D.J.s Diamond Imports, LLC et al v. Brown et al
Filing
72
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 44 MOTION to Dismiss Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to Dismiss Plaintiff D.J. Diamond Imports, LLC. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 6/11/2013. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
D.J.’s DIAMOND IMPORTS, LLC
et al.
v.
SILVERMAN CONSULTANTS, LLC
et al.
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Civil Action No. WMN-11-2027
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss or for judgment on
the pleadings which seeks as relief the dismissal of Plaintiff
D.J.’s Diamond Imports, LLC (D.J.’s Diamonds) as a plaintiff.
ECF No. 44.
The motion is fully briefed.1
Upon a review of the
papers and the applicable case law, the Court determines that no
hearing is necessary, Local Rule 105.6, and the motion will be
denied.
The factual background of this dispute was set forth in
this Court’s previous memorandum opinion, ECF No. 27, granting
in part and denying in part Defendants’ first motion to dismiss.
That background will not be repeated here.
Briefly stated,
however, this case relates to a December 11, 2006, contract
between Plaintiff Yaacov Dassa and Defendant Jack Brown.
In
their Amended Complaint, Dassa and Plaintiff D.J.’s Diamond
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This motion has been pending for some time. The Court
deferred ruling on the motion in light of a settlement
conference scheduled for June 6, 2013. The parties were
unsuccessful in reaching a settlement in the conference.
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Imports, LLC, a Maryland Limited Liability Company owned by
Plaintiff Dassa, asserted 22 separate claims against Brown and
several other Defendants.
In its previous opinion, the Court
dismissed all but three counts in the Amended Complaint.
Those
surviving counts bring claims for tortious interference with
contract and are related to the December 11, 2006, contract.
After the Court ruled on the previous motion to dismiss,
Defendants answered the Amended Complaint, the Court issued a
scheduling order, and discovery commenced.
Discovery was
stayed, however, for several months pending settlement
negotiations but that stay was lifted on November 6, 2012.
Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed the instant motion in which
they argue that D.J.’s Diamonds must be dismissed as a plaintiff
on the grounds that D.J.’s Diamonds was not a party to the
underlying contract.
Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs
impermissibly took advantage of D.J.’s Diamonds’ status as an
additional but improper Plaintiff to permit them to serve
additional discovery requests.
In opposing the motion, Plaintiffs argue that the
motivation for this motion has more to do with Defendants’
desire to avoid the ramifications of their failure to properly
respond to the discovery requests issued by D.J.’s Diamonds than
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with the merits of the motion itself.2
As to the merits of
Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs counter that, because the
December 11, 2006, contract was terminable at will, a claim of
tortious interference with that contract is analyzed as a claim
for tortious interference with economic relations.
ECF No. 48-1
(citing Macklin v. Robert Logan Assocs., 639 A.2d 112, 118 (Md.
1994)).
As such, they argue that a plaintiff need not be an
actual party to a contract to bring a tortious interference
claim.
Id. (citing Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., Inc., 599 F.3d
856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010)).
Defendants essentially ignore this
argument in their reply memorandum.
The Court concludes that Defendants’ motion must be denied.
In bringing its previous motion to dismiss, Defendants
acknowledged that the contract at issue was terminable at will.
See ECF No. 15-1 at 7.
Defendants are correct that, under
Maryland law, where a contract is terminable at will, a claim
for interference with that contract is treated as a claim of
intentional interference with economic relations.
Macklin, 639
A.2d at 118; Carter v. Aramark Sports & Entertainment Servs.,
Inc., 835 A.2d 262, 280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
To prove a
claim for intentional interference with economic relations, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) intentional and willful acts; (2)
2
This discovery dispute has been resolved by Magistrate Judge
Timothy Sullivan. ECF Nos. 60 and 61.
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calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff in its lawful
business; (3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part
of the defendants (which constitutes malice); and (4) actual
damage and loss resulting.
Carter, 835 A.2d at 279-80.
In its
previous memorandum, this Court held that the allegations in the
complaint were sufficient to support an intentional interference
claim, albeit by a slim thread.
ECF No. 27 at 16-17.
Accordingly, it is the 11th day of June, 2013, by the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
ORDERED:
1) That Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings to Dismiss Plaintiff D.J.’s Diamond Imports,
LLC, ECF No. 44, is DENIED; and
2) That the Clerk of the Court shall transmit a copy of
this Memorandum and Order to all counsel of record.
___________/s/_______________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge
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