Spearman v. Baltimore County, Maryland et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 9/18/12. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

TONYA SPEARMAN,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,
et al.,

:

Civil Action No. GLR-11-2020

:
Defendants.
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Baltimore
County,

Maryland

Cramer’s

(the

(collectively

“County”),
the

Timothy

Griffith,

“Defendants”)

Motion

Judgment against Plaintiff Tonya Spearman.
This

is

a

Section

Defendants
Federal

1983

unlawfully

Housing

Act

case

in

which

terminated
Housing

her

and

for

Summary

(See ECF No. 21).

Ms.

Spearman

participation

Choice

Lois

Voucher

alleges
in

Program

the
(the

“Program”).
The central question before the Court is whether a genuine
issue

of

material

fact

exists

as

to

whether

the

decision

rendered against Ms. Spearman, in a hearing to terminate her
participation in the Program, was (1) justified under Maryland’s
standard
procedural

of

administrative

due

process

review,

requirements,

and

(2)

and,

consistent

therefore,

with

neither

arbitrary nor capricious.

The issues have been fully briefed

and no hearing is necessary.

See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2011).

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND1

I.
On

May

10,

2010,

the

Baltimore

County

Housing

Office

(“Housing Office”) notified Ms. Spearman that her participation
in the Program would be terminated on June 30, 2010, for alleged
violations of her leasing contract under 24 C.F.R. § 982.552.
Specifically,

the

Housing

Office

alleged

that

Ms.

Spearman

allowed unauthorized persons to inhabit her unit and that an
authorized

family

member

was

engaging

in

illegal

drug

activities.

Ms. Spearman requested an informal hearing under 24

C.F.R. § 982.555, which the Housing Office received on May 20,
2010.

On

June

22,

2010,

accompanied by her attorney.

Ms.

Spearman

attended

the

hearing

Thereafter, on June 30, 2010, the

Housing Office decided to terminate Ms. Spearman’s participation
in the Program, effective July 22, 2010.
With the aid of her attorney, Ms. Spearman reached a lastminute settlement agreement (the “Agreement”) with the Housing
Office on July 21, 2010.
October

14,

2010,

The Agreement, which was finalized on

enabled

Ms.

Spearman

to

continue

in

the

Program, provided she met certain strict criteria set out in the
1

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
the Complaint and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
are viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Spearman.
2

Agreement.

Specifically,

the

Agreement

required

that

Ms.

Spearman perform six tasks: (1) file all documents requested of
her by the Housing Office and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”); (2) remove all non-authorized parties
from her unit and provide documentation of such to the Housing
Office; (3) “provide written verification to the Housing Office
that she has notified her local U.S. Post Office of the persons
who are authorized to received mail at her assisted unit”; (4)
provide by certified mail, proof of filing for child support for
her

granddaughter;

(5)

provide

proof

by

certified

mail

of

applying for benefits from the Department of Social Services
(“DSS”), including Temporary Cash Assistance (“TCA”); and (6)
attend recertification programs designed to help her find and
maintain a job.
On

(Emphasis added).

December

informed

Ms.

7,

2010,

Spearman

however,

the

Housing

its

intent

to

of

Office

again

terminate

her

participation in the Program, due to her failure to abide by the
conditions set out in the Agreement.
Office

sent

a

formal

letter

on

Thereafter, the Housing

December

28,

2010,

giving

official notice and informing Ms. Spearman of her right to an
informal hearing, if filed within ten days.

On January 3, 2011,

Ms. Spearman allegedly sent notice of her intent to invoke her
right

to

an

requirement

informal
that

Ms.

hearing.
Spearman

Despite
send
3

the

the

Housing

notice

via

Office’s
certified

mail, however, the notice was allegedly hand-delivered to the
postal-service.

The Housing Office maintains that it has no

record

receiving

of

ever

a

request

for

a

hearing

from

Ms.

Spearman and, therefore, assumed that Ms. Spearman waived her
right to a hearing.
On

February

15,

2011,

Ms.

Spearman

filed

a

Complaint

for Writ of Mandamus and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order

and

Maryland

Preliminary
for

Injunction

in

County.

The

Baltimore

the

Circuit

Motion

Court

for

Restraining Order was denied on the same day.

of

Temporary

On March 16,

2011, Defendants removed the case to this Court, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446.2

Ms. Spearman challenged the removal,

but the Court determined the removal was proper.

On May 11,

2011, the Court ruled that Ms. Spearman had timely requested an
informal

hearing

Injunction

to

and

granted

reinstate

the

benefits.

