Mizrach v. USA

Filing 68

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying (58) Motion of plaintiff to Alter Judgment in case 1:08-cv-02030-AMD; denying (65) Motion of plaintiff to Correct Clerical Error in case 1:08-cv-02030-AMD; denying (57) Motion of plaintiff to Alter Judgment in case 1:11-cv-01153-RDB; denying (65) Motion of plaintiff to Correct Clerical Error in case 1:11-cv-01153-RDB. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 4/13/2016. Associated Cases: 1:11-cv-01153-RDB, 1:08-cv-02030-AMD(c/m 4/13/16 jnls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
PHILLIP MIZRACH, pro se, as Successor
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Abraham I. Kurland, Deceased,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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Defendant.
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Civil Action Nos.: RDB-11-1153
(Mizrach II); AMD-08-2030 (Mizrach I)

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MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Phillip Mizrach (“Plaintiff” or “Mizrach”), as successor personal
representative of the estate of Abraham I. Kurland (“Kurland”), deceased, has filed two
survival actions in this Court, proceeding pro se, against the United States of America
(“Defendant” or “the Government”)  under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671, et seq., captioned AMD-08-2030 (Mizrach I) and RDB-11-1153 (Mizrach II).1
Both cases are now closed. On November 12, 2015, Judge William D. Quarles2 of this
Court entered a Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 55) and Order (ECF No. 56), docketed in
Mizrach II3, denying Plaintiff’s Motion (1) to allow supplemental pleading to be filed in
Mizrach I and for the Complaint in that case to be retroactively amended, pursuant to Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) for relief from Judgment in both Mizrach I

1 As explained infra, both cases allege negligence by Baltimore Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“VA
Hospital”) staff in their treatment of Kurland shortly before his death.
2 Mizrach II was initially assigned to Judge William D. Quarles, captioned WDQ-11-1153, but, upon Judge
Quarles’ retirement, was reassigned to the undersigned Judge Richard D. Bennett on January 22, 2016 and recaptioned RDB-11-1153.
3 All references to ECF document numbers are from Civil Case No. RDB-11-1153, unless otherwise noted.

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and Mizrach II, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) to
reopen and consolidate both cases (ECF No. 44). Plaintiff subsequently filed the presently
pending Motion to Alter Judgment (ECF No. 57) and Motion to Correct Clerical Error
(ECF No. 65). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed, and no hearing is necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter
Judgment (ECF No. 57) is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct Clerical Error (ECF
No. 65) is also DENIED4.
BACKGROUND
The background facts of this action have been fully set forth in Judge Quarles’
Memorandum Opinion of November 12, 2015 (ECF No. 55), Mizrach v. United States, No.
WDQ-11-1153, 2015 WL 7012658, at *1-2 (D. Md. Nov. 12, 2015). Therefore, only a
summary is included herein. On April 14, 2003, Abraham I. Kurland (“Kurland”) was
admitted to the Baltimore Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“VA Hospital”) for treatment of
a urinary tract infection and gastrointestinal problems. Mizrach, 2015 WL 7012658 at *1.
However, the source of Kurland’s abdominal problems was neither identified nor treated
and, on May 3, 2003, he died. Id.
On May 2, 2005, Kurland’s sister, and personal representative of his estate, filed an
administrative tort claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”), alleging that
Kurland’s medical providers had negligently caused his death. Id. On February 7, 2008, the
VA issued a final decision denying that claim and informing Kurland’s sister of her right to

4 The pending motions are also docketed in Mizrach I, AMD-08-2030, as Motion to Alter Judgment (AMD08-2030, ECF No. 58) and Motion to Correct Clerical Error (AMD-08-2030, ECF No. 65). Accordingly,
Motion to Alter Judgment (AMD-08-2030, ECF No. 58) and Motion to Correct Clerical Error (AMD-082030, ECF No. 65) are also DENIED.

