Brown v. Bailey et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 6/13/12. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DARREN BROWN,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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EDWARD BAILEY, III, et al.
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Defendants.
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Civil Action No. RDB-11-01901
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a civil rights action for damages resulting from the alleged unlawful arrest of
Plaintiff Darren Brown (“Plaintiff” or “Brown”). Specifically, the Complaint alleges that
Defendants Detective Edward Bailey, III (“Bailey”), Officer Paul Southard (“Southard”),
Officer Julian Min (“Min”), Officer Felipe Carrasquillo (“Carrasquillo”) (collectively “officer
Defendants”), the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”), and the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore (collectively “the City”) violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States by arresting and detaining
him without probable cause from August 6, 2008 to March 13, 2009. Pending before this
Court are the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF Nos.
16, 17 & 20) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also
pending before this Court are Defendants Baltimore City Police Department and Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore’s Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF Nos. 10
& 12). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local
Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
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For the reasons that follow, this case will be bifurcated under Rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so that the Plaintiff’s claims against the officer Defendants
will first be addressed, and the claims against Defendants Baltimore City Police Department
and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore will be addressed as necessary, depending
upon the status of the constitutional claims made against the officer Defendants. Thus,
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Baltimore City Police Department and the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore are STAYED pending resolution of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Edward Bailey, Paul Southard, Julian Min and Felipe Carrasquillo.
Accordingly, Defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 16) and Defendant Baltimore City Police
Department’s Motion to Dismiss said Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) are DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, subject to refiling. Defendants Edward Bailey, Paul Southard,
Julian Min and Felipe Carrasquillo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 20) is DENIED. 1
Additionally, because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
superseded the original Complaint, Defendants Baltimore City Police Department and
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s original Complaint
(ECF Nos. 10 & 12) are DENIED as MOOT.2
BACKGROUND
This Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the Plaintiffs’ complaint. See Aziz v.
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). On the night of August 5 to August 6, 2008,
The officer Defendants are only charged in Count I of the Amended Complaint.
See Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, “an amended pleading
ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect”) (citing In re Crysen/Monteray Energy Co., 226
F.3d 160, 162 (2nd Cir. 2000)).
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a shooting involving two perpetrators occurred at a Chinese restaurant on the 2700 block of
Harford Road, Baltimore, MD.
Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 13.
Officer Felipe
Carrasquillo (“Carrasquillo”) took the initial report and Detective Edward Bailey (“Bailey”)
was assigned to the investigation. Id. ¶ 9. A surveillance tape recovered from the crime
scene by Detective Bailey led to the identification of one suspect as David Jefferson and the
other as an individual nicknamed “Mookie.” Id. ¶¶ 12-15. Specifically, Officers Julian Min
(“Min”) and Paul Southard (“Southard”) identified the first suspect as David Jefferson and a
witness, Mr. Andre Rucker (“Mr. Rucker”) identified the second suspect as a man
nicknamed “Mookie . . . [who] hangs in the 2700 block of the Alameda.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
Although Officer Southard had initially been unable to identify the second suspect, Mr.
Rucker’s identification and Southard’s several encounters with both David Jefferson and
Plaintiff allegedly caused him to believe that Plaintiff, Darren Brown, was a possible suspect.
Id. ¶ 15. Officer Southard recorded this belief in his statement to Major Dickson. Id.
However, Officers Southard, Min and Carrasquillo did not further investigate whether
Plaintiff was actually known by the nickname “Mookie” nor did they re-interview Mr.
Rucker to determine whether the person identified as “Mookie” was in fact Darren Brown.
Id. ¶ 16. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that Detective Edward Bailey, III (“Bailey”) prepared a
false and misleading probable cause statement identifying him as the second suspect in the
shooting. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. As such, despite the lack of evidence linking him to the crime, a
warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest was allegedly obtained “without the approval of a prosecutor, in
violation of police department procedure.” Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
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On August 6, 2008, Officers Min and Southard arrested Plaintiff in relation to the
shooting. Id. ¶ 22. The next day, August 7, 2008, “Plaintiff was formally charged with
attempted murder, assault, armed robbery and other charges.” Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff alleges that
these charges were “brought without review by or approval of a prosecutor . . . [and that]
Defendants Bailey, Southard, Min and Carrasquillo made no further attempts” to confirm
whether Plaintiff was in fact “Mookie” and in fact involved in the shooting. Id. ¶¶ 23-24.
