Litaker et al v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 15 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 10/11/11. (apl, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
BRUCE W. LITAKER, et al.

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Plaintiffs

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vs.

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CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
Defendant
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CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-11-169

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court has before it Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment [Document 14], Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
[Document 15], and the materials submitted relating thereto.
The Court finds that a hearing is not necessary.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Bruce Litaker ("Litaker") has been employed since

1998 by Defendant CSX Transportation ("CSXT"), the operator of
the largest railroad system in the Eastern United States.
Plaintiff United Transportation Union (the "Union") is the
designated representative under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq., for train service employees and yardmasters
employed by CSX.
Litaker was employed as a conductor or locomotive engineer
when, on October 11, 2004, CSXT awarded him the position of

substitute yardmaster.

After receiving yardmaster training,

Litaker began working as a substitute yardmaster as needed in
both Brunswick and Hagerstown, Maryland.

When Litaker was not

needed as a substitute yardmaster, he continued to work as a
conductor or locomotive engineer.
Three collective bargaining agreements between the Union
and CSXT apply to the instant dispute.

The first governs the

rates of pay, rules, and working conditions of CSXT "trainmen"
employees in the relevant region, the "Trainman Agreement."1
Trainmen are those employees involved in the operation of
trains, such as conductors and locomotive engineers.
Yardmasters, on the other hand, supervise train crews when they
are working in rail yards or terminals, and their pay, rules,
and working conditions are governed by separate agreements.

The

yardmaster agreements relevant to this dispute are the
Yardmaster System Agreement and CSXT Labor Agreement 11-042-052
(collectively, the "Yardmaster Agreements").

When Litaker works

as a conductor or locomotive engineer, he is covered by the
Trainman Agreement, and when he works as a substitute

1

The full title of this agreement is "Agreement between CSXT
Transportation, Inc. (former B&O Railroad Company) and United
Transportation Union." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. A.3.)
2

CSXT Labor Agreement 11-042-05 modified some terms of the
Yardmaster System Agreement.
2

yardmaster, he is covered by the Yardmaster Agreements.
When Litaker began working as a substitute yardmaster in
late 2004, Brunswick, Maryland was assigned as his "home
terminal."

At that time, the local CSXT managers allowed

trainmen based in Brunswick, when working as substitute
yardmasters in Hagerstown, to receive payment for both travel
time and mileage according to the Yardmaster Agreements.3
Litaker thus filed claims for travel time and mileage when he
worked in Hagerstown, and these claims were paid.

Litaker would

put the travel time on his yardmaster time ticket and claim the
mileage reimbursement by filing a "Code 90" request for
reimbursement, which was paid automatically through the trainmen
payroll system.
In mid-2010, the CSXT Labor Department "became aware that
3

The provisions of the Yardmaster Agreements at issue state:
It is understood and agreed to the following:
(1) Yardmasters required to report to a location/terminal
other than their regularly assigned work location/terminal
under Article 2(d) of the 2002 System Agreement for
purposes such as, but not limited to: training, meetings,
seminars, rules class, seminars, witness for an
investigation, or other "company business" shall be paid
travel/deadhead time in addition to the standard mileage
rate.

CSXT Labor Agreement 11-042-05. Article 2(d) of the 2002 System
Agreement provides that "[y]ardmasters regularly assigned will
have a designated time and place to go on duty and will be
relieved at the starting point."
3

employees working as substitute yardmasters at Hagerstown were
being paid duplicative payments for both travel time and mileage
reimbursement."

(Scott Decl. ¶ 7.)

It reviewed the Yardmaster

Agreements and determined that only regularly assigned
yardmasters, and not substitute yardmasters, are entitled to
reimbursement for mileage and travel time.

Therefore, prior

travel payments to trainmen working as substitute yardmasters,
such as Litaker, had been made in error.4

CSXT did not consult

with the Union representatives about this contract
interpretation.
In October 2010, Litaker was informed twice by his
Trainmaster superiors that he was not entitled to travel time or
mileage from Brunswick to Hagerstown, and that he should not
claim either.