Motion
The

for

Court

Preliminary

dismissed

and

remanded the case for the purpose of conducting the informal
administrative proceeding.
On
hearing,

June

16,

during

2011,
which

the
Ms.

Housing
Spearman

Office
was

held

allowed

an
to

informal
present

evidence supporting her argument that she did not violate the
terms of the Agreement.

Furthermore, at the conclusion of the

2

Upon removal, the civil action was assigned the following
case number: 1:11-cv-00712-BEL.
4

hearing,

the

hearing

supplement the record.

officer

permitted

Ms.

Spearman

to

The informal hearing concluded on June

30, 2011, with a ruling by the hearing officer that termination
was

proper

due

the Agreement,
regulations.
Ms.

to
as

Ms.

Spearman’s

well

as

failure

applicable

to

comply

federal

with

Program

Specifically, the hearing officer determined that

Spearman

had

failed

to

supply

required

documentation

relating to (1) child support, (2) TCA, (3) income and expenses,
(4)

authorized

residents

for

the

unit,

and

(5)

post

office

authorization.
On

July

22,

2011,

Ms.

Spearman

challenged

the

hearing

officer’s ruling by filing the instant Complaint (ECF No. 1) and
a

Motion

for

Temporary

Injunction (ECF No. 6).

Restraining

Order

and

Preliminary

On September 12, 2011, the Court denied

Ms. Spearman’s request for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction.
finding

that

the

Central to the Court’s holding was its

hearing

officer’s

“lengthy

and

thorough

opinion” indicated support for the Housing Office’s decision to
terminate Ms. Spearman.
On October 17, 2011, Defendants filed the instant Motion
for

Summary

Judgment.

(ECF

No.

21).

Ms.

Spearman

filed

a

Response in Opposition to the Motion on October 31, 2011. (ECF
No. 22).

Defendants filed a Reply to the Response on November

14, 2011. (ECF No. 23).
5

II.
A.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the pleadings, the

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323-25 (1986).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the

Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and
supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a
genuine dispute exists.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

“[T]he mere existence

of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat

an

otherwise

properly

supported

motion

for

summary

judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.

A “material fact” is a fact that might affect the outcome
of a party’s case.

Id. at 248; JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports

Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
fact

is

considered

substantive

law,

and

to

be

“material”

“[o]nly

disputes
6

is
over

Whether a

determined
facts

by

that

the

might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248; Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th
Cir. 2001).
A “genuine” issue concerning a “material” fact arises when
the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return
a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor.
248.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at

Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the

pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
B.

Analysis
1.

There is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the hearing officer’s decision was justified
under Maryland’s standard of administrative review.

The Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the hearing officer’s decision was justified under Maryland’s
standard of administrative review.
The standard of administrative review that applies under
Maryland law provides as follows:
In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
(1) remand the case; (2) affirm the final decision; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial
right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced
because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is
7

unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority
or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii)
results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected
by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence in light
of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is
arbitrary or capricious.
Md.

Code

Ann.,

State

Gov’t.

§

10-222(h)

(West

2012).

Additionally, under the ruling in Clark v. Alexander, if the
local housing agency’s actions are not inconsistent with federal
housing

provisions,

reasonable

the

deference.

agency’s
85

F.3d

action
146,

152

should

be

granted

(4th

Cir.

1996).

Accordingly, “the action should be upheld, unless it is found to
be arbitrary or capricious.”

Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

Natural Ress. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837-45 (1984)).
a.

Factors in Maryland’s standard of administrative
review

In this case, the record is replete with evidence that the
hearing officer’s decision was justified by Maryland’s standard
of

administrative

review

because

it

(1)

was

not

unconstitutional, (2) did not exceed her authority as decision
maker, (3) did not result from an unlawful procedure, (4) was
not affected by any other error of law, (5) was supported by
competent,

material

and

substantial

evidence,

and

(6)

was

neither arbitrary nor capricious.
i.

Constitutional decision

First, the hearing officer’s decision was constitutional

8

because she followed the correct relevant governing statutes for
termination

of

a

tenant.

The

Housing

Office

is

a

local

administrator of HUD and is required to follow the regulations
promulgated by HUD. Ritter v. Cecil Cnty. Office of Hous. &
Cmty. Dev., 33 F.3d 323, 323-24 (4th Cir. 1994).

Because the

hearing officer followed these regulations, the Court finds that
her actions were constitutional.
ii.

Statutory authority

Second, the hearing officer did not exceed her statutory
authority.

