Schwartz v. Rent-A-Wreck of America, Inc.
Filing
535
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 7/12/2016. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)
"
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAVID SCHWARTZ,
et al.,
*
*
*
Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendants
*
v.
RENT-A-WRECK
Defendants
OF AMERICA, et al.,
and Counter-Claimants
*
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM
This case involves
and Rent A Wreck,
Claimants
Inc. (hereinafter,
Rent-A- Wreck of America,
"'Rent-A- Wreck"),
California.
a dispute between
over Schwartz's
Civil No. PJM 07-1679
OPINION
Plaintiffs
collectively
"Schwartz")
operation
10,2015,
on Remand
and Counter-
LLC (hereinafter,
of a Rent-A- Wreck franchise
the United
David Schwartz
and Defendants
Inc. and Bundy American,
The Court issued a Final Order of Judgment
2013. ECF No. 507.' On March
and Counter-Defendants
collectively
in West Los Angeles,
in this matter on August 23,
States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth
I This case has a long procedural history. Schwartz filed suit against Rent-A-Wreck
in June 2007. In the
most recent iteration of the Complaint, Schwartz sued for declaratory judgment, specific performance.
and breach of contract. In response, Rent-A-Wreck filed various counterclaims. one of which asserted that
the Schwartz franchise violated California competition law and was therefore unlawful as a restraint on
trade. The partics' claims proceeded to trial in April 2010. The jury found that Schwartz had a contract
with Rent-A-Wreck with respect to Schwartz's operation of a used car rental business in West Los
Angeles and that the contract afforded Schwartz the exclusive right to operate a Rent-A-Wreck franchise
in West Los Angeles. Rent-A-Wreek subsequently moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to set
aside portions of the jury's verdict, arguing that California competition law rendered the exclusivity
provision mid ab initio. The Court denied Rent-A-Wreck's Rule 50 Motion. It then entered a Final Order
of Declaratory Judgment on September 23, 20 IO. ECF No. 344. On March 9, 20 II, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion affinning in part, vacating in part, reversing in
part, and remanding for further proceedings. ECF No. 395. Of relevance, the Fourth Circuit instructed the
Court to submit to a jury the question of whether the exclusive territory provision of the contract
forecloses competition in a substantial share of the market for rental cars, and thcrefore whether
Schwartz's franchise is void under California law, as asserted by Rent-A- Wreck. After a second jury trial,
the jury found that Schwartz's exclusive territory agreement does not foreclose competition in a
substantial share of the market for rental cars. Accordingly, the Court entered a Final Order of Judgment
on Remand in favor of Schwartz on Rent-A-Wreck's counterclaim and closed the case.
Circuit issued an opinion affinning the Judgment. ECF No. 517. That court's mandate issued on
April 2, 2015. ECF No. 519.
Thereafter, Schwartz filed a Bill of Costs, seeking $32,665.21 in costs from Rent-AWreck. ECF No. 518. On April 1,2016, the Clerk of Court issued an Order Taxing Costs in
favor of Schwartz and against Rent-A- Wreck in the amount of $13,405.11. ECF No. 525. Now
pending before the Court is Rent-A- Wreck's timely Motion to Review Clerk's Order Taxing
Costs (ECF No. 526), in which Rent-A- Wreck asks that the Court reject Schwartz's Bill of Costs
in its entirety or, in the alternative, reduce the Clerk's award of costs by $4,442.83. Having
considered Schwartz's Bill of Costs, the Clerk's Order Taxing Costs, and the parties' briefings
with respect thereto, the Court DENIES Rent-A-Wreck's
Motion to Review (ECF No. 526) and
AFFIRMS the Clerk's Order Taxing Costs (ECF No. 525).
I.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides, in part: "Unless a federal statute, these
rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs--other
than attorney's fees-should
be allowed
to the prevailing party." As the Fourth Circuit has stated, this "rule creates the presumption that
costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party." Cherry v. Champion Intern. Corp., 186 F.3d
442,446
(4th Cir. 1999) (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981»
(emphasis added). Twenty-eight U.S.C.
