Vitol, S.A. v. Capri Marine LTD et al
Filing
184
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying as moot 154 Motion of Spartacus Navigation Corp.'s and Primerose Shipping Company Ltd. to Vacate Emergency Stay and/or Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Emergency Stay ; denying 159 Motion of Vitol, S.A. for Relief from Judgment, or in the Alternative for Permission to Amend the Complaint ; granting 161 Emergency Motion of Spartacus Navigation Corp.'s and Primerose Shipping Company Ltd.for Release of Funds Deposited in Court Registry. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 5/14/13. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
VITOL, S.A.
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Plaintiff
vs.
CAPRI MARINE, LTD et al.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-09-3430
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Defendants
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: POST-APPEAL MOTIONS
The Court has before it the following pending post-appeal
motions pertaining to Spartacus Navigation Corp. ("Spartacus")
and Primerose Shipping Company Ltd. ("Primerose") (collectively
referred to as "S & P"):
1. Defendants Spartacus Navigation Corp.'s and Primerose
Shipping Company Ltd.'s Motion to Vacate "Emergency Stay"
and/or Motion to Reconsider Order Granting "Emergency
Stay" [Document 154];
2. Plaintiff Vitol, S.A.'s Motion for Relief from Judgment,
or in the Alternative for Permission to Amend the
Complaint [Document 159];
3. Defendants Spartacus Navigation Corp.'s and Primerose
Shipping Company Ltd.'s Emergency Motion for Release of
Funds Deposited in Court Registry [Document 161];
and the materials submitted relating thereto.
The Court has held a hearing and has had the benefit of the
arguments of counsel.
I.
SUMMARY BACKGROUND1
In April 2005, Plaintiff Vitol, S.A. ("Vitol") obtained a
money judgment from the English High Court against Defendant
Capri Marine Ltd. ("Capri").
In 2009, Vitol ascertained that
the THOR, a ship owned by Spartacus and managed by Primerose,
was docked in the Baltimore harbor.
Vitol then filed in this
Court the verified complaint against S & P and others and
obtained a Supplemental Rule B attachment of the THOR.
S & P
thereafter deposited $9,301,591.55 in the Court's registry as
substitute collateral (the "Substitute Collateral") and obtained
the release of the THOR [Document 17].
S & P moved to vacate the attachment, pursuant to
Supplemental Rule E and to dismiss the Verified Complaint
against them pursuant Rule 12(b)(6).2
After concluding it
possessed competent jurisdiction in admiralty over Vitol's
action, this Court dismissed the verified complaint because the
factual allegations were insufficient to state a plausible claim
of alter ego liability against S & P, but granted Vitol leave to
amend [Document 73].
Vitol filed the Amended Verified Complaint
[Document 80] and S & P again moved to vacate the attachment and
1
For a more complete background statement see Vitol, S.A. v.
Primerose Shipping Co. Ltd., 708 F.3d 527 (4th Cir. 2013).
2
All Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
2
dismiss the verified complaint.
In the Memorandum & Order Re:
Motion to Vacate Attachment & Dismiss Amended Complaint
[Document 120] (the "Decision"), the Court found that Vitol had
failed to allege with sufficient particularity or plausibility
alter ego claims against S & P, vacated the attachment of the
THOR, and dismissed the Amended Verified Complaint against S &
P.
In the Memorandum & Order Re: Motion To Stay [Document 139],
the Court stayed release of the Substitute Collateral pending
Vitol's appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On February 8, 2013, the Fourth Circuit issued its decision
affirming this Court's vacatur of the attachment and dismissal
of the Amended Verified Complaint against S & P3 [Document 148].
The Court granted Vitol's request that release of the Substitute
Collateral continue to be stayed [Document 152].
On March 8,
2013, the Fourth Circuit denied Vitol's petition for rehearing
and rehearing en banc [Document 157], and on March 18, 2013,
issued a Mandate making its judgment issued February 8, 2013,
effective as of March 18, 2013.
[Document 160].
By the instant motions:
1.
S & P seek the release of the Substitute Collateral.
3
As well as this Court's initial determination that it had
admiralty jurisdiction over Vitol's claim to enforce the English
Judgment.
3
2.
II.
Vitol seeks to have the Court vacate the Decision,
reinstate the attachment and Verified Amended
Complaint against S & P, permit the case to proceed to
discovery, and/or permit Vitol to amend the Verified
Complaint.
PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK
Rule 60(b) authorizes a district court "[o]n motion and
just terms" to grant relief from a final judgment for five
specified reasons, including as pertinent hereto, "newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b)" and "fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party."
60(b)(2),(3).