Under

HUD

regulations,

the

Housing

Office

is

permitted to terminate assistance for a variety of reasons, such
as an inability to abide by the rules of the Program under 24
C.F.R. § 982.551, or a failure to follow an agreement made with
the

Housing

Office.

24

C.F.R.

§

982.552(c).

The

hearing

officer has the statutory right to make a decision based upon
the

evidence

adduced

982.555(e)(4)(i),(ii).

at

the

informal

hearing.

24

C.F.R.

§

Here, Ms. Spearman failed to abide by

the rules of the Program and terms of the Agreement.

The Court

finds that the hearing officer’s decision was, therefore, not
beyond her statutory authority.
iii. A lawful procedure unaffected by any other
error of law
Third, the decision rendered by the hearing officer was in
compliance with the procedural requirements mandated by HUD in

9

termination proceedings.
participant
request.

has

a

Under 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(v), the

right

to

an

informal

hearing

upon

The participant must be provided with notice including

a brief explanation of the reasons for the termination, the
right to an informal hearing upon request, and the deadline for
the hearing.

24 C.F.R. § 982.555(c)(2)(i-iii).

On December 28, 2010, Ms. Spearman received notice of the
pending

termination.

In

this

notice,

she

was

provided

detailed explanation of the reasons for her termination.

a

The

notice specifically mentioned her failure to file appropriate
documentation, as required by the Agreement she executed with
the

Housing

necessary

Office,

as

documentation

well
with

as
the

applicable housing regulations.

her

inability

Housing

to

Office,

file

the

pursuant

to

Ms. Spearman was also informed

of her right to request an informal hearing and was given a
deadline.
In preparation for the informal hearing, the participant
has a right to discovery, during which they may review all of
the evidence brought against them, as well as present evidence
of their own.
Ms.

Spearman

granted

the

24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(2),(5).
received
full

an

rights

informal
and

hearing

privileges

hearings under 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e).

On June 16, 2011,
in

attendant

she
to

was
such

Her attorney had the

opportunity to call and examine the witnesses.
10

which

Specifically,

counsel

examined

Ms.

Demattie,

the

Housing

Office

representative, regarding Ms. Spearman’s alleged failure to file
all documents requested by the Housing Office as outlined in the
Agreement.
1

at

(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A, Informal Hr’g, Tr. Vol.

10,

July

Additionally,

16,

counsel

2011,
had

ECF
the

No.

21-2)

opportunity

[“Hr’g
to

Tr.”]).

examine

Ms.

Spearman in depth and offer reasons for his client’s failure to
comply with the Agreement.

(See id. at 10-19).

Furthermore,

Ms. Spearman had an opportunity to supplement the record with
additional documentation.

(Id. at 15).

To comply with statutory requirements, the hearing must be
conducted

by

termination,

a

hearing

officer,

who

must

of

the

evidence

982.555(e)(4),(6).

As

required,

preponderance

make

a

a

person

decision

de

neutral
novo

standard.
the

24

hearing

and

in

the
by

a

C.F.R.

§

officer

in

the

present case had no prior involvement with Ms. Spearman’s case.
The hearing officer, therefore, was a proper third-party.

In

fact, at the beginning of the hearing, neither party objected to
her presiding over the matter.

(Hr’g Tr. at 2-3).

Finally, after making a decision, the hearing officer must
issue a written opinion, briefly stating the reasons for the
ruling.

24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6).

Here, the hearing officer

considered the issues raised and the various arguments made for
and

against

termination.

(See
11

generally

Hr’g

Tr.).

After

consideration of the evidence presented she found Ms. Spearman,
by

a

preponderance

of

the

evidence,

failed

to

satisfy

requirements of both the Agreement and HUD regulations.
result,

the

hearing

officer

ruled

that

the

Housing

the
As a

Office

properly terminated Ms. Spearman’s participation in the Program.
iv.

Decision supported by competent,
and substantial evidence

material,

Fourth, the hearing officers’ decision was well-buttressed
by

competent,

material,

and

substantial

evidence.

In

the

informal hearing, the hearing officer heard from both sides,
granting her the opportunity to gain perspective upon the issues
raised.

In the hearing officer’s written opinion, she provided

in-depth analysis of Ms. Spearman’s violation of two conditions
causing her termination: (1) the Agreement, and (2) the Program
requirements.

(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, Hr’g Report, ECF No.

21-4 [“Hr’g Report”]).

When Ms. Spearman voluntarily signed the

Agreement, she agreed that in order to stay in the Program, she
would fulfill its terms.

