Plaintiff
continued yelling and swore at Defendant Watkins, at which point Defendant Watkins told
Plaintiff that he was under arrest and frisked him for weapons and contraband. Defendant
2
Defendant Watkins asserted that the Auburn Police Department instructs officers to attempt to identify
any individual with whom they interact and to document or log the encounter.
3
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Watkins maintained that he attempted to place Plaintiff under arrest for being loud and
unreasonable.
B.
The Physical Altercation
Defendant Lemos and Defendant Watkins asserted that Plaintiff began to fight with
them when Defendant Watkins attempted to place him under arrest. According to the two
officers, Plaintiff punched Defendant Lemos and was swinging at Defendant Watkins.
Defendant Lemos delivered what he described as a softening blow, or a slap, to Plaintiff’s
face and attempted to knee Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Watkins threw him
against a car and held one of Plaintiff’s hands behind Plaintiff’s back while Plaintiff asked
why he was being arrested, at which point Defendant Lemos punched him in the face and
kneed him.
Defendant Lemos testified that he attempted to discharge his taser, but the darts
failed to deploy. Defendant Lemos then pulled the cartridge off the weapon and attempted
to use the taser in drive-stun mode by pressing the two metal probes at the front of the
device against Plaintiff’s back.3 Plaintiff testified that the taser was very painful and caused
his muscles to contract. As Defendant Lemos applied the taser, Plaintiff and Defendant
Lemos went to the ground. Contact between the taser and Plaintiff was broken when
3
Defendants and their chief of police testified that a taser can achieve neuromuscular incapacitation when
the darts successfully fire into separate points on a person’s body, but a taser is not intended to achieve that
effect when the probes are manually pressed against a person’s skin in drive-stun mode. Instead, drive-stun
mode is a pain-compliance technique. See also, Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2019) (noting
that concept in policies and cases).
4
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Plaintiff reacted to the taser and fell. While on the ground, Defendant Lemos tried to
reestablish contact for the remainder of the five-second firing cycle.
According to the two officers, Plaintiff was on the ground on his back, face up,
while the two officers were on top of Plaintiff attempting to overcome his physical
resistance and handcuff him. The officers testified that Plaintiff was attempting to grab the
taser while the three men struggled on the ground. Plaintiff maintains that after the initial
contact with the taser, he was face down on the ground. Plaintiff asserted that he was not
fighting with the officers and denied that he was attempting to grab the taser. Plaintiff
testified that he was in pain when he was on the ground because he was being tased by one
officer while the other officer was forcing Plaintiff’s face into the ground.
A bystander began recording video of the encounter as the two officers were on top
of Plaintiff. The person holding the camera appears to be on the sidewalk on the same side
as the club, the two officers and Plaintiff are shown on the ground in the street in the lane
closest to the sidewalk, and a police vehicle with its lights on is stationary behind them in
the middle of the street.
The video recording shows Defendants Lemos and Watkins on top of Plaintiff.
Defendant Watkins is on Plaintiff’s upper body area, and Defendant Lemos is on Plaintiff’s
lower body area. Movement is visible among the three individuals, but likely due to the
darkness of night and the sources of bright light nearby, the details of Plaintiff’s position
and most of the specific movements of the three men are not discernible. Some audible
clacking sounds can be heard at the beginning of the recording. The evidence suggested
that clacking noises occur when electricity arcs through the air between the metal probes
5
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because the taser is energized but not in contact with a person at that moment. One of
Plaintiff’s friends testified that she did not see Plaintiff resisting the officers. The person
recording the video can later be heard saying that Plaintiff was not resisting.
C.
The Use of the Canine
Defendant Ham, who was called to the scene as a cover officer for Defendant Lemos
when Defendant Lemos initially approached the individuals around the taxi, arrived at the
scene later than Defendants Lemos and Watkins. Defendant Ham parked his vehicle, and
as Defendants Lemos and Watkins were on top of Plaintiff, Defendant Ham approached
with his canine on a leash.
