Jackson v. Astrue

Filing 23

OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 1/22/13. (dass, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

January 22, 2013
LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:

Charles Robert Jackson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-11-704

Dear Counsel:
On March 16, 2011, the Plaintiff, Charles Robert Jackson, petitioned this Court to review
the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 14, 22). I find that no hearing is necessary. Local
Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported
by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will
grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny Plaintiff’s motion. This letter explains my rationale.
Mr. Jackson filed his claim on June 22, 2007, alleging disability beginning on September
1, 2006. (Tr. 94-105). His claim was denied initially on September 7, 2007, and on
reconsideration on March 13, 2008. (Tr. 52-55, 57-65). A hearing was held on November 19,
2008 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 26-47). Following the hearing, on June
2, 2009, the ALJ determined that Mr. Jackson was not disabled during the relevant time frame.
(Tr. 13-25). The Appeals Council denied Mr. Jackson’s request for review, (Tr. 1-5), so the
ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Jackson suffered from the severe impairments of diabetes
mellitus, sleep apnea, depression, bipolar disorder, obesity, and substance use disorder. (Tr. 15).
Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr. Jackson retained the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform simple, routine sedentary to light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567 (a
and b) and 416.967(a and b) except he would need the ability to shift positions for
relief of postural discomfort and perform jobs in positions away from excessive
pulmonary irritants.
(Tr. 18). At the hearing, the ALJ asked two hypothetical questions to the vocational examiner
(“VE”), the first of which contained limitations relating to ability to stay awake during the
workday and the second of which did not. (Tr. 43-44). After considering the testimony of the
VE, the ALJ determined that Mr. Jackson could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy, and that he was therefore not disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr.
24-25).

Charles Robert Jackson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-11-704
January 22, 2013
Page 2

Mr. Jackson raises a single issue on appeal. He contends that the ALJ’s second
hypothetical question to the VE, which ultimately comported with the RFC adopted by the ALJ,
did not incorporate any of the limitations caused by Mr. Jackson’s sleep apnea. (Tr. 15, 18). Mr.
Jackson is correct that the ALJ did not accept as credible his alleged need to nap for an hour
and/or fall asleep during the work shift. However, contrary to his allegations, the ALJ did
consider limitations regarding sleeping and the alleged inability to stay awake, but ultimately
rejected the VE’s testimony in response to his first hypothetical that had included such
limitations. (Tr. 38-40, 44, 274-76).
The ALJ is afforded “great latitude in posing hypothetical questions,” Koonce v. Apfel,
No. 98–1144, 1999 WL 7864, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 1999), and need only pose those that are
based on substantial evidence and accurately reflect a claimant's limitations. See Copeland v.
Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 540–41 (9th Cir. 1988). In Mr. Jackson’s case, the ALJ provided
extensive analysis of the reasons for rejecting sleep apnea limitations, including citation to
medical evidence. (Tr. 19). The evidence cited by the ALJ indicates that Mr. Jackson did not
follow the sleep apnea treatment prescribed by Dr. Whitesell, and did not return for follow-up
treatment. Id. The ALJ’s second hypothetical adequately addressed the limitations which the
ALJ accepted. Because the ALJ’s hypothetical was supported by substantial evidence, there is
no basis for remand.
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14)
will be DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) will be
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.

Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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