S
1920 sets forth the costs that a judge or clerk of any
United States court may award.2 These "costs are limited to relatively
minor, incidental
expenses." Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan. Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).
2
These costs are:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6)
2
In this District, the Clerk of Court is entrusted with the taxation of costs in the first
instance. See Us. District Court for the District of Maryland GuidelinesjiJr Bills of Costs
S
LA
(2013) (hereinafter "Guidelines"; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (providing that the "clerk may
tax costs on 14 days' notice"); Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2006 (noting that "the assessment of
costs" is often a "clerical matter" that can be "done by the clerk") (internal citations and
quotations omitted). The Clerk's discretion to tax costs is limited, however: the Clerk may not
tax costs not pennitted by statute, case law, or Local Guidelines. See Guidelines
S
LA. Rule
54(d) provides that, if a party objects to the costs awarded by the Clerk, it may file a motion
within seven days of the Clerk's order, asking a court to conduct a de novo review. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(d); see also Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. CIV.A. DKC 08-2586, 2014
WL 858330, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2014). If a district court ultimately chooses not to award
costs, it "must justify its decision" by "articulating some good reason" for not doing so. Cherry,
186 F.3d at 446 (internal citations and quotations omitted). "[OJnly misconduct by the prevailing
party worthy of a penalty ... or the losing party's inability to pay will suffice to justify denying
costs:' Id. (quoting Congregation of the Passion. Holy Cross Province v. Touch. Ross & Co.,
854 F.2d 219, 222 (7th Cir. 1988».
II.
Rent-A- Wreck first argues that the Clerk should have rejected Schwartz's entire Bill of
Costs because (I) Schwartz was not "shown to be the prevailing party" in this litigation because
he did not succeed on all claims, and, relatedly, (2) Schwartz did not "differentiate"
the costs
associated with his successful claims from those associated with his unsuccessful claims. RentA- Wreck's Mot. Objecting Clerk's Order Taxing Costs ("Rent-A- Wreck's Mot.") 3-5, ECF No.
Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
28 U.S.c. Ii 1920.
3
526. In response, Schwartz asserts that, after two trials, he is unquestionably the prevailing party,
having received a substantial amount of the relief sought: that is, a declaration that he has the
exclusive right to operate the West Los Angeles Rent-A-Wreck franchise. Schwartz's Resp. in
Opp'n 3-5, ECF No. 527. As Schwartz argues, a prevailing party need not succeed on all of its
claims to be awarded costs. Jd. Moreover, there is no requirement for differentiating
costs
between those associated with successful claims and those associated with unsuccessful claims.
Jd. 5.
The Court agrees with Schwartz.
A. Whether Schwartz Is a "Prevailing Party"
"To be deemed a prevailing party" for purposes of taxing costs under Rule 54(d), "a
plaintiff must prevail on 'any significant claim affording some relief sought.'"
Broccoli v.
Echoslar Comm'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 515 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting Tex. Stale Teachers
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Disl., 489 U.S. 782, 2791 (1989)) (emphasis added); see also
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home. Inc. v. fIT Va. Dep'l of Heallh & Human Resources, 532 U.S.
598,603 (2011)) (noting that a prevailing party is "a party in whose favor judgment is rendered,
regardless of the amount of damages awarded"). Accordingly, a party need not recover on all of
its claims for relief to be considered a "prevailing party" - just the "significant"
ones. See
Broccoli, 229 F.R.D. at 515; see also Fernandes v. Montgomery Cry.. MD, No. CIV. SAG-IO752, 2013 WL 6330705, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff was the
prevailing party even though he succeeded on only one of his several constitutional and tort
claims); Garonzik v. Whitman Diner, 910 F. Supp. 167, 168 (D.NJ. 1995) ("A prevailing party is
the one in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of whether the party has recovered its
entire claim or a portion thereof.") (internal citations omitted); All W. Pel Supply Co. v. Hill's Pel
4
Products Div.. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 153 F.R.D. 667, 669 (D. Kan. 1994) (noting that, in
general, the prevailing party is "the party who won at trial, whether or not that party prevailed on
all issues, and regardless of the amount of damages awarded") (internal citations omitted).
