Martin v. State of Maryland et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Catherine C. Blake on 2/9/12. (c/m chambers)(jnls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GUY F. MARTIN JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND, et al.

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Civil Action No. CCB-11-3443

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Guy F. Martin brings an action against the State of Maryland and Governor
Martin O'Malley to seek an injunction ordering the State of Maryland to redistrict and create one
federal representative for every 30,000 citizens, thereby increasing the number of Maryland
representatives to the United States House of Representatives from the current 8 to 192. The
claim, filed pro se, is substantially similar to a separate claim Mr. Martin brought against the
same defendants only seven months earlier. That suit was dismissed with prejudice after the
court found the issue to be a nonjusticiable political question. See Martin v. Maryland, 2011 WL
5151755 (D. Md. October 27, 2011). Instead of appealing the decision, Mr. Martin filed this
lawsuit. The defendants have again filed a motion to dismiss and Mr. Martin has filed a brief in
opposition. No oral argument is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). The
defendants’ motion will be granted.
Both Mr. Martin’s first and second lawsuits are attempts to vindicate his interpretation of
Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 2 reads: “The Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least
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one Representative.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The United States Congress has fixed the
composition of the House of Representatives at 435 members, apportioned based on the
decennial census of the population. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2a, 2b. Thus, each representative now
represents in excess of 700,000 individuals.1 Mr. Martin contends the language of Article I,
Section 2 should be interpreted to limit the maximum number of individuals each representative
may represent to 30,000. In dismissing his first claim, the district court noted that the Fourth
Circuit has held that the federal courts have no power to overturn Congress’s determination of
the proper number of members of the House of Representatives. See Saunders v. Wilkins, 153
F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1946).
The defendants argue Mr. Martin’s new lawsuit should be dismissed under the doctrine of
res judicata. In the alternative, they suggest the court should again apply the political question
doctrine or should dismiss the suit because Mr. Martin’s reading of the United States
Constitution is simply wrong on the merits. Whether res judicata applies to the relitigation of a
nonjusticiable political question is not clear.2 The court, however, need not rest on res judicata
to dispose of this case. Mr. Martin’s new lawsuit presents no new facts or law that would
suggest a different outcome than that reached in the order disposing of Mr. Martin’s first lawsuit.
The court agrees with the reasoning and conclusion of the prior decision and therefore will
dismiss Mr. Martin’s new claim as a nonjusticiable political question for the same reasons cited
therein.

1

 For a discussion of the State of Maryland’s approach to applying the 2010 census figures, see Fletcher v. Lamone, 
‐‐‐ F. Supp. 2d ‐‐‐, 2011 WL 6740169 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2011). 
2
 Where a court dismisses an action for lack of jurisdiction, res judicata may not be appropriate.  See Schiff v. 
Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1982).  Under some circumstances, however, decisions based on lack on 
jurisdiction or nonjusticiability can properly preclude relitigation.  See 18A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4436 (2d ed. 2002) (“Dismissals for want of justiciability . . . should preclude 
relitigation of the very issue of justiciability actually determined, but does not preclude a second action on the 
same claim if the justiciability problem can be overcome.”). 

2

A finding of nonjusticiability under the political question doctrine deprives the court of
subject matter jurisdiction. Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 412 (4th
Cir. 2011). Thus, this court will treat defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and the motion will be
granted.
A separate order follows.

February 9, 2012
Date

/s/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

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