Wyatt v. Maryland Institute
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 3/7/12. (dass, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ROY E. WYATT,
*
Plaintiff,
*
v.
*
MARYLAND INSTITUTE
d/b/a MARYLAND INSTITUTE
COLLEGE OF ART,
*
Defendant.
*
*
*
*
Civil Action No. RDB-10-2584
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September 20, 2010, Plaintiff Roy E. Wyatt (“Plaintiff” or “Wyatt”) filed the
present action against the Maryland Institute College of Art (“Defendant” or “MICA”)
alleging in a one count complaint disability discrimination for wrongful termination in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. amended
by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that despite knowing of
his glaucoma, which restricted him in his ability to see and drive at nighttime, Defendant
discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his disability and terminated his
employment as an Institutional Security Officer/Dispatcher due to his inability to work his
nighttime overtime shifts on account of his disability. As a result, Plaintiff seeks damages in
the form of back wages, interest on back pay, attorney’s fees and costs as well as
compensatory and punitive damages.
1
Pending before this Court is Defendant Maryland Institute College of Art’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no
hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, the
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The Maryland Institute College of Art (“Defendant” or “MICA”) is an educational
institution located in Baltimore, Maryland. Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 2, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff Roy E.
Wyatt (“Plaintiff” or “Wyatt”) was employed in the MICA Department of Campus Safety
from 2001 until his termination on September 26, 2007. Id. at ¶¶ 8-22; see also Termination
Letter, Def.’s Mot for Summ. J., Ex. 2F, ECF No. 14-9 [hereinafter Def.’s MSJ]. This Court
reviews the facts relating to his claim in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997).
Wyatt began his employment with the Maryland Institute College of Art (“MICA”) in
2001 as a security officer/building guard. Pl.’s Mem. in Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at
9, ECF No. 16 [hereinafter Pl.’s Resp.]. It was at this time that MICA first learned about his
glaucoma. Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 9. In 2002, Wyatt was promoted to the position of Institutional
Security Officer/Dispatcher (“ISO/Dispatcher”) which involved the monitoring and
dispatching of patrol officers and student workers. Pl.’s Resp. at 9. Later, in April 2004,
Wyatt allegedly suffered a “worsening of his glaucoma such that he was unable to drive at
night.” Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 10. Upon receiving notice of the change in his condition, MICA
2
allegedly modified his work schedule by permanently scheduling him for the 7:00 a.m. - 3:00
p.m. shift instead of his usual 2:00 p.m. - 10:00 p.m. shift. Pl.’s Resp. at 9.
Following the termination of another ISO/Dispatcher in March of 2007, Wyatt
claims that MICA required all security personnel to work mandatory overtime shifts to cover
the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. timeslot until the position was again filed. Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 11. At
that time, Wyatt allegedly advised both the Assistant Director of the Department of Campus
Security, David Butkiewicz (“Butkiewicz”), and the Director of Human Resources, Betty
Enselein (“Enselein”), that his condition prohibited him from working this overtime shift.
Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. Wyatt then claims that Enselein required him to obtain an examination of
his condition at the Wilmer Eye Clinic. Id. at ¶ 13. Accordingly, Wyatt met with Dr. David
Friedman who reviewed his medical records and confirmed that he suffered from glaucoma
and was not to drive at night. Id. at ¶ 14. Once his diagnosis was confirmed, Wyatt claims
that Enselein directed him not to drive any of the MICA vehicles at night. Pl.’s Resp. at 13.
Additionally, he alleges that Enselein agreed to send a patrol car or van transport to bring
him to and from his overtime shift or, in the alternative, to limit his work schedule to
daytime shifts. Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 15. Wyatt also acknowledges receiving a letter from
Enselein dated May 25, 2007 in which MICA agrees to “work with [him] on scheduling,
including mandatory overtime when transportation is not otherwise available and possible
for [him] at night.”1 Letter, Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 9, ECF No. 25. However, Wyatt claims that
In addition, Wyatt alleges that an issue of material fact exists with respect to a “fabricated” May 25, 2007
letter produced by MICA in response to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”)
investigation into his claim. See ‘Fabricated’ Letter, Pl.’s Resp. at 18-19 and Letter, Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 16, ECF
No. 32. He claims that the letter was “entirely different in content” and that it was issued in an effort to
1
3
these accommodations were never made and that he was nevertheless required to work his
overtime shifts. Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 16.