In the most recent version of the Complaint, Schwartz sought (i) a declaratory judgment
that he enjoys the exclusive right to operate a Rent-A- Wreck franchise in West Los Angeles and
(ii) an order of specific performance, directing Rent-A- Wreck to make his franchise available to
potential customers through its directories and webpages. Second Am. Complaint, ECF No. 167.
After two jury trials and two appeals, Schwartz has obtained this relief. See Final Order
Declaratory J., ECF No. 344; March 2, 2011 Order, ECF No. 382; Final Order J. Remand;
USCA J., ECF No. 517. Although Rent-A-Wreck suggests that, in order to be considered the
"prevailing party," Schwartz had to prevail on each and every argument made or position taken
throughout the course of this litigation, see Rent-A-Wreck's
Mot. 3-4, such a contention does not
accord with the law. Schwartz need only succeed on his significant claims, and he clearly has
done so here. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Schwartz is thus unquestionably the
"prevailing party" in this litigation.
B. Whether Schwartz Is Required to Differentiate
Costs
Rent-A- Wreck points to no binding legal authority that requires a prevailing party to
differentiate the costs associated with successful claims from those associated with unsuccessful
claims, nor is the Court aware of any. Such a rule, moreover, would make little sense in the
context of a party that has prevailed on its significant claims, but not all of its claims. Consider,
for example, a plaintiff who succeeds on two out of three of his or her related claims in a tort
suit. How would a clerk or a court tax an expense like the tiling fee paid in the case? Would the
5
plaintiff be entitled to reimbursement of only two-thirds of the filing fee? The Court rejects the
suggestion by Rent-A-Wreck that Rule 54(d) operates in this manner.
The presumption in the law is that the prevailing party is entitled to costs, regardless of
the amount of damages awarded. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603. The presumption is nol that
a prevailing party is entitled only to partial costs which can bc tied directly to a successful claim.
The latter rule would be unworkable, especially in the present case. Here, the costs actually taxed
by the Clerk of Court - filing fees, private process server fees, fees for transcripts of certain key
witnesses, and costs for copies of documents filed with the Fourth Circuit, see Clerks' Order
Taxing Costs - would be nearly impossible to parse or assign to Schwartz's
successful or
unsuccessful claims, especially in light of the fact that Schwartz's claims were all interrelated.
Absent clear indication that any of the taxed costs are attributable to particular claims (successful
or unsuccessful), the Court agrees with the Clerk's decision to award the costs to Schwartz.3
III.
In the alternative, Rent-A-Wreck argues that the Court should reduce the costs awarded
to Schwartz by $4,442.83, which is the total of the expenses taxed by the Clerk for transcripts
from the following five depositions: (I) the first deposition of David Schwartz, the Plaintiff and
Counter-Defendant;
(2) the deposition of Penny Cannon; (3) the deposition of Michael LaPlaca;
(4) the deposition of Richard Solomon; and (5) the second deposition of James Tennant. Rent-AWreck asserts that the transcript for the first deposition of David Schwartz should not be taxed
because the witness was unprepared
for the deposition, and Rent-A-Wreck
argues that the
transcripts of the other identified individuals should not be taxed because the individuals did not
J Even if failing to differentiate costs could be considered an error in this context, the court does not
consider it a "good reason" for "depart[ing] from the normal practice of awarding fees to the prevailing
party." See Wyne v. Meda Ind/ls .. Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586 (D. Md. 2004) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
6
testify at trial. Rent-A- Wreck's
Mot. 5-8. In response, Schwartz argues that all of these
depositions were reasonably necessary at the time of their taking. Schwartz's Resp. Opp'n 6-10.
As Schwartz reasons, it was therefore appropriate for the Clerk to tax the fees for the associated
deposition transcripts. Id.
The Court again agrees with Schwartz.