Defendant Ham testified that he told Defendants Lemos and Watkins to get off
Plaintiff, and they did so quickly. As soon as Defendants Lemos and Watkins let go of
Plaintiff, Defendant Ham directed the canine to bite-and-hold Plaintiff. The canine bit
down on the upper knee area of Plaintiff’s leg. Defendant Ham testified that he then told
Plaintiff to put his hands behind his back and that Plaintiff complied immediately. As the
canine continued to hold Plaintiff by the knee, Defendant Watkins knelt over Plaintiff’s
upper body area and placed handcuffs on his wrists. Prior to the moment Defendant
Watkins knelt over Plaintiff again, it is difficult to discern Plaintiff’s position from the
video recording, but at that point, the video shows that Plaintiff was face down on the
ground with his arms behind his back. Defendant Ham confirmed at trial that when the
dog bit and held onto Plaintiff’s leg, the dog’s longest and sharpest teeth—those that
protrude from the top of dog’s mouth—went into the back of Plaintiff’s knee.
6
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After Defendant Watkins secured Plaintiff’s arms, Defendant Ham commanded the
canine to release and he pulled the canine away from Plaintiff. The video recording shows
that, in total, the canine bit Plaintiff for approximately twenty-four seconds. Defendant
Watkins continued to kneel around and over Plaintiff’s upper body area. Defendant Lemos
knelt near Plaintiff’s lower body area, bent one of Plaintiff’s legs upward toward his back,
and assisted Defendant Watkins in holding Plaintiff on the ground. Defendant Watkins
testified that Plaintiff was still “tensed up” and “agitated,” so he reiterated to Plaintiff to
relax and stop resisting. Plaintiff can be faintly heard on the recording to say that he was
not resisting.
An ambulance subsequently arrived. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital and treated
for the bite wounds on his leg. Plaintiff has visible scars on the back of his leg in the knee
area. Plaintiff testified that he continues to experience pain from the wounds.
LEGAL STANDARD
“[B]efore a case is submitted to the jury,” Rule 50(a) authorizes parties to move the
court to resolve issues or grant judgment as a matter of law “if a party has been fully heard
on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
Within twenty-eight days following the verdict and entry of judgment, a party “may file a
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law” or a motion for a new trial. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50(b), 59. Arguments and legal theories not raised prior to a jury verdict in a Rule 50(a)
motion are deemed waived and therefore cannot support a post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion.
Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1196 (1st Cir. 1995).
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“A trial court evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b)
must view the evidence in the light most flattering to the verdict and must draw all
reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the verdict.” Rodriguez-Valentin v. Doctors’
Ctr. Hosp. (Manati), Inc., 27 F.4th 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Courts are not permitted to evaluate the credibility of witnesses or weigh the
evidence for and against a factual question. Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2008). “A party seeking to overturn a jury verdict faces an uphill battle,” because a court
ultimately may only overturn “a jury’s determination when the evidence points so strongly
and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that no reasonable jury could have
returned a verdict adverse to that party.” Jones ex rel. U.S. v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
780 F.3d 479, 487 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
A.
Excessive Force
Excessive force claims are evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective
reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). “Determining
whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth
Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental
interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). In the context of force applied to make an
arrest, the relevant factors for consideration include “the severity of the crime at issue,
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whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.
“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. A court’s assessment must also account for the fact
that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
in a particular situation.” Id. at 396 – 97. The test is not a subjective inquiry: courts ask
“whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”
Id. at 397.
Defendant Ham was dispatched as a cover officer for Defendant Lemos when
Defendant Lemos approached Plaintiff intending to issue a warning for obstructing a public
way, which warning or order to move along is a necessary precondition for the commission
of that offense. 17-A M.R.S. § 505. Obstructing a public way is a class E crime, id., which
means it is punishable by a maximum of six months in jail, 17-A M.R.S. § 1604(1). When
Defendant Ham was dispatched, no violation had yet occurred. Even if Plaintiff refused to
move along after Defendant Lemos ordered him to do so, the offense would be considered
a misdemeanor and relatively minor for purposes of the excessive force analysis.
