Campbell v. Astrue

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/11/12. (apls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
PAUL W. GRIMM
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 W. LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
[phone] FAX

October 11, 2012
Tracey Nicoll Pate, Esq.
Disability Associates, LLC
1226 Race Road, Suite B
Baltimore, MD 21237
Alex S. Gordon, AUSA
36 South Charles Street
4th Floor
Baltimore, MD 21201
Re: Stephanie Campbell v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner
of Social Security, PWG-10-2429
Dear Counsel:
Pending before the undersigned, by the parties’ consent,
are
Cross-Motions
for
Summary
Judgment
concerning
the
Commissioner’s decision denying Ms. Campbell’s claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (ECF Nos. 11,15,22). This
Court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported
by substantial evidence and if proper legal standards were
employed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589
(4th Cir. 1996); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.
1987). A hearing is unnecessary. Local Rule 105.6.
For the
reasons that follow, this Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s Motion
and DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion.
Stephanie Campbell (sometimes referred to as “Ms. Campbell”
or “Claimant”) applied for DIB on November 20, 2007, alleging
that she was disabled as of March 20, 2007, due to fibromyalgia,
back problems, hypertension, and depression. (Tr. 110, 144). Her
claim was denied initially, and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 6573).
After a hearing held on September 2, 2009, before an
Administrative Law Judge, the Honorable Judith A. Showalter,
(“ALJ”) her claim was denied in a decision dated October 28,
2009. The ALJ found that Ms. Campbell’s obesity, fibromyalgia,
1

and status post microdiskectomy with residual back pain were
severe impairments, but they did not meet, or medically equal,
any of the listed impairments. (Tr. 16-18). The ALJ also found
that Ms. Campbell retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform less than a full range of light work.1 Based
on her RFC, and after receiving testimony from a vocational
expert (“VE”), the ALJ found that Claimant was not precluded
from performing her past relevant work (“PRW”).
Accordingly,
the ALJ found that she was not disabled. (Tr. 11-23). On July
27, 2010, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Campbell’s request for
review, making her case ready for judicial review. (Tr. 1-5).
Claimant
raises
three
arguments
in
support
of
her
contention that the Commissioner’s final decision should be
reversed or, in the alternative, remanded. The undersigned has
considered all of them, and for the reasons that follow, this
Court
GRANTS
the
Commissioner’s
Motion
and
DENIES
the
Plaintiff’s Motion.
Ms. Campbell’s first argument is that the ALJ failed to
assess her credibility appropriately by improperly considering
her allegations of pain resulting from fibromyalgia. See
Plaintiff’s Memorandum, pp. 10-12.
However, after review of
the ALJ’s decision and the record, I find that the Claimant’s
arguments are without merit.
The ALJ adequately explained her
credibility determination. See SSR 96-7p.2
In determining
1

The ALJ found Ms. Campbell’s capacity for a full range of
light work was diminished by her inability to perform postural
activities more than occasionally, and her inability to climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 18).
2

SSR 96-7p, in relevant part, states:

4. In determining the credibility of the individual’s
statements the adjudicator must consider the entire
case record, including the objective medical evidence,
the individual’s statements about symptoms, statements
and other information provided by treating or
examining physicians or psychologists or other persons
about symptoms with the rest of the relevant evidence
in the case record in reaching a conclusion about the
credibility of the individual’s statements if a
disability determination or decision that is fully
favorable to the individual cannot be made solely on
the basis of objective medical evidence.
2