From May to August 2007, Wyatt asserts that in order to comply with this
requirement, he exchanged shifts with or paid other security officers to work his assigned
overtime shifts. Id. at 17. On two separate occasions during that period of time, however,
he acknowledges that he was unable to find a substitute to work his overtime shift. Pl.’s
Resp. at 15. Wyatt then claims that when he notified Butkiewicz of his inability to work
those shifts, Butkiewicz threatened him with termination. Id. Wyatt then allegedly contacted
the Vice President of Operations at MICA, Michael Molla (“Molla”), who in turn advised
Butkiewicz that Wyatt was not required to work those shifts. Id.
In September of 2007, upon learning that he was scheduled to work five overtime
shifts between September 16 and October 1, 2007, Wyatt alleges that he again informed
Butkiewicz that he could not comply with this requirement. Id. at 16; see also Pl.’s Compl. at
¶ 19.
Specifically, Wyatt claims that he told Butkiewicz that he could not work the
September 22 and 23 overtime shifts and that Butkiewicz again refused to accommodate his
request. Pl.’s Resp. at 16. Additionally, Wyatt discusses a series of emails between Molla,
Butkiewicz and Enselein in which alternative modes of transportation were discussed such as
the Mass Transit Administration (“MTA”) program or the city bus No. 14. Id. at 16-17. In
mislead the EEOC. Pl.’s Resp. at 18. However, MICA has noted that the copy produced to the EEOC was
an earlier draft of the letter Wyatt received and that it was initially produced to the EEOC by mistake. Def.’s
Reply in Supp. of Summ. J. at 12, ECF No. 34. Moreover, a review of both letters reveals that they are
essentially similar in content and reflect MICA’s agreement to accommodate Wyatt’s glaucoma to the extent
possible. These letters do not create a genuine issue of material fact which would be dispositive of this case.
See further discussion infra at 24-25.
4
one of these emails, Butkiewicz allegedly stated that Wyatt had refused to take a bus to work
and that he had been warned that disciplinary measures would be taken against him should
he fail to attend his September 22 and 23 shifts. Id. at 18; see also Email, Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 14,
ECF No. 30. Moreover, Wyatt appears to allege that he first learned of the MTA program
through a letter from Molla dated September 18, 2007, four days before the scheduled
overtime shifts in question. Pl.’s Resp. at 18.
On September 22 and 23, 2007, Wyatt was not present during his scheduled overtime
shifts. Id.; see also Pl.’s Compl. at ¶¶ 20, 22.2 A couple of days later, on September 26, 2007
his employment with MICA was terminated due to his absence for the two aforementioned
shifts and his unwillingness to work future overtime shifts. Id.; see also Termination Letter,
Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 2F, ECF No. 14-9.
Believing that he had been discriminated against and terminated because of his
disability, Wyatt filed a timely charge of discrimination with the Baltimore, Maryland Field
Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 19,
2007. Pl.’s Compl. at 2 & ¶ 29. After rejecting his claims, the EEOC issued him a Notice of
Right to sue letter on July 14, 2010. Id. He then filed the Complaint in this case against
MICA alleging one count of disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. amended by the ADA Amendments Act
of 2008. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. In the Complaint, Wyatt claims that he has an actual
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Wyatt did not report to work for the September 25, 2007 shift. However,
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as well as the transcripts
and exhibits referred to herein indicate that Plaintiff was terminated due to his failure to appear during his
September 22 and 23, 2007 overtime shifts. See also Termination Letter, Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 2F, ECF No. 14-9.
2
5
disability which affects his major life activity of seeing and that MICA regarded him as
disabled.3
Id. at ¶¶ 25-26.
He further alleges that although he requested several
accommodations, MICA failed to accommodate his disability and that his disability was the
reason for his termination. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court “shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue over a material fact
exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.”
Id.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court’s
function is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a claimed factual
dispute to warrant submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. Id. at 249.
In undertaking this inquiry, this Court must consider the facts and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007). However, this Court must also abide by its affirmative obligation to prevent
factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774,
Although Wyatt claims that MICA regarded him as disabled, he fails to make any showing of proof relevant
to that claim. As such, this Court will disregard this allegation.
