Williams v. N.B.C.I Medical Department
Filing
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MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Benson Everett Legg on 4/14/11. (c/m af 4/14/11)(amf, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DERRELL B. WILLIAMS, #305-646
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Plaintiff
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v.
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CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES,
INC. 1
Civil Action No. L-10-2600
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Defendant
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MEMORANDUM
I.
Procedural History
On September 21, 2010, the Clerk received for filing a 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 civil rights
Complaint submitted by Derrell B. Williams (“Williams”) seeking money damages and alleging
that medical personnel at North Branch Correctional Institution (“NBCI”) were refusing to treat
headaches and vision problems resulting from a December 2, 2009, attack by a fellow prisoner.
ECF No. 1 at 4–5.
Currently pending before the Court is the Motion of the Defendant, Correctional Medical
Services, Inc. (“CMS”), to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 11.
Williams has likewise filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 9.2 The issues have
been comprehensively briefed, and no hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. (D.
Md. 2010). For reasons to follow, the Motion filed by CMS, treated as a Motion for Summary
Judgment, shall be granted.
II.
Standard of Review
AWhile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff=s obligation to prove the >grounds= of his entitlement to relief
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The Clerk shall amend the caption to reflect that Correctional Medical Services, Inc. is the medical care provider at
North Branch Correctional Institution.
2
Defendant’s request for an extension of time (ECF No. 10) shall be granted nunc pro tunc.
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.@ Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1964–65 (2007).
A[S]omething beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be
alleged, lest a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up the time of a
number of other people.@ Id. at 557–58 (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must
Aaccept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true@ and Aconstrue the facts and reasonable
inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.@ Ibarra v. United States,
120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). However, Abecause the court is testing the legal sufficiency
of the claims, the court is not bound by plaintiff=s legal conclusions.@ Takacs v. Fiore, 473 F.
Supp. 2d 647, 651 (D. Md. 2007).
Under the December 10, 2010 revisions to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a):
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim
or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which
summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for
granting or denying the motion.
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The court should Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw
all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644–45 (4th Cir. 2002). The Court
must, however, also abide by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)).
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As a prisoner claiming denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
Plaintiff must prove two elements, one objective and one subjective. First, he must satisfy the
objective element by illustrating a serious medical condition. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 9 (1992); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166
(4th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). If this first element is
satisfied, Plaintiff must then prove the subjective element by showing “deliberate indifference”
on the part of prison officials or health care personnel. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303
(1991). "[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence [but] is satisfied
by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Medical
personnel "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference." Id. at 837.
Health care staff are not liable if they "knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly)
that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent." Id. at 844; see also
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998).
III.
Analysis
As a preliminary matter, CMS argues that as a corporate entity it cannot be held liable
under § 1983. To the extent the Complaint names CMS solely upon vicarious liability, Circuit
law is clear. It is well settled that a claimant may not recover against a municipality on a
respondeat superior theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 690–95 (1978). Principles of municipal liability under § 1983 apply equally to a
private corporation. Therefore, a private corporation is not liable under § 1983 for actions
allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of
respondeat superior. See Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727–28 (4th Cir. 1999);
Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982).
While CMS is entitled to
dismissal on this ground alone, the Court will proceed to Williams’s substantive allegations.
Williams claims he has been denied proper medical care since his assault on December 2,
2009. The medical record provides a somewhat different picture. Williams was brought to the
dispensary on December 2, 2009 after he was hit in the back of the head during an outdoor
recreation period. A small laceration on the back of the head was cleaned and the wound closed
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with Dermabond, a liquid skin adhesive. Antibiotics and gauze bandages were applied, and
Williams was advised to return to the dispensary if he needed further treatment. ECF No. 11,
Exhibit A, ¶ 3. Williams, who has a history of asthma, was seen in the Chronic Care Clinic on
three occasions between December of 2009 and the time he filed this action, in September of
2010. He did not complain of ongoing problems with headaches or visual disturbances from the
head injury during those visits. Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 4.
On September 2 and 3, 2010, Williams submitted sick call forms complaining of severe
migraine headaches. He attributed the headaches to the December 2, 2009, injury and stated he
had been suffering headaches since that time but they were becoming more painful.
On
September 6, 2010, Williams submitted a sick call form complaining of visual impairment,
which he again linked to the December 2, 2009 injury. That same day Williams was examined
by Steven Bray, R.N. Williams did not complain of vision problems but stated the headaches
always occurred at the back of his head. On September 9, 2010, Dennis Martin, R.N., informed
Williams that he could purchase Motrin or Tylenol at the commissary to treat his headaches, and
that he should return to the dispensary if the headaches continued. On September 20, 2010, Dr.
Majd Arnaout performed a regularly scheduled examination for Williams’s asthma. Williams
did not complain about headaches or vision problems during that visit. Id., Exhibit A, ¶¶ 5–6.
On October 16, 2010, Williams also complained of migraine headaches, impaired vision,
and dizziness attributed to the injury on December 2, 2009. He was examined by Monica
Metheny, R.N.
Metheny referred Williams to a physician and ophthalmologist for further
evaluation and treatment. Williams refused to attend his November 11, 2010, appointment with
the ophthalmologist. Id., Exhibit A, ¶¶ 7–8.
On November 13, 2010, Williams submitted a sick call form complaining of migraines.
On November 17, 2010, Karen Myers, R.N., examined him and found his blood pressure
elevated. Myers referred Williams to Physician’s Assistant Lisa Schindler, who prescribed
Excedrin Migraine (“EM”) for headaches. Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 9.
On November 24 and December 2, 2010, Williams submitted sick call forms complaining
that the EM did not help his headaches. Schindler examined Williams on December 2, 2010,
noted a slight elevation of blood pressure, and informed Williams that the elevated blood
pressure could be the cause of the headaches.
Williams refused to start treatment for
hypertension, so Schindler ordered blood pressure checks for three weeks, renewed his EM
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medication, and prescribed Naprosyn, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medication, for pain.
Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 10.
On December 6, 2010, Dr. Gregory Taylor examined Williams and noted that as with
many migraine sufferers, the use of EM made Williams’s headaches worse, due to “rebound.”
No abnormalities of the eyes or ears were found. Dr. Taylor prescribed Elavil, an antidepressant
medication also used to treat migraine headaches, and renewed the Naprosyn prescription. EM
was discontinued. Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 11.
Based upon the documented evidence presented to Court, Williams received adequate
treatment for his initial injury as well as follow-up care for complaints of migraine headaches
and vision problems. Williams refused to treat a possible blood pressure problem and refused
evaluation and treatment by an eye care professional. Williams’s complaints were not ignored to
a constitutionally significant degree. He has been prescribed appropriate medications to treat his
migraines.
Williams has failed to come forward with opposition materials refuting the Defendant’s
affirmations.
His dissatisfaction with treatment amounts to nothing more than a disagreement
between medical staff and an inmate as to a course of treatment, and does not rise to the level of
a constitutional injury. See Davis v. Greene, 2009 WL 3064106, at *13 (S.D.W.Va. 2009)
(recognizing that “disagreements between a health care provider and the inmate over a diagnosis
and the proper course of treatment are not sufficient to support a deliberate indifference claim,
and questions of medical judgment are not subject to judicial review.”). Given the objective
findings regarding Williams’s injury and the conservative and measured response by medical
personnel to his subjective complaints of pain, Williams has failed to show a genuine issue of
material fact as to his entitlement to relief. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment will be granted.
Dated this 14th day of April 2011.
/s/
_______________________
Benson Everett Legg
United States District Judge
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