Tibbs v Baltimore City Police Department
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 8/23/12. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SELAH L. TIBBS,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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BALTIMORE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Civil Action No. RDB-11-1335
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Selah Tibbs (“Plaintiff” or “Tibbs”) brought this action against the Baltimore
City Police Department (“BCPD”) alleging race and gender discrimination as well as
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e, et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The
Complaint also alleges that Defendant violated her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
later amended her Complaint to add two Defendants, namely, BCPD Major David Engel
(“Engel”) and BCPD Lieutenant Deanna Bland (“Bland”) and additional counts against
them. Pending before this Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
(ECF No. 12) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, Defendants BCPD, Engel and Bland’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED. All of Plaintiff’s claims against the BCPD are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Engel and
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Bland are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim against Bland is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Engel
and Bland are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
This Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s’ complaint. See Aziz v.
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff Selah Tibbs (“Plaintiff” or “Tibbs”)
is an African-American woman who began working for the Baltimore City Police
Department (“BCPD”) in July 1997.1 Pl.’s 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17, ECF No. 4. In July
2007, “Tibbs was promoted to the position of Detective and assigned to the Northeast
District Detective Unit (DDU).” Id. ¶ 18. About a year later, however, on October 6, 2008,
Tibbs was informed that she would be transferred to a position in the Patrol Division. Id. ¶
19. Apparently, this involuntary transfer was initiated by her superior, Defendant Major
David Engel (“Engel”), following an incident where she was accused of acting
unprofessionally by yelling while working and failing to acknowledge him as was required by
the profession. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Tibbs appealed this personnel decision but was unsuccessful.
Id. ¶¶ 23, 32.
While Engel explained that her transfer was caused by her undermining actions and
the fact that she conducted “personal business on departmental time,” Tibbs alleges that she
was transferred because of her race. Id. ¶¶ 21. In support of this claim, she alleges that four
African-American detectives were “transferred out of the unit for frivolous reasons and
replaced by Caucasian detectives” between June and October 2008. She also claims that
Nothing in the Complaint or the submissions of the parties indicates that Tibbs is no longer working for the
Baltimore City Police Department.
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another Caucasian detective who had himself failed to acknowledge Engel was not
transferred or even reprimanded. Id.¶ 24.
Additionally, Tibbs alleges that since being transferred to the Patrol Division, “she
has been subjected to continual harassment, retaliation and unequal treatment because of her
race and gender by Lieutenant Deanna Bland.” Id. ¶ 25. According to the Plaintiff, despite
her repeated internal complaints, she is still discriminated against and harassed by Bland and
is subjected to a hostile work environment. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 30. She claims that she is
“continually
threatened
with
unwarranted
discipline”
due
to
unsubstantiated
nonperformance accusations. Id. ¶ 28. Specifically, she alleges that in December 2008,
although she was dispatched to a robbery call on the 200 Block of South Broadway, Bland
accused her of making misrepresentations on her “run sheet” to cover up her failure to
respond to a “robbery dispatch call in the 1300 block of Fayette Street.” Id. ¶ 29.
According to Tibbs, she filed a timely charge of discrimination against the Baltimore
City Police Department with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
Id. ¶ 10. She alleges that the EEOC issued a determination that she was discriminated
against and the case was referred to the Department of Justice, Employment Litigation
Section, for conciliation. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. “Attempts to conciliate the case were unsuccessful,
and the Department of Justice, Employment Litigation Section issued a Notice of Right to
Sue on February 7, 2011.” Id. ¶ 13. As a result, Tibbs filed this action alleging race and
gender discrimination as well as retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Counts I, III, IV, VII, VIII); race and gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (Counts II, V), and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted; therefore, “the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test
the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483
(4th Cir. 2006). In ruling on such a motion, this Court is guided by the Supreme Court’s
instructions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009) which “require complaints in civil actions be alleged with greater specificity than
previously was required.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted). The Supreme Court’s Twombly decision articulated “[t]wo working principles”
courts must employ when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
First, while a court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the
complaint, legal conclusions drawn from those facts are not afforded such deference. Id.
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice” to plead a claim.) Second, a complaint must be dismissed if it
does not allege “a plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 679. Under the plausibility standard, a
complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Although the plausibility
requirement does not impose a “probability requirement,” id. at 556, “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 663; see also Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A
complaint need not make a case against a defendant or forecast evidence sufficient to prove an
element of the claim. It need only allege facts sufficient to state elements of the claim.”)