4 Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges that he suffered emotional distress because of his fear of losing his
employment and that he was examined by a doctor at the Veteran’s Administration in Glen Burnie, Maryland
concerning this condition. Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 21. Wyatt fails to provide any further evidence or
documentation in support of this claim.
3
6
778-79 (4th Cir. 1993).
If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment must be granted. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249-50. On the other hand, a party opposing summary judgment must “do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also In re Apex Express Corp.,
190 F.3d 624, 633 (4th Cir. 1999). This Court has previously explained that a “party cannot
create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of
inferences.” Shin v. Shalala, 166 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (D. Md. 2001) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
Defendant Maryland Institute College of Art (“MICA”) contends that it did not
discriminate against Wyatt on the basis of his disability and that summary judgment should
be entered in its favor. Specifically, MICA argues that: (1) Wyatt is not disabled within the
meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), (2) he was not a qualified
individual with a disability under the Act and (3) he was not terminated because of his
condition but because he failed to meet MICA’s legitimate expectations and deliberately
violated MICA’s policies.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits discrimination by a covered
entity, including a private employer such as MICA, “against a qualified individual” with a
disability particularly in the context of “hiring, advancement, or discharge” of an employee.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a). To survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff
asserting wrongful discharge on the basis of disability discrimination must demonstrate that
7
(1) he was discharged, (2) he was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, (3)
his performance at the time of the discharge met the legitimate expectations of his employer,
and (4) “his discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of
unlawful discrimination.” Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001).
As it is undisputed that Wyatt was discharged, this Court proceeds with an inquiry into the
remaining factors of this analysis.
I.
Whether Wyatt is a Qualified Individual with a Disability under the ADA
A qualified individual with a disability is defined as “an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Wyatt must
therefore demonstrate that he is both disabled and qualified.
a. Whether Wyatt is disabled under the ADA
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) defines actual “disability” as “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see also Boitnott v. Corning Inc., __ F.3d __,
Case No. 10-1769, 2012 WL 414662 (4th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012). “The determination of
whether a person is disabled is an individualized inquiry, particular to the facts of each case.”
E.E.O.C. v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352 (2nd Cir. 2001); see also Taylor v. Federal Express
Corp., 429 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2005). The general definition of a major life activity includes
8
the activities of seeing and working among others.
5
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). To be
substantially limited,6 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has
stated that the employee must either be “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform” or “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i).
“Among the factors courts should consider in making the substantial limitation
determination are the impairment’s ‘nature and severity’ and ‘expected duration.’ ” Heiko v.
Colombo Savings Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2006)(quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(ii)). The Supreme Court has noted that “mitigating measures must be taken
into account in judging whether an individual possesses a disability . . . [including] measures
undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices and measures undertaken,
whether consciously or not, with the body’s own systems.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527
U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999).
1. Major Life Activity of Working
Although Wyatt argues that he is substantially limited in the major life activity of
“[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(a)(1).
6 In the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-55 (2008), Congress
rejected the limiting interpretation of the term “substantially limits” in Sutton v United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. William, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) in favor of a broader
view as embodied in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (holding that a person’s
ability to work can be substantially limited by the negative reactions of others to an impairment.).
5
9
seeing, this dispute clearly revolves around Wyatt’s inability to be present during his
nighttime overtime shifts scheduled by MICA. An individual is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working, if the impairment precludes him “from more than one type of
job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.” Taylor v. Fed. Express Corp., 429 F.3d
461, 464 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999)). In a
recent opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in agreement
with “all circuit courts which have addressed this issue, . . . that an employee under the ADA
is not ‘substantially’ limited if he or she can handle a forty hour work week but is incapable
of performing overtime due to an impairment.” Boitnott v. Corning Inc., __ F.3d __, Case No.
10-1769, 2012 WL 414662 (4th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012). Moreover, upon reviewing the record in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Fourth Circuit found no evidence that his
“inability to work overtime significantly restricted his ability to perform a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes.” Id.
In this case, the record indicates that Wyatt acknowledged that he could perform at
least forty hour work-weeks. See e.g. Wyatt Dep. at 9-10, 23-24, Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 1, ECF No.
14-2 [hereinafter Wyatt Dep.]. Not only did he routinely work his daytime shifts while
employed at MICA, but since his termination, he also has held other security guard positions
requiring him to work at least forty hours a week. See e.g. Pl.’s Resp. at 13, 22-26, ECF No.
