Jones v. Astrue

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm on 9/9/11. (dass, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
PAUL W. GRIMM
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 W. LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
[phone] FAX

September 9, 2011
William J. Nicoll, Esq.
Jenkins Block & Assocs., PC
1040 Park Avenue, Ste. 206
Baltimore, MD
21201
Alex Gordon, AUSA
36 S. Charles Street
4th Floor
Baltimore, MD 21201
Re: Angela Jones v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of
Social Security, PWG-10-884
Dear Counsel:
Pending before this Court, by the parties’ consent, are
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment concerning the Commissioner’s
decision denying Angela Jones’ claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”). (ECF Nos. 12,15,18).
This Court must uphold
the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence and if proper legal standards were employed. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996);
Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). A hearing
is unnecessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow,
this Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s Motion and DENIES the
Plaintiff’s Motion.
Angela Jones (sometimes referred to as “Ms. Jones” or
“Claimant”), applied for DIB on January 14, 2008, alleging that
she has been disabled since October 12, 2005, due to chronic
fatigue, degenerative disc disease, anxiety, and depression.
(Tr.
124).
Her
claim
was
denied
initially
and
upon
reconsideration. (Tr. 86-95). After a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), the Honorable Barbara Powell,
on July 22, 20091, the ALJ denied her claim in a decision dated
1

This was the second of two administrative hearings in this

September 18, 2009. (Tr. 13-24).
The ALJ found that Claimant
met the insured status requirements through her date last
insured (“DLI”) December 31, 2006 and that she had not engaged
in any substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since her alleged
onset date of October 12, 2005. (Tr. 15).
The ALJ then found
although Claimant’s lumbar degenerative disc disease anxiety and
depression were “severe” impairments, they did not meet or
medically
equal
any
of
the
listed
impairments
in
the
Regulations.
The ALJ also found that Claimant retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a limited range
of light work2. (Tr. 16). Based on her RFC, and after receiving
testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined
that Claimant was able to perform her past relevant work (“PRW”)
as a food service worker. (Tr. 326-327). Accordingly, the ALJ
found that she was not disabled. (Tr. 21). On March 25, 2009,
the Appeals Council denied her request for review, making her
case ready for judicial review. (Tr. 4-7).
The Claimant presents several arguments in support of her
contention that the Commissioner’s final decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. First, she argues that the
ALJ was required, but failed, to explain “the seriousness of the
date last insured issue” to Claimant who was not represented by
counsel at the administrative hearing. See Plaintiff’s Mem. pp.
11-17.
In order to obtain disability benefits, a claimant must
demonstrate that he or she was disabled prior to his or her last
insured date. The claimant must prove that she was either
permanently disabled or subject to a condition which became so
severe as to disable her prior to the date upon which her
disability insured status expired which, in this case, is
December 31, 2006.
After careful review of the record, I find
the ALJ adequately explained the issue of DLI to Claimant.
At
the hearing the ALJ stated:
ALJ: [F]or every quarter that you worked you are
accredited with a quarter of social security credits
case. The first hearing took place on July 1, 2009. (Tr. 44-85)
2
The ALJ found Claimant’s ability to perform light work was
limited by the following: she could perform no crouching,
crawling, squatting, nor climbing of ladders or scaffolds. She
was to avoid exposure to hazardous situations that might cause
harm to self or others such as work at unprotected heights or
work with dangerous machinery. She was to avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold or vibration. (Tr. 18).
2

towards retirement disability. For retirement you need
40 quarters. For disability you need 20 quarters. In
other words, five years of work more or less not
absolutely consecutive work but within a range of
time, and I don’t know what it is. That gets into the
regulations and I don’t deal regularly deal with that
part. But you need 20 quarters of credits, of work
credits, full or part time of working towards
disability. And after you stop working, you have five
years more or less within the date when you stopped
working that insurance period is for. …But it’s more
or less within five years of the last date that you
worked for any appreciable length of time, and in your
case, the date you were last insured was December 31
of’06. So we’re going to be looking to see if there’s
evidence of disability within the period up to and
including December 31 of ’06 So that’s your
[INAUDIBLE] agreeable to you case, but that’s going to
be your critical evidence.” (Tr. 45-46)(emphasis
added).
Contrary to Claimant’s argument, I find the ALJ more than
adequately explained the issue of Date Last Insured (“DLI”). The
ALJ also asked Ms. Jones during the hearing whether she thought
that the file contained “all the medical evidence back around
’06”, to which Claimant responded “yes”. (Tr. 78).
Second, Claimant’s counsel alleges that Ms. Jones was
“denied a full and fair hearing” and was “prejudiced” by the
ALJ’s failure to stress the right to representation, and because
the ALJ conducted the second hearing with a vocational expert
(“VE”) that was not present at the first hearing. See
Plaintiff’s Memo., pp. 11-14. Claimant cites no authority in
support of her contention that “the vocational testimony should
have been taken at the first hearing”. I find the Claimant’s
argument without merit. As noted in the Commissioner’s
Memorandum, Claimant was adequately apprised of her right to
counsel and the ALJ noted on the record that she had signed a
waiver. (Tr. 45). Furthermore, the ALJ clearly explained to Ms.
Jones at the first hearing that there could be a need for a
second hearing based on the evidence she received. At the second
hearing, the ALJ again explained why the additional hearing was
taking place. (Tr. 27). The ALJ also explained at both hearings
that she had insured status until December 31, 2006. (Tr. 27,
46).
In sum, I do not find that Claimant’s allegations of error
3

are substantiated. Thus, for the reasons given, this Court
GRANTS the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES
Claimant’s Motion. A separate Order shall issue.

Sincerely,
/s/
Paul W. Grimm
United States Magistrate Judge

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