Claimant’s
credibility
and
the
impact
that
her
alleged
impairments had on her ability to work, the ALJ noted Claimant’s
testimony, including her statements that she cannot close her
hands due to swelling and numbness, and that her joints ached
constantly. The ALJ noted that Claimant can grocery shop, care
for her personal hygiene, but can only vacuum once every two
weeks and is able to handle her personal finances.(Tr. 21).
However, the ALJ’s inquiry did not end there.
The ALJ also
considered the findings of Dr. Gibb and CRNP Michael Crum, and
the treatments they prescribed for Claimant. The ALJ also
discussed the findings of the state agency physicians. (Tr. 22).
The ALJ noted that neither Dr. Gibb, nor Dr. Barrish, who
examined Claimant on behalf of the state agency, found any
swelling in Claimant’s hands. The ALJ discussed the fact that
there were no objective findings in the records confirming nerve
damage in Claimant’s extremities, and that Ms. Campbell reported
adequate pain relief from her prescriptions which included
Vicodin, Oxycodone, Flexeril, and Ultram. (Tr. 21).
The ALJ
also adequately explained the reasons for rejecting the opinions
of Dr. Gibb and Nurse Practitioner Crum that Ms. Campbell was
not physically or mentally able to sustain work. (Id.)
The ALJ
also explained in sufficient detail why she found Claimant’s
subjective complaints less than wholly credible. (Tr. 18-20).
In sum, the ALJ’s discussion of the factors listed in SSR
96-7p, and her discussion of Ms. Campbell’s testimony regarding
her activities, was in accordance with SSR 96-7p3.
5. It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a
single, conclusory statement that “the individuals
allegations have been considered or that the
allegations are (or are not) credible.” It is also not
enough for the adjudicator to simply recite the
factors that are described in the regulations for
evaluating symptoms. The determination or decision
must contain specific reasons for the finding on
credibility, supported by the evidence in the case
record and must be sufficiently specific to make clear
to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s
statements and the reasons for that weight.
96-7p (1996 WL 374186, at *1-*2) (emphasis added).
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SSR 96-7p also provides:
The adjudicator must consider certain factors “in
3

Claimant’s second argument is that the ALJ failed properly
to consider the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Michael
Gibb4 and treating nurse practitioner, Michael Crum.5 The
Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered these opinions, but

addition to the objective medical evidence when
assessing the credibility of an individual’s
statements”: Those factors include 1. The individual’s
daily activities; 2. The location, duration,
frequency, and intensity of the individual’s pain or
other symptoms; 3. Factors that precipitate and
aggravate the symptoms; 4. The type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the
individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or
other symptoms; 5. Treatment, other than medication,
the individual receives or has received for relief of
pain or other symptoms ; 6. Any measures other than
treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve
pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her
back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or
sleeping on a board ); and 7. Any other factors
concerning the individual’s functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
SSR 96-7p (1996 WL 374186, *2 (S.S.A.)).
4

In August 2008, Dr. Gibb completed a Medical Assessment
Report, in which he stated that Ms. Campbell did not have the
strength and endurance necessary to lift objects weighing 10
pounds, and that she could only stand and walk for a total of
one hour in an eight work day. Dr. Gibb also stated that Ms.
Campbell could never climb, stoop, crouch, crawl, kneel, push or
pull, and that she needed to lie down for an hour and a half
during an 8 hour work day. Dr. Gibb also stated that the side
effects of Claimant’s medications would cause substantial
restrictions on Claimant’s capacity to speak. (Tr. 398-400).
5

In November 2007, Nurse Practitioner Crum completed a
Medical Report Form, in which he stated, relevantly, that Ms.
Campbell’s functional capacity had gradually deteriorated and
that prolonged activities aggravate her back pain, which is
compounded by fibromyalgia. (Tr. 307).