16; Wyatt Dep. at 11-13, 22-25. Nothing in the record indicates that Wyatt could not
perform his duties during his overtime shift upon reporting for duty. However, Wyatt has
alleged that he could not report to his overtime shifts because of his inability to drive at
10
night. See Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 12, ECF No. 1; Pl.’s Resp. at 13. Nevertheless, he has also
acknowledged that he continues to drive at nighttime for professional and personal
purposes. Wyatt Dep. at 9-13, 50; see generally Wyatt Aff., Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 1, ECF No. 17
[hereinafter Wyatt Aff.]. It also does not appear that his inability to work overtime for
MICA significantly restricted his prospects in terms of security guard positions or
concerning other broad ranges of work. As such and given the recent Fourth Circuit
holding in Boitnott, Wyatt is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
2. Major Life Activity of Seeing
Nevertheless, Wyatt argues that he is substantially limited in the major life activity of
seeing and is therefore disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
Whether glaucoma
constitutes a substantial limitation on the major life activity of seeing is an issue of first
impression in this Circuit. This Court will, therefore, consider the severity and expected
duration of this condition in making the determination in this case. Heiko v. Colombo Savings
Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2006).
On the one hand, “[t]he major life activity of seeing . . . is always substantially limited
by blindness.” Heiko, 434 F.3d at 256. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that
“people with monocular vision ‘ordinarily’ will meet the Act’s definition of disability.”
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999). On the other hand, however, the
Supreme Court has indicated that “monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act’s
protection, [must] prove disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in
11
terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial.”
Id.
Additionally, a court must take “an individual’s ability to compensate for the
impairment” into account when making a determination as to its impact on the major life
activity of seeing. Foore v. City of Richmond, Va, 6 Fed. Appx. 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 565).
In Foore, the Fourth Circuit held that where a police officer with monocular vision
still had a driver’s license, could engage in other professional activities, and could read, he
was not substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. See Foore, 6 Fed. Appx. at
152. Similarly, in Perry v. Kappos, the United States Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
determined that a plaintiff’s major life activity of seeing was not substantially limited by
taking into account plaintiff’s (a) possession of a driver’s license, (b) ability to drive to and
from the metro for his commute, (c) ability to drive certain short, familiar and well-lit routes,
(d) ability to read documents in small type “with the aid of magnifying glasses and straightedge-type devices,” and (e) plaintiff’s own admission that he can perform office work
involving sitting in front of a computer work station. 776 F. Supp. 2d 182, 189-90 (E. D.
Va. 2011).
Other federal courts have held that where a visual impairment could “be
corrected to a reasonable visual acuity level . . . nearsightedness, blindness in one eye,
glaucoma, double and sometimes triple vision, night blindness, dry and painful eyes, and
blurred vision [did] not amount to a disability under the ADA.” Ellis v. McHugh, KEK-091976, 2011 WL 1344550 at *5 (M. D. Pa. March 18, 2011) (citing inter alia Mondaine v.
American Drug Stores, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1200 (D. Kan. 2006) (finding evidence of a
12
glaucoma diagnosis and of a plaintiff’s inability to drive at night linked to glaucoma
insufficient to demonstrate a substantial limitation on the major life activity of seeing given
the fact that plaintiff still occasionally drove at night, was able to complete a forty hour work
week and did not demonstrate any “specific difficulty related to her disability.”)). The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio has also required “evidence
of significant limitations resulting from the glaucoma” in order to make a determination that
an individual suffering from glaucoma was disabled under the ADA. Kaufmann v. Ohio Edison
Co., VKA-09-2517, 2010 WL 5463819 at * 4 (N. D. Oh. Dec. 13, 2010).