Litaker consulted with the senior yardmaster

Union representative, Yardmaster General Chairman Richard
DeGenova, and continued to believe that he was entitled to
travel pay under the Yardmaster Agreements.

He therefore

continued to file the Code 90 mileage claims, which continued to
be paid automatically through the trainmen payroll system.
On November 24, 2010, Litaker received a "notice of
4

Because of the error, the CSXT managers decided that they
would not attempt to recover any of the travel pay that had
already been approved. But, they decided that, from that time
forward, there would be no travel pay allowed for substitute
yardmasters traveling from Brunswick to Hagerstown.
4

investigation" stating that he was being investigated for his
continued submission of claims for travel pay after having been
told not to do so by his superiors.5

As of that date, Litaker

was suspended from service.
On December 7, CSXT conducted the investigation.

The CSXT

management witnesses testified that Litaker was insubordinate
when he failed to comply with the orders of his superiors.
Litaker’s Union representative6 contended that Litaker had a
right to continue to submit mileage claims because such claims,
if not submitted within 60 days, would be lost, and that CSXT
should have denied the Code 90 payroll claims rather than paying

5

Litaker filed 22 additional Code 90 mileage reimbursement
requests after being told that he could no longer do so. As a
result, a total of $1,276 was automatically disbursed to him
through the payroll system.
6

Litaker was represented at the investigative hearing by
Yardmaster Local Chairman Ray Weszka, the representative of his
choice. CSXT contends that the violation arose out of Litaker's
work as a trainman (and not as a yardmaster) because he made the
Code 90 reimbursement requests after being told not to do so
through the trainmen payroll system, and thus all procedures in
handling Litaker's discipline are governed by the Trainman
Agreement. According to CSXT Labor Relations Director Shannon
Farling Scott, "he was working as a trainman when he was
insubordinate and dishonest." (Scott Decl. Ex. 7.)
The Union contends that the alleged violation arose purely
out of Litaker's work as a yardmaster, because the dispute has
to do with his work as a substitute yardmaster and the contract
at issue in the dispute over whether Litaker is entitled to
travel pay is CSXT Labor Agreement 11-042-05 (one of the
Yardmaster Agreements). Moreover, the Union argues that it was
not properly notified of the investigation.
5

them automatically.

If it had done so, the Union argued, the

dispute would have gone through the conference and arbitration
processes.

Litaker testified and stated that Yardmaster General

Chairman Richard DeGenova had told him that he was entitled to
the travel time and mileage payments.
On January 5, 2011, the CSXT division manager concluded
the investigation by finding that Litaker violated CSXT rules by
continuing to file travel pay claims after his superiors had
told him not to.7

Litaker was suspended from service for a total

of 60 days, and was reinstated on January 23, 2011.

II.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A. Proceedings in this Court
The Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against CSXT on

January 20, 2011, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief requiring CSXT to return Litaker to service with pay and
benefits for time lost and with all record of discipline
expunged.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction

[Document 3], filed on January 21, 2011, was denied as moot
7

The investigation concluded that Litaker had violated CSX
Transportation Operating Rules General Regulation 2 ("All
employees must behave in a civil and courteous manner . . . .
Employees must not . . . [b]e disloyal, dishonest, insubordinate
. . .") and General Regulation 45 ("Yardmasters report to and
receive instruction from trainmasters. They must also comply
with the instructions of other company officers.").
6

[Document 12] because Litaker's suspension from service ended
two days after the motion was filed.
The Parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment.
Neither side contends that there is a genuine issue of material
fact.

Thus, the parties disagree about the application of The

Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements but agree
that one side or the other would be entitled to summary
judgment.8

B. Internal Grievance Proceedings
Subsequent to Litaker's discipline, the Union Yardmaster
General Chairman filed internal grievances on Litaker's behalf
under the procedures set forth in the collective bargaining
agreements.

