Skinner v. Astrue

Filing 25

LETTER OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 5/2/2013. (aos, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

May 2, 2013
LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:

Margaret Christine Skinner v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-11-3138

Dear Counsel:
On November 3, 2011, the Plaintiff, Margaret Christine Skinner, petitioned this Court to
review the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claim for Supplemental
Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment, and Ms. Skinner’s reply. (ECF Nos. 18, 23, 24). I find that no hearing is necessary.
Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is
supported by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (superseded by
statute on other grounds). Under that standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny
Plaintiff’s motion. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Skinner filed her claim for benefits on February 11, 2009. (Tr. 126-32). Her claim
was denied initially on March 19, 2009, and on reconsideration on August 11, 2009. (Tr. 54-57,
61-62). A hearing was held on May 19, 2010 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr.
28-49). Following the hearing, on August 27, 2010, the ALJ determined that Ms. Skinner was
not disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 14-27). The Appeals Council denied Ms.
Skinner’s request for review (Tr. 1-5), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable
decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Skinner suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative
disc disease, asthma, and a history of substance abuse. (Tr. 19). Despite these impairments, the
ALJ determined that Ms. Skinner retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
[P]erform simple, routine in nature, light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b)
except with only occasional to frequent use of the upper extremities and a
sit/stand option.
(Tr. 20). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Skinner could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, and
that she was therefore not disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 26-27).

Margaret Christine Skinner v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-11-3138
May 2, 2013
Page 2

Ms. Skinner presents three primary arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ failed to
analyze Listing 1.04 (spine disorders); (2) that the ALJ failed to support his RFC with substantial
evidence; and (3) that the ALJ erred in making an adverse credibility finding. Each argument
lacks merit.
Ms. Skinner’s first argument is that the ALJ erred at step three by failing to consider
appropriately Listing 1.04 (spine disorders). Pl. Mot. 16-21. Ms. Skinner contends that the ALJ's
step three analysis was deficient because the ALJ did not specifically identify or explain his
analysis of any Listing. Ms. Skinner further contends that the medical evidence warranted
consideration of Listing 1.04. Despite the general nature of the ALJ’s language describing his
evaluation of the Listings, I find that the ALJ provided substantial evidence to support his step
three finding as to Listing 1.04. The ALJ first noted that Ms. Skinner’s representative did not
contend that any Listing had been met or equaled. (Tr. 20). Second, the ALJ noted that no
treating or examining physician had mentioned any findings equivalent in severity to any Listing.
Id. Finally, the ALJ noted that a review of the medical evidence of record did not suggest that
such a finding would be appropriate. Id. Moreover, the ALJ thoroughly examined the objective
medical evidence pertaining to Ms. Skinner’s degenerative disc disease in his RFC assessment.
(Tr. 22). I cannot find that the ALJ erred, particularly given the fact that two separate reviewing
state agency physicians opined that Ms. Skinner’s impairments did not meet the requirements of
Listing 1.04, after reviewing the same medical evidence cited by Ms. Skinner. (Tr. 277-84, 29097).
Ms. Skinner next contends that the ALJ failed to provide substantial evidence to support
his conclusion that she could perform light work. In making that contention, Ms. Skinner
essentially relies upon her own testimony and the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Hsu. As
addressed below, the ALJ made an adverse credibility finding that was supported by substantial
evidence. As a result, the ALJ justifiably discounted Ms. Skinner’s own statements. Dr. Hsu’s
opinions were also assigned little weight. Although the opinions of treating physicians can be
entitled to controlling weight, such opinions are not entitled to controlling weight if they are
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),
416.927(c)(2). In this case, the ALJ specifically addressed, at some length, Dr. Hsu's treatment
notes and opinions. (Tr. 19, 23-25). He found that Dr. Hsu's earlier opinions, from 2006-2008,
were unsupported by other evidence of record because no such evidence pertaining to that time
period was included. (Tr. 25). With respect to Dr. Hsu’s opinions in 2009, the ALJ found that
they were “conclusory, overly sympathetic and primarily based on the claimant’s subjective
complaints and out of proportion to the reported medical findings.” Id. For example, the ALJ
noted that Dr. Hsu’s own notes indicated that Ms. Skinner walked with a normal gait and had not
increased her prescription pain medications. (Tr. 22). Moreover, the ALJ noted that a
consultative examiner had found no spinal cord compression, had ordered an MRI which
appeared within normal limits, and had recommended conservative treatment. Id. The ALJ
therefore had substantial evidence on which to base his assignment of little weight to Dr. Hsu's
opinions regarding Ms. Skinner's physical limitations.

Margaret Christine Skinner v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-11-3138
May 2, 2013
Page 3

Ms. Skinner also objects to the assignment of “great weight” to the opinions expressed by
non-examining state agency physicians. The law recognizes that state agency medical sources
are “highly qualified physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists who are experts in
Social Security disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i), 416.927(e)(2)(i). The ALJ
therefore appropriately relied on their opinions, in combination with other evidence, in reaching
his conclusions regarding Ms. Skinner's impairments. Ms. Skinner suggests that their opinions
were flawed, in part, because they were rendered prior to two MRIs conducted in 2010. As the
ALJ found, however, the 2010 MRIs were taken after a fall, and no subsequent treatment records
suggested any additional treatment or therapy indicating ongoing impairment. (Tr. 22). The
2010 MRIs do not therefore discredit the opinions of the state agency physicians.
Finally, Ms. Skinner protests the ALJ's adverse credibility finding. The Fourth Circuit has
developed a two-part test for evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints, such as the limiting
effects of an impairment. Chater, 76 F.3d at 594. First, there must be objective medical evidence
of a medical impairment reasonably likely to cause the symptoms alleged by the claimant. Id.
After the claimant meets this threshold obligation, the ALJ must evaluate “the intensity and
persistence of the claimant's [symptoms], and the extent to which it affects [his] ability to work.”
Id. at 595. The ALJ followed that process in this case. The ALJ's opinion cites “the medical
record as a whole, the lack of current treatment or therapy, and the claimant’s lack of
prescription pain medication increase despite the claimant’s reports of constant pain” as evidence
undermining Ms. Skinner’s reports of disabling symptoms. (Tr. 23). In addition, the ALJ noted
Ms. Skinner’s “relatively infrequent trips to the doctor for the allegedly disabling symptoms.”
Id. The ALJ’s citation to substantial evidence renders remand unwarranted.
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18)
will be DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) will be
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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