In December of 2008, upon seeing the surveillance tape, David Jefferson’s mother
identified the second suspect as being Kevin Johnson, Jr., David Jefferson’s cousin, thereby
exonerating Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 25. According to Plaintiff, his counsel communicated this
information to the State’s Attorney’s Office on both December 4, 2008 and December 19,
2008. Id. ¶ 26. However, no action was taken until the spring of 2009, when the new
Assistant States’ Attorney assigned to the case, Ms. Madigan, asked the BCPD to reopen the
investigation and interview David Jefferson’s mother. Id. ¶¶ 27-30. This new investigation
led to the dismissal of the charges against Plaintiff and his release on March 13, 2009. Id. ¶
30. On April 30, 2009, Kevin Johnson, who was known as “Mookie” at the time of the
shooting, was charged and subsequently convicted of the August 2008 shooting. Id. ¶ 31.
On July 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case which he later amended on
November 23, 2011. See ECF Nos. 1 & 13. The Amended Complaint alleges violations of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants. Pl.’s Am. Compl., ECF No. 13. Specifically, in
Count I, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants Bailey, Southard, Min and Carrasquillo acted with
deliberate and/or reckless disregard for the truth,” while conducting their investigation into
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the shooting, resulting in Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and detention from August 6, 2008 to
March 13, 2009. Id. ¶ 36-37. Count II alleges that the Baltimore City Police Department’s
(“BCPD”) customs, policies and practices in terms of officer training, officer evaluations and
arrests without probable cause resulted in his unlawful arrest. Id. ¶¶ 46-51. Finally, Count
III alleges that Defendants Bailey, Southard, Min and Carrasquillo’s actions were the result
of the Mayor and the City Council of Baltimore’s (collectively “the City”) customs, policies
and practices regarding (1) the BCPD’s hiring and training of police officers, (2) its
assessment of arrest policies and practices, (3) its failure to seek prosecutorial review and (4)
the City’s indifference and lack of efforts at halting the “widespread and on-going practice of
. . . arresting individuals without probable cause.” Id. ¶ 64.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted; therefore, “the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test
the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483
(4th Cir. 2006); see also McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted). When ruling on such a motion, the court must “accept the well-pled allegations of
the complaint as true,” and “construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir.
1997).
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A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also
Simmons v. United Mort. and Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2011); Andrew
v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009). Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must
contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Even though the requirements for pleading a
proper complaint are substantially aimed at assuring that the defendant be given adequate
notice of the nature of a claim being made against him, they also provide criteria for defining
issues for trial and for early disposition of inappropriate complaints.” Francis v. Giacomelli,
588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the legal framework of
the complaint must be supported by factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The Supreme Court has explained that
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice” to plead a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
plausibility standard requires that the pleader show more than a sheer possibility of success,
although it does not impose a “probability requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Thus, a
court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to determine whether the
pleader has stated a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950; see also Brockington v. Boykins, 637
F.3d 503, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2011).
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ANALYSIS
I.
Claims against the City and the Baltimore City Police Department (Counts II
& III)
In general, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Baltimore Police Department
(“BCPD”) and Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s (collectively “the City”) failure to
properly train, supervise and discipline Detective Bailey and Officers Southard, Min and
Carrasquillo (collectively “officer Defendants”) resulted in the alleged Section 1983
violations. Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable.” Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality or
employer cannot be held vicariously liable based solely on an agency relationship. Monell v.
New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-94 (1978). Thus, the City and the BCPD
in this case cannot be found liable unless the Plaintiff first establishes that his constitutional
rights were violated by the alleged unlawful arrest and detention conducted by the officer
Defendants.