Internal grievances have been filed appealing

Litaker's discipline, as well as the decision to disallow claims
for travel payment.
On June 13, 2011, the Union Yardmaster General Chairman
filed an appeal of Litaker's discipline action claiming that
CSXT violated Articles 21(a) and (b) of the Yardmaster System
8

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the
pleadings and supporting documents "show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2).
7

Agreement by denying Litaker due process.9

This appeal was

denied by CSXT on February 8, 2011 as procedurally defective
because the appeal was submitted pursuant to the Yardmaster
Agreements and not the Trainman Agreement.10

CSXT also addressed

the merits of Litaker's appeal, and concluded that it failed on
the merits as well.
The Union also began filing claims under Article 20 of the
Yardmasters System Agreement11 for mileage reimbursement each

9

Articles 21(a) and (b) govern the procedures for
disciplining yardmasters. In relevant part:
(a) Yardmasters shall not be disciplined, disqualified
subsequent to their being qualified, or dismissed
without a fair and impartial hearing before a
proper officer. Such Yardmaster shall be apprised
in writing of the precise charge against him, with
copy to the General Chairman, and hearing will be
held within fifteen (15) days following the
supervisor's first knowledge of the incident. He
shall have reasonable opportunity to secure the
presence of necessary witnesses and shall have the
right to be represented by the duly accredited
representative. . . .
(b) A decision shall be rendered within thirty (30)
days after completion of the investigation, with
copy to the General Chairman and charged
Yardmaster.
(Scott Decl. Ex. 1.)
10

CSXT's position is that the appeal of Litaker's discipline
should have been submitted pursuant to the protocol described in
Rules 17 and 32 of the Trainman Agreement.
11

Article 20 is entitled "Claims or Grievances" and it
8

describes the procedure for filing grievances under the
Yardmaster Agreements. In relevant part:
(a) All claims or grievances must be presented in
writing or electronically on the agreed form, if
available, by or on behalf of the Yardmaster
involved, to the Carrier Officer authorized to
receive same, within sixty (60) calendar days from
the date of the occurrence on which the claim or
grievance is based. . . .
(b) The Yardmaster or the duly authorized
representative who files the claim must furnish
information on the agreed form, if available, to
identify the basis of the claim: (1) Date,
claimant's name and employee number. (2) Seniority
date. (3) Date of violation. (4) Tour of duty
involved. (5) Rules involved, if known. (6) Amount
claimed. (7) Details of work performed or
opportunity denied. (8) Reasons supporting claim.
(c) Should any claim or grievance be disallowed, the
Carrier shall, within sixty (60) calendar days from
the date it was filed, notify . . . the Yardmaster
or his representative of the reasons for such a
disallowance. . . .
(d) If the disallowed claim or grievance is to be
appealed, such appeal must be made . . . to the
Highest Designated Officer of the Carrier within
seventy-five (75) calendar days from date of
denial. The Carrier shall, within seventy-five (75)
calendar days from the date appeal was receipted
notify . . . the Yardmaster or his representative
of the reason for the decision. . . .
(e) . . . [I]n cases of appeal from the decision of the
Highest Designated Officer . . . [a]ll claims or
grievances . . . shall be barred unless within
twelve (12) months from the date of said officer's
decision [sic] proceeding are instituted by the
employee or his duly authorized representative
before the appropriate division of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board or a system, group or
9

time Litaker works as a substitute yardmaster.

Between January

13, 2011 and June 20, 2011, the Union Chairman filed 44 claims
on Litaker's behalf.

CSXT has handled the claims internally

pursuant to Article 20 of the Yardmaster System Agreement.12

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq., which governs collective bargaining in the railroad
industry, employer-union controversies are generally divided
into two categories: major disputes and minor disputes.
v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989).