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bring a civil suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) within the next six months.
Id. On August 5, 2008, two days before that six month deadline, Kurland’s nephew Phillip
Mizrach (“Plaintiff” or “Mizrach”)5 filed a survival action in this Court, pro se, against the
United States of America (“Defendant” or “the Government”), pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 267, et seq., alleging negligence by the VA Hospital staff in their
treatment of Kurland. Id. That case, Mizrach v. United States, AMD-08-2030 (Mizrach I), was
assigned to Judge Andre M. Davis, formerly of this Court.6 Id. However, Judge Davis
dismissed the case without prejudice on February 17, 2009 for failure to exhaust Maryland
state administrative prerequisites7, and denied Mizrach’s subsequent Motion to Alter the
Judgment. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge
Davis’ ruling in a Judgment that took effect on February 3, 2010, Mizrach v. United States, 334
F. App’x 571, 572 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam). Id.
Mizrach proceeded to fulfill his administrative prerequisites and, on March 2, 2011,
Maryland’s ADR Office issued an order allowing Mizrach to file his claim in federal court.
Id. at 2. Two months later, on May 2, 2011, he filed the present action, Mizrach v. United
States, WDQ-11-11538 (Mizrach II), in this Court, pro se, pursuant to the FTCA, again alleging
negligence on the part of VA Hospital medical providers. Id. The Government moved to

5 Kurland’s sister died on October 31, 2006, and Mizrach became personal representative of Abraham I.
Kurland’s estate. Id.
6 On November 10, 2009, Judge Andre M. Davis was commissioned as a Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
7 Pursuant to Maryland’s Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A01, et seq., Mizrach was required to present his claims to Maryland’s Health Claims Alternative Dispute
Resolution Office (“Maryland ADR Office”) and file an expert’s certificate that Kurland’s medical providers
had departed from the standard of care, prior to filing suit in this Court. Id.
8 As stated supra, this case was initially assigned to Judge William D. Quarles, but has since been reassigned to
the undersigned Judge Richard D. Bennett and re-captioned RDB-11-1153.

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dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction (ECF No. 10), while Mizrach moved to reopen Mizrach I and
consolidate it with Mizrach II (ECF No. 14). Via Order dated February 7, 2012 (ECF No.
29), Mizrach v. United States, No. WDQ-11-1153, 2012 WL 414806 (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2012),
Judge Quarles granted the Government’s Motion to Dismiss and denied Mizrach’s Motion
to Reopen and Consolidate. Id. In an accompanying Memorandum Opinion, Judge Quarles
concluded that Mizrach’s action was untimely because it was filed after the FTCA’s six
month deadline and that Maryland statutes of limitations, which would have been more
favorable to Mizrach, did not apply. See Mizrach, 2012 WL 414806 at *3-4. Judge Quarles
further concluded that the FTCA’s time limit was jurisdictional but that, even if it was not,
Mizrach would not be entitled to equitable relief. Id. at 4-5. Judge Quarles found that
Mizrach had failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights and rejected his
contention that the Government had acted improperly by failing to inform him of
Maryland’s administrative prerequisites in the initial right to sue letter Id.

Judge Quarles

also denied Mizrach’s subsequent Motion to Alter the Judgment (ECF No. 30), Mizrach v.
United States, No. WDQ-11-1153, 2012 WL 2861367 (D. Md. July 10, 2012), and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed Judge Quarles’ ruling in a judgment that took effect on December 11, 2013,
Mizrach v. United States, 539 F. App’x 284 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (per curiam).
Over a year later, Mizrach filed a Motion (1) to allow supplemental pleading to be
filed in Mizrach I and for the Complaint in that case to be retroactively amended pursuant to
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) for relief from Judgment in both Mizrach
I and Mizrach II, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) to
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reopen and consolidate both cases (ECF No. 44). Judge Quarles denied that Motion, in its
entirety, on November 12, 2015. See Order, ECF No. 56; Mizrach, 2015 WL 7012658.
Plaintiff now moves this Court to alter Judge Quarles’ Order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mot. to Alter, ECF No. 57.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a United States District
Court to alter, amend, or vacate a prior judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that a judgment may be
amended under Rule 59(e) in only three circumstances: (1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. See, e.g., Gagliano v. Reliance Standard
Life Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 230, 241 n. 8 (4th Cir. 2008). Such motions do not authorize a “game
of hopscotch,” in which parties switch from one legal theory to another “like a bee in search
of honey.” Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003). In other words, a
Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of judgment.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am.
Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting 11 Wright, et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, at 127–28 (2d ed. 1995)). Where a party presents newly
discovered evidence in support of its Rule 59(e) motion, it “must produce a legitimate
justification for not presenting the evidence during the earlier proceeding.” Id. (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). “In general, reconsideration of a judgment after its

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entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Id. (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
I.