However, a Rule 60(b) motion seeking
relief under Rule 60(b)(2) or (b)(3) "must be made within . . .
a year after the entry of the judgment."
Id. 60(c).
Accordingly, any claim by Vitol pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) or
(b)(3) is time barred.
Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a district court may vacate a
judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief."
A Rule
60(b)(6) motion is not subject to a one year time limit but must
be filed "within a reasonable time."
The Rule 60(b)(6) movant
bears the burden of demonstrating that there is a "meritorious
claim or defense and that the opposing party [will] not be
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unfairly prejudiced by having the judgment set aside."
Aikens
v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011).
With respect to when relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is
appropriate, "[w]hile this catchall reason includes few textual
limitations, its context requires that it may be invoked in only
'extraordinary circumstances' when the reason for relief from
judgment does not fall within the list of enumerated reasons
given in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5)."
Id. at 500.
Indeed, a party may
not "circumvent the one year limitation [for fraud and new
evidence claims] by invoking" the residual clause.
See Srzysko
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1972).
If a movant should prove the existence of a Rule 60(b)
claim, the district court must then "balance the competing
policies favoring finality of judgments and justice being done
in view of all the facts, to determine, within its discretion
whether relief is appropriate in each case."
Square Const. Co.
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 657 F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir.
1981).
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Relief From the Judgment
Vitol contends that it is entitled to relief under Rule
60(b)(6) because S & P's counsel perpetrated a fraud on the
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court by submitting perjurious witness statements in connection
with S & P's dismissal and vacatur motions.
The Fourth Circuit recognizes that if a judgment was
obtained by a "fraud upon the court," there could be relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).4
See Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
Am., 675 F.2d 1349, 1356 (4th Cir. 1982).
But, "[n]ot all fraud
is 'fraud on the court'" and the concept is narrowly construed
so that "the otherwise nebulous concept" does not "overwhelm the
specific provision of 60(b)(3) and its [one-year] time
limitation."
Id. (finding claim that party submitted false
evidence at trial did not constitute "fraud on the court").
Assertion of a fraud on the court is a "serious allegation ...
involving corruption of the judicial process itself."
Cleveland
Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scraps Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 986 (4th
Cir. 1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Fraud
upon the court is "typically confined to the most egregious
4
Rule 60(d)(3) provides that Rule 60 "does not limit a
court's power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the
court."
It appears that claims of "fraud upon the court" may
be pursued under either 60(d)(3) or 60(b)(6). See Irving v.
Town of Camden, 2:10-CV-00367-MJK, 2012 WL 2155238, at *2 (D.
Me. June 13, 2012). Though the Parties dispute whether Vitol
raised a 60(d)(3) claim in its moving motion, the Parties have
presented no material distinction between terming Vitol's fraud
upon the court claim as one under 60(b)(6) or 60(d)(3).
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cases, such as bribery of a judge or juror, or improper
influence exerted on the court by an attorney, in which the
integrity of the court and its ability to function impartially
is directly impinged."
Great Coastal, 675 F.2d at 1356;
Rainwater v. Mallas, 42 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished).
Perjury and fabricated evidence alone do not constitute
grounds for relief as "fraud upon the court."
675 F.2d at 1357.
Great Coastal,
There must be evidence of a "deliberate
scheme to directly subvert the judicial process."
Id. at 1356.
The evidence provided by Vitol could be found to establish
that a statement made by Mr. Nicolas Velliades (the majority
owner of S & P) was incorrect.
In his 2010 declaration,
Velliades, after explaining that Primerose is a Marshall Islands
company established in Greece, stated that the "first director
of Primerose was myself" and that he served as the legal
representative of the company "from March 2003 until July 2008."
Velliades' Decl. [Document 159-18] ¶ 3-4.
Translated Greek
government records attached to Velliades' Declaration provide
Primerose is a Marshall Islands company that gained legal status
to do business in Greece in 2003 and that Velliades "appears to
be the representative of [Primerose] in accordance with a copy
of a resolution passed by the sole director of [Primerose] and
dated 6th February 2003."
Velliades' Decl. [Document 33-14].
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There is no contention that these documents are false.
However,
Vitol has presented an unsigned document that, according to an
investigator for Vitol, reflects that a Mr. Danon said that he
had served as the first director of Primerose for one month
beginning in 2001 at the behest of Defendant Gerassimos
Kalogiratos.5
See [Document 159], Ex. A, B.
Moreover, a Vitol
investigator states that he saw in the Greek government records
a document that states that Mr. Danon was a director of
Primerose before Velliades.
