Calhoun-El v. Maynard et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 5/31/11. (apl, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 6/1/11)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JAMES CALHOUN-EL, #160083
Plaintiff
v
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Civil Action Case No. RDB-I0-765
GARY MAYNARD
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES,
INC.,
NURSE ADAMS
Defendants
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The pro se Plaintiff James Calhoun-EI ("Calhoun-EI") has filed his Complaint seeking
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punitive and compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 91983. ECF No. 4. Defendant Gary
Maynard, Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services for the State of Maryland by his
counsel, moves to dismiss or, in the alternative for summary judgment (ECF No.9) and
Defendants Correctional Medical Services, Inc. ("CMS") and Timberlie Adams R.N. ("Nurse
Adams") (collectively, the "Medical Defendants"), by their by their counsel move to dismiss or,
in the alternative for summary judgment. ECF No. 13. Calhoun-EI has filed a reply to the
dispositive motions. ECF No. 23.
After review of the pleadings, exhibits, and applicable law,
the Court determines that a hearing is unwarranted.
Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2010). For the
reasons that follow, Defendant Maynard and the Medical Defendants' motions for summary
judgment (ECF NO.9 and 13) will be GRANTED and judgment will be ENTERED in their
favor.
BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Claims
Calhoun-EI is an inmate at the North Branch Correctional Institution (NBCI). He
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Calhoun-EI's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction was dismissed on April 6, 2010. ECF NO.2.
complains that on February 26,2010, he was placed on "feed-in"
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status by Dr. Ottey for
diverticulitis of the colon and the chronic back pain that he suffers when he sits on a hard
surface. Complaint, p. 4. On March 1,2010, Nurse Adams "wrote a medical assignment
denying [him] gym/yard, no work, and no inside recreation." !d. Calhoun- El asserts that NBCI
policy denies telephone privileges, access to the library, attendance at religious services, and
outside recreation to inmates on feed-in status. Complaint, p. 5.
Calhoun-EI filed a sick call slip complaining that he needed exercise because he suffers
from Type II diabetes. On March 9, 2010, Dr. Majd Amaout, M.D. wrote an order to allow him
to exercise for one year. See id. On March 11, 2010, Nurse Adams removed him from feed-in
status. Calhoun-El claims her action constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs and
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See id.
Calhoun-El has filed an affidavit in which he alleges that from March 1-6,2010, he was
told by unidentified "numerous correctional officers") that he could not shower, use the law
library, attend religious services, receive mail or make telephone call because of his feed-in
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status. He claims also that he was denied ice for his medical condition.
In his Reply (ECF No. 23, pp. 3-4, Exhibit 5), Calhoun-EI states that on April 8,2011,
NBCI issued a Memorandum to inmates announcing a new "policy" for feed-in status. CalhounEl contends the new "policy" is used as a punishment against inmates with medical needs that
Feed-in status aIlows inmates to eat meals in their ceIls. ECF No. 13, Medical Defendants' Memorandum, p. 8. n.
5.
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In his reply, Calhoun-EI provides the names of the corrections officers. ECF No. 23, p. 7.
To the extent Calhoun-EI attempts to introduce new claims in his Reply (ECF No. 23) for improper confiscation of
his back brace and medicaIly prescribed cushion or for failure to provide diabetic shoes, he must do so in a separate
complaint.
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require them to be placed on feed-in status.5 See id. According to Calhoun-EI, if an inmate is
housed in a single cell when placed on feed-in status, he will be moved to another housing unit
and placed into a cell with another inmate designed to hold a single prisoner and lose his
institutional job. See id. Calhoun asserts that moving an inmate to another housing unit or into a
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double cell constitutes retaliation due to medical condition.
ECF No. 23, pp. 3-4.
B. Defendants' Dispositive Pleadings
1. Secretary Maynard
Counsel notes that the only time Secretary Maynard is referenced in the Complaint is the
caption; Secretary Maynard is not mentioned elsewhere in the Complaint.
Counsel has
submitted verified records to show that neither the Division of Correction nor NBCI has a policy
which denies inmates on feed-in status showers, access to the library or religious services, mail,
telephone calls, or ice. ECF No.9, Exhibit C, Declaration of Richard Graham.