Conrail

In

Conrail, the Supreme Court established that when an employer
governed by the RLA asserts a contractual right to take a
regional board of adjustment that has been agreed
to by the parties . . .
(f) . . . [N]o monetary claim shall be allowed
retroactively for more than sixty (60) calendar
days prior to the filing thereof.
(Scott Decl. Ex. 1.)
12

Ten claims were denied at the first and second levels of
internal review, thus these 10 claims are ripe for the Union to
seek to conference the claims and list them for arbitration.
Another 10 claims have been denied by CSXT at the first level of
review but have not yet been appealed by the Union or Litaker to
the second level of internal review. The remaining 24 claims
were denied at the first level of internal review but were not
timely appealed to the second level of internal review,
therefore these 24 claims have expired per the time limits in
Article 20.
10

contested action, the ensuing controversy is a minor dispute if
the action is "arguably justified" by the terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement.13

Id. at 307.

Minor disputes are governed by 45 U.S.C. §§ 152 Sixth and
153 First (i).

These sections establish conference

and compulsory arbitration procedures for disputes arising out
of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions.

§ 152 Sixth.

When a minor dispute arises, it is

subject to compulsory and binding arbitration, and the
jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board is
exclusive.14

§ 153.

Thus, minor contract interpretation

disputes must first be handled in conferences between the
carrier and union "in the usual manner," § 153, First (i),
according to any agreement as to conferences in effect between

13

In contrast, major disputes originate from "the formation
of collective agreements, efforts to secure them. They arise
where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change
the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an
existing agreement controls the controversy." Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). Major
disputes require the "traditional voluntary processes of
negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and
conciliation." Id. at 725.
14

Or other arbitration board agreed to by the parties.
153, First (i); Conrail, 491 U.S. at 303.
11

§

the parties,15 § 152, Sixth.
As a consequence, United States District Courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over minor disputes under the RLA,
United Transp. Union v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 130 F.3d 627, 63132 (4th Cir. 1997), except to enforce the Adjustment Board's
award, Dement v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co.,
845 F.2d 451, 463 (4th Cir. 1988).

IV.

DISCUSSION
A. Contentions
Plaintiffs contend that CSXT violated its duties under the

RLA when it disciplined Litaker for continuing to file travel
mileage claims.16

In their motion for summary judgment,

Plaintiffs state that "CSXT has short circuited the minor
dispute resolution process required by the RLA by disciplining
an employee who filed disputed [travel pay] claims, in violation
of its duty under the RLA to resolve minor disputes in
conference or arbitration."

(Pls.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 9.)

15

CSXT and the Union have established minor dispute
resolution and discipline procedures in Articles 20 and 21 of
the Yardmaster System Agreement, and in Rules 17 and 32 of the
Trainman Agreement.
16

Plaintiffs, in their Verified Complaint [Document 1],
allege that CSXT violated 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, First, Second,
Sixth, and 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (i).
12

Thus, under Plaintiffs' theory, "Litaker was disciplined for
using the 'minor dispute' resolution procedure that is at the
core of the RLA," which, they contend, "is a statutory violation
by CSXT that can only [be] remedied by injunctive relief."
(Pls.' Mem. Resp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 1.)

Plaintiffs contend

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CSXT argues that it did not discipline Litaker for pursuing
the dispute resolution procedures prescribed by the RLA for
resolving minor disputes, rather, it disciplined Litaker for
insubordination pursuant to the collective bargaining agreements
after he disobeyed the direct instructions of his supervisors
when he continued to seek mileage reimbursement through the
payroll system.

According to CSXT, Litaker should have disputed

CSXT's determination that he was not entitled to travel pay by
following the protocol in the Yardmaster System Agreement
Article 20 and filing a time claim or grievance with the
designated official, rather than by continuing to file travel
pay claims through the payroll system.

CSXT contends that

Plaintiffs mistakenly conflate Litaker's right to file
grievances or claims under Article 20 with his asserted right to
file Code 90 payroll claims for reimbursement.
By failing to follow the grievance protocol in Article 20,
13

CSXT argues that Litaker failed to follow the "well-settled
arbitral doctrine of 'obey now, grieve later.'"
Supp. Summ. J. 12-14.)