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properly afforded them minimal weight. See Defendant’s
Memorandum, pp. 18-20.
The opinion of a treating physician is given controlling
weight when: 1) it is well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical
laboratory
diagnostic
techniques
and
2)
it
is
consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 20 CFR
§404.1527(d)(2)).
While treating source opinions on issues
reserved to the Commissioner--such as determining a claimant’s
RFC--are not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ still must
evaluate all of the evidence in the record to determine the
extent to which the opinion is supported by it.
Contrary to Claimant’s argument, I find that the ALJ
adequately discussed the opinions of Dr. Gibb and Nurse
Practitioner Crum, and explained why she was according their
Medical Assessment Reports less than controlling weight. The ALJ
noted that there was no evidence in their treatment notes to
support
their
opinions
regarding
Ms.
Campbell’s
extreme
functional limitations. (Tr. 22, Tr. 251-281).
For example,
the ALJ discussed the Claimant’s MRI results, which showed no
significant spinal narrowing and only minor disc bulges.
The
ALJ also noted that Ms. Campbell reported to Dr. Gibb that she
was able to function on Vicodin and that, despite her back pain,
she was able to pick papers up off the floor. See Exhibits 4-F
and 6-F, 19-F 20-F and 22-F. (Tr. 251-270, 278, 398-400, 401406).
The evidence of record properly was considered by the
ALJ, and her findings are explained and supported by substantial
evidence.
Claimant’s final argument is that the ALJ erred at the
fourth step of the sequential evaluation because the ALJ’s
finding that Claimant could perform PRW was not supported by
specific findings or an analysis of the physical and mental
demands of her past work.
The Commissioner argues that the
ALJ’s determination that Ms. Campbell was capable of performing
her PRW is substantially supported by, and consistent with, the
vocational information and the VE’s testimony.
Under the fourth step of the disability inquiry, a claimant
will be found not disabled if she is capable of performing her
past relevant work either as she performed it in the past, or as
it is generally required by employers in the national economy.
Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1207 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
5

added), citing SSR 82-61(1982 WL 31387 **2(S.S.A))(if the
claimant cannot perform the excessive functional demands and/or
job duties actually required in the former job but can perform
the functional demands and job duties as generally required by
employers throughout the economy, the claimant should be found
to be not disabled).
After review of the record and the ALJ’s
decision, I am not persuaded by Claimant’s argument. The ALJ’s
findings about the requirements of Claimant’s PRW -–as performed
in the economy--are consistent with the testimony of record and
the vocational information.
SSR 82-62, in relevant part,
provides:
...[D]etermination of the claimant’s ability to do PRW
requires a careful appraisal of (1) the individual’s
statements as to which past work requirements can no
longer be met and the reason(s) for his or her
inability to meet those requirements; (2) medical
evidence
establishing
how
the
impairment
limits
ability to meet the physical and mental requirements
of the work; and (3) in some cases, supplementary or
corroborative information from other sources such as
employers, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,
etc., on the requirements of the work as generally
performed in the economy.
(1982 WL 31386, *3) (S.S.A)).
At the hearing, the ALJ specifically asked Ms. Campbell
about the demands of her previous jobs.
For example, the ALJ
asked what type of work she did, where she worked, how much
lifting was involved, and how much of her time was spent sitting
and standing. (Tr. 30-35, 45).
Ms. Campbell also completed
forms detailing the type of work she performed, how much lifting
was required, and what her duties included. (Tr. 145). The ALJ
stated that her decision regarding Ms. Campbell’s ability to
perform her PRW was based on the VE’s testimony at the hearing.
At the hearing, the ALJ asked the VE to describe Ms. Campbell’s
previous work. (Tr.
55-59).
In response, the VE stated that
Claimant’s previous work as a clerk/cashier was a position that
is classified as a light exertional level, with an SVP6 of two,
6

Specific Vocational Preparation, (“SVP”) as defined in
Appendix C of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, is the
amount of lapsed time required by a typical worker to learn the
techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility
needed for average performance in a specific job-worker
situation. U.S. Department of Labor. (1991). Dictionary of
6

and that the front desk clerk position is classified as light,
semiskilled, with an SVP of four. (Tr. 56).
It was proper for the ALJ to rely on the testimony of
Claimant and the VE as sources for vocational information. 20
CFR §404.1566. Thus, there is adequate information in the
record to support the ALJ’s determination about the exertional
and nonexertional demands of Ms. Campbell’s past relevant work
and her ability to perform it.
In sum, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and must be affirmed.
Thus, for the reasons given,
this Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and DENIES Claimant’s Motion. A separate Order shall issue.

Sincerely,
/s/
Paul W. Grimm
United States Magistrate Judge

Occupational Titles (Rev. 4th ed.). Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
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