Upon review, the hearing officer found

five distinct violations of that Agreement.

(Id. at 7-9).

First, Ms. Spearman agreed that she would ensure that an
application

for

child

support

granddaughter. (Id. at 7).

would

be

completed

for

her

Ms. Spearman turned in a blank form,

however, claiming that it was not her responsibility to do so,
which she later admitted was not true as her daughter was still

12

a minor.

(See Hr’g Tr. at 24-25, 73-74).

Second, Ms. Spearman

agreed that she would file for and continue use of TCA.
Report at 7).
appointments
(Id.)

She started the TCA program, but then missed two
and

Third,

documentation

did

Ms.

Program

required

(Id.)

documentation

by

despite

over

Fourth,

attempt

sixteen

Ms.
to

the

the

rectify

to

the

provide

Program,

situation.

all

including

necessary
income

or

She did not properly file her

fact

years

Spearman

DSS

to

agreed

(Id. at 8).

forms”

for

not

Spearman

“survival forms.”
“survival

(Hr’g

that

and

agreed

regarding

she

had
that

the

had

been

access
she

people

to

would
living

in

the

counsel.
provide
in

her

household via means of certified mail; Ms. Spearman failed to
mail the forms.

(Id.)

Fifth, she agreed that she would notify

the post office to stop sending mail to her address for those
who

were

no

longer

residents.

Id.

Despite

the

Agreement

specifying that this process had to be done via certified mail,
Ms. Spearman failed to do so.

(Id.)

Additionally, the hearing officer found that Ms. Spearman
had failed to follow the Program rules.

One such rule required

“[t]he family . . . [to] supply any information that the PHA or
HUD

determines

program.”
above

is

necessary

in

the

24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(1).

documents,

Ms.

Spearman

Agreement.
13

administration

of

the

By failing to file the

violated

the

terms

of

the

The hearing officer found Ms. Spearman’s well-documented
and

substantiated

evidence

in

termination.

compliance

favor

of

the

failures

to

propriety

of

overwhelming

Ms.

Spearman’s

Ms. Spearman does not deny these failures occurred

or that they lacked severity.

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Summ.

J. at 1-2 [“Pl.’s Opp’n”], ECF No. 22).
therefore,

be

based

upon

competent,

The decision was,

material,

and

substantial

evidence.
v.

The decision
capricious

was

neither

arbitrary

nor

Fifth, the hearing officer’s decision was neither arbitrary
nor

capricious.

An

agency

action

will

not

be

considered

arbitrary or capricious if the agency is able to “examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
actions including a ‘rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.’”

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc.

v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983)
(citations
whether

omitted).

the

decision

Upon
was

review,
based

on

the
a

court

must

“consider

consideration

of

the

relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.”

(Id. at 43) (citations omitted).

It is not within

the purview of the reviewing court, however, to make up for
deficiencies.

(Id.)

“[A] reviewing court . . . must judge the

propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the

14

agency.”

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).

In

Ms.

Spearman’s

case,

there

was

an

articulable

satisfactory explanation for the hearing officer’s actions that
bore

a

hearing

rational

connection

and

decision

the

to

the

made.

facts

adduced

Specifically,

during

as

the

discussed

above, the hearing officer found that Ms. Spearman’s failure to
abide

by

the

Agreement

and

relevant

Program

sufficient basis to terminate her Program benefits.

rules

was

a

There is no

clear error of judgment and the Court is, therefore, required to
accord the hearing officer’s judgment a measure of deference.
Consequently, the Court finds that Ms. Spearman has failed
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the hearing officer’s decision was justified under Maryland’s
standard of administrative review.
b.

Ms. Spearman’s arguments concerning substantial
compliance and mitigation are without merit

Ms. Spearman argues that the hearing officer’s decision was
procedurally flawed because under the ruling of Forman v. Motor
Vehicle

Admin.,

the

hearing

officer

failed

to

“resolve

all

significant conflicts in the evidence” and “to make a full,
complete and detailed finding of fact and conclusion of law.”
630 A.2d 753, 764 (Md. 1993); (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3).
Upon the basis of this supposed requirement, Ms. Spearman
asserts that the hearing officer failed to address two issues of

15

fact and law, namely (1) Ms. Spearman’s substantial compliance
with the Agreement under contract law, and (2) the issue of
mitigation. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 10-11).
As
Spearman

the

Agreement

took

the

between

form

of

a

the

Housing

binding

Office

contract,

Ms.

argues that it should be governed by contract law.
12).

and

Ms.