The trial testimony, however, showed that obstructing a public way was not the
crime of arrest. Defendant Watkins first attempted to place Plaintiff under arrest for
disorderly conduct based on Plaintiff’s response to his interactions with Defendant Lemos
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and Watkins. Disorderly conduct is also a class E crime, 17-A M.R.S. § 501-A(3), a
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of six months in prison. For purposes of analyzing
this Graham factor, therefore, the crime of arrest was not particularly serious. See Morelli
v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding first factor weighted against
reasonableness of officer’s use of force because “[i]f a crime was committed at all, it was
a Class E crime (the lowest level of criminality recognized under Maine law)”). Because
both offenses that arguably led to Plaintiff’s arrest are relatively minor for purposes of the
use of force, the first factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.4
The record lacks any evidence that the officers suspected Plaintiff had threatened
any bystanders or would likely do so, or that he possessed a weapon. In fact, because
Defendant Ham directed the two other officers to get off and release Plaintiff—freeing
Plaintiff’s hands and arms in the process—any contention that Defendant Ham had an
objectively reasonable basis to believe Plaintiff might have had a firearm or other weapon
would be questionable. The central issue for the second Graham factor (i.e., whether
Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others), therefore, is
4
Defendant Ham testified that his actions were not based on the crimes of obstructing a public way or
disorderly conduct but were instead based on what he perceived as a person fighting with police officers.
Although resisting arrest and assaulting a police officer can constitute crimes, they were not the bases of
the decision to place Plaintiff under arrest and take him into custody. The extent of the resistance to being
arrested, if any, is properly analyzed under the second and third Graham factors. Defendant Ham’s
argument is perhaps best viewed as relevant to weight of the first factor, and the Court considers it for that
purpose.
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whether Plaintiff attempted to take possession of Defendant Lemos’s taser, as Defendants
asserted.5
Plaintiff’s alleged attempt to grab the taser was disputed at trial. Defendants
testified that Plaintiff was fighting and attempting to grab the taser away from Defendant
Lemos, presumably to use against the officers. Plaintiff denied attempting to grab the taser.
The physical position or orientation of Plaintiff is relevant to the assessment of the issue.
If Plaintiff was on his back, he would have been in a better position to resist the officers
and to grab the taser. If Plaintiff was on his stomach with the two officers on top of him,
Plaintiff arguably would have been less likely to attempt to or to be in position to take
possession of the taser. A careful examination of the video evidence does not definitively
resolve the issue. Accordingly, the video evidence is subject to the jury’s interpretation
and assessment.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, as the Court must,
the jury could have reasonably determined that Plaintiff was not attempting to grab the
taser. That is, a reasonable jury could find Plaintiff’s testimony more credible than
Defendants’ testimony regarding Plaintiff’s position on the ground and his actions
regarding the taser. The jury could also have determined that Plaintiff’s account was more
consistent with subsequent portions of the video recording showing Plaintiff face down on
The Court analyzes the closely related and disputed issue of the extent of Plaintiff’s physical resistance
under the third Graham factor.
5
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the pavement and other circumstantial evidence, such as the location of the bite marks on
the back of Plaintiff’s knee.
Because the jury reasonably could have determined that Plaintiff was unarmed, not
attempting to grab the taser, and was face down on the ground with two officers on top of
him, the jury could have reasonably determined that Plaintiff did not pose a significant or
urgent threat to the officers or others when Defendant Ham directed the officers to release
him and then directed the canine to bite-and-hold Plaintiff. The second Graham factor,
therefore, weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
The next relevant issue in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury’s excessive force finding is Plaintiff’s alleged resistance. A logical conclusion from
the jury verdict in favor of Defendants Lemos and Watkins on the excessive force claim is
that the jury did not find credible Plaintiff’s testimony that before Plaintiff went to the
ground, Defendants Lemos and Watkins struck and tased Plaintiff without any resistance
by Plaintiff. Because the alleged physical contact and use of the taser would likely not
have been justified against a person who did not resist, see Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1,
9 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding use of a taser excessive when the plaintiff was defiant but offered
only de minimis resistance), the jury’s verdict can reasonably be construed to reflect the
jury’s finding that at least initially, Plaintiff physically resisted the arrest. The fact that
Plaintiff might have initially resisted, however, is not dispositive. The inquiry continues
because an officer can violate the Fourth Amendment through “the increased use of force
on a previously resisting but now non-resisting arrestee,” Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 18
(1st Cir. 2007) see also, Pearson v. Taylor, 665 F. App'x 858, 864 (11th Cir. 2016) (“when
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the [subject] is no longer resisting” a previously reasonable use of force “can constitute
excessive force”); or by using too great a level of force against a person who was resisting
but who did not represent a serious threat. See Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
2019) (concluding there was a viable Fourth Amendment claim when a significantly larger
officer tased a mentally ill subject who was resisting but had been sufficiently subdued so
as not to pose a serious threat).