Wyatt’s deposition testimony as well as his recent affidavit, with new details
concerning the progression of his disease, demonstrate that despite his glaucoma, Wyatt still
drives a car during the day and at night for his personal and professional use. See generally
Wyatt Dep. at 7-13, 25, 40-41, 50-51; Wyatt Aff. at ¶ 5-8. He also regularly drives short,
familiar and well-lit routes. Wyatt Aff. at ¶ 5-7. In addition, Wyatt continues to hold a valid
Maryland Driver’s License which only requires him to wear corrective lenses and have
mirrors on each side of the car. Wyatt Dep. 7-8, 25. Moreover, Wyatt is still capable of
performing his duties as a security guard and has been so employed with other companies
since his termination from MICA. See Wyatt Dep. 9-13, 22-26. Wyatt even indicates that
while working at MICA, he could compensate for his poor vision by adjusting the size and
definition of his office computer. Wyatt Aff. at ¶ 8. Additionally, Wyatt has stated that he
has no problem caring for himself or engaging in other major life activities. Wyatt Dep. at
24. While Wyatt has acknowledged that he has difficulties reading and writing, he also states
13
that he chose his occupation based on the limited amount of reading and writing required
and explains that as an ISO/Dispatcher for MICA he was able to alter his computer settings
to fit his vision restrictions.7 Wyatt Aff. at ¶ 8. Finally, the medical evidence included in the
record only indicates that Wyatt suffers from glaucoma and that he was directed by his
doctor not to operate a vehicle at nighttime. See Dr. Andrew Doyle Letter, Def.’s MSJ, Ex.
3A, ECF No. 14-11 and Dr. Friedman Report, Pl.’s Resp., Ex 8, ECF No. 34).
Although there is a potential for his glaucoma to substantially impair his major life
activity of seeing in the future, because Wyatt (a) has the use of both of his eyes, (b)
continues to drive during the day and at night, (c) is able to read and write, albeit slowly, (d)
is able to use a computer after altering its definition and font-size settings, and (e)continues
to care for himself in terms of his seeing ability to the same extent as “an average person in
the general population,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i), he is not substantially limited in the major
life activity of seeing. Consequently, because Wyatt is neither substantially limited in the
major life activities of working and seeing, or any other major life activities for that matter,
he has not met the requirement for an actual disability under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. As such, although glaucoma is an impairment, Wyatt is not disabled within the meaning
of the Act.
Wyatt also contends that he cannot use the text messages option of a cell phone due to his inability to see
the screen. Wyatt Aff. at ¶ 9. However, Wyatt does not indicate whether the use of a magnifying glass or
other magnifying options could allow him to “text.” An individual’s inability to see a cell phone screen in
order to send a text message is insufficient alone to constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity
of seeing.
7
14
b. Whether Wyatt is a Qualified Individual
MICA contends that even if Wyatt’s glaucoma amounted to a disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), summary judgment should be entered in its favor
because Wyatt is not a qualified individual. Specifically, MICA argues that mandatory
overtime is an essential function of the Institutional Security Officer/Dispatcher
(“ISO/Dispatcher”) position and that despite reasonable accommodations Wyatt could not
perform this obligation.
1. Whether Wyatt Performed the Essential Functions of the ISO/Dispatcher Position.
Wyatt argues that the overtime requirement is not an essential function of the
ISO/Dispatcher Position but rather a qualification standard.8 Pl.’s Resp. at 30. He further
argues that the mandatory overtime requirement was mandatory in name only because
MICA referred to it as an “inconvenience,” allowed employees to find suitable substitutes
and authorized occasional reductions in personnel when substitutes were unavailable. Id. at
33.
The essential functions of a job are the “fundamental job duties” of the position. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). A job function may be considered essential because, among other
reasons, the position exists to perform that function, there are a limited number of
“Qualification standards means the personal and professional attributes including the skill, experience,
education, physical, medical, safety and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements
which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q).
Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from “using qualification standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals
with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to
be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
8
15
employees to whom that function can be assigned, or the function is so specialized that the
employee was hired specifically to perform it. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). In determining
which functions are essential, the ADA instructs that “consideration shall be given to the
employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this
description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8).
In this case, the MICA ISO/Dispatcher position description along with the Staff
Handbook, the Campus Safety Operations Manual and personnel memoranda indicate that
MICA considered mandatory overtime as an essential function of the ISO/Dispatcher
position.
See Excerpts of MICA Policies, Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 2B, ECF No. 14-5.
The
ISO/Dispatcher position explicitly required employees in that capacity to be “on-call” and
“to work varied shifts including weekends, nights, and/or holidays.” Id. Wyatt has also
acknowledged as much in his deposition. Wyatt Dep. at 45-48. Moreover, MICA has
indicated that the ISO/Dispatcher position is instrumental in providing for the safety and
security of its community and property. Def.’s Mot. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at
25, ECF No. 14-1 [hereinafter Def.’s MSJ Mem.]; see also Butkiewicz Aff. at ¶ 4, Def.’s MSJ,
Ex. 2, ECF No. 14-3 [hereinafter Butkiewicz Aff.]. MICA has further asserted that “staffing
the dispatch communications command center is a critical public safety function and must
be performed twenty-four hours a day.”
Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 25, ECF No. 14-1.
Additionally, the record indicates that all ISO/Dispatchers were required to work overtime
16
shifts. Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 26-27; Butkiewicz Aff. at ¶ 6; Wyatt Dep. at 95-96.
While Wyatt cites to the Campus Safety Full-Time Employee Operations Manual in
an effort to support his contention that overtime was mandatory in name only, Wyatt in fact
supports MICA’s contention that overtime shifts are mandatory. Pl.’s Resp. at 33. In fact,
the policy makes clear that MICA will only allow for shift substitutions “when in
management’s opinion adjustment to [an employee’s] working schedule foes not place
additional risk on the safety and security of the MICA community.” Id. This demonstrates
MICA’s attempt at balancing the personal requirements of its employees with its own safety
and security requirements.
Based on these facts, this Court is satisfied that MICA’s concern for the safety and
security of its community and property required the presence of round the clock security
personnel. The ISO/Dispatcher position was implemented to ensure the safety and security
of the MICA campus as a whole. Additionally, all ISO/Dispatchers were scheduled on a
rotating basis to ensure their constant and uninterrupted presence on campus. As such, it is
clear that mandatory overtime is an essential function of the ISO/Dispatcher position.
2. Whether Wyatt Received Reasonable Accommodations
Wyatt contends that even where mandatory overtime is an essential function of the
ISO/Dispatch position, he could perform all essential functions of the position with
reasonable accommodations. However, MICA allegedly failed to accommodate his disability
by obligating him to work the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift from May 2007 until his discharge
despite his inability to drive at night.
17
In order to succeed on a failure to provide reasonable accommodations claim, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the employer had notice of his disability, (2) he could
perform the essential functions of the position with reasonable accommodations and (3) the
employer refused to make reasonable accommodations. See Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373,
387 (4th Cir. 2001). It is undisputed that MICA had notice of Wyatt’s condition and his
need for an accommodation. See Schneider v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 389 Fed. Appx. 263, 270
(4th Cir. 2010) (holding that the notice requirement is not ‘onerous’ but that an employer
must be advised of both the disability and the derivative need for an accommodation). The
issue here is whether Wyatt could perform the essential functions of the ISO/Dispatcher
position with reasonable accommodations and whether MICA refused to provide such
accommodations.
Under the ADA, an employer is required to make “reasonable accommodations” for
the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified disabled individual, unless the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring, parttime or modified work schedule, reassignment to a vacant position, [and] acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Nevertheless, it is well
established that the ADA does not require an employer to hire an additional person to
perform an essential function of a disabled employee’s position. Lusby v. Metropolitan Wash.
Airports Auth., 187 F.3d 630 (Table), 1999 WL 595355 at *16 (4th Cir. 1999); see also 29
C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. at § 1630.2(o) (“An employer or other covered entity is not required to
18
reallocate essential functions.”). A genuine issue of material fact exists if plaintiff shows that
his proposed accommodation is feasible or plausible and if defendant is unable to
demonstrate that the accommodation would create an undue hardship. See U.S. Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002); see also E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515
F.3d 307, 314-15 (4th Cir. 2008).
In asserting that MICA failed to reasonably accommodate his disability, Wyatt argues
that MICA could have either scheduled him for mandatory overtime during the day or
alternatively reduced the number of employees working the overtime shift so as to allow him
not to work at night. Pl.’s Resp. 36. However, MICA has established that having adequate
security at all times of the day was necessary for the security and safety of its community and
property. Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 25. Specifically, the record indicates that MICA’s need for
the remaining ISO/Dispatchers to work the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift originated upon the
termination of the ISO/Dispatcher employee permanently assigned to that shift. See Pl.’s
Compl. at ¶ 11. Wyatt has also stated that this requirement would likely be a temporary
situation until the position was once again filled. Id. Moreover, all the ISO/Dispatchers
were asked to work that shift and received their assignment based on a “reverse seniority
method.” Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 27. Finally, MICA has established that it was obligated to
schedule Wyatt for that shift as eliminating mandatory overtime only for him was “not
operationally feasible” given the limited number of available employees. Def.’s MSJ Mem. at
31-32.