Judge Quarles Correctly Denied the Underlying Motion (ECF No. 44), in its
Entirety, for the Reasons Set Forth in Mizrach v. United States, No. WDQ-111153, 2015 WL 7012658 (D. Md. Nov. 12, 2015)
Via Order dated November 12, 2015 (ECF No. 56), Judge Quarles denied Plaintiff’s

Motion (1) to allow supplemental pleading to be filed in Mizrach I and for the Complaint in
that case to be retroactively amended pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; (2) for relief from Judgment in both Mizrach I and Mizrach II, pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure9; and (3) to reopen and consolidate both cases
(ECF No. 44). Judge Quarles explained his reasoning in an accompanying Memorandum
Opinion (ECF No. 55), Mizrach v. United States, No. WDQ-11-1153, 2015 WL 7012658, at
*3-6 (D. Md. Nov. 12, 2015).
The first issue facing Judge Quarles was whether it was even possible for him to grant
relief in Mizrach I without first re-opening Mizrach II and vacating his ruling that Plaintiff’s
action was untimely and that equitable tolling was not warranted. That is, whether vacating
the holding in Mizrach II was a necessary prerequisite to granting Plaintiff’s additional
requests in the underlying motion. The Government argued that, if Plaintiff was “not

9 Under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may relieve a party from a final judgment
for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that,
with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that
has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any
other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

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entitled to Rule 60(b) relief, there [was] no basis to reopen and consolidate the cases or
permit a supplemental pleading and amendment in Mizrach I.” Mizrach, 2015 WL 7012658 at
*3. Plaintiff objected that “Rule 15 relief is independent from Rule 60(b) relief because ‘[t]he
consideration and intent is different under each Rule.’ ” Id. (citing Pl. Reply, p. 2, ECF No.
54). After considering both arguments, Judge Quarles concluded that this Court could not
grant any relief with respect to Mizrach I “unless it vacate[d] its ruling in Mizrach II that
equitable tolling was not available under the FTCA, and it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the suit.” Id. Judge Quarles distinguished the present case from Laber v. Harvey, 438
F.3d 404, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2006), Katyle v. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470-71 (4th
Cir. 2011), and other prior cases discussing Rule 60(b) and Rule 15 relief. Id. at 3, n. 14.
While those cases “involved relatively simpler circumstances in which courts dismissed a
complaint in one suit, and the plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter the judgment and amend
the complaint in that suit,” the Plaintiff in the present case “[sought] to amend the complaint
in Mizrach I—a suit that ha[d] not been assigned to or consolidated before this Court.” Id.
Therefore, “issues of reopening and consolidating the suits before this Court, and amending
the complaint in Mizrach I” would only become relevant if Judge Quarles first vacated his
ruling that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mizrach II. Id. Judge Quarles
further explained the situation as follows:
To avoid the FTCA time bar, Mizrach needs this Court to equitably toll the
statute of limitations while he complied with Maryland’s Health Care
Malpractice Claims Act and consolidate the suits. Tolling the statute of
limitations is insufficient; when Mizrach filed Mizrach I, he had three days
remaining under the FTCA’s six-month time bar. See ECF No. 1, Ex. A (VA's
February 7, 2008 final claim denial); Mizrach I, ECF No. 1 (complaint filed
August 5, 2008). On March 2, 2011, the Maryland ADR Office issued its
order transferring the case to federal court. See ECF No. 1, Ex. D. However,
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Mizrach waited two months to initiate Mizrach II, far exceeding the three days
he had left under the FTCA time bar. See ECF No. 1 (complaint filed May 2,
2011). Id. at 3, n. 15.
Having determined that Plaintiff’s request for Rule 60(b) relief from the judgment
dismissing Mizrach II was potentially dispositive of the entire underlying motion, Judge
Quarles proceeded to determine whether Plaintiff was in fact entitled to Rule 60(b) relief. Id.
at 4-5. Plaintiff requested that Judge Quarles vacate his prior judgment in light of the United
States Supreme Court’s intervening decision in United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct.
1625, 1638 (2015), holding that Federal Tort Claims Act time limits were non-jurisdictional
and subject to equitable tolling. Id. Plaintiff claimed that Kwai Fun Wong dictated reversal of
Judge Quarles’ prior order dismissing his complaint for untimeliness. Id. However, Kwai
Fun Wong “did not change the general rule that equitable tolling requires a movant to have
diligently pursued his rights.” Id. In his previous opinion dismissing Plaintiff’s action, Judge
Quarles held that the FTCA’s time limit was jurisdictional, but also concluded that, even if it
was not jurisdictional, Plaintiff was not eligible for equitable tolling.