(Def.'s Mem.

CSXT urges the Court to find that the

entire dispute is a "minor dispute" under the Railway Labor Act,
and that therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the dispute.

Finally, CSXT argues that Plaintiff

Litaker lacks standing to enforce his claims under 45 U.S.C. §§
152, First, Second, and Sixth because those provisions do not
provide for a private right of action.
In the instant case there are two underlying disputes:
first, CSXT determined that Litaker is not entitled to travel
pay, and second, Litaker was disciplined for continuing to file
payroll claims for travel pay after being told not to do so.
These disputes will be discussed in turn.

B. Travel Pay Entitlement
The parties agree that the dispute, insofar as it relates
to CSXT's determination that Litaker is not entitled to travel
pay, is a minor dispute because it arises out of and is arguably
justified by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
See Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307.

The provisions of the Yardmaster

Agreements at issue state:
It is understood and agreed to the following:
14

(1) Yardmasters required to report to a location/terminal
other than their regularly assigned work location/terminal
under Article 2(d) of the 2002 System Agreement for
purposes such as, but not limited to: training, meetings,
seminars, rules class, seminars, witness for an
investigation, or other "company business" shall be paid
travel/deadhead time in addition to the standard mileage
rate.
CSXT Labor Agreement 11-042-05.

Article 2(d) of the 2002 System

Agreement provides that "[y]ardmasters regularly assigned will
have a designated time and place to go on duty and will be
relieved at the starting point."
In October 2010, CSXT asserted a contractual right under
these provisions when it determined that only regularly assigned
yardmasters, and not substitute yardmasters, are entitled to
reimbursement for mileage and travel time.

With respect to

Litaker, CSXT's position is that "[Litaker] is an unassigned
yardmaster, which by definition is an individual who has
acquired Yardmaster seniority . . . but is not regularly
assigned to a position.

By definition, unassigned yardmasters

have no regularly assigned reporting location as yardmaster."
(Scott Decl. Ex. 10 (citing Yardmaster System Agreement Art.
1).)
In Plaintiffs' view, CSXT Labor Agreement 11-042-05
"plainly entitles Litaker to the mileage claimed when employed
as a substitute yardmaster."

Plaintiffs, however, agree that
15

CSXT's position is "arguable," and that therefore, this dispute
can be resolved "only in arbitration."

(Pls.' Mem. Resp. Def.'s

Mot. Summ. J. 3.)
This Court agrees with the Parties that CSXT's
determination that substitute yardmasters are not entitled to
travel pay under the Yardmaster Agreements is arguably justified
by the terms of those agreements.

Therefore, Litaker's claims

for travel pay constitute a minor dispute that is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment
Board.

Thus, thus the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter.

C. Discipline
The question before the Court is whether CSXT violated the
RLA when it disciplined Litaker for continuing to submit travel
pay claims.

The relevant procedures for employee discipline are

set forth in Article 21 of the Yardmaster System Agreement and
Rule 17 of the Trainman Agreement.
Generally, disputes over employee discipline are considered
minor disputes under the RLA because they arise from the
discipline procedures in the collective bargaining agreement.
See Andrews v. Louisville &

Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320,

325 (1972) (holding that Congress intended the RLA dispute
resolution mechanism to be mandatory for a wrongful discharge
16

claim based squarely on an alleged breach of the collective
bargaining agreement); Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307; Bhd. Of
Locomotive Eng'rs Div. 269 v. Long Island R.R. Co., 85 F.3d 35,
38 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that dispute over whether employer
had an implied right under the collective bargaining agreement
to impose disciplinary fines was a minor dispute and subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment
Board).
Plaintiffs argue that Litaker was impermissibly disciplined
for using the minor dispute resolution procedure, and implicit
in their argument is the assumption that filing a Code 90
trainmen payroll claim is part of the minor dispute resolution
procedure itself.17

They contend that this issue "cannot be

resolved in arbitration because it does not involve
interpretation of an agreement.
Act itself."