On another note, MICA and Wyatt agree that accommodations were made. MICA
19
allowed Wyatt to find volunteer substitutes to work his shifts on a number of occasions. See
e.g. Pl.’s Resp. at 15; Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 28. Following the receipt of his medical diagnosis,
MICA ensured that Wyatt would not be required to drive any of its vehicles at night. See e.g.
Pl.’s Resp. at 13; Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 6. MICA even excused two of his absences which
occurred between May and August 2007 and for which Wyatt was unable to find a
replacement. Pl.’s Resp. at 15-16. MICA went so far as to brainstorm ideas concerning
transportation methods to enable Wyatt to get to and from work. See Pl.’s Resp. at 16-17;
Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 10-13. In sum, short of eliminating the overtime requirement for Wyatt,
MICA sought to accommodate his disability in a number of ways.
Consequently, MICA did not fail to make reasonable accommodations to allow Wyatt
to perform an essential function of his position. Although both parties agree that Wyatt was
capable of fulfilling his responsibilities once at work, because Wyatt continued to be
unavailable for his overtime shift despite MICA’s efforts at providing reasonable
accommodations, he could not perform an essential function of his position. Therefore,
Wyatt has not presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he is a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.
Therefore, MICA’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
II.
Whether Wyatt met MICA’s Legitimate Expectations
Even if Wyatt was a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA, summary
judgment would still be entered in MICA’s favor because Wyatt has not shown that he met
MICA’s legitimate expectations at the time of his termination. In fact, Wyatt only argues
20
that he could perform all essential functions of the ISO/Dispatcher position. The Fourth
Circuit has directed that the inquiry into the ‘legitimate expectations’ factor is distinct from
the inquiry into the ‘essential functions of a job.’ See Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Ed. Radio
Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 61-62 (4th Cir. 1995). In Ennis, the court reviewed the extensive evidence
provided by the employer regarding the employee’s job performance, such as annual
performance evaluations, memoranda to the personnel file, and communications about her
conduct, to conclude that she did not meet the employer’s legitimate expectations. Id. The
Fourth Circuit has also stated that “[i]t is the perception of the decision maker which is
relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80
F.3d 954, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1996); King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003); DeJarnette
v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998).
In this case, while both parties agree that Wyatt’s performance on the job was
satisfactory, MICA has demonstrated that Wyatt failed to satisfy one of its significant
legitimate expectations. Namely, MICA has explained that one of its expectations is for
ISO/Dispatchers to be present during their shifts or to find a volunteer to replace them.
Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 38. MICA has explained that this expectation stems from its need to
have permanent security staff present to support the needs of its community. Def.’s MSJ
Mem at 25. The parties agree that Wyatt was advised that he would face termination should
he fail to report to his shifts or to secure a replacement volunteer. See e.g. Pl.’s Resp. at 1617; Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 38.
The record shows that, despite his knowledge of this
requirement, Wyatt was not present during, nor did he find a replacement for, his September
21
22 and 23, 2007 shifts. See generally Pl.’s Resp.; Def.’s MSJ Mem. Therefore, there is no a
genuine issue of material fact and reasonable trier of fact would be unable to find that Wyatt
met MICA’s legitimate expectations. As such summary judgment should be entered in favor
of MICA.
III.
Whether Wyatt’s Discharge Raises the Inference of Unlawful Discrimination
Even if Wyatt could prove that he was a qualified individual with a disability under
the Americans with Disabilities Act and that his performance at the time of the discharge
met MICA’s legitimate expectations, MICA had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
Wyatt’s termination which does not raise an inference of unlawful discrimination. To
establish this element, the plaintiff is required to “present some other affirmative evidence
that disability was a determining factor in the employer’s decision.” Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59.
This “burden is ‘not onerous,’ . . . , it is also not empty or perfunctory.” Id. (citing Tx. Dept.
of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). “Plaintiff’s evidence must be such that, if
the trier of fact finds it credible, and the employer remains silent, the plaintiff would be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59.