On this record, the jury could have supportably determined that after he went to the
ground, Plaintiff was face down with two officers on top of him and another officer nearby,
while being tased in the mode designed to cause considerable pain.6 Several witnesses
testified to the pain generated from the use of a taser in drive-stun mode and acknowledged
that subjects will involuntarily move in response to the taser and flinch away from the
painful stimulus. See also, Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2018)
(distinguishing between “an involuntary response to a painful stimulus” and an attempt to
grab the taser in “an act of resistance”). The jury could have reasonably concluded,
therefore, that any movement by Plaintiff depicted in the video recording reflected
Plaintiff’s natural movement after being tased.
Other portions of the video recording also support an inference that Plaintiff was
not fighting or significantly resisting as Defendant Ham approached the scene. Some
movement under the officers was visible while the taser was energized, but just after
The clacking sounds imply that the taser was not in contact with Plaintiff’s body the entire time, but there
is at least one noticeable moment when the sounds ceased and then continued, which a reasonable jury
could have viewed as confirmation of Plaintiff’s testimony that he experienced significant pain from the
taser while he was on the ground.
6
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Defendant Ham directed the two officers to get off Plaintiff, there was a brief time where
Plaintiff was on the ground unrestrained before the canine bit Plaintiff’s knee. Plaintiff did
not attempt to get up or fight, even though he presumably could or would have done so if
he had been physically resisting or intended to resist physically. A reasonable jury could
have concluded that although he had resisted before going to the ground, Plaintiff remained
on the ground because his most recent movement was the result of his tensing or flinching
in response to the pain from the use of the taser, which pain had ceased when Defendants
Lemos and Watkins released him. All the Graham factors, therefore, support Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim when the facts are viewed most favorably to the verdict.
Finally, because dog bites can be painful, frequently leave wounds on the subject’s
body, and can cause lasting damage, see e.g., Hood v. Koeller, No. 1:05CV1484-RLYWTL, 2007 WL 1468712, at *4 (S.D. Ind. May 18, 2007) (“any officer who releases a
trained police dog to subdue a suspect knows that he is directing the use of force that is
much more likely to inflict serious injury than other methods”); Melgar ex rel. Melgar v.
Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 362 (4th Cir. 2010) (Michael, J, concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“As many cases document, find-and-bite police dogs have caused serious injury,
disfigurement, and even death”), whether the police officer gave a warning before directing
the dog to bite is also a consideration in a court’s assessment of an excessive force claim.
See Jarrett v. Town of Yarmouth, 331 F.3d 140, 143, 147–49 (1st Cir. 2003) (repeatedly
emphasizing that the police officer had given the proper verbal warnings that if the plaintiff
did not comply, the officer would deploy the dog); Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d
590, 599 (8th Cir. 2003) (“the presence or absence of a warning is a critical fact in virtually
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every excessive force case involving a police dog”);7 Glenn v. Washington Cnty., 673 F.3d
864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Other relevant factors include the availability of less intrusive
alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings were given and whether it
should have been apparent to officers that the person they used force against was
emotionally disturbed”).
Here, Defendant Ham did not provide any warning before directing the canine to
bite-and-hold Plaintiff. Defendant Ham did not allow Plaintiff an opportunity to comply
or to signal his compliance before Defendant Ham directed the dog to bite. The jury could
have reasonably interpreted Plaintiff’s immediate compliance with Defendant Ham’s order
to put his hands behind his back as evidence of his intent to comply before Defendant Ham
directed the dog to bite-and-hold.
In sum, the jury could have reasonably concluded that when Defendant Ham arrived
at the scene (1) no crime had been committed, (2) there was no basis to suspect that Plaintiff
was armed or dangerous, (3) although Defendant Ham could reasonably conclude that
Plaintiff initially offered some resistance to the efforts of Defendants Watkins and Lemos
to arrest him, after he went to the ground, Plaintiff was face down and not in a position to
grab the taser, (4) there were two officers on Plaintiff, (5) Defendant Ham could see and
hear that Defendant Lemos was using his taser on Plaintiff in drive stun mode, and (6)
7
Some courts describe Kuha as abrogated in part on other grounds by Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park,
Minnesota, 486 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007). The Szabla Court differed with the Kuha Court on the standard
for municipal liability based on policies regarding police canines, an issue that is not relevant here. Id. at
392. The Szabla Court “accepted the Fourth Amendment holding” from Kuha regarding the need for a
warning before the officer deployed the police dog. Id. at 392.
