Duvall, et al v. Hogan, et al

Filing 487

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 12/10/12. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JEROME DUVALL, et al.
v.
MARTIN O’MALLEY, ET AL.

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* Civil No. JFM-94-2541
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MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs have filed a motion seeking a determination that they are prevailing parties and
the defendants are liable for their attorneys’ fees. The issues have been fully briefed. The
motion is denied.
I.
The following short chronology may be useful in understanding the issues.
November 1972

Admission by defendants (including State officials) “that the
Baltimore City Jail is now overcrowded and that the State of
Maryland and City of Baltimore are responsible for alleviating
overcrowded conditions at the Jail”

1972 and 1978

Entry of consent decrees in Duvall v. Lee and Collins v.
Schoonfield

1991

The State of Maryland assumes responsibility for running the
Baltimore City Detention Center (formerly the Baltimore City
Jail)

1993

Entry of consent decree

1996

Passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

1999-2004

Litigation concerning whether the 1993 consent decree should be
terminated under the PLRA

2004-2010

Discovery and settlement negotiations conducted

April 6, 2010

This court’s approval of a class action Partial Settlement

Agreement (“PSA”)
April 9, 2012

This court’s approval of an amendment to the class action (“PSA
Amendment”)
II.

Plaintiffs seeks to recover attorneys’ fees in connection with the litigation concerning the
termination of the 1993 Decree, the discovery in which they engaged, and the settlement
negotiations leading to the PSA and PSA Amendment.
The PLRA requires that in order for attorneys’ fees to be recoverable, a constitutional
violation be found. The 1993 Consent Decree, the PSA, and the PSA Amendment expressly
provide that defendants are not admitting any Constitutional violations. Thus, plaintiffs may not
recover attorneys’ fees under the PSA, the PSA Amendment, or the 1993 Consent Decree.
Instead, plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees because the fees were
“directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.” PLRA, 42
U.S.C. §1997e(d)(1)(B)(ii). According to plaintiffs, the violations giving rise to the relief that
they are attempting to enforce were made by the Court in the 1970s. Although plaintiffs take the
position that State officials can be held liable for the attorneys’ fees as successor defendants or as
intervening defendants, plaintiffs point out that State officials were from the outset defendants in
Duvall v. Lee.
Several factors persuade me that plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys’ fees. First, the
passage of time between the 1970s, when the Constitutional violations were found, and the dates
on which the PSA and PSA Amendment were approved, is vast. Second, although plaintiffs are
correct in their assertion that State officials were originally defendants in Duvall v. Lee, the State
officials’ alleged role in contributing to the overcrowded conditions at the Baltimore City Jail

arose not from any management responsibilities the State was under at the Jail (as indicated
above, the State did not assume responsibility for running the institution until 1991), but from
the fact that State defendants were housed at the jail, thus contributing to the overcrowded
conditions. This problem has long since been rectified. Third, the State and its officials have
steadfastly maintained since the State did assume responsibility for running BCDC in 1991 that
no Constitutional violations have been committed. Fourth, it is not clear to me that negotiation
of the PSA and the PSA amendment, which provides for additional improvements at the BCDC,
constitute “enforcement” of the constitutional violation found to exist in the 1970s. These
factors, considered together, persuade me that the relief obtained by plaintiffs in the PSA and the
PSA Amendment cannot be fairly traced to the constitutional violations found in the 1970s.
Although I am denying the request for attorneys’ fees, I want to express my appreciation
to plaintiffs’ counsel for the public service they have performed in persuading the State to make
the improvements to BCDC called for in the PSA and the PSA Amendment. It is a truism that a
civilized society is measured, in part, by the manner in which it treats those who are the least
powerful. Although the State itself and its lawyers are themselves to be commended for
agreeing to make the improvements called for in the PSA and the PSA Amendment,
unquestionably the highly professional efforts of plaintiffs’ counsel throughout this litigation
played a critical role in the process of having the improvements effectuated. That fact alone,
however, does not entitle me to ignore the intent Congress has expressed in the PLRA.

Date: December 10, 2012

/s/
J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge