CHIKHLADZE v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION et al

Filing 7

RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER PRELIMINARY REVIEW re 1 Complaint. Objections to R&R due by 3/21/2025. By MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN FRINK WOLF. (MGW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
SIMON CHIKHLADZE,
Plaintiff
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS et al.,
Defendants

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No. 2:25-cv-00075-JAW

RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER PRELIMINARY REVIEW
Because I granted Simon Chikhladze’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis, see Order (ECF No. 5), his complaint (ECF No. 1) is now before me for
preliminary review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In a confusing and rambling complaint, Chikhladze alleges that he while he
was in the process of seeking asylum in the United States in the 1990s, he was
“forcibly sent back to” his birth country of Georgia. Complaint ¶¶ 13, 20. According
to Chikhladze, he has since been “locked in former Soviet Georgia without the right
to leave the country” and has faced many “grave human rights abuses, unlawful
deportations,” and coordinated denials of his applications for visas and asylum.
Id. ¶¶ 13-19. Chikhladze brings claims against the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI), the “Government of the Kingdom of Denmark,” “Danish authorities,” “Georgian
[a]uthorities,” Georgian “Minister of Justice” Tea Tsulukiani, and the “Kordzakhia
Crime Cell.” Id. ¶¶ 14-19. He seeks “damages and injunctive relief” for violations of
his “constitutional and human rights under U.S. and international law.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.
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Chikhladze’s complaint is subject to dismissal for several reasons.
First, venue is improper in the District of Maine because Chikhladze is a
Georgian citizen suing the FBI and several foreign entities based on allegations that
have no connection to Maine. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (f), 1406(a). Second, even
with a liberal reading, Chikhladze’s complaint fails to offer enough cogent detail to
state a viable claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
And finally, Chikhladze’s claims are frivolous because they are based on fantastic and
delusional allegations of vast international conspiracies, coordinated criminal
networks, “covert operations” against him by “foreign intelligence operatives,” and
ongoing abuse with a “torture generator . . . washing machine.” Complaint ¶¶ 2, 9,
30-31, 36, 41; see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that a case
is factually frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the
wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to
contradict them”); Marshall v. Stengel, No. 3:10CV-159-S, 2010 WL 1930172, at *3
(W.D. Ky. May 12, 2010) (“It is clear that this Court is not the forum that can provide
Plaintiff with the type of assistance [he] truly needs. Plaintiff’s allegations are simply
based on some paranoid or delusional fantasy and unsupported imaginings that
Defendants and various other state and federal officials are engaged in an elaborate
and massive criminal conspiracy to torture and torment [him].”).
From a search of PACER, Chikhladze appears to have initiated at least nine
other similar lawsuits in federal courts around the country, eight of which have been
dismissed. Given the duplicative and frivolous nature of his filings and the negative

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impact those filings have on the judiciary’s limited resources, Chikhladze should be
warned that further groundless filings may result in the imposition of filing
restrictions limiting his ability to initiate new cases in this District. See Cok v. Fam.
Ct. of R.I., 985 F.2d 32, 34-35 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that courts may impose filing
restrictions on abusive litigants after adequate notice).
Finally, given the frivolity of Chikhladze’s complaint and the fact that it was
filed in an obviously improper venue, the Court should certify that any appeal from
its order dismissing this matter would not be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3) (“An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies
in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A) (“A party
who was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the district-court action . . . may
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis without further authorization, unless . . . the
district court—before or after a notice of appeal is filed—certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith . . . and states in writing its reasons for the certification . . . .”).
In summary, I recommend that the Court (1) DISMISS Chikhladze’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), (2) WARN him that filing
restrictions may be in the offing, (3) CERTIFY that any appeal from the order of
dismissal would not be taken in good faith, and (4) MOOT his nonsensical “emergency
motion for confirmation of right to leave country” (ECF No. 6).
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a Magistrate
Judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the District
Court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
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(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum
shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the District Court and to appeal the District Court’s
order.
Dated: March 7, 2025
/s/ Karen Frink Wolf
United States Magistrate Judge

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