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because Defendant Ham had time to direct the other officers to release Plaintiff and get out
of the way, which left Plaintiff alone on the ground surrounded by officers, Defendant Ham
could have warned Plaintiff before directing the dog to bite-and-hold, which predictably
resulted in a serious injury. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the jury supportably
determined that there was a constitutional violation because—drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the verdict—the relevant factors weigh against Defendant Ham and
in favor of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.8
B.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects public officials from suit for violations of
constitutional rights except when officials were “plainly incompetent” or “knowingly
violate[d] the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The qualified immunity
doctrine is designed to balance “two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
Defendant Ham argues that Plaintiff’s movements shown in the video recording are sufficient to establish
that a reasonable officer in his position could have “reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect”
was “fight[ing] back,” which might have made him “justified in using more force than in fact was needed.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). Whether Plaintiff’s actions were reasonably susceptible to a
mistaken interpretation is arguably more appropriately addressed in the assessment of Defendant’s qualified
immunity argument. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (discussing mistakes of fact in
the context of qualified immunity). In assessing Plaintiff’s challenge to the jury’s excessive force finding,
the Court must view the evidence most favorably to the verdict. As explained above, the evidence would
support a jury’s determination that Plaintiff was not resisting at the time Defendant deployed the canine.
Even if the potential for misinterpretation of the circumstances is an appropriate consideration in the
analysis of the Graham factors in this case, and even if the Court determined that the potential for
misinterpretation existed, the result would be the same. The jury’s verdict is still supportable because the
jury could have reasonably determined that any misinterpretation of Plaintiff’s actions as depicted on the
video recording was insufficient to justify the escalation to a canine bite-and-hold on a person who was not
yet handcuffed but was sufficiently subdued so as not to constitute a serious threat, see Gray, 917 F.3d at
9, especially without any warning or opportunity to comply. See Jarrett, 331 F.3d at 143, 147–49; Kuha,
365 F.3d at 599. Furthermore, the record lacks any evidence that Plaintiff attempted to flee at any time.
The use of the canine bite-and-hold in this case, therefore, cannot be justified based on a need to locate and
prevent a person from fleeing.
8
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harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). An official’s reasonable mistake is protected
regardless of whether it is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed
questions of law and fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
When considering the question of qualified immunity after a jury verdict, a court
views the facts most favorably to the verdict. Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir.
2010). “The qualified immunity analysis has two facets: the court must determine whether
the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and then must determine whether
the allegedly abridged right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s claimed
misconduct.” Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). On the second issue (i.e., the “clearly established” issue), to avoid
the application of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must: (1) “identify either controlling
authority or a consensus of cases of persuasive authority sufficient to send a clear signal to
a reasonable official that certain conduct falls short of the constitutional norm,” and (2)
“demonstrate that an objectively reasonable official in the defendant’s position would have
known that his conduct violated that rule of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The relevant rule of law “must be particularized to the facts of the case” rather than
“defined at a high level of generality.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017); see
also, Hunt v. Massi, 773 F.3d 361, 368 (1st Cir. 2014) (“the relevant question” for purposes
of clearly established law “is not whether the Fourth Amendment generally prohibited
excessive force”). “This does not mean that an official action is protected by qualified
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immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but rather
that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Barton v. Clancy,
632 F.3d 9, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (no single prior case needs to be “directly on point” as
long as the rule was beyond debate). “The salient question is whether the state of the law
at the time of an incident provided fair warning to the defendants that their alleged conduct
was unconstitutional.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (internal quotation marks
and modifications omitted).
Prior to February 2014, a consensus of authority established that it is unlawful for
an officer to direct a canine to bite-and-hold a suspect without warning or opportunity to
comply when it was feasible to provide one, including when there is no urgency or
substantial threat, such as when a suspect is unarmed, on the ground, and surrounded by
multiple officers. See Campbell v. City of Springboro, Ohio, 700 F.3d 779, 789 (6th Cir.