At most, Vitol's evidence would
establish that Mr. Danon was the first director of Primerose –
analogous to an incorporator of a shelf corporation6 in the
United States.
However Velliades became the director when the
entity was taken off the shelf.
In context the Velliades misstatement is of minimal
significance.
There is nothing to indicate that S & P's counsel
knew of the error or were reckless.
Indeed, the Greek
government documents attached to the Velliades Declaration
reflect that Velliades was the director at all times pertinent
to the instant litigation.
5
Vitol takes the position that Gerassimos is the real owner
and controller of S & P and Mr. Velliades is simply his puppet.
6
The Parties appear to agree that prior to gaining Greek
status in 2003, Primerose was a "shelf company" based in the
Marshall Islands and not engaging in any significant business
transactions.
8
Vitol also accuses S & P's counsel of fraud on the court by
virtue of Velliades' 2010 statement that "Primrose does not
share its . . . email address with any other person or company."
Velliades' Decl. [Document 159-18] ¶ 10.
Vitol has submitted
evidence that on a few occasions prior to 2010 asserted nonPrimerose employees (Gerassimos, etc.) used the Primerose email
address.
First, the email address statement, being in the
present tense as of 2010, appears to have been literally true.
If interpreted as a statement of general practice, it is not
proven false by evidence of a few times in which the email
address had been used by others.
If taken to be a statement
that no one outside of Primerose has ever used its email
address, it would be false but there is nothing indicating that
S & P's counsel of record knew of the falsity.
Maria Moisidou (a foreign licensed attorney who represents
Gerassimos, the owner of Capri, and his family in matters not
before this Court) declared in the instant case that "[a]s Mr.
Velliades - the owner and manager of [S & P] has stated under
oath, the Kalogiratos family has no ownership or management
involvement with regard to either Primerose or Spartacus."
Moisidou Decl. [Document 159-22] ¶ 22.
The statement that the
family had no such ownership or management involvement is, of
course, debatable, although consistent with S & P's position in
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this case.
Even if there were evidence now available that would
provide that Moisidou knew of specific indications of ownership
or management involvement, there is nothing to indicate that S &
P's counsel of record were aware that she was making a false
statement.
The Court finds, without doubt, that there is no evidence
that even approaches a plausible basis to accuse S & P's counsel
of record of a fraud on the court or any other impropriety.
Finally, the Court must note that even if Vitol's claims of
fraud were established, the fraud had no effect whatsoever.
The
Court held against S & P with regard to their jurisdictional
contention.
The Court – as did the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit – held dismissal and vacatur was
proper based upon consideration of the statements in the Amended
Verified Complaint and did not, therefore, rely on any allegedly
fraudulent statements made on behalf of S & P.
Hence, even if
there had been some "fraud upon the court," the fraud cannot be
said to have undermined the judicial process "by preventing the
district court or [the Fourth Circuit] from analyzing the case."
See generally United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d
415, 454 (9th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Vitol has failed to
establish that S & P or their counsel perpetrated any "fraud
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upon the court" or that any exceptional circumstances exist for
setting aside the Decision under Rule 60.
B.
Amendment of the Verified Complaint
Because the Court has denied Vitol's motion to vacate the
Decision and reinstate the action against S & P, there is no
need to address any post-judgment amendment of the pleadings.
See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006)
(explaining a district court may not grant a post-judgment
motion to amend "unless the judgment is vacated pursuant to Rule
59(e) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)").
C.
Release of the Substitute Collateral
There is now a final judgment vacating the attachment of
the THOR and dismissing the Verified Complaint against S & P.
As represented by Vitol, it is not pursuing any further
appellate proceedings.7
Therefore, there is no basis for the
Court to delay release of the Substitute Collateral pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2042.
7
At the hearing, Vitol advised the Court that it will not
petition the Supreme Court for certiorari, and agreed that if
the Court declines to grant it relief under Rule 60, the
Substitute Collateral must be released.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. Plaintiff Vitol, S.A.'s Motion for Relief from
Judgment, or in the Alternative for Permission to
Amend the Complaint [Document 159] is DENIED.
2. Defendants Spartacus Navigation Corp.'s and Primerose
Shipping Company Ltd.'s Motion to Vacate "Emergency
Stay" and/or Motion to Reconsider Order Granting
"Emergency Stay" [Document 154] is DENIED as MOOT.
3. Defendants Spartacus Navigation Corp.'s and Primerose
Shipping Company Ltd.'s Emergency Motion for Release
of Funds Deposited in Court Registry [Document 161]
is GRANTED and the funds shall be released pursuant
to separate Order.
SO ORDERED, this Tuesday, May 14, 2013.
/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge
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