Judge Quarles

concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to equitable tolling because of his failure to exercise
due diligence in preserving his legal rights and because no government misconduct had
occurred. Id. Furthermore, Judge Quarles noted that “a new rule of federal law retroactively
applies only to ‘cases still open on direct review.’ ” Id. (quoting Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2007)). When
the Supreme Court decided Kwai Fun Wong, Mizrach II was closed and all appeals had been
exhausted. Therefore, Judge Quarles held that Plaintiff was not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief

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in Mizrach II. Accordingly, he denied Plaintiff’s request for Rule 60(b) relief in Mizrach II
and, for the reasons outlined supra, denied as moot Plaintiff’s additional requests.
II.

Plaintiff Has Failed to Present New Evidence, Point to An Intervening
Change in Law, or Demonstrate that Altering Judge Quarles’ Judgment Would
Correct a Clear Error of Law or Prevent Manifest Injustice
Plaintiff now moves, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

to alter Judge Quarles’ Order (ECF No. 56) denying Plaintiff’s underlying Motion. Mot. to
Alter, ECF No. 57. In support of the pending Motion to Alter (ECF No. 57), Plaintiff raises
several arguments.

Id. at 3-5.

However, as explained herein, Plaintiff points to no

“intervening change in controlling law,” presents no “new evidence not available at trial,”
nor would the relief that Plaintiff requests “correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” See, e.g., Gagliano, 547 F.3d at 241 n. 8. Accordingly, the “extraordinary remedy”
that Plaintiff requests, see Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403, is not warranted.
Plaintiff first objects that Judge Quarles failed to consider some of the arguments he
raised in support of the underlying motion, including “lack of jurisdiction for use of
Maryland’s process,” “preemption,” “breach of fiduciary responsibility,” “lack of a stay,” and
“application of Maryland law on filing date from arbitration filing date.” Mot. to Alter, p. 3,
ECF No. 57. However, Plaintiff presents no new evidence related to these arguments, nor
does he cite any intervening change in the law. He simply seeks to re-litigate arguments
already considered, and rejected, by Judge Quarles in an earlier opinion. Nearly all of the
arguments Plaintiff cites were rejected by Judge Quarles in his February 7, 2012 opinion,
which was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

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Circuit.10 See Mizrach, 2012 WL 414806, at *1-3, aff’d 539 F. App’x 284 (4th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Judge Quarles’ decision not to re-address these
arguments in ruling on the underlying motion amounts to a clear error of law or manifest
injustice. Therefore, Plaintiff’s first argument fails.
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that his Rule 15 requests for supplemental pleading and
retroactive amendment of Mizrach I should not have been denied as moot simply because
Judge Quarles held that he was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) in Mizrach II. Mot. to
Alter. at 3-4. This issue was thoroughly discussed in Judge Quarles’ opinion dismissing the
underlying motion, summarized supra. As Judge Quarles explained, the question of whether
or not Mizrach I could be amended was irrelevant unless there was a basis to reopen Mizrach
II, in which he considered, and rejected, Plaintiff’s arguments for equitable tolling. In order
to comply with the FTCA’s six month time limit, Plaintiff must rely on equitable tolling,
which was raised for the first time in Mizrach II, and was only addressed in Judge Quarles’
rulings in Mizrach II. Without a basis to re-open Mizrach II and find that equitable tolling is
warranted, amendments to the pleadings in Mizrach I are futile. Plaintiff fails to present new
evidence or point to an intervening change in law as to this question, but simply seeks to reargue the issue. A Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise
arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of judgment.” Pac.
Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting 11 Wright, et al.,

10 While Judge Quarles did not explicitly address the “lack of a stay” in this case in his February 7, 2012
opinion, he did note that “[o]n February 17, 2009, then District Judge Andre Davis denied Mizrach’s motion
to stay the proceedings.” Mizrach I, AMD-08-2030, ECF Nos. 20-21. Plaintiff argued his request for a stay
in Mizrach I, see Mot. to Stay, ECF No. 7, and Judge Davis rejected his arguments. Plaintiff now raises no new
evidence in support of a stay, cites no intervening change in the law, and fails to demonstrate how Judge
Quarles’ failure to reconsider this settled issue in denying the underlying motion constitutes a clear error of
law or manifest injustice.

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Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, at 127–28 (2d ed. 1995)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
second argument fails.
Plaintiff further contends that he was diligent in bringing suit and that defense
counsel breached their ethical “duty not to mislead” by failing to advise Mizrach of the
administrative prerequisites to his bringing a claim in this Court. Id. at 4-5. Therefore, he
argues, “the Defendant is barred by equitable grounds from opposing a filing” in this Court.
Id.