2012) (officer was not entitled to qualified immunity when he “failed to give warnings”
during two incidents before allowing a canine to bite unarmed suspects when “the suspects
were not believed to be a threat to anyone at the time the canine unit was called in,” had
“no ability to evade police custody” due to proximity to officers, and were “in areas
unlikely to expose police to ambush”); Chatman v. City of Johnstown, PA., 131 F. App’x
18, 20 (3d Cir. 2005) (when police used a dog to apprehend plaintiff, who was wanted on
an outstanding warrant and spotted walking on a city street, the issue of “[w]hether plaintiff
received a warning before the dog was released or not until afterwards is a material question
of fact” precluding summary judgment); Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 598
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(8th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that “there may be exceptional cases where a warning is
not feasible,” but holding in the context of a suspect who fled from a routine traffic stop
and hid, “the allegation that the police officers failed to give a verbal warning prior to using
a police dog trained to bite and hold is sufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim”); Bey
v. Cimarossa, 202 F.3d 272, 2000 WL 12830 at *2 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying summary
judgment to an officer based on plaintiff’s testimony that he was not fleeing and the officer
“failed to issue a warning” and “never gave him an opportunity to peacefully surrender
before ordering the dog to attack”); Vathekan v. Prince George’s Cnty, 154 F.3d 173, 175
(4th Cir. 1998) (officer investigating possible break-in who directed dog to search a house
and bite was not entitled to qualified immunity because “it was clearly established in 1995
that it is objectively unreasonable for a police officer to fail to give a verbal warning before
releasing a police dog to seize someone”); Burrows v. City of Tulsa, Okl., 25 F.3d 1055
1994 WL 232169 at *4 (10th Cir. 1994) (in the context of an attempt to arrest a plaintiff
on outstanding warrants for forgery, false impersonation, and check fraud, jury could have
found the “failure to warn” plaintiff before putting a dog over the fence to find and bite the
plaintiff to be objectively unreasonable).
Police officers, however, are permitted to deploy canines to bite-and-hold subjects
without providing a warning or opportunity to comply when it is not feasible to do so,
including when the circumstances present greater urgency or when revealing the officer’s
location by calling out would put the officer’s safety at risk. See Thomson v. Salt Lake
Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1321 (10th Cir. 2009) (no liability for sending dog without a warning
when police were searching for suspect who had threatened others with a gun because “[a]
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warning is not invariably required even before the use of deadly force, let alone here, where
the release of the dog was nondeadly force used in the face of an imminent threat”);
Johnson v. Scott, 576 F.3d 658, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2009) (no liability for sending dog to bite
plaintiff without a warning when officers were responding to a suspected shooting and
plaintiff fled first in a vehicle and then on foot); Grimes v. Yoos, 298 F. App’x 916, 923
(11th Cir. 2008) (no liability for sending without a warning a dog to find and bite when it
would increase the likelihood that suspect would escape and “the defendants had reason to
believe that [plaintiff] may pose a risk to their safety” following a burglary because the
officers believed suspect may be armed and they were in a location with thick vegetation
and low visibility); Est. of Rodgers ex rel. Rodgers v. Smith, 188 F. App’x 175, 182 (4th
Cir. 2006) (no liability for sending a dog to bite without a warning when another officer
yelled “Gun!” and noting that prior Fourth Circuit cases “stand at most for the principle
that the Fourth Amendment is violated when an officer who faces no immediate threat
deploys a police dog without prior warning”) (emphasis in original); see also, McKinney
v. City of Middletown, 49 F.4th 730, 741 (2d Cir. 2022) (in the context of a prisoner who
admittedly grabbed police baton, charged officers, and continued fighting with officers
even after dog’s bite-and-hold, no liability because “deploying a police dog may be
objectively reasonable, even without a warning, when there is an immediate threat to the
safety of officers and the community”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Officers trained as canine handlers in Maine, such as Defendant Ham, are instructed
consistent with these principles.9 Indeed, given that research revealed that in most cases
in which canines have been directed to bite, a warning has been given, it is reasonable to
conclude that most police canine handlers around the country are regularly trained using
those principles. See e.g., Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting
that officers “issued what are known as K–9 warnings”); Grimes v. Yoos, 298 F. App’x
916, 919 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that according to training manual, “[b]efore using such
force, the police officers generally were required to give a verbal warning to allow the
suspect to surrender. However, when such a warning would ‘prove unsafe to the search
team or allow the offender to escape,’ the police dog handler conducting the search could
decide not to provide the warning”); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Trott, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that suspects are given a specific
warning before Los Angeles Police Department K–9 Unit police dogs are used, which gives
the suspect control over his own fate).
