Woolard et al v. Sheridan et al
Filing
71
MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Benson Everett Legg on 7/23/2012. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
RAYMOND WOOLLARD, et al.
:
Plaintiffs
:
v.
Civil Case No. L-10-2068
:
MARCUS BROWN, et al.
:
Defendants
:
o0o
MEMORANDUM
Presently pending before the Court is the Motion of Defendants for a Stay Pending
Appeal. Docket No. 67. The issues have been comprehensively briefed, and the Court finds oral
hearing unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons set forth herein, the
Court will, by separate Order, DENY the Motion.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the State of Maryland‟s handgun
permitting scheme. In July of 2010, Plaintiff Robert Woollard filed suit contending that § 5306(a)(5)(ii) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code violates the Second Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The provision in question requires that, prior to issuing a
permit to wear or carry a handgun in the state of Maryland, the Secretary of the State Police must
make a finding that the applicant “has good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a
handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against
apprehended danger.”
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The Court agreed with Woollard, and entered an Order permanently enjoining
Defendants, their officers, agents, and employees, from enforcing § 5-306(a)(5)(ii). See Docket
Nos. 52 and 63. The Court further ordered Defendants to promptly process Woollard‟s 2009
application for a permit renewal, the denial of which gave rise to the instant suit, without
consideration of the “good and substantial reason” requirement. Id.
Defendants timely filed an application for stay and a notice of appeal to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Implementation of the Court‟s ruling was preliminarily stayed while
the parties briefed the issue of whether a more permanent stay should be entered pending the
Fourth Circuit‟s decision. Following expedited initial briefing, the Court convened a
teleconference with counsel for all parties and ordered supplemental briefing, which has now
been completed.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) permits a District Court to stay pending appeal a
final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction. In determining whether a stay is
warranted, the Court must consider: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing
that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested
in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,
776 (1987).
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III.
DISCUSSION
In this case, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing that the
aforementioned factors weigh in favor of a stay. The Court will briefly address each of these
factors.
a. Likelihood of Success
Just as every party to appeal a trial court‟s judgment does so with the expectation (or at
least the hope) of vindication, every court that renders a judgment does so in the belief that its
judgment is the correct one. Accordingly, the “likelihood-of-success standard does not mean
that the trial court needs to change its mind or develop serious doubts concerning the correctness
of its decision in order to grant a stay pending appeal.” Goldstein v. Miller, 488 F. Supp. 156,
172 (D. Md. 1980). A party seeking a stay, however, must nevertheless make a “strong
showing” that he is likely to succeed. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
Defendants rest their argument largely on the fact that this case involved difficult and
novel issues in a largely undeveloped area of law. As this Court has long noted, however, a stay
is not required “every time a case presents difficult questions of law.” St. Agnes Hosp., Inc. v.
Riddick, 751 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D. Md. 1990) (quoting Miller, 488 F. Supp. at 173). While the
result in the case at bar was not ineluctably dictated by controlling precedent, it did flow
naturally from the Supreme Court‟s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), and, perhaps more
importantly, from the Fourth Circuit‟s decision in United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458
(4th Cir. 2011). These decisions, as the Court noted, left useful “signposts” and provided “a
ready guide.” Mem. Op. at 7, 6, Docket No. 52.
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While Defendants have cited post-Heller decisions in which courts have upheld similar
(though not identical) permitting regulations, they cite none from the Fourth Circuit. By
contrast, as Woollard points out, subsequent to this Court‟s award of summary judgment another
district court in the Fourth Circuit has also held, as this Court did, that “[a]lthough considerable
uncertainty exists regarding the scope of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, it
undoubtedly is not limited to the confines of the home.” Bateman v. Perdue, No. 5:10-CV-265H, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47336, at *10–*11 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2012). In so doing, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, like this Court, placed
considerable reliance on Judge Niemeyer‟s non-controlling opinion in Masciandaro.
Defendants have beyond question shown that considerable difference of opinion exists
throughout the country as to the proper scope and application of the Second Amendment
following the Supreme Court‟s watershed decisions in Heller and McDonald. In the case at bar,
the Fourth Circuit could certainly find reasonable grounds to reverse this Court‟s decision. Such
an outcome does not appear so probable, however, as to outweigh the remaining considerations
discussed below.
b. Irreparable Injury
Defendants point to little in the way of truly irreparable injury that is likely to result
should their request for a stay be denied. First, Defendants urge that “their ability to protect
public safety will be curtailed” because of their “inability to enforce an important component of
the handgun permit regulations . . . .” Defs.‟ Mot for Stay 17, Docket No. 54. The problem with
this line of argument is that it begs a question that has already been answered. To accept
Defendants‟ contention would be to ignore the Court‟s determination that the “good and
substantial reason” requirement is insufficiently tailored to serving the State‟s admittedly
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legitimate interest in public safety. This and other such arguments that seek to relitigate the
merits of the case must fail.