It involves application of the

(Pls.' Reply to Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. 4.)

CSXT, on the other hand, argues that Litaker's discipline
was proper under the Trainman Agreement and that Litaker was not
disciplined for exercising his right to make a claim under the
collective bargaining agreements.

It contends that a Code 90

payroll claim is not a "claim" within the meaning of the Article
17

Plaintiffs note that "Article 20 obviously applies to the
claims Litaker filed, and CSXT could have denied them." (Pls.'
Reply to Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. 3.)
17

20 dispute resolution procedure of the Yardmaster System
Agreement – rather, it is a wholly distinct action that is not
part of any collective bargaining agreement dispute resolution
process.

CSXT has submitted a declaration from CSXT Labor

Relations Director Shannon Farling Scott explaining the
difference between an Article 20 claim and a Code 90 claim, as
well as samples of Code 90 claims.

CSXT notes that "if

Plaintiffs really are arguing that Litaker was disciplined for
filing a time claim under Article 20, it is CSXT's position that
he was disciplined for submitting Code 90 claims to the trainmen
payroll system."

(Def.'s Opp'n Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 9.)

This Court finds that this dispute over Litaker's
discipline is a minor dispute because its resolution requires
the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.

The

dispute implicates the discipline procedures of Article 21 of
the Yardmaster System Agreement and Rule 17 of the Trainman
Agreement, and appears to turn on the interpretation of "claim"
under Article 20 of the Yardmaster System Agreement.

In

relevant part, Article 20 provides:
(a) All claims or grievances must be presented in
writing or electronically on the agreed form, if
available, by or on behalf of the Yardmaster
involved, to the Carrier Officer authorized to
receive same, within sixty (60) calendar days from
the date of the occurrence on which the claim or
grievance is based. . . .
18

(b) The Yardmaster or the duly authorized
representative who files the claim must furnish
information on the agreed form, if available, to
identify the basis of the claim: (1) Date,
claimant's name and employee number. (2) Seniority
date. (3) Date of violation. (4) Tour of duty
involved. (5) Rules involved, if known. (6) Amount
claimed. (7) Details of work performed or
opportunity denied. (8) Reasons supporting claim.
(Scott Decl. Ex. 1.)

Article 20 requires that the basis of the

claims or grievances be explained and sent to the appropriate
CSXT officer, whereas a Code 90 payroll claim is a simple
computerized input of travel pay value into the trainmen payroll
system.

Therefore, CSXT's interpretation that the Code 90

payroll claims are not claims or grievances within the meaning
of Article 20, and that Litaker's discipline under the
collective bargaining agreements was therefore proper, is
arguably justified.

See Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307.

Thus, this Court finds that the discipline dispute is a
minor dispute under the RLA and is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the discipline dispute.18

18

Because this Court has found that it does not have
jurisdiction in this matter, it does not reach CSXT's argument
that Plaintiff Litaker lacks standing to enforce his claims
under 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, First, Second, and Sixth because those
provisions do not provide for a private right of action.
19

Plaintiffs have already commenced the internal appeal
procedure, and as they exhaust their claims at the internal
level of review, they are able to proceed to conference and
binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment
Board or other agreed-upon adjustment board, according to the
procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreements and
the RLA.

Because CSXT is arguably justified in its

interpretation of the relevant provisions of the collective
bargaining agreements, Plaintiffs' contention that this court
should issue equitable relief to require CSXT's compliance with
its duties under the RLA is unavailing.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [Document
14] is DENIED.

2.

CSXT's Motion for Summary Judgment [Document 15]
is GRANTED.

3.

Judgment shall be entered by separate Order.

SO ORDERED, this Tuesday, October 11, 2011.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge
20