Under the facts of this case, it would have been clear in 2014 to an objectively
reasonable officer in Defendant Ham’s position that his or her conduct violated the rule of
law that required a warning before a canine was deployed. The facts, when viewed most
favorably to the verdict, include: (1) when Defendant Ham was dispatched, no crime had
9
When asked if it is good police practice to first tell someone they better stop or he would send the dog in
for a bite, Defendant Ham responded that would be proper “if time allows it in certain circumstances.”
Defendant Ham also confirmed that the goal in using K-9s is to gain voluntary compliance “in certain
situations when practical” by telling an individual to comply or the dog would be used. Defendant Ham
also admitted that he did not give Plaintiff the opportunity to comply on February 15, 2014.
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been committed, (2) throughout the encounter, there was no basis to suspect that Plaintiff
was armed, (3) although Defendant Ham was entitled to conclude that Plaintiff initially
offered some resistance to Defendants Watkins’s and Lemos’s efforts to arrest him, after
going to the ground, Plaintiff was face down and not in a position to grab the taser, (4)
there were two officers on Plaintiff when Defendant Ham first observed Plaintiff, (5) there
has never been an assertion that Plaintiff or the location presented a reasonable fear of
ambush or a need to conceal Defendant Ham’s location which would have been
compromised by calling out a warning, and (6) Defendant Ham had time to direct the other
officers to release Plaintiff and get out of the way before deploying the canine to bite
Plaintiff. A reasonable officer in Defendant Ham’s position could not have perceived the
kind of urgency or threat to the officers or the public which courts have recognized as
sufficient to justify the use of a canine bite-and-hold without any warning or opportunity
for the subject to comply voluntarily.
Defendant Ham nevertheless offers three arguments to challenge the suggestion that
his failure to warn can support the verdict, which arguments focus in part on the state of
the law in 2014. First, he argues that a warning is only required in deadly force situations
and courts have held that police canines do not necessarily constitute deadly force. See
e.g., Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920, 926 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing dog bite as force “at
the higher end of the spectrum” yet concluding that dogs are not per se deadly force, but
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rather depends on how a dog is trained).10 The Supreme Court has held that deadly force
can only be justified by an urgent threat and that a warning is required when feasible before
using deadly force. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985); McKenney v.
Mangino, 873 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2017). The cited authority, however, does not imply
that the use of deadly force is the only scenario where a warning is required. As discussed
above, because of the significant injury dog bites ordinarily inflict, the law was clearly
established that when feasible (e.g., when no immediate threat of harm exists) a warning is
required before an officer can lawfully direct a canine to bite-and-hold. Lower courts have
also held that warnings are sometimes required in other circumstances. See, e.g., Mattos
v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 451 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the lack of a warning before
firing a taser made the force unreasonable because “[w]e have previously concluded that
an officer’s failure to warn, when it is plausible to do so, weighs in favor of finding a
constitutional violation”); Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir.
2007) (in the context of a misdemeanant who was struggling with another officer but was
not violent or fleeing, noting that “[t]he absence of any warning—or of facts making clear
that no warning was necessary—makes the circumstances of this case especially
troubling”).
Defendant Ham next argues that the cases in which a bite-and-hold warning was
required are factually distinguishable from the circumstances of this case. For example,
10
In Jarrett, 331 F.3d at 149, the First Circuit also raised a question as to whether the use of a canine
constitutes deadly force per se, but it did not explicitly resolve the issue.