Next, Defendants advert to what they characterize as “significant, immediate
administrative burdens” that would be involved in implementing the Court‟s Order. Id. at 20.
While the Court is not unsympathetic to the very real and often costly considerations involved in
revamping a regulatory scheme, administrative hardship does not rise to the level of irreparable
harm. As to the more concrete costs of compliance, “[m]ere economic injury is rarely, if ever,
sufficient to warrant entry of a stay of judgment to protect a party against it . . . .” Miller, 488 F.
Supp. at 175.
Nor does it seem likely that the attendant burdens would be as onerous as Defendants
would have the Court believe. The Court‟s main concern involved the difficulty Defendants
might have in revoking permits that will have already been issued should they succeed on appeal.
On this point, the parties appear to agree that the Court‟s decision does not stop Defendants from
tracking whether applicants have a “good and substantial reason,” only from denying permits on
this basis. While Defendants concede this point, they contend that “in light of the strong feelings
surrounding this issue, [the Maryland State Police („MSP‟)] nonetheless expects that a significant
number of applicants who have good and substantial reason may decline to provide it during the
Interim Period as a matter of principle.” Defs.‟ Supp. Brief 4, Docket No. 68. Notably,
however, Defendants offer no factual support for such an expectation. Moreover, applicants with
good and substantial reason who decline to provide it would do so with the understanding that, as
a consequence, they might have their permits revoked and be forced to repeat the application
process.
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As to those new applicants without good and substantial reason, Defendants admit that
“MSP expects that many such individuals would comply with its directions and return their
permits.” Id. While they assert that it would be “impractical” to track down and recover the
remainder, id., MSP is doubtless called upon to recover revoked permits from time to time.
Furthermore, any permit holder who refused to voluntarily return a permit would be in knowing
violation of MD Code, Public Safety, § 5-310, which requires the holder to “return the permit to
the Secretary [of State Police] within 10 days after receipt of written notice of the revocation.”
Defendants have given the Court no basis from which to infer that a significant number of those
applicants who have waited patiently for the outcome of this litigation and complied with the
permit application process in full would, upon revocation, suddenly decline to adhere to the law.
c. Interest of Other Parties and the Public
Against costs to Defendants of complying immediately with the Court‟s ruling, the Court
must balance the harm to Woollard and those like him. If a stay is granted, a sizeable number of
people will be precluded from exercising, while the case is argued on appeal, what this Court has
recognized as a valid aspect of their Second Amendment right. In the First Amendment context,
the Supreme Court has stated that “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods
of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976). As the Court discussed in its summary judgment opinion, there are substantial
similarities between the First and Second Amendments, and the analogy is appropriate here as
well.
The question of public interest is somewhat more involved. It is self-evident, as the
Fourth Circuit has noted, that “[s]urely, upholding constitutional rights serves the public
interest.” Newsom v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003). At the same
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time, however, the Court would not forget another admonition from the Fourth Circuit: that
“[t]his is serious business. We do not wish to be even minutely responsible for some unspeakably
tragic act of mayhem because in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to
Second Amendment rights.” Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475.
For this reason, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing how
Maryland‟s permitting scheme, without the “good and substantial reason” requirement, compares
to the systems in force in other states and how Maryland‟s rate of handgun violence compares to
that of other states with more liberal regulations. The Second Amendment does not “require
judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions and thus to make difficult
empirical judgments in an area in which they lack expertise.” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
Nevertheless, persuasive evidence that states with more permissive regulatory schemes suffer
from more handgun crime, or that states experience an increase in handgun violence when
moving from a “may issue” to a “shall issue” framework, would certainly militate in favor of a
stay.
The parties have conducted commendably thorough research on the subject, and each has
dedicated considerable time and energy to debating the relative merits of the studies and statistics
offered by the other. The inescapable conclusion, however, is that the evidence does not point
strongly in any one direction. As Defendants aptly state, “Identifying causal trends in crime data
is notoriously difficult in any circumstance because of the multiplicity of variables that impact
crime and the different effects of those variables in different places and on different people.”
Defs.‟ Supp. Brief 5, Docket No. 68. On this dimension, then, the Court cannot say that a stay
would demonstrably serve or disserve the State‟s goal of preventing a potential increase in
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handgun violence pending appeal. Defendants have not established that the public interest
weighs in favor of a stay.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Having given due weight to the four Hilton factors, the Court determines that a stay
pending appeal is not warranted. The Court will, by separate Order, lift the temporary stay now
in effect.
Dated this 23rd day of July, 2012
/s/
_______________________________
Benson Everett Legg
United States District Judge
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