Nevertheless, where the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability
discrimination, the defendant bears the burden to rebut the presumption of discrimination
by providing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his action. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206
F.3d 420, 429 (4th Cir. 2000). At that time, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “prove
22
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dept. of Cmty Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). “The plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of proving
that the employer intentionally discriminated against [him].” Evans v. Tech. Applications &
Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
The Fourth Circuit has stated: “when an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the plaintiff, ‘it is not our province to decide whether
the reason was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for the
plaintiff’s termination.” ’ Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting
DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998)). A Court should not secondguess an employer’s appraisal. Hawkins, 203 F.3d at 280. Rather, the Court’s sole concern
should be “whether the reason for which the defendant discharged the plaintiff was
discriminatory.” Id. (quoting DeJarnette, 133 F.3d at 299).
In this case, the evidence presented by Wyatt would not allow a reasonable trier of
fact to conclude that he should be awarded judgment as a matter of law. See Ennis, 53 F.3d.
at 59.
If anything, without the proof provided by MICA, his allegations lead to the
reasonable inference that he may have been terminated for failing to report to his shifts.
Additionally, MICA has presented sufficient evidence to establish that it had a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason to dismiss Wyatt. Specifically, MICA contends that Wyatt was
terminated for failing to report for duty on September 22 and 23, 2007 and for failing to find
a replacement for himself on those dates. As such, MICA has demonstrated that mandatory
23
overtime was necessary and in fact mandatory. The evidence also shows that Wyatt knew of
that requirement, knew to find a replacement should he not be able to report for duty and
knew that sanctions, including termination, could be imposed should he fail to meet his
obligation. Wyatt Dep. at 48-49. Moreover, the record indicates that Wyatt was aware that
he would face termination should he not report for duty or find a replacement for the
September 22 and 23 overtime shifts. See Wyatt Dep. at 71-72, 74; Butkiewicz Aff. at ¶ 15.
The parties also agree that Wyatt failed to report for duty on those dates and that he failed to
find a replacement. See generally Pl.’s Compl.; Def.’s MSJ Mem. Additionally, the termination
letter sent to Wyatt on September 26, 2007 explains that Wyatt was terminated because of
these two absences.
This Court is therefore satisfied that MICA provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for Wyatt’s termination.
Furthermore, Wyatt has presented no evidence
demonstrating that MICA’s reason for terminating him was a pretext for discrimination.
Thus, Wyatt has not presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he
was dismissed because of his alleged disability or that MICA’s reason for dismissing him was
a pretext for discrimination. As such, summary judgment should be entered in favor of
MICA.
IV.
The May 25, 2007 Letter
Wyatt attempts to attach great significance to the fact that a draft of a May 25, 2007
letter was initially sent to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and
that this draft was not identical to the final letter which he in fact received. Pl.’s Resp. at 18;
24
See also ‘Draft’ Letter, Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 16, ECF No. 32 and ‘Original’ Letter, Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 9,
ECF No. 25. He specifically alleges that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect
to the copy of a May 25, 2007 letter which was produced by MICA during the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) investigation into his discrimination
charge. Id. He alleges that the copy of the letter produced to the EEOC differs in large part
from the May 25, 2007 letter he received. Pl.’s Resp. at 18. Specifically, he claims that the
copy produced was fabricated and was meant to mislead the EEOC in its investigation. Pl.’s
Resp. at 19. In response to this accusation, MICA has simply noted that the copy produced
to the EEOC was an earlier draft of the letter Wyatt received and that it was initially
produced to the EEOC by mistake. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Summ. J. at 12, ECF No. 34.
Moreover, the record reflects that upon learning of this issue, MICA promptly informed
Wyatt of the mistake that had occurred. Id. at 13. MICA also does not dispute that the draft
version was never sent to Wyatt. Id.
A review of the draft letter and the final letter does not present any genuine issue of
material fact which precludes the entry of summary judgment for the Defendant MICA in
this case. The draft and the final letter are essentially the same in content and reflect MICA’s
agreement to accommodate Wyatt’s glaucoma to the extent possible. Both the draft and the
final letter inform Wyatt that he will not be required to drive MICA vehicles during evening
hours but confirm that he is responsible for getting to and from work. There is simply no
issue of material fact concerning the initial draft and the final letter which precludes the entry
of summary judgment for the Defendant in this case.
25
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Maryland Institute College of Art’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED.
A separate Order follows.
Dated:
March 7, 2012
/s/_____________________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
26
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?