Spearman

(Id. at 11-

She alleges that the doctrines of substantial compliance,

as well as the law’s abhorrence of forfeitures, should have been
a consideration in her favor, given her alleged compliance with
many of the requirements in the Agreement.

(Id.)

Under 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i), the hearing officer is
permitted

to

take

into

account

the

circumstances

of

the

participants and the effects that termination will have on them
and their families.

Ms. Spearman alleges that the entire focus

of her argument was on the basis of mitigation, not on the
denial of the facts presented.

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 11).

She avers

that had the hearing officer properly considered the issue of
mitigation,

given

the

obvious

distress

of

her

financial

and

family situation, it is possible that the hearing officer might
have reached a different ruling.

(Id.)

Ms. Spearman contends that the hearing officer’s failure to
“go there,” especially when Ms. Spearman sent a letter stating
the effects termination would have on her family, was a failure
on the part of the hearing officer to address “all material
16

issues.”

(Id.)

Accordingly, Ms. Spearman concludes that under

the principles of Forman, the failure of the hearing officer to
“squarely address” these issues should be fatal to the hearing
officer’s ruling.

(Id.)

The Court finds this argument without

merit for two reasons.
First,

Ms.

Spearman’s

reliance

on

Forman

is

misplaced.

While Forman does indeed state that ALJ’s are required to take
into account all material facts, that holding is only applicable
to

state

agencies.

authorities,

such

state agencies.

630

as

A.2d

the

at

Housing

763.

Here,

Office,

are

local
not

housing

considered

Sager v. Hous. Comm’n of Anne Arundel Cnty.,

No. ELH-11-2631, 2012 WL 1233016 at *32 (D.Md. Apr. 11, 2012)
(“For purposes of liability under state law, housing authorities
in Maryland are ordinarily considered local government agencies,
not state agencies.”) (citing Mitchell v. Hous. Auth. of Balt.
City, 26 A.3d 1012, 1020 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2011), cert. denied,
31 A.3d 920 (2011)).

This status is uncontested by either side.

(See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 n.4); (see also Defs.’ Reply to Opp’n to
Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 3 [“Defs.’ Reply”], ECF No. 23).
Secondly, the rationale behind the ruling in Forman was the
failure of the ALJ to state any basis for his reasoning, which
the court required.
in

Forman

noted

630 A.2d at 763.

that

the

ALJ

“failed

Specifically, the Court
to

resolve

important

factual issues and to make clear what [his] decision means.”
17

Id.
The Court in Forman held that “at a minimum, one must be
able

to

discern

from

the

record

the

facts

found,

applied, and the relationship between the two.”
Therefore,

even

under

Forman,

a

ruling

is

the

law

Id. at 764.

not

necessarily

procedurally incorrect if it did not “squarely address” every
issue

of

law

mentioned,

provided

the

logical

relationship

between the record and the law can be extrapolated.

Here, as

discussed above, the hearing officer provided ample reasoning
for

her

decision,

stating

the

facts

that

were

used

in

her

decision-making as well as the relevant law. (See generally Hr’g
Report 7-9).

This allows for a logical relationship between the

record and the law to be drawn.
Similarly,

the

hearing

officer’s

refusal

to

adopt

Ms.

Spearman’s contract law theory is not a failing on the part of
the hearing officer.

The doctrine of substantial compliance,

upon which Ms. Spearman relies, is dependent upon the hearing
officer
complied.

believing

Ms.

Spearman

had

actually

substantially

As stated in her hearing report, however, it appears

the hearing officer did not believe Ms. Spearman substantially
complied with the agreement.

(See generally Hr’g Report at 5-

7).
Specifically,

the

hearing

officer

found

Ms.

Spearman’s

failure to obtain child support particularly indicative of a
18

failure to reasonably comply. (Hr’g Report at 7) (“Her failure
to take any additional steps in six months does not show a
reasonable

effort

to

comply.”).

Similarly,

regarding

Ms.

Spearman’s obligation to obtain TCA, “this failure to attend
[interviews] does not show a reasonable effort to comply.”
at 7-8).
general

(Id.

The hearing officer also took note of Ms. Spearman’s
inability

to

follow

the

terms

of

the

Agreement

and

provide documentation: “Her failure to fill out the forms or
take other steps to provide the required information even after
she was repeatedly notified that this was not completed does not
show a reasonable attempt to comply.”

(Hr’g Report at 8).

From the Hearing Report, it is manifestly clear that the
hearing officer did consider the concept of compliance, as it is
mentioned

numerous

times

in

her

“findings

of

fact”

section.

