Jackson v. Caraway

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 11/15/11. (c/m af 11/15/11)(amf, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
EUGENE JACKSON
:
Petitioner

:

v

:

J.R. CARAWAY

:

Respondent

Civil Action No. WMN-11-1876
(Related Crim Case WMN-01-464)

:
o0o
MEMORANDUM

Pending is Respondent’s Response to the above-captioned Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. ECF No. 3. Petitioner has filed a Reply. ECF No. 5.
A hearing in this matter is unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
Background
Petitioner Eugene Jackson (“Jackson”) was convicted on May 21, 2002, of conspiring to
distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. On July 19,
2002, Jackson was sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit on August 15, 2003. Jackson subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied on February 8, 2005. The Fourth Circuit denied Jackson’s
request for a certificate of appealability. Jackson later filed additional motions, one of which was
re-characterized as a motion under § 2255 and another which was styled as a motion pursuant to
§ 2255. Both were denied.
Jackson states that the government filed a notice of enhancement under 21 U.S.C.
§851(a). ECF No. 1 at Ex. B. One of the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence was a
1992 drug case from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland in which Jackson entered an

Alford plea.1 Id. at Ex. D. Jackson claims he was not represented by counsel at the proceeding
where he entered the Alford plea and in exchange for the plea, he was released from custody that
day.
On June 30, 2011, Jackson filed the instant petition. Jackson asserts that his prior
conviction from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City should not have been used to enhance his
sentence. He claims a recent Fourth Circuit decision, issued after his Motion to Vacate was
decided, holds that a conviction based on an Alford plea may not be used to enhance a sentence
under the United States sentencing guidelines. ECF No. 1 at p. 3, citing United States v. Willie
Lee Alston, Slip Op. No. 09-4375 (4th Cir. July 2, 2010). Jackson asserts that Alston is new
decisional law which renders his sentence inoperable and should apply retroactively to his case.
Id. Jackson further claims that although Alston is not a Supreme Court decision, the same
principles should apply to the case as if it were because if it had been available during the trial,
appellate or post-conviction stages of his case Jackson would have prevailed. ECF No. 1 at p. 4.
Respondent asserts that the instant petition should be construed as a Motion to Vacate
under 28 U.S.C. §2255. ECF No. 3. As such, the Motion to Vacate would be both successive
and untimely. Id. Alternatively, Respondent claims that the enhancement of Jackson’s sentence
was appropriately based on the Alford plea case. Id. at p. 4.
Standard of Review
The threshold question presented is whether this claim is properly raised in a ' 2241
petition or is more properly construed as a Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. '2255. A petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '2241 and a motion to vacate, set aside or correct
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 are distinct mechanisms for obtaining post-conviction
1

The plea permits a criminal defendant to enter the equivalent of a guilty plea by admitting there is enough
evidence to convict him at trial, but maintaining his innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

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relief. A ' 2241 petition attacks the manner in which a sentence is executed. See 28 U.S.C.
'2241(a). By contrast, a '2255 motion challenges the validity of a conviction or sentence. See
In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2000); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n. 5 (4th Cir.
1997).
Although a federal prisoner generally may not seek collateral relief from a conviction or
sentence through filing a '2241 petition, there is an exception under the Asavings clause@ of
'2255.2 It provides a prisoner may seek relief under '2241 if the remedy under '2255 is
Ainadequate or ineffective to test the validity of his detention.@ 28 U.S.C. '2255. A motion filed
pursuant to '2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction when: (1) at
the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of
the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first ' 2255 motion, the
substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed
not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of ' 2255
because the new rule is not one of constitutional law. See Jones 226 F.3d at 333-34.
Analysis
In Alston the petitioner raised the following issue: “[w]here the defendant enters a plea
under the doctrine announced in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), can the district
court consider the disputed facts proffered by the prosecutor to establish the nature of a prior
conviction and whether that conviction qualifies as a [violent felony] under the Armed Career
Criminal Act [ACCA]?” Alston, 611 F. 3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2010). The prior conviction at
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28 U.S.C. '2255 provides in relevant part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by
motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply
for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it
also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

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issue in Alston was second-degree assault which under Maryland law is a broad-based offense
which “embraces a wide range of conduct, including kissing without consent, touching or
tapping, jostling, and throwing water upon another.” Id. citing United States v. Kirksey, 138 F.
3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 1998). The sentencing court in Alston thus permitted the government to
proffer evidence that the particular assault conviction at issue involved violence. The transcript
of the proceeding established that the witnesses for the state would have testified that Alston
pointed a gun at three victims and said he would kill them all and that Alston admitted the
witnesses would testify to that effect, but he did not admit he did the act. Alston at 223. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) 3 “prevents sentencing courts from assessing whether a prior
conviction counts as an ACCA predicate conviction by relying on facts neither inherent in the
conviction nor admitted by the defendant.” Id. at 226. In short, Alston concerned examination of
additional evidence to determine if the nature of the predicate offense fits within the ACCA
sentencing requirements. In Jackson’s case, however, there is no ambiguity concerning the
nature of the predicate offense, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, making the issue of
whether or not he admitted to specific factual allegations regarding the offense irrelevant.
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Alston to Jackson’s case, he has also failed to show
that his claim falls within the exception carved out for 2241 habeas corpus relief. Leaving aside
the fact that Alston is not a Supreme Court case, it is also not a decision which calls into
question the criminality of the conduct underlying his criminal conviction. See e.g. Jones, 226 F.
3d at 334 (intervening Supreme Court decision4 clarified that mere possession of a firearm does

3

The Shepard decision held that a sentencing court cannot look to police reports to determine if a generic burglary
conviction qualifies a defendant under the ACCA.
4

Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).

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not constitute use of a firearm in drug trafficking offense). Jackson asserts that the meaning of
the Alston holding is that he is “actually innocent” of the life sentence he received. ECF No. 5,
p. 7. The sentencing enhancement resulting in a life sentence, however, is not “conduct” for
which Jackson was found guilty and which has been called into question by Alston. The “actual
innocence” exception Jackson references applies where a petitioner seeks to raise procedurally
defaulted claims. Notably, Jackson does not claim he is actually innocent of either the predicate
offense used to enhance his sentence or the offense for which he was sentenced. See United
States v. Pettiford, 612 F. 3d 270, 283 (4th Cir. 2010) (actual innocence requires proof that
petitioner did not commit the crime of which he was convicted). Thus, it is clear that the instant
petition is not appropriately filed as such and is actually a successive Motion to Vacate;5 over
which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
A certificate of appealability may issue Aonly if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.@ 28 U. S.C. ' 2253(c)(2). The petitioner “must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), or that “the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Because this court finds that
there has been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of
appealability shall be denied. See 28 U.S.C.§ 2253(c)(2). Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of

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Under 28 U.S.C. '2255:
A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the
appropriate court of appeals to containB(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed
in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable.

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Habeas Corpus shall be denied by separate Order which follows.
/s/
11/15/2011
Date

_______________________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge

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