Rent-A- Wreck's arguments that certain deposition costs should not be taxed because the
individuals did not subsequently testify at one of the trials misunderstands the law. The costs ofa
deposition taken by the prevailing party are recoverable under 28 U.S.c.
"necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U.S.c.
S
S
1920(2) if they are
1920(2); Wyne v. Meda Indus., Inc., 329
F. Supp. 2d 584, 588 (D. Md. 2004) (quoting Cheny, 186 F. 3d at 449). In applying this rule,
"costs associated with a deposition are commonly awarded 'when the taking of the deposition is
reasonably necessary at the time of its taking.'" Wyne, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 588 (quoting LaVoy
Corp. v. Dominion Federal Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 830 F.2d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 1987)).
In reviewing the depositions challenged by Schwartz, the Court views all to have been
reasonably necessary at the time of their taking.
David Schwartz was a party to the litigation and corporate designate of his co-Plaintiff,
Rent A Wreck, Inc. He also testified at both trials. Rent-A- Wreck's suggestion that David
Schwartz's first deposition was not reasonably necessary at the time of its taking is dubious, at
best. While the Court acknowledges that Rent-A- Wreck had to depose David Schwartz a second
time because he could not provide certain information about the accounting of Rent A Wreck,
Inc., see Rent A Wreck's Mot. 5-6, the Court does not view this circumstance as a sufficiently
compelling reason to overcome the presumption that the costs associated with the taking of
David Schwartz's first deposition should be taxed.
7
Penny Cannon was Rent-A- Wreck's
former Director of Franchise Services. Michael
LaPlaca, Esquire, was Rent-A- Wreck's counsel for franchising matters. Both parties designated
these two individuals as potential witnesses at the first trial. Joint Proposed Pretrial Order 18,20,
ECF No. 203. Schwartz, in particular, viewed both witnesses as beneficial to his case in chief
because they could offer information on the implied contract governing the franchise agreement
between Schwartz and Rent-A-Wreck.
Schwartz's
Bill of Costs Mem. Supp. 13-14, ECF No.
518-1. The depositions of both these individuals were thus reasonably necessary at the time of
their taking.
Richard Solomon was deposed by Rent-A- Wreck's counsel with respect to the revenue
streams and finances of Schwartz's franchise. Schwartz designated Solomon as a witness at the
first trial. Joint Proposed Pretrial Order 18. Rent-A- Wreck also designated excerpts of Solomon's
deposition for use at the first trial during their case in chief. Jd. 24. Solomon's deposition was
thus reasonably necessary at the time of its taking.
James Tennant was an expert witness originally designated by Rent-A- Wreck to opine on
the viability of its counterclaim during the second trial - i.e., whether an exclusive territorial
provision.
such as that contained
in Mr. Schwartz's
1985 Letter Agreement,
forecloses
competition in a substantial share of the market of the affected line of commerce in Los Angeles.
Since this counterclaim was the focus of the second trial, the second deposition of Tennant was
reasonably necessary at the time of its taking. even if Rent-A- Wreck ultimately decided to
change its theory of the case.
Because all of the challenged depositions were reasonable necessary at the time of their
taking, costs of transcripts were appropriately taxed to Rent-A- Wreck. Accordingly, the Court
8
,
'
.
rejects Rent-A- Wreck's request to reduce the Clerk's Order Taxing Costs by the costs associated
with the deposition transcripts of the above five individuals.
IV.
For the foregoing
reasons,
AFFIRMED and Rent-A-Wreck's
the Clerk's
Order Taxing
Costs (ECF No. 525) is
Motion to Review Clerk's Order Taxing Costs (ECF No.
526) is DENIED.
Rent-A- Wreck SHALL pay costs in the amount of $13,405.11 to Schwartz within thirty
(30) days. If Rent-A- Wreck chooses to appeal this Order, Rent-A- Wreck SHALL post bond in
the amount of $25,000.00, which would cover not only the amount of costs incurred, but any
possible future costs associated with such appeal.
A separate Order will ISSUE.
lsI
I •.......
July _'
PE ER J. MESSITTE
UNITED TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2016
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?