Moreover, the hearing officer clearly articulated the applicable
statutory regulations she relied upon in making her decision.
(See Hr’g Report at 9).

There is sufficient information in the

record to find the facts, the law applied, and the relationship
between the two, as is minimally required by Forman.
at

764.

Accordingly,

the

Court

finds

that

Ms.

630 A.2d
Spearman’s

argument concerning substantial compliance is without merit.
As to the mitigation issue, a perfunctory review of the
Hearing

Report

mitigation,

but

reveals
found

that
Ms.

the

hearing

Spearman’s
19

officer

arguments

addressed

unpersuasive.

(Hr’g

Report

at

8-9)

(“[Ms.

Spearman]

has

not

asserted

any

significant disabling condition or mitigating circumstances that
prevented her from complying throughout the last eight months.”)
(Emphasis added).

To be sure, the hearing officer was aware of

the mitigation arguments that had been presented.

(Id. at 6-7).

In the course of the informal hearing, Ms. Spearman offered
extensive

testimony

and

arguments

termination would have on her family.

of

the

effects

that

(Hr’g Tr. at 10-18).

While Ms. Spearman might disagree with the hearing officer’s
decision, it is inaccurate to state that the hearing officer did
not

address

circumstances

mitigation.
is

not

a

Indeed,

consideration

requirement,

hearing officer’s discretion.

but

of

solely

mitigating
within

the

24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i).

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the hearing officer’s decision
was procedurally flawed.
2.

There is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the hearing officer’s decision was consistent
with the requirements of procedural due process.

The Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the

hearing

officer’s

decision

was

consistent

with

the

requirements of procedural due process.
Under the standard of due process elucidated by Goldberg v.
Kelly, the hearing must contain five elements: (1) timely notice
20

from the housing authority stating the basis for the proposed
termination; (2) an opportunity for the tenant to cross-examine
each witness relied upon by the authority; (3) the right of the
tenant

to

be

represented

by

counsel;

(4)

a

decision,

based

solely on evidence adduced at the hearing, in which the reasons
for the decision are set forth; and (5) an impartial decisionmaker. 397 U.S. 254, 264-71 (1970); see also Caulder v. Durham
Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970).
As discussed above, all of these requirements were met in
Ms.

Spearman’s

case.

Ms.

Spearman

received

notice

of

her

termination on December 10, 2011, along with a brief summary of
the reasons for her termination.

Additionally, as mentioned

above, Ms. Spearman was represented by counsel throughout the
hearing and had the opportunity to examine each witness, such as
Ms. DiMatte.

(Hr’g Tr. at 10).

Moreover, Ms. Spearman received

a decision based solely on the evidence at the hearing with the
stated reasons set forth.
hearing

officer

was

relevant guidelines.

an

Finally, there is no dispute the
impartial

decision-maker

under

See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(4)(i).

the
The

hearing officer worked for DSS and not for the Housing Office,
rendering

her

a

fair

and

impartial

decision-maker

under

HUD

guidelines.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the hearing officer’s decision
21

was consistent with procedural due process requirements.
a.

Ms.

Allegations
review the
merit.

Spearman

that the hearing officer did not
matter de novo, as required, lack

contends

that

the

hearing

officer

used

improper considerations and did not review the matter de novo as
required.

She alleges that this is supported by the hearing

officer’s use of the word “uphold” which indicates the hearing
officer

was

findings.
also

impermissibly

deferring

(Pls. Opp’n at 13).

demonstrated

by

the

to

the

Office’s

Ms. Spearman claims that this is

criterion

upon

which

officer chose to rely in her written decision.
15-16).

Housing

the

hearing

(Pls. Opp’n at

Allegedly, the fact that the hearing officer focused on

the certified mail requirement evidenced the hearing officer’s
failure to be “a true decision-maker.”

(Id. at 17).

Instead,

Ms. Spearman contends the hearing officer simply wished to “call
it a day” and decided to merely affirm the lower decision rather
than actually make a de novo finding.

(Id.)

Ms. Spearman offers little in the way of proof of these
allegations.

The mere fact that the hearing officer chose to

use this language is not dispositive of anything.

As discussed

above, the hearing officer articulated, in painstaking detail,
the litany of reasons for Ms. Spearman’s termination from the
Program.

Ms. Spearman, therefore, has failed to demonstrate

that any genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the
22

hearing officer adopted a de novo standard of review.
IV. CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Court

GRANTS

Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21).
Entered this 18th day of September, 2012

/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

23