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some cases involved scenarios where a dog was released from a leash, whereas Defendant
Ham kept the canine on a leash. The deliberate release from a leash has been cited in some
cases, such as when a dog bites contrary to the direction of the officer, but it is not
constitutionally relevant here—Defendant Ham admitted he directed the canine to bite
without warning or an opportunity for Plaintiff to comply.11 Minor or immaterial factual
differences in the above cited cases were not sufficient to create any reasonable uncertainty
about the need for a warning in the circumstances here. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
742 (2002) (teaching against “the danger of a rigid, overreliance on factual similarity”);
Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 925 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The fact that no court had put these pieces
together in the precise manner we do today does not absolve defendants of liability”).
Finally, Defendant Ham argues even if a warning is required in certain
circumstances, a warning was not feasible because Plaintiff was violently fighting with two
officers and Plaintiff presented an urgent and serious threat to the officers because he was
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Vathekan, 154 F.3d at 175–76, used seemingly comprehensive language
in adopting a warning requirement, but the facts of that case involved the intentional release of a canine
off-leash to find and bite. The Fourth Circuit later distinguished Vathekan in two cases involving dogs that
were tracking individuals on leashes and bit without a command from the officers because the officers
mistakenly but reasonably believed the dog was under control and would not bite so abruptly. Melgar ex
rel. Melgar v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 352–53, 358 (4th Cir. 2010); Maney v. Garrison, 681 F. App’x 210,
214, 216–17 (4th Cir. 2017). Likewise, the incidents at issue in the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Campbell,
700 F.3d at 785–86, 789, depended not only on the lack of warning, but also on the lack of training of the
dog, which bit at least one of the individuals while tracking on a long leash and without a command to do
so. The training was presumably particularly relevant in that case because the officer could not reasonably
believe that the dog would always remain under the officer’s control and behave only as the officer directed.
Id. at 783 (“Without such training, the dog's level of obedience may erode over time and the dog may not
respond as well to the handler’s commands”). Those cases and the distinguishable facts in this case provide
no support to an officer who intentionally and without warning directs a dog to bite a person. Because the
salient variable is the likelihood that someone will be bitten and thus suffer significant injury, in a case
where an officer intentionally commands a dog to bite, the presence or absence of a leash and the selfdiscipline of the dog in the absence of a command are not particularly relevant variables to the central legal
question: whether it was feasible for the officer to provide a warning or opportunity to comply.
11
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attempting to take the taser. The Court, however, must construe the facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. As discussed above, the jury reasonably could
have concluded that Plaintiff was not violently fighting or attempting to grab or in a
position to grab the taser, especially after the officers stepped away from Plaintiff at
Defendant Ham’s directive. See Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648 F.3d 24, 38 (1st Cir. 2011) (no
qualified immunity because “Defendants have not even come forward with a justification
for [their alleged conduct]. Their defense is that they did not use the force they are alleged
to have used”). Even if the Court concluded that a competent officer could have reasonably
misinterpreted Plaintiff’s movement when the officers were on top of him as some type of
resistance,12 the resistance was not such that it placed the officers in immediate danger.
Moreover, the movement that was arguably susceptible to misinterpretation stopped when
the officers got up and moved away from Plaintiff, which was before Defendant Ham
directed the canine to bite. Any urgency that Defendant Ham might have reasonably
mistakenly perceived had dissipated at the time he directed the canine to bite.
In sum, viewing the facts most favorably to the jury’s verdict, the record supports a
finding that a reasonable officer in Defendant Ham’s situation would not have directed the
canine to bite-and-hold. In addition, the law was clearly established in 2014 that a
reasonable officer could not deploy a canine to bite-and-hold when a subject was not
12
It was clearly established prior to February 2014 that it is unlawful to use significant force or to increase
the level of force after a person has been apprehended and has ceased resisting. See Jennings, 499 F.3d at
16–18; Parker, 547 F.3d at 9; see also, Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920, 929 (7th Cir. 2016) (canine handler
was not entitled to qualified immunity in March 2011 for dog bite because “officers cannot use significant
force on a nonresisting or passively resisting suspect”).
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resisting or without warning and opportunity to comply when it was feasible to provide
one, such as when the subject is unarmed, on the ground, and in the presence of multiple
officers (i.e., where there is no urgency or substantial threat). Finally, an objectively
reasonable officer in Defendant Ham’s position would have known that his or her conduct
violated that rule of law. Defendant Ham, therefore, is not entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court denies Defendant Ham’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 6th day of January, 2023.
26
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