Cherry, Jr. et al v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City et al

Filing 186

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 175 MOTION to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 11/30/2012. (aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ROBERT F. CHERRY, JR., et al.
Plaintiffs
vs.
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE CITY, et al.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-10-1447

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Defendants
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II
The Court has before it the Defendant Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore's Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended
Complaint [Document 175], and the materials submitted relating
thereto.

The Court has held a hearing and has had the benefit

of the arguments of counsel.
In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a
claim that, through enactment of Ordinance 10-306, the City
violated their rights under the Contract Clause of the Federal
Constitution (the "Contract Clause Claim").

In Count II of the

Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim that through
enactment of Ordinance 10-306 ("the Ordinance"), the City took
property of Plaintiffs without just compensation and violated
their due process rights under the "takings" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution (the "Takings
Claim").

The Amended Complaint also presents state law claims

not pertinent to the instant matter.
By agreement of all parties the Court proceeded through
trial and resolution of the Contact Clause Claim in Count I.
Plaintiffs prevailed in that the Court found the elimination of
the Variable Benefit feature by the Ordinance unconstitutional
and have been determined to be entitled to relief.

The question

presented is whether the Takings Claim in Count II should be
dismissed as moot.
As stated on the record of proceedings held on November 19,
2012, any relief that Plaintiffs could obtain on Count II
(Takings Claim) would be duplicative of the relief already
obtained on Count I (Contract Clause Claim), with the exception
of a possible award of legal fees if Count II is determined to
present a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that in "any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision" of § 1983, "the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs."

(emphasis added).

The grant or denial of a motion for

attorneys' fees under § 1988(b) is generally reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.

See Kebe ex rel. K.J. v. Brown, 91 F.

App'x 823, 828 (4th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278

1

The Amended Complaint does not explicitly assert Count II
as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
2

F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir. 2002).

A party "prevails" within the

meaning of § 1988(b) "when actual relief on the merits of his
claim materially alters the legal relationship between the
parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that
directly benefits the plaintiff."

Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S.

Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12
(1992)).

An award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party may

be denied where "special circumstances would render such an
award unjust."

See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429

(1983) (internal quotations omitted).
The Court will assume, without ruling on the matter, that
Plaintiffs would be held to be "prevailing parties" for §
1988(b) purposes if they succeeded on the Takings Claim even
though Plaintiffs would obtain no greater relief than already
awarded on their Contract Clause Claim.
Of course, the Takings Claim is based upon the same
enactment as the Contract Clause Claim.

However, in view of the

multitude of additional issues presented in regard to the
Takings Claim which may require the presentation of further
evidence, substantial proceedings would be required to resolve
the claim.

Moreover, it is highly likely that a decision by

this Court for Plaintiffs on the Takings Claim would have no
substantive effect.
If this Court is affirmed in regard to the Contract Clause
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Claim, Plaintiffs would obtain no more by virtue of the Takings
Claim.

If this Court were to be reversed on its decision

regarding in the Contract Clause Claim, it appears virtually
certain that such a reversal would be fatal to the Takings Claim
because the appellate court would be holding that the City did
not unconstitutionally impair Plaintiffs' contract rights by
enacting the Ordinance.

In such a circumstance, it is

difficult, perhaps impossible, to imagine a viable basis upon
which the Ordinance could nevertheless be viewed as having taken
Constitutionally cognizable property rights of Plaintiffs.
The Court finds that the circumstances of the instant case
would render an award of legal fees to Plaintiffs for proceeding
on the Takings Claim unjust.

Indeed, to proceed on the Taking

Claim the Court would require both sides to engage in
substantial additional proceedings and incur substantial
additional legal fees for the purpose of determining essentially
whether Plaintiffs could be entitled to recover their fees from
the City for those additional proceedings.
In sum, the Court can now state definitively that, in the
circumstances now presented2, Plaintiffs will not recover a legal
fee award on their Takings Claim.

Therefore, in the particular

context of the instant case, the Court cannot afford Plaintiffs
2

The Court does not, however, foreclose the possibility of a
legal fee award in the event that appellate review resulted in a
remand of the case for proceedings on the Takings Claim.
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effective relief on their Takings Claim.

See generally Cent.

States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 841
F.2d 92, 95 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining "a court should not
render an opinion in a dispute if the court is without the power
to afford effective relief").

Accordingly, Count II shall be

dismissed as moot.
For the foregoing reasons:
1.

Defendant Mayor & City Council of Baltimore's
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended
Complaint [Document 175] is GRANTED.

2.

COUNT II of the First Amended and Restated Class
Action Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and
Monetary Relief [Document 5] is hereby DISMISSED
as moot.

SO ORDERED, this Friday, November 30, 2012.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge

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