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The Memorandum from Richard 1. Graham, Assistant Warden reads:
Beginning on April 13, 20 II when a medical provider places an inmate on a
medical feed-in status, the inmate will be transferred to Housing Unit 2 0
wing. It will be the responsibility of the medical department to notify NBCI
Traffic Office of this status change. The NBCI Traffic Office will
immediately notify the dietary department and make the arrangements for
the move. The inmate will remain in HU 2 until the order expires and there
is a vacancy in Housing Unit 3 or 4.
ECF No. 23, Plaintiffs
Exhibit 5.
The Memorandum, by its own terms, takes effect on April 13,20 II, and thus was issued after the events under
consideration in this case. Furthermore, the Memorandum does not address job assignments. Although the
Memorandum addresses cell location for feed-in status, there is no reference to double or single ceiling. Calhoun-El
neither alleges that Housing Unit 3 and 4 are comprised solely of single-celled inmates, nor that Housing Unit 2, 0
wing is comprised solely of double cell placements. It bears noting that inmates do not have federally protected
rights to placement in a single cell or particular institutional job assignments. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337,350 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541-44, (1979); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,244-48 (1983).
Work assignments of prisoners ... are matters of prison administration, within the discretion of the prison
administrators ...." Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812, 813 (4th Cir. 1978).
To the extent Calhoun-El wants to raise a retaliation claim in his Reply for the first time, he may not do so. He
must raise new claims in a separate complaint.
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2. Medical Defendants
The Medical Defendants have filed verified copies of Calhoun- EI' s medical records
demonstrating that on February 26,2010, Colin Ottey, M.D. examined Calhoun-EI for chronic
low back pain and assigned him to feed-in status for one month during which time he would
avoid recreation activities.
ECF No. 13, Exhibit A, Declaration of Colin Ottey, M.D.; Exhibit B,
pp. 1-5. On March 1,2010, Nurse Adams transcribed the order for feed-in status on a Medical
Assignment form. See id.
On March 9, 2010, Majd Arnaout, M.D. examined Calhoun-EI for dermatitis.
the appointment, Calhoun-EI complained about lack of exercise.
During
Dr. Arnaout recommended
that Calhoun-EI exercise regularly for one year. ECF No. 13, Exhibit B, pp. 6-8.
On March 11, 2011, Nurse Adams informed Dr. Arnaout of the inconsistency between
feed-in status and the exercise recommendation.
In light ofCalhoun-EI's
request for exercise,
his feed-in status was cancelled. Nurse Adams wrote on Calhoun-EI's medical chart:
Spoke with Dr. Aranout concerning inconsistencies in 1M's [inmate's] order
for feed-in verus recreation. Latest order for "recreation" x 1 year clarified.
1M requested to have recreation privileges reinstated. Per Dr. Aranout, "feedin" status cancelled due to 1M's request for exercise. New paperwork sent to
dietary to cancel feed-in.
ECF No. No. 13, Exhibit p. 9.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw." This does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
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motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
"The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must 'set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football
Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e)). The court should "view the evidence in the light most favorable to ....the nonmovant, and
draw all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness'
credibility." Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Medical Center, Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir.
2002). The court must, however, also abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to
prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d
at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th
Cir.1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
ANALYSIS
A. Claims Against Secretary Maynard
1. Respondeat Superior
As previously noted, Calhoun-EI points to no action or inaction on the part of Secretary
Maynard that resulted in the constitutional injury alleged. To the extent Calhoun-EI premises
liability on respondeat superior, the doctrine does not apply in
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1983 proceedings.
See Monell
v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766,
782 (4th Cir. 2004). Liability of supervisory officials must be "premised on 'a recognition that
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative
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factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.' " Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001), citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th
Cir.1984). Supervisory liability under
S 1983 must
be supported with evidence that 1) the
supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct
that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff,
2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices, and 3) there was an
affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
Calhoun-El's claims that NBCI policy
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prevented him from recreation and other
activities while in feed-in is directly refuted by verified exhibit. ECF NO.9, Exhibit C, ~ 5.
