Simmons v. Astrue

Filing 26

LETTER OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 1/9/2013. (aos, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

January 9, 2013
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Barbara Allyn Simmons v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security;
Civil No. SAG-10-1918

Dear Counsel:
On July 16, 2010, claimant Barbara Allyn Simmons petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 19, 25). I find that no hearing is necessary. Local
R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported by
substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). I will deny both motions, vacate
the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Simmons filed her claim for benefits on January 25, 2006, alleging disability
beginning on April 17, 2004. (Tr. 82-89). Her claim was denied initially on June 30, 2006,
2008, and on reconsideration on January 12, 2007. (Tr. 57-61, 63-66). After a hearing, (Tr. 3150), an Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”) issued an opinion denying benefits because he
determined that Ms. Simmons had not been disabled. (Tr. 11-20). The Appeals Council denied
Ms. Simmons’s request for review, (Tr. 1-4), so the ALJ’s opinion is the final, reviewable
decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Simmons suffered from the severe impairments of major
depressive disorder, general anxiety disorder, panic disorder, post traumatic stress disorder,
borderline personality disorder, and degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 13). Despite these
impairments, the ALJ found that Ms. Simmons had retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to:
perform a limited range of light work in which she can lift up to 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, sit for up to 6 hours and stand/walk for up
to 6 hours in an 8 hour day. The claimant can perform jobs which require no
more than occasional climbing, balancing, kneeling, crouching, crawling and
stopping. She can perform jobs that require no more than brief, superficial
contacts with co-workers and no interaction with the general public. She is able

Barbara Allyn Simmons v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security
Civil No. SAG-10-1918
January 9, 2013
Page 2
to remember, understand and carry out no more than simple instructions and make
simple work-related decisions. She is able to perform work activities that do not
expose her to high production rate quotas or rapid assembly line work.
(Tr. 16). After hearing testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ concluded that Ms.
Simmons could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, and that
she therefore was not disabled. (Tr. 19).
Ms. Simmons makes several arguments in support of her appeal. I concur with her
contention that the ALJ erroneously relied upon the testimony of the VE after presenting the VE
with an inadequate hypothetical. The hypothetical posed was:
How about assuming a hypothetical person with the same age, education and
work experience as Ms. Simmons. Assume this person would be able to
remember, understand, carry out no more than simple instructions. Make simple
work-related decisions. Assume could do that on a sustained and continuous
basis. Could do jobs that did not involve any more than brief superficial contact
with co-workers. No interactions with the general public. Just take that for now.
Would there be any jobs in the local or national economy for somebody like that?
(Tr. 47). In response to the VE’s request for clarification, the ALJ imposed no physical
limitations. Id. The VE responded with two medium, unskilled positions and the light, unskilled
positions of “cleaner of [sic] housekeeping” and “office helper.” Id.
The RFC found by the ALJ in his opinion varies in significant ways from the
hypothetical posed to the VE. First, the RFC is limited to light work, so only the
cleaner/housekeeping and office helper positions would remain viable. Second, the RFC does
not specify that Ms. Simmons’s ability to make work related decisions would persist “on a
sustained and continuous basis,” which was part of the hypothetical presented to the VE. The
VE had testified at the hearing that, if frequent lapses in concentration prevented the sustained
ability to make simple work-related decisions, no work would be available. (Tr. 48). Third, and
most importantly, Ms. Simmons’s RFC contains a number of restrictions, both physical and
mental, that were not presented to the VE. Specifically, the RFC is limited to “no more than
occasional climbing, balancing, kneeling, crouching, crawling and stopping.”1 The VE did not
consider whether either the cleaner/housekeeping or the office helper position would require
more than occasional postural actions of this type. Moreover, Ms. Simmons’s RFC contains a
limitation that the individual “is able to perform work activities that do not expose her to high
production rate quotas or rapid assembly line work.” (Tr. 16). Although one might assume that
neither the cleaner/housekeeping position nor the office helper position would involve such
quotas, the VE was not presented that limitation for consideration. The Fourth Circuit has stated
that, “[i]n order for a vocational expert’s opinion to be relevant or helpful, . . . it must be in
1

Presumably, “stopping” is meant to read “stooping,” which is the customary postural limitation
considered in an RFC.

Barbara Allyn Simmons v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security
Civil No. SAG-10-1918
January 9, 2013
Page 3
response to proper hypothetical questions which fairly set out all of claimant’s impairments.”
Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50-51 (4th Cir. 1989). Because the ALJ’s hypothetical did not,
his subsequent reliance on the VE’s testimony to establish the existence of jobs was not
supported by substantial evidence. Remand is warranted.
I need not address the remaining issues Ms. Simmons has raised on appeal, because the
case will be remanded for further proceedings. In so holding, I express no opinion on whether
the ALJ’s ultimate determination that Ms. Simmons was ineligible for benefits was correct or
incorrect.
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Simmons’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
19) and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 25) will be DENIED. The ALJ’s
opinion will be VACATED and the case will be REMANDED for further proceedings. The
clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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