Once Plaintiff establishes that the officer Defendants violated his constitutional
rights, the City and the BCPD may be liable under Section 1983 where “the constitutionally
offensive acts of city employees [were] taken in furtherance of some municipal ‘policy or
custom.’ ” Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 694). A plaintiff may establish the existence of such a policy or custom in several
ways: “1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; 2) through the
decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; 3) through an omission, such as a
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failure to properly train officers, that ‘manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of
citizens’; or 4) through a practice that is so ‘persistent and widespread’ as to constitute a
‘custom or usage with the force of law.’ ” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir.
2003)(quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Although the parties have not requested it, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b),
which governs bifurcation, provides that a court may order a separate trial of one or more
separate issues or claims “for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The court has broad discretion to bifurcate claims for
trial and its decision will only be set aside for clear abuse. See Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990
F.2d 1440, 1443 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 510 U.S. 915 (1993). This Court has consistently held
that in the context of Section 1983 claims, bifurcation of the Monell supervisory claims from
the individual claims is appropriate and often desirable. See, e.g., James v. Frederick County Pub.
Schs., 441 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762 (D. Md. 2006); Robertson v. Prince George’s County, 215 F. Supp.
2d 664, 665 (D. Md. 2002); Dawson v. Prince George’s County, 896 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Md.
1995); Marryshow v. Town of Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318, 319-20 (D. Md. 1991). As such, this
Court finds that bifurcation is again warranted in the present case.
Although the Plaintiff has provided greater specificity in his constitutional claims
against the officer Defendants in Count I, he presents more generalized accusations against
the Baltimore City Police Department in Count II and against the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore in Count III. There are general allegations of a “history” of unlawful police
activity and a “custom, policy and practice of failing to properly . . . train . . . police officers.”
Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-48, 60, ECF No. 13. While general in nature, these allegations
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suffice to survive the subject motions to dismiss which are DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, subject to potential refiling.
To prove a pattern and practice case against the BCPD and the City, Plaintiff would
need to submit evidence of prior misconduct by law enforcement personnel and of prior
arrests without probable cause as well as the BCPD and the City’s lack of response to such
misconduct. A stay of discovery serves the interests of efficiency and judicial economy, as
there is no reason to delve into matters relating to the BCPD and the City’s policies and
practices unless and until the officer Defendants are found to have violated the Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Accordingly, this case will be bifurcated under Rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure such that the Plaintiff’s claims against the officer
Defendants will first be addressed, and the claims against the BCPD and the City will be
addressed subsequently as necessary. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the City and the
BCPD are STAYED pending the resolution of Plaintiff’s claims against the officer
Defendants. As a result, Defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 16) and Defendant Baltimore City Police
Department’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) are DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, subject to refiling.
II.
Claims against the officer Defendants (Count I)
In this action for damages, Plaintiff alleges that Detective Bailey and Officers
Southard, Min and Carrasquillo’s “reckless disregard for the truth” and failure “to conduct a
reasonable investigation” resulted in his unlawful arrest and incarceration from August 6,
2008 to March 13, 2009 in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
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Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-42, ECF No.
13. Plaintiff also alleges that the officer Defendants failed to pursue exculpatory evidence
and submitted a materially false statement of probable cause. Conversely, in their motion to
dismiss the officer Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted because he “does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that [they] lacked
probable cause” for the arrest. Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Count I of Pl.’s
Am. Compl. at 8, ECF No. 20. Alternatively, the officer Defendants argue that Count I
should be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
A civil rights action under Section 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a
federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). The civil rights statute ‘is not itself a source of
substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.’ ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994), quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144, n. 3 (1979). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 2) the alleged
violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liability is appropriate under Section 1983 only to remedy violation
of federally protected rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 145-46; Clark v. Link, 855
F.2d 156, 161, 163 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that Section 1983 claims rest on violations of the
Constitution or statutes of the United States, not solely on violations of state statutes or
common law torts).