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, a court must
“draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to determine whether the pleader has
stated a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.
ANALYSIS
I.
Plaintiff’s claims against the Baltimore City Police Department
Tibbs’ claims against the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”) 2 include
claims for disparate treatment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Counts I, II, IV and V)
as well as a claim for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count III). Defendants
contend that these claims must be dismissed because Tibbs fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted as mandated by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The same analysis applies to race discrimination and retaliation claims under both
Title VII and Section 1981. See James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376 (4th
Cir. 2004); Wang v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 853, 869 (D. Md. 2004). Where the
record contains no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, plaintiff’s claims must be
analyzed under the burden-shifting scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Hawkins v. Pepsico, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 281 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2000)
The First Amended Complaint refers to the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”) as “Defendant,”
to Major David Engel as “Engel,” and to Lieutenant Bland as “Bland.” See Pl.’s 1st Am. Compl., ECF No. 4.
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(noting that the “McDonnell Douglas framework applicable to claims of race discrimination
applies to retaliation claims as well) (citing Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222,
1228 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Under this framework, the plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of retaliation
and discrimination. If a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.
See O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996). If the employer
fulfills this reciprocal duty, the burden reverts back to the plaintiff to establish that the
defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual and that her termination was instead racially
motivated. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993).
A. Race and Gender Discrimination Claims (Counts I, II, & III)
An employee establishes a prima facie case of disparate treatment on the basis of race
or gender discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by showing that (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) her job performance was satisfactory; (3) she was subjected
to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her class
received more favorable treatment. See Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214
(4th Cir. 2007); see also Prince–Garrison v. Md. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 526 F. Supp. 2d
550, 554 (D. Md. 2007) (citing McCain v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 568, 573 (D. Md.
2000)). Construing the complaint liberally, see De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th
Cir. 2003), Plaintiff does not satisfy the aforementioned elements.
Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfies the first requirement as she is African-American and
therefore part of a protected class. She also satisfies the third requirement as she alleges that
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she was demoted from her Detective position with the Northeast District Detective Unit to
the Patrol Division which caused her to lose the compensation and incentives associated
with the Detective position. Tibbs does allege that a similarly situated employee outside her
class was treated more favorably. Specifically, she claims that another Caucasian detective
who failed to acknowledge Defendant Engel was not subjected to an involuntary transfer.
Nevertheless, Tibbs fails to allege that her job performance was satisfactory.
In fact,
Defendants contend that she was involuntarily transferred for acting unprofessionally and
failing to comport herself respectfully with her superiors. Defendants also claim that she
conducted personal business during working hours and undermined the work environment.
Additionally, once on the Patrol Division, she was accused of failing to report to the proper
robbery site and altering her run sheet to account for the discrepancy.
Furthermore, although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that she was discriminated against, this
determination does not override the requirement that a plaintiff plead a prima facie case. See
EEOC v. Harvey L. Walner & Assoc., 91 F.3d 963, 968 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1996) (“This
determination of reasonable cause is only an administrative prerequisite to a court action and
has no legally binding significance in subsequent litigation.”) (citing EEOC v. J.M. Huber
Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1991); Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312, 1321 (8th Cir. 1983)
(holding that “the EEOC’s recommendation that a finding of discrimination be made is
entitled to deference” and that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of race and age
discrimination); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1972) (holding that the
admission of the EEOC’s record is within the district court’s discretion). Thus, Tibbs fails
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to state a prima facie case of race and gender discrimination against the Baltimore City Police
Department (“BCPD”) under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Even if Tibbs had alleged a prima facie claim of race discrimination, she has not
sufficiently alleged that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her transfer proffered
by the Defendants were a pretext for discrimination. The Fourth Circuit has stated that:
“when an employer gives a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging the
plaintiff, ‘it is not our province to decide whether the reason was wise, fair, or even correct,
ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for the plaintiff's termination.’ ” Hawkins v.
PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d
293,299 (4th Cir. 1998)).
A Court should not second-guess an employer’s appraisal.
Hawkins, 203 F.3d at 280. Rather, the Court’s sole concern should be “whether the reason
for which the defendant discharged the plaintiff was discriminatory.” Id. (quoting DeJarnette,
133 F.3d at 299). The Fourth Circuit has also stated that it does “not believe that Title VII
authorizes courts to declare unlawful every arbitrary and unfair employment decision.”