As stated supra, Judge Quarles specifically addressed the question of Government

counsel’s duty to inform Plaintiff of his obligations under Maryland law in his February 7,
2012 opinion. See Mizrach, 2012 WL 414806, at *4 (“ ‘To estop the Government, a party
must show affirmative misconduct by government agents.’ This is a ‘rigorous’ standard,
which requires more than a showing that ‘a government agent misinformed [the party] of the
proper method of filing a complaint.’

Mizrach’s allegation that the Government

misinformed him of the prerequisites to filing suit is not ‘a proper basis for estoppel.’ [citing
Austin v. Winter, 286 F. App'x 31, 38 (4th Cir. 2008)]. Mizrach also has not shown that the
Government committed fraud. Under federal law, ‘fraud is the knowing misrepresentation of
a material fact, or concealment of the same where there is a duty to disclose, done to induce
another to act to his or her detriment.’ Here, the Government had no duty to inform
Mizrach of the requirements of Maryland’s Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. Federal
regulations required only that, in denying an administrative claim, the VA inform a claimant
of his right to file a lawsuit ‘in an appropriate U.S. District Court not later than 6 months
after the date’ of the denial. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a). The VA did this. [citing Compl., Ex. A].”).
Again, Plaintiff has cited no intervening change in law nor new evidence that suggests this
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Court should overturn Judge Quarles’ previous ruling. Judge Quarles’ holding is wellsupported by the record in this case and by the relevant case law. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
argument fails.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that Judge Quarles misused Katyle v. Penn. Nat Gaming, Inc.
637 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2011), a case affirming an order by Judge Messitte of the Court that
denied a Motion for Leave to Amend a Complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Mem. Supp. Mot. to Alter, p. 4, ECF No. 57-1.

Plaintiff seeks to

distinguish that case, arguing that, while the proposed amendment in Katyle “did not cure the
defect” in the complaint, his amendment would cure any defect in Mizrach I. Id. He argues
that the supplemental pleading he would file would completely cure the defect in Mizrach I,
his failure to comply with Maryland’s administrative claims process. However, as Judge
Quarles explained in his opinion denying the underlying motion, Mizrach II must be
reopened at least for the purpose of consolidation because Plaintiff did not satisfy the state
malpractice filing requirements until after Mizrach I was dismissed. Additionally, Plaintiff
must rely on equitable tolling which was raised for the first time in Mizrach II, which is also
only addressed in the ruling for Mizrach II. Judge Quarles correctly concluded that his ruling
in Mizrach II must be vacated before any Rule 15 relief can be afforded in Mizrach I.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument fails.
Judge Quarles correctly dismissed Mizrach II, and Judge Davis correctly dismissed
Mizrach I. This Court need not revisit those decisions. Without the Plaintiff providing new
evidence, pointing to an intervening change in law, or otherwise satisfying Rule 59, this
Court need not reopen Mizrach II and disturb the Fourth Circuit’s mandate affirming Judge
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Quarles’ dismissal of this case. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment (ECF No.
57) is DENIED.11
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is this 13th day of April, 2016, ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment (ECF No. 57), docketed in RDB-11-1153, is
DENIED;

2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment (ECF No. 58), docketed in AMD-08-2030, is
DENIED;

3.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct Clerical Error (ECF No. 65), docketed in RDB-11-1153,
is DENIED;

4.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct Clerical Error (ECF No. 65), docketed in AMD-082030, is DENIED;

5.

The Clerk of this Court transmit a copy of this Memorandum Order to the Plaintiff
and Counsel of record; and

6.

This case shall remain closed.

________/s/________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge

11 In Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct Clerical Error (ECF No. 65), Plaintiff requests that Mizrach I, AMD-082030, be reassigned to the undersigned Judge Richard D. Bennett. However, in ruling on the underlying
motion, which concerned both Mizrach I and Mizrach II, Judge Quarles did not see fit to request reassignment of Mizrach I. See Mizrach, 2015 WL 7012658, at *3 (observing that Mizrach I “has not been
assigned to or consolidated before this Court.”). Additionally, Mizrach I is a closed case, and all avenues of
appeal have been exhausted. For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Order, it will remain closed.
Therefore, there is no need to re-assign Mizrach I to the undersigned Judge Richard D. Bennett. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct Clerical Error (ECF No. 65) is DENIED.

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