Blake v. Astrue
Filing
16
LETTER OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 4/25/2013. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
(410) 962-7780
Fax (410) 962-1812
April 25, 2013
LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:
Eric Dru Blake v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-11-2318
Dear Counsel:
On August 19, 2011, the Plaintiff, Eric Dru Blake, petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 13, 15). I find that no hearing is necessary. Local
Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported
by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute on
other grounds). Under that standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny Plaintiff’s
motion. This letter explains my rationale.
Mr. Blake filed his claims for benefits on September 25, 2007. (Tr. 130-40). His claims
were denied initially on January 16, 2008, and on reconsideration on June 12, 2008. (Tr. 78-82,
87-90). A hearing was held on October 14, 2009 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
(Tr. 30-54). Following the hearing, on February 26, 2010, the ALJ determined that Mr. Blake
was not disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 10-29). The Appeals Council denied Mr.
Blake’s request for review (Tr. 1-4), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable
decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Blake suffered from the severe impairments of bipolar disorder,
depression, anxiety, right arm injury, and obesity. (Tr. 15). Despite these impairments, the ALJ
determined that Mr. Blake retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
[P]erform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the
ability to stand/walk six hours and sit six hours, lift and carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently using both arms, but is dependent on the
dominant left upper extremity for reaching, pushing and pulling, can occasionally
stoop, climb stairs, and crouch, with no other postural limitations, and
occasionally reach with the non-dominant right upper extremity. In addition, the
claimant is able to understand, remember, and execute simple instructions, and is
Eric Dru Blake v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-11-2318
April 25, 2013
Page 2
able to concentrate and pay attention at that level of complexity given customary
breaks, can be distracted easily by coworkers and the general public, has difficulty
accepting criticism from supervisors, but, with effort, can do it, so that contact
with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public is limited to occasional.
(Tr. 20). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Mr. Blake could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, and that
he was therefore not disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 24-25).
Mr. Blake presents two primary arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ erroneously
assessed his RFC; and (2) that the ALJ used a flawed hypothetical to elicit testimony from the
VE. Both arguments lack merit.
Mr. Blake’s challenge to his RFC has three subparts. First, he submits that the ALJ failed
to consider the opinion of the state agency physician, Dr. Lessans. Mr Blake is correct that Dr.
Lessans checked eight “moderate limitations” in Section I of his opinion, and that the ALJ did
not include all eight limitations in her hypothetical. (Tr. 255-57). However, the relevant portion
of Dr. Lessans’s opinion is not Section I, which sets forth a series of “check the box” rankings,
but Section III, which provides a detailed narrative functional capacity assessment. See Program
Operations Manual System DI 24510.060B (Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment).
Because Section I does not include the requisite level of detail to inform the ALJ’s opinion, an
ALJ need not address each of the Section I limitations, and need not include each of those
limitations in the hypothetical to the VE. See, e.g., Andrews v. Astrue, Civil No. SKG-09-3061,
slip op. at *39 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2011) (noting that “even if the ALJ had not explicitly addressed
each of the mental function limitations appearing on Section I of the mental RFCA, he was not
required to do so.”).
Second, Mr. Blake contends that the ALJ failed to include a visual limitation in the RFC.
Pl. Mot. 7. However, as the ALJ noted, consultative examiner Dr. Jensen deemed Mr. Blake’s
evaluation to have been “objectively normal,” despite the 20/50 visual acuity reading. (Tr. 1718). Other reviewing physicians concurred that there were no visual limitations. (Tr. 238, 279,
283). Mr. Blake has therefore not met his burden to establish that he had a visual impairment
that affected his ability to perform work functions. See Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th
Cir. 1995) (noting that the claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four steps of the
sequential evaluation).
Third, Mr. Blake contends that the ALJ failed to evaluate appropriately the opinions of
Dr. Alan Peck. Pl. Mot. 7-8. The ALJ’s opinion contained an extensive summary of Dr. Peck’s
consultative examination report. (Tr. 16, 18-19, 22, 23). Dr. Peck’s thorough report contained
both information that could be used to support an argument that Mr. Blake was disabled, and
information that could be used to support the contrary position taken by the ALJ. (Tr. 241-46).
The ALJ’s comprehensive summary of information from Dr. Peck’s report constitutes substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination, particularly in light of the concurring evaluation
Eric Dru Blake v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-11-2318
April 25, 2013
Page 3
from the state agency medical consultant, Mr. Blake’s activities of daily living, and the cognitive
evaluation by Dr. Barrish. (Tr. 18-20, 23). Remand is therefore unwarranted.
Mr. Blake’s final argument is that the ALJ presented a deficient hypothetical question to
the VE. The ALJ is afforded “great latitude in posing hypothetical questions,” Koonce v. Apfel,
No. 98–1144, 1999 WL 7864, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 1999), and need only pose those that are
based on substantial evidence and accurately reflect a claimant's limitations. See Copeland v.
Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 540–41 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE,
which accurately incorporated the RFC assessment he made, was permissible without including
any additional limitations that the ALJ did not deem valid. Mr. Blake’s specific alleged
deficiencies are derived from Part I of Dr. Lessan’s examination, his visual acuity, and Dr.
Peck’s report. Those issues were addressed above, and the ALJ’s determination on each issue
was found to be supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the ALJ’s hypothetical question
was sufficient.
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13)
will be DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) will be
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge
An
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