Rawlings v. City of Balto. Mayor and City Council Dept. of Public Works

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Benson Everett Legg on 4/12/11. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 4/12/11-das)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHARLES RAWLINGS
:
Plaintiff
:
v

Civil Case No. L-10-2077
:

CITY OF BALTIMORE, MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL, DEPT. OF PUBLIC
WORKS

:
:

Defendant
o0o
MEMORANDUM

This is an employment discrimination case. The Plaintiff, Charles Rawlings, brings suit
pro se against the Mayor and City Council of the City of Baltimore (“the City”),1 alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Now pending are the City’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 5) and Rawlings’s Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint (Docket No. 14). The Court has reviewed the papers, and no hearing is
deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2010).
For the reasons stated herein, the Court will GRANT the City’s Motion to Dismiss, and
DENY Rawlings’s Motion to Amend.

1

As the City properly points out, the action is nominally brought against “City of Baltimore Mayor and the
City Council Dept. of Public Works,” which is not a legal entity subject to suit. The Court will construe the
Complaint as naming the proper entity, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, which is a municipal corporation
that may sue and be sued.

1

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Rawlings, an African American, claims a long history of discrimination and failure to

accommodate during his 17-year employment with the Baltimore City Department of Public
Works, culminating with his termination on May 11, 2006. He alleges that he and others
similarly situated were subject to racial abuse and ridicule, and were passed over for job training,
reassignment, and promotion in favor of white co-workers. He also alleges that the City
assigned him to a laborer’s position notwithstanding his qualification for more highly skilled
posts and the fact that a prior injury left him unable to perform heavy manual labor. According
to Rawlings, this unfitness for duty was the proffered basis for the City’s eventual decision to
fire him.
The Complaint indicates that Rawlings filed a charge with the EEOC on March 30, 2007
and received a right-to-sue letter on April 6, 2010. On July 28, 2010, Rawlings instituted suit in
this Court, claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act. On October 6, 2010, the City filed the instant Motion to
Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. On November 24, 2010, Rawlings
responded to the City’s Motion and also filed a Motion seeking leave to amend his Complaint.
The Amended Complaint would “add counts for racial discrimination and violations of equal
protection and due process in pay, promotions, job training and reassignment, and termination,
under 42 USC 1981, 1983 and 1985, and intentional infliction of mental [sic].” Pl.’s Mt. to
Amend 1–2, Docket No. 14.

2

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff

must plead plausible, not merely conceivable, facts in support of his claim. See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). The complaint must state “more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
at 1965. The Court must, however, “assume the veracity [of well-pleaded factual allegations]
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

III.

DISCUSSION
Because the Court finds that both Rawlings’s filing with the EEOC and the filing of the

Complaint in this case were untimely, his suit must be dismissed.
A plaintiff bringing suit under Title VII and the ADA must first timely file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC or a state fair employment practices agency. Jones v. Calvert
Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). In
Maryland, the charge must be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. See id.
Likewise, the Rehabilitation Act expressly incorporates the “remedies, procedures and rights” of
Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(1). Among the incorporated remedies and procedures is the
requirement that an aggrieved employee exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to
filing suit in federal court. The time period for filing an EEOC charge commences at the time
the decision to terminate is made. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258–59
(1980).

3

Rawlings was advised by letter dated April 19, 2006 that, because his application for
disability retirement and the ensuing appeal had been denied, he was officially being
recommended for termination. Def.’s Mt. to Dismiss Ex. 4, Docket No. 5. Rawlings was,
therefore, required to file a complaint with the EEOC on or before February 13, 2007, the 300th
day after learning of the decision to terminate his employment. Rawlings states, however, that
he did not file his charge until March 30, 2007, one and a half months after this deadline.2 Pl.’s
Compl. 3, Docket No. 1.
Rawlings’s failure to submit a charge to the EEOC within the 300-day window, without
more, requires the dismissal of his claims. Even if Rawlings’s charge had been timely filed,
however, his Complaint in this action was not. A plaintiff must file suit within 90 days of
receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). Rawlings asserts that he
received his right-to-sue letter, dated April 6, 2010, on April 28, 2010. He did not file suit until
July 28, 2010, the 91st day after receipt. See Pl.’s Compl. 3, Docket No 1; Def.’s Mt. to Dismiss
Ex. 8, Docket No. 5.
a. Equitable Tolling
Rawlings does not dispute that his filings were untimely. Rather, he requests that the
Court consider his particular circumstances and apply the doctrine of equitable tolling, thus
excusing his noncompliance with the filing deadlines. Rawlings sets forth a number of
sympathetic circumstances, including psychological treatment, financial distress, and woefully
incompetent legal representation. The Court is sensitive to the myriad difficulties that Rawlings
has encountered. Nevertheless, the law does not permit equitable tolling on facts such as those
presented here.
2

Even if the 300-day period did not begin until the date of actual termination, Rawlings’s filing would still
be untimely by some three weeks. Rawlings’s termination became effective on May 11, 2006, meaning that the
charge would be due on or before March 7, 2007.