Balazs v. Liebenthal, 32 F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 1994). The submissions of the parties have
indicated an issue which arose with respect to Tibbs’ conduct and interaction with her
supervisor. In her Complaint, Tibbs not only fails to allege a prima facie case of race
discrimination, but fails to allege any plausible claim of pretext on the part of the
Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims in Counts I, II & III against the BCPD
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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B. Retaliation Claims (Counts IV & V)
Initially, and as alleged in the Complaint, it should be noted that Tibbs was
transferred to the Patrol Division before seeking to appeal the transfer decision or filing
internal complaints against Defendant Bland. In order to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged
in a protected activity, (2) that her employer took a “materially” adverse action against her
and (3) that a causal connection existed between the activity and the adverse action. Cepada
v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty., 814 F. Supp. 2d 500, 514 (D. Md. 2011) ( citing Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333
F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2003)).
Title VII protects participation and opposition activity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). The
participation clause protects an employee from retaliation where he “has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing”
under Title VII. Id. Where an employee has opposed any unlawful practice under Title VII,
he is also protected from retaliation. Id. With respect to the second factor, “[t]he central
focus of the inquiry is whether the employer has treated ‘some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.’ ” Foreman v. Weinstein,
485 F. Supp. 2d 608, 612 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1978)).
To be adverse an employment action must be discriminatory and must
“adversely affect ‘the terms, conditions, or benefits’ of the plaintiff’s employment.” James,
368 F.3d at 375 (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001)). “An
adverse action is one that ‘constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as
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hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or
a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’ ” Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321,
337 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). This
Court must determine “whether there was a change in the terms or conditions of plaintiff’s
employment which ha[d] a significant detrimental effect on her opportunities for promotion
or professional development.” James, 368 F.3d at 376 (quoting Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253,
256 (4th Cir. 1999)) (quotation marks omitted). Specifically, a decrease in “compensation,
job title, level of responsibility or opportunity for promotion” would indicate that an adverse
employment action occurred. Id. Finally, an action is materially adverse where it “might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68.
In this case, Tibbs alleges that she was engaged in a protected activity. She claims
that she filed a number of internal complaints and a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). While she alleges that she was subjected
to an adverse employment action in that she was demoted from her Detective position, she
fails to allege that this adverse employment action was causally connected to her complaints.
In fact, the Complaint establishes that she was first transferred before seeking to appeal the
decision and before filing complaints concerning Defendant Bland’s actions against her. She
also fails to allege that there was a significant change in her employment status after she filed
her internal complaints against bland. Moreover, her responsibilities are not alleged to have
changed nor were her benefits affected subsequent to these complaints or even to the filing
of her charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
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Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim of
retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the BCPD in Counts IV and V are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
II.
Plaintiff’s claims against Engel and Bland
A. Title VII Claims against Engel and Bland (Counts III, IV, VII & VIII)
Plaintiff alleges gender discrimination and retaliation against Defendant Bland
(Counts III and IV) as well as race and gender discrimination against Defendant Engel
(Counts VII and VIII) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).
It is well-established that “supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII
violations.” Lissau v. Southern Food Services, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998). In Lissau,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that only an employer may be
held liable for Title VII violations, and that individual liability under the Act “would
improperly expand the remedial scheme crafted by Congress.” Id. at 181. Accordingly,
supervisors cannot be held individually liable under Title VII. As such, Defendants Engel
and Bland are not individually liable under Title VII for the alleged wrongful conduct against
Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Defendants Engel and Bland in
Counts III, IV, VII and VIII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim (Count V)
Count V of the Complaint also alleges a claim of retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 against Defendant Bland. “Individual supervisors also cannot be liable under § 1981
unless they intentionally cause [an employer] to infringe the rights secured by [that] section.”
Luy v. Baltimore Police Dept., 326 F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (D. Md. 2004) (internal quotations
omitted).
