LENARTSON v. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF PORTLAND MAINE et al

Filing 4

RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER PRELIMINARY REVIEW re #1 Complaint. Objections to R&R due by 8/12/2024. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN FRINK WOLF. (MGW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ASHLEY A. LENARTSON,
Plaintiff
v.
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT OF PORTLAND, MAINE,
et al.,
Defendants

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No. 2:24-cv-00267-LEW

RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER PRELIMINARY REVIEW
Ashley A. Lenartson filed a pro se complaint against “The Supreme Judicial
Court of Portland, Maine,” Carol Anne Silvius, Helen M. Hall, Andrea Turner,
Cumberland County Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Grant Whelan, Maine
Superior Court Justice Deborah Cashman, and the State of Maine. See Complaint
(ECF No. 1).

Because I granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, see

ECF No. 3, Lenartson’s complaint is now before me for preliminary review in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
As far as can be gleaned from Lenartson’s disjointed and confusing complaint,
he was charged in state court with assaulting Hall and was ultimately required to
pay a $300 fine. See Complaint at 5. He contends that the Defendants—who, apart
from Hall, appear to be witnesses and individuals and entities involved in the state
court proceedings—violated his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments to be
himself as a gay man. See id. at 3. He asserts that he has “been embarrassed and
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put thr[ough] the coals etc. as a Sacrificial Victim.” Id. at 4. He seeks damages for
his pain and suffering. See id. at 5.
Lenartson’s complaint is subject to dismissal for several reasons.
First, the State of Maine, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Justice
Cashman, and ADA Whelan are all immune from suit. See Doyle v. State of Maine,
No. 2:15-cv-00078-JAW, 2015 WL 5813312, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 5, 2015) (holding that
the State of Maine is immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Harmon v.
Bullock, 21 F. App’x 9, 10 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a state trial court “is a state
entity . . . immune from § 1983 liability”); Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704,
710-11 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that state court judges and prosecutors enjoy absolute
immunity from section 1983 liability for actions taken in their official capacities).
Second, Lenartson does not cogently allege that the remaining Defendants
were acting under color of state law. See Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50,
55 (1st Cir. 2006) (“To state a viable section 1983 claim, a plaintiff first must identify
an act or omission undertaken under color of state law.” (cleaned up)).
And finally, even with a liberal reading, Lenartson complaint lacks sufficient
detail to state a plausible claim for relief against any of the Defendants.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Byrne v. Maryland, No.
1:20-cv-00036-GZS, 2020 WL 1317731, at *5 (D. Me. Mar. 20, 2020) (rec. dec.), aff’d,
2020 WL 2202441 (D. Me. May 6, 2020) (noting that even pro se complaints must
contain “the crucial detail of who, what, when, where, and how” in order to provide
fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds upon which they rest).

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For these reasons, I recommend that the Court DISMISS Lenartson’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a Magistrate
Judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the District
Court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum
shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the District Court and to appeal the District Court’s
order.
Dated: July 29, 2024
/s/ Karen Frink Wolf
United States Magistrate Judge

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