4

A total failure to comply with the available administrative remedies serves as a
jurisdictional bar to a suit in this Court; however, failure to timely comply with the available
administrative remedies requires a separate analysis. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498
U.S. 89, 111 (1990). Generally, when an employee fails to timely submit his administrative
complaint, the failure is forgiven only if (1) the government should be equitably estopped from
asserting the time bar, (2) the time for filing should be equitably tolled, or (3) plaintiff did not
know about the time requirement. Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 589 (4th Cir. 1992). “[T]he
doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel have a common origin; they are based
primarily on the view that a defendant should not be permitted to escape liability by engaging in
conduct that prevents the plaintiff from filing his or her claim on time.” English v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987). “The common element to both doctrines is
some form of misconduct by the defendant.” Lekas v. United Airlines, Inc., 282 F.3d 296, 301
(4th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling may also apply where plaintiff has been “excusably ignorant of
filing requirements.” Lane v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 749, 754 (D. Md.
1999).
Rawlings states that he retained an attorney to protect his interests even before his actual
termination, but that the attorney misled him on the subject of legal fees and convinced him to
abandon a potentially meritorious appeal. Rawlings claims that a second attorney, retained to
file his EEOC claim, also advised him poorly, negligently failed to file his claim on time, and
even lied about the filing. See Pl.’s Opp. 5–6, Docket No. 15. Rawlings further states that he
was, at this time, undergoing treatment for emotional and psychological illness. Nonetheless,
Rawlings acknowledges that his attorney “was well aware of all dates required to make a timely
filing with the EEOC.” Id. at 6. At no point does he advance allegations of deception or

5

misconduct on the part of either his employer or the Government. As such, his failure to timely
exhaust his administrative remedies may not be excused.
For much the same reason, neither could the Court overlook Rawlings’s untimely filing
of the instant civil action. Courts in the Fourth Circuit have held that, under most circumstances,
a suit filed even a single day late should not be entertained. See Harvey v. City of New Bern
Police Dep’t, 813 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1987); Roberson v. Bowie State Univ., 899 F. Supp.
235, 238–39 (D. Md. 1995). In Harvey, the Fourth Circuit adopted the “flexible approach” then
in place in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, holding that “district courts should conduct a
thorough examination of the facts to determine if reasonable grounds exist for an equitable
tolling of the filing period.” 813 F.2d at 654. Though the Court should examine each case on its
individual circumstances, the bar for relief is a high one. The Harvey court cited by way of
example Franks v. Bowman Transportation, 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the
claimant’s nine-year-old nephew received and promptly lost the notice mailed by the EEOC, and
never told the claimant about it. Under these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit found that the
filing period should be tolled. By contrast, where there has been no showing that the plaintiff did
not have sufficient time in which to act, the 90-day filing period is strictly enforced. Harvey, 813
F.2d at 654.
Rawlings states that he failed to file his Complaint on time because he had difficulty
reacquiring his file from the attorney he had previously discharged, and that other attorneys
whom he attempted to hire unreasonably delayed before telling him that they would not take his
case. He also notes that during this period his mother passed away, and that he faced severe
financial distress, including the forced sale of his home and car. While such a state of affairs is
undoubtedly regrettable, it is undisputed that Rawlings had the full 90 days’ notice prescribed by

6

the law in which to file his complaint. The Supreme Court has admonished that “[p]rocedural
requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be
disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.” Baldwin County
Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (declining to apply equitable tolling where
the plaintiff, while claiming she had acted diligently, was fully aware of the 90-day filing
period).
This is not a case in which the plaintiff was excusably unaware of the requirements for
filing suit, nor even a case where he mistakenly believed that he had complied with them.
Equitable tolling of the deadline, therefore, is not an option. While this result may seem harsh,
“[i]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements
specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Id.
(quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)).
b. Motion to Amend
Rawlings has filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint in order to set forth more fully his
Title VII and ADA claims. The Amended Complaint would also add counts under 42 USC §§
1981, 1983, and 1985. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that freedom to
amend pleadings should be liberally granted when justice so requires. A court should deny leave
to amend, however, when the proposed amendments would be futile, that is, where they would
not survive a motion to dismiss. See Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910, 917 (4th Cir. 1995).
A more structured and eloquent explication of Rawlings’s discrimination claims would
do nothing to cure the procedural defects in his case. Likewise, his proposed 1981, 1983, and
1985 claims would be barred by Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations. See Shield Our
Constitutional Rights and Justice v. Hicks, No. DKC 09-0940, 2009 WL 3747199 at *6 (D. Md.

7

Nov. 4, 2009) (explaining that the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts do not provide a statute of
limitations, but require courts to borrow the statue of limitations from the state in which the
claims arose, and applying Maryland’s three-year limitations period to § 1981, § 1983, and
§ 1985 claims). The latest date at which Rawlings’s claims can be said to have accrued is May
11, 2006, the date of his termination. Because Rawlings did not bring suit until July 28, 2010,
more than three years after this date, any claims under § 1981, § 1983, or § 1985 would also be
time-barred.
Because amendment of his Complaint would be futile, leave to file such an amendment
must be denied.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will, by separate Order of even date, GRANT the

City’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 5), DENY Rawlings’s Motion for leave to Amend
(Docket No. 14), and order the Clerk to CLOSE the case.

Dated this 12th day of April, 2011.
/s/
_______________________________
Benson Everett Legg
United States District Judge

8