Absent personal involvement by Secretary Maynard or unconstitutional policy or custom, there
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is no legal basis to find Secretary Maynard liable, see Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F. 3d 791, 799 (4 Cir.
1994), and Secretary Maynard is entitled to judgment in his favor.
2. Conditions of Confinement
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual living conditions. See
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). In order to state a constitutional claim
premised on prison conditions, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the challenged
conditions resulted in a deprivation of a basic human need that was objectively "sufficiently
serious" and (2) that, subjectively, the defendant prison officials acted with a sufficiently
"culpable state of mind" with regard to the conditions. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,298
7 As noted earlier, the "policy" about which Calhoun-EI complains was instituted after the incidents at issue here
took place and does not support his allegations. See supra note 3.
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(1991). To satisfy the objective element of a conditions claim, the plaintiff must show that he has
sustained a serious or significant mental or physical injury as a result of the challenged
conditions. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375,1380-1381
(4th Cir.1993).
Assuming the facts alleged by Calhoun-EI as true, he spent a total of seven days, from
March 1-6,2010, on feed-in status with restrictions on exercise, library, religious, and telephone
visits.
Isolation, inactivity, discomfort and inconvenience do not in and of themselves violate
the Constitution. See In Re Long Term Administrative Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five
Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 471-72 (4th Cir. 1999) (indefinite administrative segregation). The
time Calhoun-el allegedly suffered deprivation was brief, and no facts are alleged to show
deliberate indifference.
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In sum, Calhoun-EI's claims do not suggest a violation of
constitutional magnitude.
B. Medical Defendants
In order to state a constitutional claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a defendant's
acts (or failures to act) amounted to deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,106 (1976). The medical treatment
provided must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or
to be intolerable to fundamental fairness. See Miltier v. Beom,
1990) (citation omitted).
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896 F.2d 848,851 (4
Cir.
A defendant must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety. "[T]he [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference."
8 Nonmedical prison officials "can generally rely on his medical staffs examinations and diagnoses" in determining
what level of treatment is warranted./ka v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372
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F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004); Miltier v. Beam, 896 F.2d 848, 854-55 (4 Cir. 1990).
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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 837 (1994).
Thus, a health care provider must have actual
knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of the symptoms. See Johnson v.
Quinones, 145 F .3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998). Mere negligence or malpractice does not rise to a
constitutional level. See Millier v. Born, 896 F.2d 848 (1990).
1. eMS
CMS argues that as a corporate entity it cannot be held liable under
S
1983. To the extent
the Complaint names CMS solely upon vicarious liability, it is well settled that a claimant may
not recover against a municipality on a respondeat superior theory under 42 U.S.C.
Monell v. Department
liability under
o/Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95(1978).
S 1983 apply
not liable under
S
S
1983. See
Principles of municipal
equally to a private corporation. Therefore, a private corporation is
1983 for actions allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is
predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior. See Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195
F.3d 715, 727-28 (4th Cir.1999); Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th
Cir.1982). For this reason, CMS is entitled to dismissal
2. Nurse Adams
Calhoun-EI claims that his health was adversely affected when Nurse Adams cancelled
his feed-in status. Calhoun-El's medical records show that after removal from feed-status,
medical practitioners continued to address his medical concerns.
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ECF No. 13, ~~ 7-8; Exhibit
B, pp. 15-16. Calhoun-EI provides no facts to support a claim of deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. Indeed, when Calhoun-EI brought his need to exercise to the attention of
9 Calhoun-EI claimed in his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction that as a result of being denied an opportunity" to
exercise, shower, law library and telephone calls, " he suffered and continues to suffer serious physical and mental
injuries. He asserts that has not received medical treatment for high glucose, severe back spasms, headaches,
constipation lethargy, and depression. ECF No. I, p. 5. If Calhoun-EI believes he is being deprived constitutionally
adequate care for these conditions, he may file a separate civil rights complaint.
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medical providers, his concerns were promptly considered and his assignment to feed-in
cancelled in response.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Calhoun-EI,
the Court finds that no genuine issue as to any material fact is presented. Secretary Maynard and
the Medical Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and judgment will be
entered in their favor. A separate Order follows.
fYlA-'/
Date
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pJ{~2~
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RICHARD D. BENNETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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