Thus, supervisors may be individually liable under Section 1981 when they
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‘authorize, direct, or participate in’ a discriminatory act.” Atkins v. Winchester Homes, CCB–
06–278, 2007 WL 269083, at *9 (D. Md. Jan.17, 2007)(quoting Manuel v. Int'l Harvester Co.,
502 F. Supp. 45, 50 (N. D. Ill. 1980)). Hence, while individual liability for supervisors may
arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it only applies where the act or omission resulting in the
infringement of rights was intentionally caused by the supervisor and where the Plaintiff
makes an affirmative showing of that fact. Because Bland allegedly directed and participated
in the discriminatory acts against Plaintiff, she can be held individually liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. However, in order to proceed individually against Bland under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
Plaintiff must establish the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation. See Luy, 326 F. Supp.
2d at 688–89.
As explained above, although Plaintiff alleges that she was engaged in a protected
activity and that her employer took a “materially” adverse action against her, she fails to
establish that the adverse employment action was causally related to her engagement in a
protected activity. See Cepada v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty., 814 F. Supp. 2d 500, 514 (D.
Md. 2011). Specifically, with respect to Bland, Tibbs fails to allege that Bland to an adverse
employment action which “adversely affect[ed] the terms, conditions or benefits of [her]
employment.” Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). Nor does Tibbs allege that Bland to an action against her which
“might have dissuaded [her] from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68. In fact, she claims that she filed numerous
internal complaints, albeit without receiving a favorable response, and that she also filed a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
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while remaining employed by the Patrol Division of the BCPD. Therefore, Tibbs fails to
state a prima facie case of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Bland and her claim
against Bland in Count V is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim against Engel and Bland (Count VI)
Tibbs brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Engel and Bland for denial of
“due process under 42 U.S.C. 1983 [sic] by violating her rights protected and equal by 42
U.S.C. 1981[sic].” Pl.’s 1st Am. Compl. ¶ 59, ECF No. 4. She also alleges that Bland and
Engel enforced police rules and regulations unconstitutionally so as to discriminate and
retaliate against her as well as create a hostile work environment. In order to state a claim
under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a right or privilege secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States and that (2) the deprivation was caused by an
individual acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Establishing individual liability under Section 1983 requires an affirmative showing that the
defendant personally acted to deprive the plaintiff of her rights. See Wright v. Collins, 766
F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The Defendant “must have had personal knowledge of and
involvement in the alleged deprivation of appellant’s rights in order to be liable. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that “the factual
elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination are the same
for Title VII, Section 1981, and Section 1983 claims.”3 Hooper v. State of Md., Dept. of Human
The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit recently concluded that “while Title VII provides the exclusive
remedy for employment discrimination claims created by its own term, its exclusivity ceases when the
employer’s conduct also amounts to a violation of a right secured by the Constitution.” Henley v. Brown, 686
F. 3d 634, 642 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In doing so the Eight Circuit noted that the Fourth Circuit
had reached the same conclusion in the past. Id. (citing inter alia Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 382-83 (4th
Cir. 2003)).
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Resources, 45 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Gairola v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dept. of Gen.
Services, 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985). As Tibbs reasserts the same allegations in this
count as those asserted against the Baltimore City Police Department, it follows, as explained
above, that Tibbs fails to state a claim of race and gender discrimination as well as retaliation
against Engel and Bland.
To the extent that Tibbs asserts a claim of hostile work environment, she must
demonstrate that: “(1) the harassment was unwelcome; (2) the harassment was based on
[her] race and [gender]; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is some basis for
imposing liability on [the Defendants].” Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir.1998). In
weighing the “severe and pervasive” factor, courts look at the totality of the circumstances
and consider: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510
U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
In addition, courts are instructed that “the objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (internal quotations
omitted).
Although Tibbs claims that she was harassed on the basis of her race and gender and
that the harassment was unwelcome, she does not allege specific instances which would
allow this Court to determine whether the harassment was “sufficiently pervasive and
severe.” Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
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of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a
claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Finally, while she claims that Bland and
Engel acted unconstitutionally, her allegations fail to establish that their conduct amounted
to a violation of her right secured under the Constitution. Accordingly, Tibbs fails to state a
prima facie case of employment discrimination and hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Therefore, her claims against Engel and Bland in Count VI are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. As a result, Defendants Baltimore City Police Department,
David Engel and Deanna Bland’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants Baltimore City Police Department
(“BCPD”), David Engel (“Engel”) and Deanna Bland’s (“Bland”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 12) is GRANTED.
All of Plaintiff’s claims against the BCPD are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Engel and Bland are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim against Bland is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against
Engel and Bland are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
A separate Order follows.
Dated:
August 23, 2012
/s/_________________________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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