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In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that he was arrested and detained without probable
cause for seven months. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that Detective Bailey prepared a
statement of probable cause for his arrest, without prosecutorial review, based on the
witness identification of an individual named “Mookie” on the surveillance footage and on
Officer Southard’s belief and feeling that Plaintiff was said individual. Plaintiff further
alleges that the officer Defendants never re-interviewed the witness in question, Mr. Rucker,
to determine whether the individual he identified as “Mookie” was in fact Plaintiff Darren
Brown. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Bailey, Southard, Min and Carrasquillo
failed to reasonably conduct their investigation given Plaintiff’s statements that he was not
nicknamed “Mookie” and the exculpatory testimony of the actual second suspect’s mother
first offered in December of 2008.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that it was not until the
assignment of a new Assistant State’s Attorney to his case in the spring of 2009, that the
investigation into his case was reopened. This new investigation led to an interview of the
second suspect’s mother and the dismissal of the charges non prosequi against Plaintiff.
As a result, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also
Simmons v. United Mort. and Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2011); Andrew
v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint “pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663; see also A Society Without A Name v. Virginia,
655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011). In fact, not only does Plaintiff allege that his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution were violated, but he also
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identifies Detective Bailey and Officers Southard, Min and Carrasquillo as the persons acting
under the color of state law who committed said violations. Moreover, this Court is not
indifferent to the fact that Plaintiff was incarcerated for a period of seven month despite the
initial presence of surveillance footage and of a witness, Mr. Rucker, which could have led to
his prompt release.
As stated above, the officer Defendants alternatively argue that even if Plaintiff
successfully states a claim against them, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Government
officials are generally protected by qualified immunity when they perform the discretionary
duties of their offices. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The affirmative
defense of qualified immunity shields an officer from monetary damages as long as his
conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Id.
Courts have traditionally engaged in a two-step analysis when determining whether an
officer is protected by qualified immunity. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). First, a
court determines whether a constitutional right has been violated. Second, “assuming that
the violation of the right is established, courts must consider whether the right was clearly
established at the time such that it would be clear to an objectively reasonable officer that his
conduct violated that right.” Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The United States Supreme Court has modified this rigid, twotiered approach, by allowing reviewing judges to evaluate the two factors in whatever order
they wish, in view of the unique facts of a case. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)
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(“[t]he judges of the district courts and courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise
their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis
should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).
This Court is mindful of “the importance of resolving immunity questions at the
earliest possible stage in the litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). However,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted that principles of
qualified immunity do not “ ‘give special substantive favor to the defense.’ ” Henry v. Purnell,
619 F.3d 323, 333 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003)).
It is simply premature to rule upon the issue of qualified immunity in the context of a
motion to dismiss as there has been no discovery or development of a record in this case.
Indeed, the issues of whether there was a constitutional violation and “whether it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted,”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, are highly fact-dependent. Moreover, “the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6)
is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the
merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d
480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006); see also McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff has properly stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the officer Defendants. Therefore, Defendants Edward Bailey, Paul Southard, Julian Min
and Felipe Carrasquillo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20) is
DENIED, and discovery shall proceed as to those claims.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this case will be bifurcated under Rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Plaintiff’s claims against the officer Defendants will
be initially addressed. The claims against Defendants Baltimore City Police Department and
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore will be addressed as necessary in subsequent
proceedings.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Baltimore City Police
Department and Mayor and City Council of Baltimore are STAYED pending resolution of
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Edward Bailey, Paul Southard, Julian Min and Felipe
Carrasquillo.
Consequently, Defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended (ECF No. 16) and Defendant Baltimore City Police Department’s
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) are DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, subject to refiling. Defendants Edward Bailey, Paul Southard, Julian Min and
Felipe Carrasquillo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20) is
DENIED. Additionally, because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint superseded the original
Complaint, Defendants Baltimore City Police Department and Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore’s Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF Nos. 10 & 12) are
DENIED as MOOT.
Separate Orders follow.
Dated:
June 13, 2012
/s/______________________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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