Dickerson v. Warden

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Catherine C. Blake on 4/20/11. (c/m af 4/20/11)(amf, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAMON DICKERSON
Plaintiff,
v.

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*

WARDEN

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CIVIL ACTION NO. CCB-11-40

Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM
Damon Dickerson (ADickerson@) filed this complaint while held as a federal detainee at the
Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center (“MCAC”).1 The letter complaint, dated December 30,
2010 and received for filing on January 4, 2011, alleged that Dickerson had been detained for
twenty-two months and had not received post-surgical care for his left shoulder. Dickerson further
claimed that his left knee is injured and requires surgery. ECF No. 1. He stated that he can barely
use his shoulder because of the pain and his knee had gotten worse from constant climbing on and
jumping off the top bunk in his prison cell.
Although received in letter form, the correspondence was construed as a civil rights action
seeking injunctive relief against the medical provider under contract to provide care for federal pretrial detainees at MCAC. On January 26, 2011, counsel for the health care provider was ordered to
file a response to the complaint for injunctive relief, focusing entirely on Dickerson’s health care
claims.

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At the time his complaint was filed Dickerson remained detained pending his transfer to a
designated Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) facility. On January 7, 2011, he was sentenced to a 188-month term in
the BOP, ordered to serve three year of supervised release, and directed to pay a $100.00 assessment. See
United States v. Dickerson, Criminal No. CCB-09-402 (D. Md.).

On March 11, 2011, counsel for Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (“CMS”) filed a show
cause response, accompanied by affidavit and medical records. ECF No. 3. Because the response
relied on exhibits filed outside the scope of the pleading and substantively responded to Dickerson’s
medical complaints, on March 22, 2011, the court issued an order which treated the response as a
motion for summary judgment and placed Dickerson on notice that he was entitled to file an
opposition response with materials in support thereof. ECF No. 4. Notice of the re-characterization
was also sent to Dickerson pursuant to the dictates of Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d. 309 (4th Cir.
1975). ECF No. 5. He was granted additional time to file a response and has failed to do so. The
court may determine the case without hearing. See Local Rule 105.6. (D. Md. 2010).
A detainee=s medical claim may sound under the Fourteenth Amendment=s Due Process
Clause. There is no practical difference, however, between the due process standard and the Eighth
Amendment protection standards which measure substantial risk and deliberate indifference for
convicted individuals. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988). To establish a
claim of this nature Dickerson must satisfy two requirements. First, he must satisfy the “objective”
component by illustrating a serious medical need.

See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9

(1992); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir.
1995); Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). If he has proven this first element,
Dickerson must then prove the second subjective component of the Eighth Amendment standard by
showing deliberate indifference on the part of correctional and medical staff. See Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (holding that claims alleging inadequate medical care are subject to the
“deliberate indifference” standard outlined in Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06).

“[D]eliberate

indifference entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less
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than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will
result.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Defendants “must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and must also
draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Further, to obtain a preliminary injunction the moving party must establish “[1] that he is
likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the
public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, __, 129 S.Ct. 365,
374 (2008). All four requirements must be satisfied. Id. Indeed, the Court in Winter rejected a
standard that allowed the [movant] to demonstrate only a “possibility” of irreparable harm because
that standard was “inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the [movant] is entitled to such relief.”
Id. at 375-76.
The record shows that Dickerson has a history of hypertension, non-insulin dependent
diabetes mellitus (“NIDDM”), elevated cholesterol, and gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”).
He received an intake evaluation at the Maryland Reception, Diagnostic, and Classification Center
(“MRDCC”) on August 6, 2009, and did not report any concerns about injuries to his left shoulder or
left knee. The next day, August 7, 2009, Dickerson was evaluated by Physician’s Assistant Clark.
He offered no complaint of pain or injury to his left shoulder or left knee. In addition, Dickerson did
not mention his past shoulder surgery during either of his initial evaluations with medical providers
at MRDCC. ECF No. 3 at Ex. A.
Between April 29, 2010, and December 27, 2010, Dickerson submitted sick-call encounter
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forms for a variety of medical issues concerning constipation, renewal of medications, vegetarian
and cardiovascular diets, nighttime snack bags, and trimmers for shaving. He did not submit any
sick-call forms complaining of left shoulder or left knee pain. Further, his medical record shows
that during the same time period he did not complain of shoulder or knee pain when evaluated by
medical staff. Id. On December 27, 2010, Dickerson was evaluated by Dr. Ross in the Chronic
Care Clinic for his NIDDM. During the appointment he did not complain of pain in the shoulder or
knee, nor did he mention his past shoulder surgery.
On February 7, 2010, Dickerson was evaluated by Ross in response to a letter received from
Dickerson’s attorney, who indicated that a court-ordered evaluation was to occur.

During the

appointment, Dickerson for the first time told Ross that he had surgery on his left shoulder on March
7, 2009, and that because of his arrest, he had not received any post-surgical treatment. Dickerson
complained that his shoulder was sore and also stated that he suffered soreness in his left knee from
a torn meniscus. Dickerson claimed that he had submitted sick-call request forms regarding his
shoulder and knee, but Ross and the MCAC medical staff could not locate “any documentation”
regarding the shoulder or knee in Dickerson’s medical chart. Id.
Ross’s physical evaluation of Dickerson revealed tenderness and decreased range of motion
(“ROM”) in his left shoulder and knee. Ross observed, however, that Dickerson’s gait was normal
and he did not appear to be in distress when ambulating. He ordered an x-ray of Dickerson’s left
shoulder. X-ray results showed normal alignment and no abnormality of the shoulder.

Ross

determined that no further treatment was medically indicated for Dickerson’s shoulder or knee based
upon his examination and the x-ray results. ECF No. 3, Ex. A.

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The submissions have been examined. The court concludes that Dickerson has failed to
show that his constitutional right to necessary medical care was violated. His sick-call encounter
forms received by medical staff at MCAC did not mention his shoulder surgery or claim that he was
experiencing pain in his left shoulder and knee. Once the medical staff became aware of
Dickerson’s complaint of shoulder and knee pain he received an evaluation from Dr. Ross and
diagnostic testing.

While Dickerson’s ROM in his shoulder and knee was decreased, no

abnormalities in his gait were observed and his shoulder x-ray was negative. In the absence of
findings of an objective medical condition or injury, deliberate indifference cannot be shown.
Dickerson is not entitled to injunctive relief.
Moreover, in any event Dickerson’s claim is moot. “[A]s a general rule, a prisoner’s transfer
or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect
to his incarceration there.” Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009). The Federal
Bureau of Prisons locator indicates that Dickerson is now confined at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Yazoo City, Mississippi.2 His transfer moots his claims about his medical care at
MCAC.
A separate Order follows.

Date: April 20, 2011

/s/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

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Dickerson did not inform the court of his new address, as required under local rule. The docket shall
be amended to reflect Dickerson’s new address.

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